fbpx

ABSTRACT

The subject of security has been at the heart of the study of international relations especially for the past half century. It has been to some extent pivotal to the way the scholars of international relations have thought about the core purpose of discipline and the location of its boundaries. For many students of international relations, it is the security aspect that makes the study worthwhile. As Karl Deutsch stated, the study of international analysis is “the art and science of the survival of mankind.”

The concept of security has been traditionally concerned more with states than people. Despite the prevalence of the state-based approaches to security during the Cold War, alternative ways of thinking about security also developed. However, during the Cold War, the military dimension dominated all the other dimensions of security. However, in the post-Cold War era the primacy of the state as referent object in consideration of security has become under increasing challenges from a variety of perspectives. One of the key themes to emerge from the post-Cold War debate on the nature of security has been the need to go beyond traditional understandings of security.

In today’s world, the effort to redefine security stems not just from a changing world but also from changes in the state itself. These changes, having primarily to do with the global economic system, affect material conditions within states – safety, welfare, sovereignty – in ways that serve to undermine the traditional roles of government. These transformative forces also affect the capabilities of states, by creating contradictions between the accustomed practices of governments and the responses needed to buffer against those forces.

From the European security environment perspective, the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo have provided striking confirmation of European weaknesses and dependency on US. Without entering into its details, the conflict clearly demonstrated that Europe’s influence and responsibility will continue to be limited in the absence of substantial effort to improve its military capabilities. In that respect, the European Security Defense Identity was an initiative designed to give the EU an independent voice with respect to security issues, including independent means in responding to these issues. By its very nature it is intended to shift the European/Americas balance within the NATO alliance, instilling greater influence on the European side.

 

I.       INTRODUCTION: NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

The 1990s witnessed intense institutional maneuvering by Western governments eager to influence the contours of the so-called European security architecture. In the immediate wake of the revolutionary changes of 1989, Western Europe and the United States worked feverishly to ensure the continuation of existing multilateral security institutions. As Robert J. Art has explained, Western governments feared that a weakening of these institutions would lead to an upsurge in nationalism and ultimately the re-nationalization of defense and security. In short, Western European governments continued to regard security as indivisible and consequently felt compelled to cooperate in order to achieve national security.[1]

Determined efforts were thus made to consolidate international cooperation in the European Union and NATO. Notwithstanding the important achievements in terms of developing a common European security framework, the United States and her Atlanticist allies in Europe have managed to retain NATO as the central military security organization in Europe. This process of institutional positioning was accompanied by attempts to formulate new strategic doctrines and defense policies for the Western allies. However, the rapidly changing security environment that characterized the 1990s was hardly conducive to the formulation of long-term security policies and strategies. There was broad agreement that the existing force structures, geared as they were to a massive conventional war with the Warsaw Pact, were rapidly becoming obsolete.[2]

It was more difficult to agree on a suitable replacement, and after a decade of efforts to reform, only a handful of countries seem to have achieved anything resembling a comprehensive defense reform. In the absence of a political consensus on the goals and objectives of security cooperation, it is difficult to launch an effective and targeted defense reform. There is strong agreement on the desirability of sustaining the existing cooperative frameworks, but a large part of the motivation would seem to be negative rather than positive.

The Western community is facing a new range of threats and risks, which necessitates the development of new approaches to international security and the formulation of new security strategies. However, it is difficult to agree on the exact nature of these threats and how best to counter them. Notwithstanding the indivisibility of security, the distance between Washington D.C. and Brussels seems to have grown considerably within the past decades, and it is increasingly acknowledged that the Europeans need to develop their own platform for security and defense policy. It is this recognition which has led to the development of a security strategy to help guide the future workings of the CSDP.[3]

Ironically, the passing of the Cold War has in fact made the use of military force much more probable. The rigidity of the former bipolar system has been replaced by a much more fluid and indeterminate international distribution of power. Limited wars and armed conflicts that were near-unthinkable during the Cold War have materialized, prompting a re-evaluation of security thinking, policy and strategy. An efficient military capacity is becoming increasingly important for overall foreign policy and diplomacy. In the words of NATO Ex-Secretary-General Lord Robertson:

“The days of planning for massive armored clashes in the Fulda Gap are behind us.   Today, we need forces that can move fast, adjust quickly to changing requirements, hit hard, and then stay in the theater for as long as it takes to get the job done: this means that today military forces must be mobile, flexible, effective at engagement, and sustainable in theater.”[4]

At a time when the need for the projection of international military force seems to become ever more apparent, most European states have sought to cash in on the so-called “peace dividend”. A common short-term solution to this dilemma has been the development of dual defense structures: traditional armed forces trained and equipped for territorial defense within the NATO framework have been supplemented with international rapid reaction forces that can operate under different lines of national and international authority. Some of the savings realized through massive force reductions in terms of territorial defense have thus been redirected towards more modern, internationally deployable forces. The European trend is thus towards   reduced territorial mass armies co-existing with smaller international units.

Developing common European responses to current security and defense challenges is a tremendous political undertaking. The issues involved are politically contentious, and it will be difficult to reach a consensus on the form and substance of a common security and defense policy. As Marc Otte stresses, “two kinds of gaps have to be filled: the first is a transatlantic one (i.e. the widening capability gap); the other is a gap among Europeans themselves (i.e. the strategic policy gap)”.[5] Developing a common political vision of the EU as security actor and mobilizing the resources required to implement this vision are the most formidable political challenges facing the European Union today.

II. THEORETICAL OUTLOOK

An interested observer examining the EU’s CFSP comes across with the interesting puzzles. Perhaps, as Michael Smith points out, the most important questions are the most general ones: Why should a regional economic organization struggle for so long to develop its own foreign policy? Another set of puzzles related with the impact made by EU foreign policy on non-members, and the effects of external forces on the EU as an international actor. If we look at the origin of the CFSP, European Political Cooperation (EPC) was not created to help Europe solve international problems; it was created to prevent and manage international problems from disrupting the Community and, to a certain degree, to make sure a common European voice was heard in international affairs. EPC has changed from a defensive or passive approach to cooperation, from negative to positive integration in the course of time.[6]

This cooperation is theoretically and empirically interesting for some reasons. First, EU foreign policy is largely aspirational and secondly, this cooperation was achieved with an innovative and flexible set of institutional procedures, one that is still expanding. Lastly, how and why the states with vastly various capabilities, through EU, follow such symbolic or aspirational goals by pooling their sovereignty with new institutional mechanism.[7]

Indeed, it is fair to say that the mutual links between the inclination of states to cooperate to achieve joint goals, gains and institutional development is dynamic and circular. That is to say; cooperation can inspire and encourage actor to build institutions and in return, institutions themselves help foster cooperative outcomes. Thus, causality runs in both direction, and institutionalization and cooperation affect each other in in a bi-directional manner.[8]

On the other hand, mono-causal theories, such as realism, neorealism, to EU foreign policy are extremely problematic. For example, realism emphasizes the centrality of structural anarchy and power politics in the international system. Security is to be gained through power politics and states can most effectively find security through alliances and the effective operation of the balance of power. But cooperation in the EC/EU has taken place during bipolarity (Cold War) and unipolarity. In other words, there has been no systematic relationship between policies of the superpowers and the response of the EU. A single international framework can hardly explain the wide variety of outcomes in world politics. Realist theories perceiving external threats as a motivating factor for cooperation are not very useful for understanding EU foreign policy.[9]

In particular liberal institutionalists stressed the potential for international cooperation, especially through multilateralism, interdependence and institutional integration which confront the abovementioned limitations of realist theory. Interdependence theories suggest that states are more likely to cooperate the cost and benefit of the arisen issues, as security concerns lessen among a set of states, and as issues become increasingly entangled with each other.

According to Smith, European foreign policy cooperation and integration in general can be explained by two causal logics. First the regional integration logic, which involves situations where outside actors make demands on the EU as a result of its efforts to create common polices, primarily in terms of completing the single European market. The second, interdependence logic, imply that international pressures can stimulate a collective response by the EU. The latter became especially relevant after 1972, when political and economic upheavals involving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil crises challenged the EC to find a common external policy.[10]

One of the leading figures in early integration studies, Ernst Haas, defined integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.”[11]  The early integration theories were quite optimistic in assuming that the process of integration would be linear and self-reinforcing due to spill-over effect. The latter concept was defined by Charles Lindberg as “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.”[12] Integration in one field naturally leads to integration in others, and as the capacity and authority of the new center grows, still more citizens will shift their “loyalties, expectations, and political activities” towards the new center. The creation of a customs union between the members of the European Community thus necessitated the development of a common commercial policy. Likewise, the creation of an internal market necessitated the development of a common agricultural policy to replace the divergent and discriminatory national policies.

The optimism of the early integration theories made them an easy target for criticism when the integration process ground to a halt because of political differences between the member states. Integration theory fell in disrepute, and more traditional, state-centric intergovernmentalism invaded the field of study. One of the early traditionalist critics, Stanley Hoffmann, suggested that a division of labor might be called for, leaving supranationalists to toy around with the low politics of economic integration, while the field of high politics would remain the exclusive domain of intergovernmentalists.[13] National governments might be enticed to pool their sovereignty in policy fields that do not threaten the very core of their national authority, but they would certainly reject the idea of granting other states a say in questions of their own “national security”. In matters of life and death, risk-averse governments prefer to keep a tight rein.[14]

Notwithstanding the richness of the theoretical debates in this field, it is fair to say that most explanatory frameworks emphasize the interests and actions of the member states. No one will deny that the political interests and policies of the member states are a necessary, if not sufficient, explanatory variable in explaining European efforts in the field of security and defense policy. In order to understand the potentials and limits of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), therefore, it is necessary to understand the political forces at work in the current European landscape.

EU security and defense is more a matter of traditional intergovernmental negotiations than formal negotiations and treaty provisions. The United States still has a key role in the development of the CSDP. The Saint-Malo initiative of December 1998, which led to the development of the ESDP, was based on the experience of European military impotence when faced with the war in the Balkans, not misgivings about the Amsterdam Treaty, which had not even been put into effect. Secondly, the initiative was driven forward by the great powers with the joint Franco-British Saint Malo declaration and the subsequent involvement of Germany[15], which took over the EU Presidency in January 1999. Finally, the project was only allowed to move forward with the decision at the NATO Summit in April 1999 and thereby the United States agreeing to give EU access to NATO capabilities and planning assets.[16]

All this suggests that the development of the CFSP and ESDP remains a fundamentally intergovernmental process, with the member states as the main actors. The main driving force behind such changes is still provided by external factors in the international system and the response of member states to those factors, rather than some internal logic of integration from which a need is created for common policies and institutions in the area of foreign, security and defense policy.

Nevertheless, the debate on the EU as a security actor suggests exceptions to the general rule of intergovernmentalism. On some issues, EU actors were instrumental in proposing new areas of cooperation in security and defense. This is not to suggest that supranational institutions in the areas of security and defense are developing, but rather that the increasing degree of interdependence is leading member states to take steps towards common policy-making.

The result of the push and pull between, nation states striving to maintain their sovereignty and notion of interdependence leading the same nation states to seek common solutions, resulted in a Union that is developing into a joined-up security actor distinct from NATO. But NATO is a cornerstone of European security, and the Union’s role in European security will to a large degree depend on its relationship with NATO.

The CSDP is thus the last place one would imagine supranational theories having any explanatory relevance, this being the archetypical example of so-called high politics. It is nevertheless worth considering the relevance of the integration theories in making sense of current political developments in Europe.

A convergence of national interests is obviously a necessary condition for the CSDP to develop, but it is hardly a sufficient explanation, in that it does not shed any light on why interests are converging. Member states obviously find it advantageous to cooperate in this field, but in order to understand, why we may have to move beyond the limits of traditional intergovermentalist theory. Thus, a traditional intergovernmental perspective is hardly adequate in explaining the processes that are currently taking place.

European Union is developing a distinct approach to international security and defense policy not in isolation, but in reaction to wider political developments. The EU is formed not only according to the logic of its own internal development, but also in reaction to global lines of political conflict. This process is neither linear nor smooth, but it has the potential to gradually reinforce itself. Whether by design or as the result of wider political developments, the EU is developing a stronger presence and identity in international relations.

III.     EU SECURITY MANAGEMENT

After the Cold War, it has been discerned that Europe would have to play a larger role in security matters than it had generally been accustomed to. Conflicts in the Balkans confirmed that prediction. At the same time, it made also clear that Europe lacked the capabilities needed to address post-Cold War security challenges thoroughly.

At first, Europeans responded to the challenge by creating the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) within NATO. CJTF, a multinational, multi-service arrangement, allowed for more flexible deployment of NATO assets through ad hoc arrangements.[17]

Despite this effort to improve flexibility, however, the subsequent Kosovo intervention made it clear that the European allies were not investing adequately in the capabilities needed to perform the humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions that framed NATO planning at the time. Almost a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, European countries still lacked many of the capabilities necessary to conduct effective military operations outside NATO’s borders. To repeat just one oft cited statistic, during the Kosovo war on European soil, the US flew 70-80 percent of all strike sorties and dropped 80 percent of precision munitions.[18]

In 1999, a new initiative addressing the shortfalls that became apparent during the Kosovo intervention was launched at NATO Summit in Washington. The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified 58 key capability shortfalls that merited investment and multinational cooperation. The DCI covered in particular to improve Alliance capabilities in the five areas: mobility and deployability; sustainability; effective engagement; survivability and interoperable communications.[19]

Indeed, DCI’s long list of areas for improvement simply proved too ambitious and did little more than paralyze action. In fact, most European defense budgets actually declined in the first few years following DCI’s launch.[20] But, it soon became apparent that, DCI would not succeed in producing substantial changes in European military capabilities.

The 1999 DCI was succeeded by the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment. At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO launched a streamlined and more focused follow-on to DCI. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) outlined four critical areas for improvement, including: defending against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks; ensuring command, communications, and information superiority; improving interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; and ensuring rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces. The Prague declaration also recognized the need to think creatively about NATO assets, especially in light of shrinking European defense budgets. It stressed that efforts and initiatives to strengthen capabilities “could include multinational efforts, role specialization and reprioritization.”[21] The hope was that, short of increasing their defense budgets, European countries would at least aim to spend their defense resources more wisely by eliminating waste and duplication and identifying other cost savings.

Considering PCC and past NATO initiatives, PCC has done more to strengthen European military capabilities. Nevertheless, progress remains slow and continues to be hindered in some cases by the lack of political will, shrinking defense budgets, and resistance to pooling initiatives.

Similar to NATO initiatives, the EU has undertaken also a number of efforts to bridge the European capability gaps. In order to build CFSP, all EU members have believed that the policy have to include some capacity to back that policy with force. In 1999 EU member states signed the Helsinki Headline Goal of being able to deploy a 60,000-strong crisis management force within sixty days and to sustain it for at least one year. This European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), designed to conduct “Petersberg Tasks” (defined in the Amsterdam Treaty as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking), was slated to become operational by the end of 2003. The Helsinki Headline Goals served as much as a political signal about the need in 1999 of strengthening the European military arm after the almost traumatic experiences in the Western Balkans.[22]

When EU members compared the requirements of the Petersberg Tasks with their existing national commitments to the EU, they found several shortfalls. In an effort to address these shortfalls, the European Union launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) at the Laeken Summit in December 2001. But there has been little progress in finding solutions.[23]

With the European Security Strategy of December 2003, a new set of Headline Goals were needed, and in May 2004 the EU Defense Ministers adopted the Headline Goal 2010. These new ambitions for military capabilities include a number of interesting, new thoughts, in particular the introduction of rapidly deployable Battle Groups of roughly 1500 troops, capable of deploying within 10 days after an EU decision to launch an operation. Although the ECAP has been slow to trigger major changes in European military capabilities, it did spur the creation of the EU Battlegroups. A Battle Group (BG) is defined as the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. The BG is based on a combined arm, battalion-sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. A BG is in principle based on multinationality and could be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. Member States invited to participate in BGs included the non-EU European NATO countries, candidates for accession and other potential partners in their BGs. All EU States except Denmark have committed military capabilities to BGs.[24]

The BGs will spur EU members to develop the expeditionary capability they lack, but there are doubts about the viability of the overall concept. First, it is unclear whether EU member states will acquire the strategic lift needed to deploy the BGs in a timely fashion. Second, questions remain about the BGs’ relationship with the NATO Response Force and the extent to which their development might distract from the EU’s 2010 Headline Goals. Third, there are competing views on how and when the BGs will be used, with some countries envisioning a full spectrum of future missions and others suggesting that the BGs only be used for low-intensity missions.[25]

The BGs offer participation to all EU partners, whether big or small, and offers in particular smaller countries opportunities of pooling resources, role specialization and complementary capabilities. Scarce financial, technical and human resources have to be channeled towards viable objectives.

However, EU should also take a number of steps to improve its ability to conduct operations. The BGs should be strengthened through regular training and certification, preferably using NATO standards. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria.

The EU has also focused in recent years on strengthening its civilian capabilities for conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian missions. In 2004 Civilian Capabilities were committed simultaneously with military capabilities at the EU Civilian Capabilities Commitments Conference. The Civilian Headline Goal was developed with a target date of 2008 in order to secure interoperability, deployability and sustainability of civilian resources. This Headline Goal sets out the EU’s ambitions for civilian ESDP for the coming years and provides a firm basis for identifying requirements and establishing the capabilities needed. The Civilian Headline Goal also establishes a systematic approach for the further development of civilian capabilities. The EU’s assets for stabilization and reconstruction are valuable even in hostile environment.[26] It has been proved in the earlier operations. Thus, the EU’s military capability may remain limited, but it’s potential complementary role to NATO makes the cooperation between two organization both valuable and necessary.

The year 2004 is was pivotal for European Defence Capability development. The European Defense Agency (EDA) was created to further remedy capability shortfalls and steer the implementation of ESDP. The EDA is intended to improve the coordination and press EU member states, when necessary, to make capability improvements.[27] The EDA faces a number of tough challenges when we consider its ambitious set of missions such as: modernizing and strengthening Europe’s fragmented defense industry; eliminating duplication in arms research, development and procurement. Perhaps even more challenging, it will have to persuade the more equal members like the UK, France and Germany to commit to a European system they do not control completely or to an extent they desire.

The current mechanism between NATO and EU was formalized in the Berlin Plus arrangement, signed in March 2003. Under this agreement, the military cooperation mechanism through which the EU can have “assured access” to the collective assets and capabilities of Alliance, has been established. Berlin Plus refers to framework of EU-NATO relations.

In 1996, a NATO ministerial in Berlin agreed that in principle NATO assets could be made available for crisis management operations led by the Western European Union. At the 1999 NATO summit in Washington, Alliance leaders-initiated discussions on what became the main features of “Berlin Plus”: assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and presumed availability of certain NATO capabilities and common assets, along with determination of the role of NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe in EU-led operations.

Initially, these discussions took place between the Western European Union and NATO, but the role of the WEU was soon subsumed by the European Union. In January 2001, the EU and NATO began negotiations that eventually led to the “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP” (December 16, 2002) and the Berlin Plus arrangements (March 17, 2003).

The later included:

  • A NATO-EU security agreement governing the exchange of classified information;
  • Assured EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations;
  • Availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led operations;
  • Procedures for release, monitoring, return, and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
  • Terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, who serves as the operation commander of an EU-led operation under Berlin Plus;
  • NATO-EU consultation arrangements; and
  • Incorporation within NATO’s established defense planning system of the military needs and capabilities possibly required for EU-led military operations.[28]

Nevertheless, the Berlin Plus arrangements cannot be seen as “indicators of a healthy NATO-EU relationship.” Under this agreement EU does not gain access to troops and equipment belonging to NATO members, only to certain NATO assets, such as the planning, force generation, and headquarters capabilities at SHAPE. The agreement does not provide also a mechanism for combining military and civilian capabilities in a particular operation. Consequently, Berlin Plus arrangements apply only after the result of the decision-making process is an EU-led operation. In other words, Berlin Plus does not essentially facilitate the process when NATO or EU should take the lead and it does not provide a mechanism to launch combined operations in times of crisis as seen in Darfur crisis. “In Darfur Crisis, NATO and EU agreed to disagree, and two separate airlifts were established, with the expectation that they would be coordinated by the African Union.” [29]

In this regard, NATO and the EU must develop compatible capabilities and establish mechanisms that will allow a rapid coordinated response in times of crisis. If they are willing to work together effectively, they should recognize their relative crucial roles in transatlantic security. Thus, a willingness to make compromises on both sides of the Atlantic is necessary for the healthy future.

The current gap between requirements and capabilities poses serious obstacles to EU’s ability to execute out of area missions and to protect and advance its interests in the security environment. The EU crisis management operations will have their geographical focus constrained by shortfalls in enabling factors such as strategic mobility, specifically strategic capabilities as transport and logistics, command and control as well as reconnaissance. The EU’s global approach on deployability and interoperability will be a key element of CSDP development. Consequently, the proclaimed global role of the EU depends to a large extent on the EU’s ability to generate sufficient resources[30] to overcome shortfalls in enabling factors of the CSDP.

IV.     CONCLUSION

The motivation behind the European quest for constructing a defense policy, despite not partaking any large scale military role for a long time is a good question to ponder. I believe there are internal reasons arising directly from the European integration dynamic itself and external reasons contingent on world events and developments in American policy. Thus, it is fair to say that the EU’s aspirations, world events and the US might be the chief impelling forces of the European Union’s security and defense policy.

The developments leading to the CSDP, -particularly, the arrangements introduced in Brussels in January 1994 and concluded in Berlin in June 1996-, served as the basis for cooperation between the WEU and NATO. Concerns and misgivings were not very visible about aspects of ESDI that had been much discussed in the two years since the Berlin and Brussels agreements. But debate has become visible on the surface after the turning point of St.Malo. The US was surprised to see Britain and France in agreement on matters of military security and activities affecting NATO.[31] Secretary Albright emphasized these concerns with three D’s (Duplication, decoupling, and discrimination) at the December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels, just days after the St.Malo meeting.

The Europeans are critically important security partners of the United States. For this reason, the emergence of CSDP ought to be a welcome development to the United States. Yet the CSDP process has turned out to be a bittersweet development.

The debate over NATO’s future and CSDP continue to turn back to question over whether alliances in general make sense without adversary.[32] Nevertheless, many of today’s challenges to traditional and nontraditional security concerns can undoubtedly be worked out only if efforts and measures are taken across national boundaries. In the absence of a global consensus, regional measures and responses are suitable alternatives. As long as they are appropriate to each particular regional context, states do collaborate on, and coordinate their responses to political, economic and environmental threats.[33]

As NATO has been changing and the European allies begin to play a greater role by developing their CFSP and adapting their armed forces to face the new threats more effectively, NATO, through CSDP, could work towards strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link at the same time.  A robust CSDP anchored in NATO would make the Alliance much stronger and better equipped to face the new challenges.  Under these conditions NATO would be in a much better position to promote stability and security in the changing Europe.

Nonetheless, the prospect of the EU becoming a security actor distinct from NATO remains important for the future development of the relationship between the CSDP and NATO and thus the EU and the United States. American support for the further development of the CSDP will depend on whether or not the CSDP is viewed as complementary to NATO.

Indeed, those in Europe who believe that they must weaken NATO to strengthen CSDP are only likely to achieve an insecure and incapable Europe unsure of itself and its role in the world. If they want the US to support CSDP, they must produce real capabilities and assume real peacekeeping responsibilities. Those in the United States who believe that strengthening CSDP means weakening NATO are only likely to achieve a lonely superpower unable to count on the added abilities and resources of its allies when it comes to facing new threats and risks. If they want European support for US initiatives, they must be willing to allow allies to develop the capacity to do so.[34] Thus, the US and EU relationship on security issues will be deepened and EU will be seen as a proper security actor.

Above all, CSDP can be seen as a driving force “not only to develop military capacity but also to further European integration.” Assuming that Europeans have long corroborated efforts for the EU to take on a larger role in the global arena, it would be that CSDP will be one domain in which Europe could get ahead, particularly if integration in other areas is blocked.[35] Last but not least, economics will be at least as large a factor as security strategy in defining Europe’s political choices on defense and security. Thus, the industrial base will be a factor for each policy option in European security architecture and in turn will be influenced by it.

 

 

* Mehmet ARI, PhD, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Bonn University

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albrecht Schnabel, ‘The European Union, ESDP and the United Nations: Competitors or Partners’ in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Die Europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, (Baden: Baden, 2002)

Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO, (London: Brassey’s, 1989)

Charles-Philippe David, Jacque Levesque, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security, (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999)

Clay Clemens, NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security, (New York: Macmillan 1997)

David G. Haglund, ‘ESDP and Transatlantic Relations’ in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Die Europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, (Baden: Baden, 2002)

Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)

European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, (Brussels, December 2003)

EU Focus, European Security and Defense Policy: Working for a Safer World, (Washington DC, January 2006)

F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebl, et al., Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture, (The Atlantic Council Policy Paper, March 2006)

Hans Mouritzen, Theory and Reality of International Politics, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998)

Igor Maslov, Russia and NATO: A Critical Period, Mediterranean Quarterly, (Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1998)

Javier Solana, “Common European Foreign and Security Policy Targets for the Future”, NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace 1/2000

Jeffrey Becker, “Asserting EU Cohesion: Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Relaunch of Europe”, European Security, (Vol. 7 No. 4, Winter 1998)

Johan P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (vol. 40, no. 5, 2002)

Jolyon Howorth , “European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?”, (Chaillot Paper, no. 43, 2000),  and William Wallace, “A Security Strategy for the EU?”,  (FORNET CFSP Forum, vol. 1, issue 2, September 2003)

Julian Lindley-French, “The ties that bind”,  NATO Review, Autumn 2003

Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963)

Lord Robertson, Post-Cold War Defense Reform, (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002)

Marc Otte, “ESDP and Multilateral Security Organizations: Working with NATO, the UN, and OSCE” in Esther Brimmer (ed.), The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations, (Washington D.C.: Center for  Transatlantic Relations, 2002)

Michael E.Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Michele A.Floumoy and Julianne Smith, “European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington: October 2005)

Naom Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003)

NATO and the European Union: Partners in Security, (Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, May 6, 2004)

NATO Handbook 2001, (Brussels: NATO Press)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Prague Summit Declaration 2002”

Philip Gordon, “Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work”, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 79, no. 4, July/August 2000).

Richard Gowan, “The Battlegroups: A Concept in Search of a Strategy?” in Sven Biscop (ed.), E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union, (Academia Press, June 2005)

Rob de Wijk, “European Military Reform for a Global Partnership”, (The Washington Quarterly, Winter 03-04)

Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor?, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002)

Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political Science Quarterly, (vol. 111, no.1, 1996)

Stanley Hoffmann, “The European Process at Atlantic Cross Purposes”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (vol. 3, no. 2, 1965)

Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, The European Union and The Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered, (Maryland : Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2003)

Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane, “The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Leaning from Failure”, (Survival, 45:3, 2003)

Tom Lansford, “The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security After the Cold War”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, (Vol. 22 No. 1, Mar 1999) and Alistair Shepherd, “Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capacity?” , European Security (Vol. 9 No. 2, Summer 2000)

William Wallace, “A Security Strategy for the EU?”, (FORNET CFSP Forum, vol. 1, issue 2, September 2003)

Wolfram Hilz, Europeas verhindertes Führungstrio: Die Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens in den Neunzigern, (Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 2005)

http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/treaties-other.htm.

http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk

 

 

[1] Robert J. Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO”, Political Science Quarterly, (vol. 111, no.1, 1996)

[2] Ibid.

[3] European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, (Brussels, December 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

[4] Lord Robertson, Post-Cold War Defense Reform, (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002), p.56

[5] Marc Otte, “ESDP and Multilateral Security Organizations: Working with NATO, the UN, and OSCE” in Esther Brimmer (ed.), The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations, (Washington D.C.: Center for  Transatlantic Relations, 2002), p.52

[6] Michael E.Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.3-5

[7] Smith, pp.10-11

[8] Smith, pp.17-18

[9] Smith, pp.19-20

[10] Smith, pp.21, 36

[11] Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)

[12] Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p.10

[13] Stanley Hoffmann, “The European Process at Atlantic Cross Purposes”, Journal of Common Market Studies, (vol. 3, no. 2, 1965), pp.85-101

[14] Hans Mouritzen, Theory and Reality of International Politics, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p.113

[15] Wolfram Hilz, Europeas verhindertes Führungstrio: Die Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens in den Neunzigern, (Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 2005), pp.188-198.

[16] Ibid.,p.199.

[17] Wolfram Hilz, Europeas verhindertes Führungstrio: Die Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens in den Neunzigern, (Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 2005), pp.146-158.

[18] Philip Gordon, “Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work”, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 79, no. 4,

July/August 2000).

[19] NATO Handbook 2001, (Brussels: NATO Press), pp. 50-52

[20] Michele A. Floumoy and Julianne Smith, “European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington: October 2005), p.21

[21] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Prague Summit Declaration 2002”, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.

[22] F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebl, et al., p.5

[23] F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebl, et al., p.10

[24] F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebl, et al., pp.5, 9

[25] Richard Gowan, “The Battlegroups: A Concept in Search of a Strategy?” in Sven Biscop (ed.), E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union, (Academia Press, June 2005), p.14

[26] F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebl , et al., p.11

[27] EU Focus, European Security and Defense Policy: Working for a Safer World, (Washington DC, January 2006), p.6

[28] F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebl, et al., p.13

[29] F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebl, et al., pp.14, 15

[30] There are also different methods to generate sufficient resources other than procurement or budget allocation for defense. For instance, pooling is one of the most effective way and may take a variety of forms, from contributing national assets to multinational formation, to sharing infrastructure and support assets, to undertaking common or coordinated procurements.

[31] Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor?, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p.33

[32] David G. Haglund, ‘ESDP and Transatlantic Relations’ in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Die Europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, (Baden: Baden, 2002), p.272

[33] Albrecht Schnabel, ‘The European Union, ESDP and the United Nations:. Competitors or Partners’ in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Die Europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, (Baden: Baden, 2002), pp.315, 316

[34] Julian Lindley-French, “The ties that bind”,  NATO Review, Autumn 2003

[35] F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebl, et al., p. 10

Contact

Phone

Tel: +32 (0) 2 801 13 57-58

Email

info@behorizon.org

Address

Beyond the Horizon ISSG
Davincilaan 1, 1932 Brussels

COVID19 DashboardOne-stop-shop for all useful datasets, charts, articles, latest news and official social media posts about #coronavirus.
Visit now!