ASIA ON THE HORIZON 500X500 (Logo)

26 JANUARY 2026

This week’s issue arrives at a juncture where the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture is being fundamentally redrawn through a new U.S. defence doctrine and an unprecedented surge in middle-power strategic autonomy. From the high-tech corridors of Seoul to the maritime crossroads of the Indian Ocean, the region is navigating a transition where burden-sharing is no longer a request from Washington, but a structural requirement for stability.

The stories we bring you this week reveal an Asia where traditional security guarantees are being supplemented by a dense web of “special strategic partnerships” and values-based supply chains. At the forefront, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s landmark tour of Tokyo and Seoul signals Europe’s deepening strategic pivot to Asia, upgrading ties with Japan to a “special strategic partnership” focused on defence and critical minerals. Simultaneously, the newly released 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) codifies a shift toward “integrated deterrence” and “homeland defence,” explicitly demanding greater responsibility from regional allies like Japan and South Korea.

In the economic domain, the battlefield for technological sovereignty is intensifying. The European Union is advancing a Cybersecurity Act to purge Chinese equipment from critical infrastructure, while Taiwan and the U.S. move to formalize a “democratic” high-tech supply chain to insulate semiconductor flows. Meanwhile, middle powers are carving out their own spheres of influence: India and the UAE have formalized a comprehensive defence partnership, and Pakistan is leveraging its “combat-tested” hardware to ignite a surge in global defence exports.

Our visual sections this week explore the frontiers of these evolving alignments. Our Infographic of the Week breaks down the “alignment without entanglement” defining the burgeoning EU–India security pact, while the Photo of the Week captures the “diplomacy of the selfie” between Meloni and Japanese PM Takaichi—a moment of personal rapport underscoring hard strategic interests. Finally, our Analysis section provides a deep dive into the 2026 NDS and its transformative implications for Indo-Pacific deterrence.

Together, these reports offer a panoramic view of a region where the architecture of deterrence is increasingly dependent on empowered regional actors. As always, Asia on the Horizon brings you the developments that matter most, capturing the pulse of a region that is actively reshaping the global order.

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Italy–Japan Elevate Partnership in Tokyo

Italy and Japan formally upgraded their bilateral relations to a special strategic partnership during Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s visit to Tokyo, marking 160 years of diplomatic ties. The leaders — Meloni and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — agreed to deepen cooperation across defence, economic security, and critical mineral supply chains, aiming to reduce dependencies on China and bolster resilience amid rising geopolitical competition. Both sides underscored shared opposition to unilateral efforts to alter the status quo in the East and South China Seas and condemned North Korea’s military provocations, reflecting converging strategic priorities in an unsettled regional security environment.

Beyond symbolic reaffirmation, the upgrade signals more structured engagement: Italy and Japan are expanding defence collaboration — including work on next-generation platforms such as the Global Combat Air Programme — while fostering economic cooperation in technology, supply chains, and investment. Tokyo is Italy’s third-largest Asian trading partner with over €10 billion in annual trade, and leaders emphasized the value of aligning economic security with broader strategic goals. Meloni framed the partnership as rooted in mutual respect, shared values, and a rules-based international order, while Takaichi highlighted the urgency of resilient critical mineral networks.

Italy–South Korea Summit Advances Tech and Strategic Cooperation

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni concluded her six-day Asia tour in Seoul with South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung, marking the first bilateral visit by an Italian premier to South Korea in 19 years. The leaders committed to reinforcing cooperation across advanced technology sectors — notably artificial intelligence, semiconductors, aerospace, and industrial automation — signing or agreeing in principle on memoranda to deepen ties in these areas. Both sides highlighted efforts to build resilient critical mineral and chip supply chains, reflecting shared concerns about global technological competition and economic security. The summit also touched on broader people-to-people links through research, education, and cultural exchange frameworks.

Beyond economics, Meloni and Lee reaffirmed support for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and discussed the implications of wider geopolitical tensions. Seoul and Rome positioned their partnership within the context of a rules-based international order, aligning with broader Western interests in the Indo-Pacific. Italy’s engagement supplements its ongoing strategic pivot toward Asia following parallel initiatives with Japan, underscoring Rome’s intent to leverage technology diplomacy alongside traditional political dialogue.

Seoul Pushes for Favourable U.S. Chip Tariff Terms

South Korea has signalled it will enter negotiations with the United States to secure favourable tariff treatment for its memory chip exports amid Washington’s broader effort to impose trade barriers on semiconductors. Seoul’s presidential office confirmed that officials will press for terms based on “no-less-favourable” treatment to ensure South Korean firms like Samsung and SK Hynix are not disadvantaged relative to competitors, reflecting concerns that prospective U.S. duties could disrupt global supply chains and investment calculations. Government advisers also reiterated that the latest tariffs, focused on select high-end computing chips, are expected to have a limited immediate impact on Korean exporters because memory chips — where Korean producers dominate — are currently less affected.

President Lee Jae-Myung publicly sought to downplay the threat of potential U.S. tariffs of up to 100 per cent on semiconductor imports, warning that such measures would likely raise chip prices in the United States rather than meaningfully dent the competitiveness of South Korean or Taiwanese producers, who collectively control most key segments of the market. Lee underscored safeguards in trade arrangements that he said protect Korea’s chipmakers from discriminatory treatment, even as Washington’s industrial policy increasingly leverages tariffs to incentivise onshore production. His comments signal Seoul’s dual approach: manage geopolitical economic friction while seeking to maintain its central role in the global semiconductor ecosystem.

EU Moves to Exclude Chinese Tech from Critical Infrastructure

The European Union is advancing a draft Cybersecurity Act that would mandate the removal of Chinese-made equipment from key critical infrastructure across its 27 member states, marking a significant escalation in technology and security policy. Under the proposal, gear from so-called “high-risk” suppliers — widely understood to include Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE — would be barred from sectors including telecommunications, solar energy systems, security scanners, water networks, and other essential ICT supply chains. This move would transform existing voluntary EU restrictions into binding legal requirements with phased compliance timelines, including a multiyear exit window for operators to replace existing equipment.

Brussels frames the initiative as a response to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and dependencies on external technology sources, aiming to harmonize risk mitigation across the bloc and reduce exposure to potential foreign interference. The shift aligns with broader Western trends in de-risking and supply-chain diversification seen in the United States and other allies. China has sharply criticised the plan as discriminatory protectionism that could undermine investment confidence and contravene global trade norms, raising the prospect of wider political and economic friction between Beijing and the EU.

India–UAE Strategic Defence Partnership Deepens

India and the United Arab Emirates have taken significant steps to elevate their strategic defence relationship, agreeing to formalise a comprehensive defence partnership that enhances military cooperation, joint exercises, and shared security objectives. During high-level talks in Abu Dhabi, leaders from both countries committed to institutionalising defence industry collaboration, intelligence sharing, and interoperability across naval, air, and land domains. The partnership reflects converging interests in maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean–Middle East nexus, countering terrorism, and securing critical maritime trade routes against emerging threats.

Alongside defence, New Delhi and Abu Dhabi agreed to boost bilateral trade and energy cooperation, including finalising a long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply deal that underscores India’s energy diversification strategy. The agreement aims to expand economic linkages — already robust — through enhanced investment flows, technology partnerships, and cooperation in emerging sectors such as critical minerals and renewable energy. By synchronising strategic and commercial agendas, the India-UAE axis positions itself as a stabilising force in a region marked by shifting geopolitical alignments and intensifying great-power competition.

Pakistan’s ‘Combat-Tested’ Jets Ignite Surge in Defence Export Talks

Pakistan’s defence industry is leveraging the combat-tested status of its military hardware — notably the China-co-developed JF-17 Thunder fighter jet — to court international buyers, with Islamabad holding negotiations with at least 13 countries, six to eight of which are in advanced stages. Prospective deals span not only multi-role combat aircraft but also training planes, drones, ammunition and other systems, with interest reported from nations in the Middle East, Africa and Asia such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Morocco, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Bangladesh. Pakistan has pitched these systems as cost-effective alternatives to pricier Western equipment while riding a global trend toward diversified suppliers after recent geopolitical disruptions.

The push comes after Pakistan’s air force performance in last year’s conflict with India, which Islamabad and some analysts argue has demonstrated battlefield credibility for its platforms. Despite rising interest, analysts and officials caution that geopolitical pressures, production limitations and potential objections from China — a co-partner on the JF-17 — could constrain actual export contract success. Pakistan aims to expand its roughly 20-aircraft annual production capacity to meet demand by 2027, highlighting a broader strategic pivot toward defence diplomacy to boost its industrial base and geopolitical footprint — even as firm orders remain elusive.

ASEAN Refuses to Endorse Myanmar Election

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has declared it will not send observers to Myanmar’s ongoing three-phase election and will not certify the results, according to Malaysia’s foreign minister. The decision came after Myanmar’s military junta, which seized power in a 2021 coup, initiated the electoral process beginning in December 2025 — a ballot widely criticised by the United Nations, Western governments, and rights groups as a strategy to legitimise military rule through allied proxies. ASEAN’s collective refusal to participate stems from concerns the vote lacks free, fair, and inclusive conditions and thus cannot confer regional legitimacy on the poll.

ASEAN’s stance reflects deeper unease with Myanmar’s political trajectory and highlights the bloc’s continuing struggle to enforce unity on contentious internal matters. While consensus on observer missions and certification eluded member states, some individual governments may still attend independently — underscoring internal divisions over engagement strategies. The broader context of Myanmar’s election — marked by low turnout, ongoing civil war, and opposition boycotts — reinforces ASEAN’s cautious approach; yet the decision may further strain relations with the junta and complicate efforts to implement the bloc’s long-standing Five-Point Consensus peace plan.

South Korea Urges Caution on Drone Detection to Avoid DPRK Escalation

South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung has called for a measured approach to enhancing drone detection systems near the North Korean border, underscoring Seoul’s concern that overly aggressive defensive measures could be misinterpreted by Pyongyang as escalatory. Lee’s remarks came amid ongoing discussions to bolster surveillance and response capabilities against increased unmanned aerial activity, particularly given recent North Korean tests and deployments of drones. While emphasising the need to protect South Korean airspace and infrastructure, Lee urged defence planners to balance security improvements with diplomatic sensitivity to avoid inadvertently heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Lee’s comments reflect Seoul’s broader strategic calculus: strengthening deterrence and situational awareness without crossing thresholds that could be framed by the North as hostile posturing. This nuanced posture points to internal debates within South Korea over how best to counter asymmetric threats — including drones — while maintaining avenues for dialogue with Pyongyang. Observers note the challenge for Seoul in calibrating enhancements to air-defence and detection architectures that satisfy domestic security imperatives yet minimise the risk of unintended provocation in a persistently volatile environment.

Taiwan to Co-Lead Democratic High-Tech Supply Chain with U.S.

Taiwan has announced plans to lead efforts with the United States in developing a “democratic” high-tech supply chain, strengthening cooperation in semiconductors and other advanced technologies amid intensifying geopolitical competition with China. Taipei’s Ministry of Economic Affairs said discussions with Washington will focus on supply chain resilience for critical components — especially chips — and on securing diversified, reliable production networks among like-minded partners. The move aligns with U.S. industrial policy that seeks to reduce dependence on Chinese manufacturing and promote secure technology ecosystems within the broader Indo-Pacific.

Taipei’s leadership role underscores its central position in global semiconductor supply — notably through firms like TSMC — and reflects deepening U.S.–Taiwan economic and technological ties even absent formal diplomatic relations. By framing cooperation as part of a values-based network of “democratic” suppliers, Taiwan and the U.S. aim to signal both to Beijing and global markets their commitment to secure, transparent supply chains. The initiative also feeds into broader efforts to counter China’s growing influence in critical technologies, though it risks escalating cross-Strait tensions as Taipei integrates further with Western industrial strategies.

Macron Pushes for Expanded Chinese Investment in Key European Sectors

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, French President **Emmanuel Macron publicly urged a significant increase in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into strategic sectors across Europe, framing Beijing’s capital as a catalyst for growth, technology transfer, and innovation rather than solely a source of subsidised exports. Macron emphasized that Chinese companies should go beyond exporting products and instead invest in batteries, electric vehicles, solar energy and other advanced industries, where China currently has comparative advantages, to help bolster European competitiveness and address deep trade imbalances. His remarks reflect a broader call for rebalancing economic ties with China amid global trade friction and intensifying U.S.–Europe tensions.

Macron’s appeal comes as Europe navigates competing pressures from the United States, China, and domestic industry concerns. By inviting increased Chinese investment, he signals a pursuit of European strategic autonomy — seeking diversified capital flows and technology partnerships while resisting over-dependence on any single power. The proposal also implicitly critiques purely protectionist responses to Chinese competition, stressing that balanced FDI could support industrial resilience. However, this approach risks political pushback both domestically and from allies wary of Beijing’s global influence, positioning Paris at the centre of evolving EU–China and transatlantic economic policy debates.

China Claims to Repel Philippine Aircraft Over Scarborough Shoal

China’s military announced that it deployed naval and air assets to warn and drive away a Philippine government aircraft it accused of illegally intruding into the airspace above Scarborough Shoal, a long-disputed feature in the South China Sea. The Southern Theatre Command’s statement condemned Manila’s action as a provocation and urged the Philippines to desist from what Beijing framed as infringements on its so-called sovereign rights. Philippine authorities had not immediately responded to requests for comment, leaving Manila’s account of the incident unverified in initial reports.

This January-20 confrontation underscores enduring maritime and airspace friction between China and the Philippines amid unresolved territorial claims. Scarborough Shoal sits well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone under the 2016 Hague tribunal ruling — a judgment China rejects — making such encounters focal points for broader strategic competition in the South China Sea. While this specific episode did not escalate into an exchange of fire, it adds to a pattern of mutual accusations and military posturing that complicates diplomatic engagement and risks miscalculation in a region central to global trade and U.S.-China rivalry.

EU–India Free Trade Deal Nears Historic Conclusion

The European Union is on the verge of finalising a long-sought free trade agreement (FTA) with India, a pact that European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described as potentially historic at the World Economic Forum in Davos. The deal — decades in the making — would link two major economic blocs, creating a market of roughly 2 billion people and accounting for nearly a quarter of global GDP. Final negotiations are still underway, and von der Leyen is expected to visit India soon to advance talks ahead of a planned announcement later this month.

If concluded and eventually ratified — a process that could take at least a year — the FTA would significantly expand market access, with tariff cuts expected on European cars and wine and improved Indian access for textiles, electronics and other exports. The pact reflects broader shifts in global trade, as India pursues diversification amid rising U.S. protectionism and the EU seeks to reduce dependency on single markets like China. Beyond goods, the agreement is intertwined with deepening strategic engagement between New Delhi and Brussels, including anticipated cooperation on services, investment and mobility, reinforcing their economic and geopolitical linkages.

Nvidia CEO’s China Visit Aims to Reopen AI Chip Market

Nvidia’s CEO Jensen Huang is planning a trip to China in late January 2026 as part of an effort to reopen access to a critical market for the company’s artificial intelligence chips — especially the H200 model — after months of regulatory and geopolitical friction. The visit, timed around Lunar New Year company events, may include stops in Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, though it remains unclear whether Huang will meet senior Chinese officials. His presence comes amid ongoing uncertainty: the U.S. has eased export restrictions enough to allow H200 exports in principle, but Chinese customs has signalled restrictions on actual imports, complicating Nvidia’s commercial prospects there.

Huang’s trip reflects broader tensions at the intersection of global technology competition, export controls and market access. China represents one of the world’s largest potential markets for AI infrastructure, but ongoing regulatory scrutiny, geopolitical pressure to develop domestic alternatives, and Chinese hesitancy to accept U.S.-made chips pose obstacles to meaningful revenue recovery. Reestablishing a foothold in China could materially affect Nvidia’s revenue exposure and competitive positioning amid efforts by Chinese firms to build indigenous AI chip capabilities. The visit underscores how corporate diplomacy now intersects with U.S.–China strategic rivalry in high-tech industries.

EU to Phase Out “High-Risk” Chinese Tech From Critical Infrastructure

The European Union is moving toward legally **banning “high-risk” technology from Chinese suppliers such as Huawei and other firms from critical infrastructure sectors, signalling a major shift in bloc policy from voluntary to binding restrictions. The draft Cybersecurity Act under discussion would require member states to remove such equipment from essential networks — including telecommunications, water systems, energy grids and transportation — over a multi-year phase-out period. Brussels argues this is necessary to protect cybersecurity and operational resilience, citing concerns that dependence on foreign technology could expose the EU to espionage or supply-chain vulnerabilities.

The proposal reflects broader Western efforts to de-risk critical technology ecosystems amid intensifying competition with China on economic and security fronts. It aligns with similar moves by the United States and other allies to curb the influence of Chinese tech firms in sensitive sectors. Beijing has criticised the EU’s approach as discriminatory and politically motivated, warning it could damage investment confidence and bilateral economic ties. Industry groups within Europe also express concerns that stringent rules could raise costs and complicate network upgrades, highlighting the trade-offs between security objectives and market openness.

UK Greenlights China’s Largest European Embassy Amid Security Concerns

The British government has approved plans for China to construct its largest embassy in Europe on the Royal Mint Court site in central London, despite warnings from UK and U.S. lawmakers about espionage and national security risks. The decision ends years of political and planning delays and clears the way for a sprawling diplomatic compound that will consolidate China’s operations — a project Beijing has long sought, and which London officials have linked to efforts to reset bilateral ties ahead of Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s anticipated visit to Beijing. UK security agencies, including MI5 and GCHQ, participated in the review, and ministers argued that any risks can be mitigated, though critics remain deeply sceptical.

Opposition politicians, local campaigners and Hong Kong pro-democracy activists have vocally opposed the embassy plan, arguing its proximity to critical communications infrastructure — including fibre-optic cables serving London’s financial sector — could facilitate intelligence gathering or interference. Critics, including U.S. lawmakers, warn the new facility may expand China’s espionage footprint in the UK, and legal challenges are expected. Beijing has dismissed such concerns, asserting its planning complies with laws and diplomatic norms. The episode highlights London’s delicate balancing act between safeguarding security and pursuing economic and diplomatic engagement with China amid broader Western unease.

Beijing Pushes Economic Engagement as London–Beijing Visit Looms

China has signalled a willingness to strengthen economic ties with the United Kingdom, framing closer trade and investment cooperation as mutually beneficial and supportive of global economic stability. The Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasised that enhanced bilateral economic relations — built on “mutual respect” — could help foster a more favourable business environment for firms on both sides. This overture coincides with preparations for UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s anticipated visit to Beijing, which would be the first such trip by a British leader since 2018 and is aimed at reinvigorating a period of more robust economic dialogue. The two sides are also planning to revive a high-level business forum, harkening back to a pre-pandemic “golden era” of commercial engagement.

Ahead of Starmer’s journey, Chinese officials met with representatives from about 30 British companies, including major names such as HSBC and Swire Group, underscoring Beijing’s intent to deepen cooperation in sectors like services, green technology and innovation. While Chinese counterparts touted the potential for “win-win” outcomes, some British executives were cautious about the scale of near-term breakthroughs, noting constrained demand in key product areas. These interactions reflect both sides’ interest in expanding economic ties and the pragmatic business considerations that will shape any outcomes from the forthcoming diplomatic engagement.

China Distances Itself from Greenland Row but Urges Europe to Reconsider U.S. Dependence

China has publicly disavowed any intention to compete for influence in the West over the unfolding Greenland controversy, responding to a U.S. bid to assert control over the strategic Arctic island. Beijing’s foreign ministry spokesperson stated that China does not seek to rival other powers for sway in Europe or the Arctic and emphasised its commitment to mutual respect and constructive engagement in international affairs. This came as U.S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive push on Greenland — including threats of tariffs tied to the issue — has unsettled NATO allies and prompted debate over Western security arrangements.

At the same time, Chinese state media and official commentary seized the moment to urge Europe to reduce its reliance on the United States for security and diplomatic direction. Editorials argued that deep transatlantic dependence could leave European states vulnerable to U.S. policy swings and that diversifying partnerships — including with China and Russia — could augment Europe’s strategic autonomy. While framing this as advice rather than direct interference, China’s messaging reflects a broader attempt to exploit fissures in Western unity amid geopolitical competition, even as its own direct influence in Greenland remains limited.

EU–India Security and Defence Partnership Nears Signature

The European Union and India have agreed to advance a new Security and Defence Partnership, with plans to sign the agreement during the upcoming 16th EU–India Summit in New Delhi. EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas announced that both sides have concluded negotiations to proceed with the pact, which will expand cooperation in areas such as maritime security, counter-terrorism and cyber defence, as well as enhance strategic coordination amid global instability and pressures on the rules-based order. The partnership is being positioned alongside a broader EU-India strategic agenda that includes an imminent free trade deal and initiatives on mobility and technological cooperation.

This security and defence pact marks a significant deepening of strategic ties between two major democracies beyond economic engagement. It is expected to facilitate closer military-to-military cooperation and could lay the groundwork for industrial collaboration in defence sectors, a departure from India’s historical reliance on traditional suppliers. The move also reflects the EU’s effort to diversify its security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and integrate India more fully into its geostrategic architecture as both actors face shared challenges from great-power competition and regional tensions.

India–EU Free Trade Deal Nears Historic Conclusion

India and the European Union are on the verge of concluding long-running negotiations on a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA), with officials from both sides expecting an official announcement within the next few days ahead of the India-EU Summit later this month. Spain’s foreign minister, speaking from New Delhi, described the process as moving “perfectly” toward closure, with high-level engagement continuing to resolve remaining sticking points such as carbon levies and import duties on autos and steel. The pact — potentially covering a market of around 2 billion people and roughly a quarter of global GDP — aims to formalise decades of dialogue into a legal framework that significantly lowers tariff barriers and expands market access.

The anticipated FTA would open the way for reduced tariffs on European cars, wine and machinery, while bolstering Indian exports in textiles, electronics, chemicals and other sectors, potentially offsetting pressures from U.S. trade policy. Negotiators are also addressing non-tariff challenges like regulatory standards, highlighting the complexity of finalising terms that balance liberalisation with sensitive domestic interests. Beyond trade volumes, both New Delhi and Brussels view the agreement as a strategic signal of economic cooperation amid rising protectionism globally, reinforcing diversification of supply chains and deeper integration of two major democratic economies

Taiwan Seeks Expanded Chip Investment in Arizona

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has publicly expressed Taipei’s anticipation of increased semiconductor investment in Arizona, signalling intent to deepen industrial integration with the United States. In discussions with U.S. Senator Ruben Gallego, Lai highlighted the substantial presence of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in the Phoenix area — where the company is already committing $165 billion to build high-end chip fabs — and said Taiwan looks forward to further manufacturing, research and development facilities being established there. This push aligns with Washington’s industrial policy aimed at bolstering domestic advanced chip production amid global competition and national security concerns.

The emphasis on Arizona reflects how Taiwan–U.S. economic ties are becoming a cornerstone of broader strategic cooperation, especially in high-technology sectors. Taipei’s outreach follows a recent U.S.–Taiwan trade agreement that cut tariffs on many Taiwanese semiconductor exports and accompanies Taiwanese commitments to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. semiconductor, energy and AI sectors. Expanded chip investment in the United States not only supports supply-chain resilience but also reinforces Taiwan’s geopolitical relevance amid U.S.–China tech rivalry.

U.S. Defence Official to Visit South Korea and Japan Amid Regional Security Coordination

A senior U.S. defence official, Deputy Secretary of Defense Colby, is scheduled to visit South Korea and Japan next week as part of Washington’s ongoing efforts to deepen trilateral security cooperation in East Asia. The visit, reported by South Korea’s Yonhap news agency, is expected to include consultations with military and government counterparts to discuss alliance coordination, deterrence strategies, and responses to North Korean threats. The itinerary reflects growing emphasis on integrated defence planning among the U.S., Seoul, and Tokyo against shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

Colby’s trip comes at a time of heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula and amid broader concerns about China’s military assertiveness. Discussions are likely to cover extended deterrence commitments, joint exercises, and bolstering interoperability among allied forces. Japan and South Korea, both key U.S. treaty allies, have been incrementally expanding security cooperation with Washington, including in areas such as missile defence and intelligence sharing. The visit serves both as a signal of sustained U.S. engagement and as an opportunity to align strategic priorities ahead of upcoming regional security dialogues.

Italy Calls for International Accord on Raw Material Prices

Italy has urged the launch of a multilateral agreement to stabilize global raw material prices, reflecting growing concerns in Rome about the economic disruptions caused by volatile commodity markets. Speaking at an international forum, Italian officials stressed that unpredictable swings in costs for key inputs like metals and energy not only inflate inflationary pressures but also undermine industrial planning, supply-chain resilience, and investment decisions. Italy’s proposal seeks coordinated action among major producers and consumers to improve market transparency, reduce speculative volatility, and ensure fair access to essential materials for manufacturing and clean-energy transitions.

The initiative aligns with broader European and G7 concerns about dependency on concentrated supply sources and the strategic implications of raw materials for technology and defence sectors. While major economies acknowledge the challenges posed by price instability, reaching a binding international accord would involve complex negotiations among diverse stakeholders with competing interests — from energy exporters wary of price caps to import-dependent industrial powers seeking predictability. Italy’s call could act as a catalyst for renewed dialogue on supply-chain governance, particularly as nations balance economic security priorities with market liberalization.

U.S. Rebalances North Korea Deterrence, Elevates Seoul’s Responsibility

The Pentagon’s newly released 2026 National Defense Strategy signals a shift toward a more limited U.S. role in deterring North Korea, placing primary responsibility on South Korea while Washington maintains “critical but more limited” support. The document reflects a broader realignment of U.S. military priorities toward defending the homeland and countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, with U.S. forces potentially becoming more flexible to address a wider range of regional contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula. South Korea currently hosts about 28,500 U.S. troops and has increased its defence spending, underscoring Seoul’s growing capacity to shoulder the deterrence burden.

This recalibration does not signal a unilateral U.S. withdrawal, but it does shift the burden-sharing dynamic in the alliance and could influence force posture and command arrangements on the Peninsula. While Seoul has steadily strengthened its armed forces and aspires to assume wartime command, questions remain over how far this rebalancing will go and how it will affect deterrence credibility given Pyongyang’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities. The adjustment also reflects Washington’s intent to leverage allied capabilities more broadly while prioritising emerging challenges in the region’s strategic landscape.

South Korea–U.S. High-Level Dialogue on Alliance and Regional Security

South Korean Prime Minister Kim Bok-do held strategic talks with U.S. Vice President David Vance in Washington, underscoring the robust alliance between Seoul and Washington amid evolving regional security challenges. The discussions focused on strengthening bilateral cooperation in defence, economic security, and diplomatic coordination, with particular emphasis on addressing North Korean provocations, supply-chain resilience, and converging Indo-Pacific priorities. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to extended deterrence and deeper interoperability between South Korean and U.S. military forces, reflecting sustained alignment amid geopolitical shifts.

Beyond traditional security issues, Prime Minister Kim and Vice President Vance also explored areas of economic and technological collaboration, including semiconductor supply chains, critical minerals, and clean energy partnerships, aiming to synergize bilateral strengths in high-tech and strategic industries. The meeting conveys a mutual intent to expand the U.S.–South Korea partnership into a comprehensive strategic framework that integrates defence commitments with economic and diplomatic engagement — a response to intensifying regional competition and shared concerns over China’s assertiveness.

U.S. Recalibrates Indo-Pacific Role in 2026 Defense Strategy

The newly released 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy reaffirms Washington’s emphasis on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific through strength while simultaneously prioritizing homeland defence but reframes how allies will be engaged in that effort. The document underscores building a “denial defence along the First Island Chain” — encompassing key strategic maritime approaches from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines — to prevent any attempt by Beijing to dominate the region and to maintain a balance of power conducive to peace and stability. It also stresses burden-sharing with regional partners, encouraging allies to assume greater responsibility for local security roles while the U.S. provides enabling support and strengthens interoperability with partners who share a commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

In practical terms, the strategy signals a more nuanced U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula, endorsing South Korea’s primary responsibility for North Korean deterrence with limited U.S. support — a move that could allow American forces greater flexibility to address wider Indo-Pacific contingencies, including threats emanating from China’s military modernization. While the U.S. remains committed to deterring Beijing’s regional aspirations, the document’s emphasis on greater partner burden-sharing and tailored engagement rather than unilateral leadership points to a strategic evolution in how Washington approaches alliance dynamics and force posture in Asia.

Italy–South Korea Economic Ties

Italy’s relationship with South Korea rests on a steadily strengthening economic foundation, underscoring why the 2026 summit marked more than a symbolic upgrade. Italy is now South Korea’s fourth-largest trading partner within the EU, and bilateral trade has shown consistent growth over the past five years. Total trade volume rose from approximately $11.8 billion in 2021 to $14.2 billion in 2024, with 2025 estimates reaching around $15 billion, reflecting resilience despite global supply-chain disruptions and economic uncertainty. This trajectory highlights a shift from episodic commercial exchange to a more structural and diversified economic relationship.

Equally notable is the evolution in the composition of trade. While traditional strengths remain, machinery now accounts for roughly a quarter of bilateral exchanges, followed by chemicals (around 20 percent). Luxury and fashion goods — once emblematic of Italy–Korea trade — represent a smaller but still significant share (about 15 percent), while electronics and AI-related goods have expanded to roughly 20 percent, signalling a pivot toward advanced technology cooperation. Automotive products and other sectors make up the remainder. Taken together, the data point to a partnership moving decisively beyond prestige goods toward industrial, technological, and strategic value chains, aligning economic ties with the broader political and security ambitions articulated at the 2026 summit.

Italy–South Korea Economic Ties Beyond the Horizon ISSG

https://behorizon.org/italy-south-korea

Scarborough Shoal and the Geometry of Escalation

This week’s map lays bare the strategic geography behind the January 20 confrontation over Scarborough Shoal, illustrating how overlapping claims, airspace activity, and military signalling intersect in one of the South China Sea’s most sensitive flashpoints. The visual juxtaposition of China’s nine-dash line against the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) — as defined by the 2016 Hague tribunal ruling — highlights the core legal and strategic dispute. The mapped flight paths and intercept vectors underscore how even a single aircraft movement can trigger a rapid, multi-domain response involving air and naval assets, reflecting the region’s low threshold for escalation.

More broadly, the map captures why Scarborough Shoal remains a persistent source of friction despite the absence of open conflict. Located well within Manila’s EEZ under international law — but firmly claimed and controlled by Beijing — the feature sits at the intersection of lawfare, military presence, and political messaging. The January incident did not spiral into violence, but the cartography makes clear the structural risk: dense military activity in contested airspace, incompatible legal frameworks, and zero-sum sovereignty narratives. As such, the map is less about a single encounter and more about a pattern — one in which geography itself fuels recurring tension in a region central to global trade and strategic competition.

Scarborough Shoal and the Geometry of Escalation Beyond the Horizon ISSG

Personal Chemistry, Strategic Convergence

This week’s image — Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi smiling for a selfie in Tokyo — captures more than a light-hearted diplomatic moment. It visually distils the personal rapport underpinning a newly elevated Italy–Japan special strategic partnership, one rooted as much in shared political outlooks as in hard strategic interests. Both leaders, the first women to head their respective governments and shaped by conservative, self-made political trajectories, project confidence and ideological alignment — a rare pairing that adds an unmistakably human dimension to statecraft.

Yet the symbolism goes well beyond personality politics. Set against the backdrop of Tokyo talks that upgraded bilateral ties, the photograph underscores how personal affinity can lubricate strategic alignment in an era of geopolitical fragmentation. Italy and Japan are converging on defence cooperation, economic security, and supply-chain resilience, while voicing shared concerns over China’s regional behaviour and North Korea’s provocations. The image therefore functions as a visual shorthand for a deeper reality: the blending of values, leadership style, and strategic calculation that is drawing two geographically distant but like-minded Indo-Pacific and European powers closer together.

Personal Chemistry, Strategic Convergence Beyond the Horizon ISSG

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world

EU–India Security & Defence Partnership

This week’s infographic captures the strategic logic behind the EU–India Security and Defence Partnership, framing it squarely within the Indo-Pacific rather than as a narrow bilateral accord. The visual emphasis on maritime routes, digital networks, and cyber domains underlines that the agreement is non-kinetic by design, prioritising stability over escalation. Open sea lanes, maritime domain awareness, and cyber resilience emerge as the core pillars—areas where European and Indian interests converge amid rising pressure on supply chains and critical infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific.

Equally important is what the infographic makes explicit about what the partnership is not. EU officials frame the agreement as a response to geopolitical disruption, but it deliberately stops short of binding defence commitments. This is alignment without entanglement. For both Brussels and New Delhi, the partnership is about flexibility, political signalling, and strategic optionality—strengthening cooperation in sensitive domains while preserving autonomy. In an era of uncertainty, the infographic conveys a clear message: the EU–India relationship is evolving into a stabilising force in the Indo-Pacific, anchored more in shared risk management than in formal military integration.

India–UAE Strategic Partnership and Its Indo-Pacific Significance

Introduction

The deepening strategic partnership between India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) marks a notable evolution in regional alignments that resonates beyond the immediate neighborhood into Indo-Pacific strategy and security architectures. Traditionally viewed as a bilateral relationship rooted in trade, energy, and diaspora ties, the recent agreements between New Delhi and Abu Dhabi signal a broader strategic convergence — one that has implications for regional security, defence cooperation, and the balancing of external powers across the Indo-Pacific and its adjoining corridors. This analysis contextualises the India–UAE strategic defence partnership within the wider tapestry of Indo-Pacific geopolitics, tracing its drivers, manifestations, and potential effects on alliance patterns and regional stability.

Drivers of the India–UAE Strategic Defence Partnership

The impetus for an enhanced India–UAE security relationship stems from several intersecting trends in regional geopolitics. New Delhi and Abu Dhabi have shared interests in maintaining secure maritime routes, energy flows, and political stability across the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman — nodes that are intrinsically linked to broader Indo-Pacific trade and security dynamics. The two leaders agreed on a Letter of Intent toward a Strategic Defence Partnership Framework, designed to broaden defence cooperation beyond ad-hoc drills to encompass industrial collaboration, interoperability, advanced technologies, training, cyberspace operations, and counter-terrorism cooperation. This initiative extends a pattern of growing security dialogue that includes joint exercises and high-level military exchanges.

The acceleration of this partnership occurs at a time when the Indo-Pacific is experiencing intensifying competition, particularly between the United States and China, and when states in South and West Asia are navigating complex alignments. Against this backdrop, India’s outreach to the UAE serves multiple purposes: hedging against undue reliance on any single external power, projecting strategic influence across critical sea lanes, and reinforcing cooperative frameworks that enhance deterrence and crisis response in contested maritime domains. The focus on counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and defence industrialisation parallels broader coalition-building efforts seen in forums like the Quad (United States, Japan, Australia, India) and reflects India’s aim to meld Middle Eastern security concerns with Indo-Pacific strategic currents.

Strategic and Economic Dimensions

The defence partnership is nested within a wider economic and geopolitical agenda. Alongside defence cooperation, India and the UAE signed a $3 billion ten-year LNG supply agreement and set an ambitious target to double bilateral trade to $200 billion by 2032, while expanding engagement in energy, space, AI, nuclear technology, and infrastructure investment. These economic dimensions reinforce strategic ties by creating interdependencies that elevate the salience of security cooperation.

Crucially, the integration of trade, energy, and security objectives mirrors India’s broader strategy of linking economic partnerships with geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific periphery. For New Delhi, the Gulf — and particularly the UAE — functions as a strategic bridge between the Indian Ocean littoral and the western sectors of the Indo-Pacific theatre, where power projection, maritime security, and energy flows coalesce. The synergy between economic cooperation and defence engagement enhances India’s role in shaping stable order in critical sea lines of communication extending from the Arabian Sea to Southeast Asia.

Implications for Indo-Pacific Security Architectures

The India–UAE strategic defence partnership carries several implications for Indo-Pacific alliances and regional security dynamics:

1. Diversification of Strategic Networks:

India’s engagement with the UAE expands its security network beyond traditional Indo-Pacific partners (e.g., Japan, Australia, ASEAN states) into West Asia, an increasingly salient sub-region in any comprehensive Indo-Pacific security calculus. This diversification strengthens resilience against coercive pressures and enhances India’s capacity to contribute to stability across contiguous maritime domains.

2. Complementarity with U.S. Strategic Objectives:

While the partnership with the UAE is bilaterally driven, it dovetails with U.S. interests in bolstering coalition frameworks to manage China’s rise without over-dependence on U.S. unilateral deployments. The UAE, a key security partner in the Gulf and a member of I2U2 (with India, Israel, and the United States), anchors a network through which broader cooperation — including security dialogues that intersect with Indo-Pacific objectives — can be advanced.

3. Balancing Regional Power Dynamics:

The pact also signals an effort to balance the influence of other regional alignments — notably the Saudi-Pakistan defence cooperation — that could shape power equations in West Asia with indirect bearings on the Indo-Pacific via energy markets and militant networks. India’s strategic outreach to the UAE positions it as a security partner of choice in a region where multiple external powers vie for influence.

4. Military Interoperability and Capability Development:

Emerging defence cooperation frameworks emphasise joint training, technology exchange, and interoperability. These initiatives could strengthen regional capacity to respond to cross-domain threats — from maritime piracy to cyber operations — that have become increasingly trans-regional in nature. Improved interoperability with the UAE’s forces could also facilitate combined operations that align with multiparty Indo-Pacific security initiatives.

Challenges and Limitations

Despite its promise, the partnership faces challenges. India has been careful to clarify that deeper defence ties do not imply involvement in regional conflicts, particularly those in the Gulf’s complex theatre. This caution reflects New Delhi’s longstanding strategic autonomy doctrine and its desire to avoid entanglement in localized disputes. Balancing strategic cooperation with such autonomy will require careful diplomatic calibration.

Additionally, while the UAE–India partnership strengthens bilateral ties, translating a Letter of Intent into a fully codified and operational defence framework will be intricate, requiring sustained engagement, trust-building, and alignment of threat perceptions. The effectiveness of this partnership in shaping broader Indo-Pacific security outcomes will depend on its operational depth and the degree of integration with other regional security architectures.

Conclusion: Strategic Connectivity Across Regions

The India–UAE strategic defence partnership exemplifies how middle and major powers are reconfiguring alliances beyond traditional regional boundaries in response to evolving security challenges. Within the Indo-Pacific context, this relationship reinforces India’s role as a bridging power, enhancing security linkages between South Asia, West Asia, and the wider Indo-Pacific. By integrating economic, energy, and defence cooperation, both nations are cultivating a multidimensional partnership that augments regional stability, diversifies alliance structures, and contributes to resilient security architectures adaptable to the 21st-century strategic environment.

U.S. 2026 National Defense Strategy — Implications for the Indo-Pacific

Introduction

The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) represents a significant recalibration of American military priorities, with profound implications for the Indo-Pacific. Released by the Pentagon in January 2026, the strategy reflects a marked shift away from broad global commitments toward a narrowed focus on homeland defence and deterring China “through strength, not confrontation.” While it retains America’s foundational interest in the Indo-Pacific, the approach and burden-sharing expectations it signals are set to reshape regional dynamics, alliance responsibilities, and deterrence postures across Asia.

Strategic Context and Core Priorities

At the core of the 2026 NDS are three strategic lines of effort: defend the U.S. homeland, deter China in the Indo-Pacific, and increase burden-sharing with allies and partners. The document elevates homeland defence as the top priority, a pivot that reflects domestic political pressures and a re-evaluation of global commitments. Yet it explicitly maintains that deterring China’s bid for regional dominance remains a principal external security objective, enshrined as a distinct line of effort that incorporates military strength, reassurance of partners, and calibrated engagement with Beijing.

Importantly, the strategy frames deterrence not as seeking confrontation with China but as preventing any power from dominating the Indo-Pacific. It prescribes strengthening “denial defence” along the First Island Chain — the arc of maritime geography stretching from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines — aimed at constraining coercive efforts to alter the regional status quo. This emphasis preserves continuity with earlier U.S. policy, which has long viewed preventing Chinese hegemony over maritime Asia as central to a stable security order.

Alliance Burden-Sharing and Regional Partnerships

A defining feature of the 2026 NDS is its explicit call for greater burden-sharing from U.S. allies and partners. The strategy states that while Washington will continue to provide critical but limited support, allies must assume primary responsibility for local defence — including in Korea, Europe, and beyond — enabling the U.S. to concentrate its forces where they matter most. In the Indo-Pacific, this implicitly compels states such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and ASEAN partners to sustain and enhance their capabilities, deterrence postures, and contributions to regional security architecture.

This expectation builds on existing frameworks like the U.S.–Japan alliance, the Australia–U.S. partnership, and security dialogues such as Quad (U.S., Japan, Australia, India) and AUKUS. In practice, it institutionalizes an evolving division of labour: the U.S. provides strategic direction, key enabling capabilities, and deterrent underpinnings, while allies and partners bolster conventional capabilities and assume leadership in local contingencies. This marks a departure from past eras of more unilateral U.S. defence commitments.

However, this shift is not purely doctrinal — it also reflects structural constraints. U.S. defence planners have cited the simultaneity problem: the impossibility of sustaining high-end combat operations across multiple theatres without overstretch. By pushing allies to lead in regional defence responsibilities, the strategy attempts to hedge against the risk of being drawn into simultaneous crises, while still maintaining credible deterrence against China.

Rebalancing Presence and Force Posture

Despite rhetoric prioritizing the homeland, the NDS underscores that the Indo-Pacific remains central to U.S. strategic interests, given the region’s economic significance and geostrategic contours. The emphasis on deterrence through strength implies continued U.S. force posture investments in forward-deployed units, joint exercises, technological integration, and interoperability initiatives with regional allies — elements that underpin a networked security approach rather than a purely unilateral footprint.

Operationally, this approach intersects with ongoing initiatives like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), which has funded capabilities and infrastructure intended to enhance readiness in the Western Pacific. Although not explicitly updated in the NDS text itself, the strategic logic of PDI — bolstering air and maritime denial, enhancing pre-positioning, and supporting joint exercises — coheres with the document’s deterrence objectives.

Risks, Reception, and Regional Reactions

The strategy’s emphasis on limited direct support to allies has elicited concern among U.S. partners, particularly in East Asia. Some analysts argue that messaging about scaled-back support could undermine deterrence by introducing ambiguity into U.S. security commitments. For instance, Southeast Asian states — already navigating a delicate balance between Beijing and Washington — may perceive the emphasis on allied responsibility as a signal of diminishing U.S. guarantees, complicating their strategic calculations.

Similarly, Japan and South Korea — who face direct security challenges from China and North Korea, respectively — are recalibrating their defence postures in light of the strategy. Japan has accelerated its defence budget and missile defence integration, while South Korea has been encouraged to assume greater responsibility in deterring North Korea. These trends align with U.S. expectations but also reflect the broader Indo-Pacific trend toward strategic autonomy among key regional powers.

Conclusion: Continuity and Change in Indo-Pacific Policy

The 2026 National Defense Strategy reaffirms that the Indo-Pacific remains central to U.S. strategic interests, particularly in deterring China’s dominance. Yet it departs from past defence doctrines by prioritizing homeland defence and requiring greater burden-sharing from allies. In effect, Washington is signalling a more networked and partnership-dependent approach — one that balances credible deterrence with constraints on U.S. force deployment and expectations about ally contributions.

For the Indo-Pacific, this strategy crystallizes a transitional moment: the United States remains a security linchpin, but the architecture of deterrence increasingly depends on empowered regional actors. Whether this will strengthen regional security or create gaps in commitment perceptions will hinge on follow-through in alliance modernization, interoperability, and sustained political will across capitals in Asia and Washington alike.

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