ASIA ON THE HORIZON 500X500 (Logo)

05 JANUARY 2026

Welcome to the first 2026 edition of Asia on the Horizon. As we stand at the threshold of a new year, we look back on a December that was anything but quiet. Because we did not publish during the final two weeks of 2025, this issue serves as an expanded retrospective and a forward-looking briefing, capturing the seismic shifts that defined the year’s end and set the stage for the strategic challenges of 2026.

The closing weeks of 2025 were marked by profound tragedy and hardening geopolitical lines. Australia remains in a state of national mourning and intense security debate following the horrific December 14 terrorist attack at Sydney’s Bondi Beach, an event that has fundamentally shifted the domestic conversation on extremism and radicalization. Simultaneously, in Hong Kong, the landmark conviction of Jimmy Lai under the National Security Law has signalled a definitive legal and political closing of an era for the city’s pro-democracy movement, drawing sharp international condemnation and further polarizing China’s relations with the West.

Across the Indo-Pacific, the military and maritime temperature continues to rise. From the “grey zone” tactics at Sabina Shoal, where Filipino fishermen were injured by Chinese water cannons , to the massive PLA live-fire exercises encircling Taiwan in the final days of December, the risk of miscalculation is higher than ever. These operational realities are now being met with legislative and budgetary force: the U.S. Senate’s passage of the PORCUPINE Act and Japan’s record-breaking ¥8.3 trillion defence budget for 2026 underscore a region arming itself for a “2027 window” that no longer feels hypothetical.

Diplomatically, we are witnessing a complex reordering of legacies and alliances. While China and Saudi Arabia tighten their strategic embrace, and India cements a critical military logistics pact with Russia, the European Union has adopted a more sceptical and assertive tone, warning against the “weaponization” of economic ties. Even the symbols of diplomacy are shifting; for the first time in half a century, Japan’s zoos will be empty of giant pandas—a quiet but potent marker of the current chill in Sino-Japanese relations.

In this issue, we analyse these developments not as isolated incidents, but as interconnected threads in a broader struggle for regional order. Whether it is the technological battle over semiconductor tariffs or the unglamorous but vital logistics integration of the Quad, Asia on the Horizon remains your essential guide to the nuances of power in the world’s most consequential region.

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Deadly Bondi Beach Attack Heightens Concern Over Antisemitism and Terrorism in Australia

On 14 December 2025, a mass shooting at a Hanukkah menorah-lighting event on Sydney’s Bondi Beach resulted in one of the most horrendous acts of violence in modern Australian history. Two gunmen, later identified as father and son Sajid and Naveed Akram, opened fire on attendees at the Chanukah by the Sea celebration, killing 15 civilians and injuring more than 40 others before Sajid was killed by police and Naveed was critically wounded and taken into custody on multiple terrorism and murder charges. The victims spanned a wide age range—from children to elderly Holocaust survivors—and included individuals who tried to intervene to protect others. The attack was swiftly declared a terrorist incident by New South Wales authorities, with ISIS-inspired symbols found in the perpetrators’ vehicle and evidence pointing to antisemitic motivation, though investigators have concluded there is no indication the pair were part of a broader militant cell.

The shooting has triggered significant political and social fallout within Australia. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese condemned the assault as a “dark day” and vowed to pursue tougher gun control and counter-extremism measures, a response echoed by state leaders. Calls for a federal royal commission into antisemitism and extremist radicalisation have been spearheaded by prominent athletes and community figures, urging deeper inquiry into societal divisions that may have enabled the attack.

Hong Kong Court Convicts Jimmy Lai in National Security Trial

On 15 December 2025, Hong Kong’s High Court delivered a landmark verdict in the high-profile national security prosecution of media tycoon and pro-democracy advocate Jimmy Lai, finding him guilty on two counts of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces and one count of sedition under the China-imposed National Security Law. The charges, rooted in alleged efforts to enlist foreign pressure against the Hong Kong and mainland governments and to publish material deemed seditious, carry penalties including up to life imprisonment, with sentencing scheduled for a future date. Lai, 78, who has been detained since 2020 and previously spent years in custody on related protest-linked offences, maintained his innocence throughout the protracted trial.

The verdict has prompted sharp polarisation both within Hong Kong and internationally. Hong Kong and Chinese officials frame the ruling as a lawful and necessary enforcement of sovereign security statutes, insisting due process was observed and dismissing claims that the case targets press freedom per se. In contrast, press freedom groups and Western governments have condemned the conviction as politically motivated and a “sham” that erodes the city’s autonomy under the one country, two systems framework.

China–Saudi Strategic Convergence Gains Momentum

China and Saudi Arabia used Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s mid-December visit to Riyadh to signal a tighter alignment on both regional diplomacy and long-term economic strategy. In meetings with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and senior Saudi officials, both sides pledged deeper coordination on Middle East flashpoints — including Gaza and Gulf security — while reiterating respect for each other’s “core interests.” Beijing framed Riyadh as a pivotal stabilising force in the region, while the Saudis welcomed China’s support for diplomatic solutions and its expanding political role beyond energy cooperation.

Economically, the visit also revived Beijing’s push to finalise a long-delayed free-trade agreement between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Chinese officials cast the deal as a bulwark against global protectionism and a natural evolution of already-dense trade links, as Saudi Arabia remains a key energy supplier to China. The courtship underscores a broader reality: both governments see value in insulating their partnership from Western pressure while embedding it in institutions and long-term investment frameworks. For Washington and Brussels, the message is uncomfortable but unambiguous — China’s political and economic footprint in the Gulf is no longer peripheral, but increasingly central to regional order.

Escalation at Sabina Shoal: Filipino Fishers Injured in South China Sea Clash

In mid-December 2025, a serious maritime incident unfolded near Sabina Shoal (Escoda Shoal) in the South China Sea, within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, when the China Coast Guard used high-pressure water cannons and blocking manoeuvres against a group of Filipino fishing boats. Manila’s coast guard reported that three fishermen were physically injured and two vessels suffered significant damage after being struck by water jets, while smaller Chinese boats also cut anchor lines, endangering crews amid strong currents. Philippine rescue vessels attempting to reach the scene were repeatedly blocked before finally delivering medical aid and supplies, prompting Manila to lodge a diplomatic protest and call on Beijing to adhere to “internationally recognised standards of conduct at sea.”

The confrontation has drawn international condemnation, with the United States and Canada publicly denouncing China’s actions as “aggressive” and a threat to lives and regional stability, underscoring treaty obligations and support for Philippine sovereign rights. Washington’s State Department urged restraint and respect for freedom of navigation, while Beijing accused Manila of provocation and warned against foreign interference in what it views as its maritime affairs. The skirmish highlights the persistent volatility of South China Sea disputes, where civilian fishers increasingly find themselves at the front line of broader geopolitical competition between claimant states and external powers.

India–France Tax Treaty Overhaul Strengthens Economic Ties

On 12 December 2025, India and France formally agreed to revamp their bilateral tax treaty, delivering a significant diplomatic and economic victory for both sides. The updated pact enhances France’s ability to tax profits from digital and cross-border services earned by French companies operating in India, while granting Delhi greater rights to tax income derived from Indian entities in France. The deal was celebrated by Paris as a means to curb tax avoidance and align with global standards on taxing digitalised businesses, reflecting broader OECD-led reforms. For New Delhi, the treaty update secures clarity and reciprocal enforcement mechanisms, reducing longstanding friction over double taxation and strengthening investor confidence.

The renewed treaty also signals a deepening of strategic cooperation between the two democracies beyond defence and climate partnerships. Indian officials highlighted the pact as part of a broader effort to modernise economic frameworks in support of intensified trade and investment flows. French policymakers, meanwhile, underscored the agreement’s role in promoting fair taxation and sustainable economic engagement amid a shifting global tax landscape. Observers view the treaty as bolstering bilateral economic relations while exemplifying how major emerging markets and advanced economies can reconcile competing tax interests in the digital age.

EU–India Trade Deal Stalls, Dimming Hopes for Year-End Conclusion

Efforts to finalise a comprehensive EU–India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) have faltered, with senior EU and Indian officials indicating there is little realistic prospect of concluding the deal by the end of 2025. Negotiations, ongoing for nearly a decade, have repeatedly run into sticking points on market access, tariffs, and regulatory alignment, particularly over European demands for greater Indian agricultural and dairy exports and Indian insistence on safeguards for its sensitive industries. Despite mutual recognition of the strategic value of stronger economic ties, both sides have adopted cautious postures, prioritising domestic sector concerns over rapid finalisation.

The delay highlights broader challenges in bridging the divergent economic interests of a major global trading bloc and a large emerging market. For the EU, securing enhanced access to India’s fast-growing consumer base is key to diversifying supply chains and counterbalancing China’s regional influence. New Delhi, for its part, remains wary of exposing nascent industries to European competition and seeks greater reciprocity on services and investment protections. While officials say talks will continue into 2026, the setback underscores the complexity of aligning regulatory and economic priorities at a time of heightened geopolitical and protectionist pressures.

China Marks Nanjing Massacre Quietly Amid Japan Tensions

On 13 December 2025, China observed the 88th anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre with a subdued memorial in Nanjing, reflecting both reverence for historical memory and an effort to temper bilateral tensions with Japan. The ceremony at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall was attended by local officials and survivors’ families, emphasising solemn remembrance of the atrocity in which hundreds of thousands of Chinese civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed by the Imperial Japanese Army in 1937–38. State media highlighted themes of peace and mutual respect, while avoiding overtly confrontational rhetoric. The muted tone, compared with more politically charged commemorations in the past, suggests Beijing is seeking to balance domestic expectations for historical recognition with broader diplomatic stability in East Asia.

Despite the restrained official observance, the anniversary occurs against a backdrop of renewed strains in China–Japan relations, including disputes over history education and territorial issues in the East China Sea. Japanese government statements reiterated regret over past wartime actions but stopped short of offering new apologies, prompting friction in domestic political discourse on both sides. Analysts say China’s low-key ceremony may be calculated to avoid escalation with Tokyo while retaining sovereignty over the narrative of historical trauma. The development underscores how historical memory remains a potent but carefully managed element of regional diplomacy, with implications for future cooperation on security and economic issues in the Asia-Pacific.

Japan Returns Pandas to China as Ties with Beijing Cool

Japan returns its last two giant pandas, Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei, to China in late January 2026, ending a continuous presence of the iconic animals in the country that stretches back to the 1972 normalisation of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. The twin pandas, born at Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo in 2021, have drawn huge crowds and become beloved national fixtures. Their departure—scheduled ahead of the formal end of their loan agreement—will leave Japan without any giant pandas for the first time in over 50 years, prompting emotional responses from visitors and raising concerns among zoo officials and the public. Tokyo has expressed interest in securing new panda loans, but no firm commitment has emerged yet.

The decision is widely seen as a symbolic marker of deteriorating Japan–China relations, even though the panda return follows the terms of existing lease arrangements. Rising geopolitical tensions, notably over Taiwan and recent diplomatic friction after comments by Japan’s leadership, have clouded bilateral exchanges. While panda diplomacy has historically served as a soft-power bridge between Beijing and other capitals, the absence of pandas in Japan may reflect fraying goodwill at a time of deepening strategic competition in East Asia.

U.S. Senate Passes PORCUPINE Act to Bolster Taiwan’s Defense Partnerships

In a significant legislative move on 11 December 2025, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the PORCUPINE Act, designed to accelerate and expand the transfer of defense equipment from the United States and its allies to Taiwan. Formally titled the Providing Our Regional Companions Upgraded Protection in Nefarious Environments Act, the measure amends the Arms Export Control Act to simplify export procedures for military hardware and related support, aiming to enhance the island’s deterrence amid rising military pressure from China. Taipei’s government welcomed the bipartisan support, framing it as a tangible reinforcement of Washington’s commitment to Taiwan’s security under the Taiwan Relations Act.

The legislation emerges against a backdrop of intensifying cross-strait tensions — including recent PLA exercises encircling Taiwan and increased Chinese cyber and military coercion — and reflects broader U.S. strategic efforts to deter Beijing’s coercive posture in the Indo-Pacific. While not altering U.S. policy on formal recognition, the PORCUPINE Act signals deeper defense cooperation with Taipei and facilitates multilateral support channels involving U.S. allies. Observers say the move will likely deepen Taipei’s defense partnerships with key democracies and may prompt further legislative initiatives focused on supply-chain security and capacity building with Taiwan in 2026.

China Hits Back at Former Japanese Defence Official with Sanctions

On 15 December 2025, Beijing announced targeted countermeasures against Nobuo Kishi, a former Japanese defence minister and influential figure in Tokyo’s security establishment, following his recent remarks advocating for expanded Japanese military cooperation with the United States and a firmer stance on Taiwan’s defence. China’s foreign ministry accused Kishi of promoting “wrong policies” that harm Sino-Japanese ties and undermine regional peace. The measures reportedly include restrictions on Kishi’s travel to or business with mainland China, though Beijing did not specify the full scope or enforcement mechanisms. Chinese officials framed the move as a necessary response to what they described as “irresponsible” political posturing.

The sanctions underscore increasing diplomatic friction between Beijing and Tokyo amid a rapidly shifting security environment in East Asia. Tokyo has been steadily enhancing its defence posture, including through deeper engagement with the United States, Australia and other Quad partners, in response to China’s growing military assertiveness. While Japan has refrained from officially commenting on Beijing’s sanctions against Kishi, analysts say the episode highlights the broader politicisation of defence dialogues and the risk that individual policymakers may become flashpoints in great-power competition. The development is likely to complicate efforts to stabilise China–Japan relations, already strained by historical disputes and diverging strategic priorities.

India and Russia Cement Military Logistics Cooperation

On 15 December 2025, India and Russia formally signed the ReLOS military logistics agreement, a pact designed to streamline defence cooperation by facilitating reciprocal access to military facilities for supplies, repairs and replenishment. President Vladimir Putin ratified the agreement into Russian federal law, completing a key procedural step following its negotiation earlier this year. New Delhi portrays ReLOS as a practical framework to enhance operational interoperability and readiness across a range of defence engagements — from joint exercises to strategic mobility — without compromising India’s strategic autonomy.

The deal signals a deepening of Indo-Russian defence ties amid a complex security landscape in Eurasia, even as New Delhi concurrently expands partnerships with Western and Quad allies. For Moscow, the pact reassures India of Russia’s commitment as a reliable defence partner despite Western sanctions pressure. While the agreement is not a mutual defence pact, analysts say it strengthens logistical linkages that could prove consequential in contingencies and boosts confidence for future joint operations and technology collaboration. The move underscores New Delhi’s calibrated approach to balancing great-power relations while enhancing its strategic defence infrastructure.

Taiwan Armed Forces Stress Readiness Amid China’s Military Pressure

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense stated on 16 December 2025 that its military maintains the capability to rapidly respond to any sudden attack by China, underscoring heightened vigilance amid increased PLA air and naval activity near the island. Taipei highlighted ongoing improvements in surveillance, force mobility, and joint operations readiness, while reiterating its commitment to defending territorial integrity without seeking conflict. The statement followed a period marked by frequent Chinese sorties into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, which Taipei says aim to wear down its forces and signal Beijing’s determination to assert claims over the island.

The public emphasis on rapid response capability aims to reassure both domestic audiences and international partners, particularly the United States, of Taiwan’s defensive resilience. Analysts note that Taiwan’s push for enhanced readiness dovetails with procurement of advanced weapons systems and reforms to operational command structures. While Taipei continues to avoid provocative rhetoric, its defensive posture reflects growing strategic calculation that deterrence — bolstered by clear communication of military preparedness — is essential amid Beijing’s sustained pressure and growing regional uncertainty.

EU Warns China’s Economic Leverage Is Being Weaponized for Political Ends

On 15 December 2025, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, speaking on behalf of the European Union, warned that China is increasingly weaponizing economic ties to secure political advantages, signalling a more assertive and skeptical EU posture toward Beijing. Kallas underscored Beijing’s use of trade restrictions, investment controls, and market access as tools to influence foreign policy decisions, framing these practices as a challenge to the rules-based international order. The comments come amid broader EU introspection over dependencies in critical sectors such as telecommunications, rare earths, and green technology supply chains, where Chinese firms play dominant roles.

The statement reflects mounting concern in Brussels that economic engagement without strategic safeguards may undercut EU autonomy and leverage. While the bloc continues to pursue constructive dialogue with China on global issues like climate change and peace diplomacy, Kallas stressed the need for reciprocity, fair competition, and resilience against coercive tactics. Analysts say the shift indicates a maturing EU China strategy that balances cooperation with defensive measures, aiming to protect European interests without decoupling entirely — a nuanced approach as geopolitical competition intensifies across the Asia-Europe corridor.

UK Intelligence Watchdog Urges Stronger Stance on China Security Risks

The United Kingdom’s parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) has publicly warned that the government is “dragging its heels” on key decisions related to China’s strategic threat, particularly over whether to classify Beijing as a top-tier risk under its Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS). The ISC, which oversees national security policy, criticised ministers for delays in deciding whether individuals and organisations acting on behalf of China should be subject to stricter registration requirements — a move that would align China with states like Russia and Iran in terms of scrutiny. The committee’s annual report suggests unresolved concerns about foreign interference and asserts that delaying such a classification risks prioritising economic and diplomatic considerations over national security.

The watchdog’s rebuke comes amid broader unease in London about Chinese espionage and influence operations, exacerbated by collapsed spy cases and intelligence assessments of Beijing’s covert activities. While Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s government emphasises a “balanced approach” that combines engagement with challenge, critics argue that the cautious posture risks undermining the UK’s ability to respond effectively to sophisticated threats. The ISC has urged clearer accountability for how decisions are made and warned that strategic ambiguity may erode public confidence in the government’s capacity to protect democratic institutions.

U.S. Labels Fentanyl a Weapon of Mass Destruction

On December 15, 2025, President **Donald J. Trump issued an executive order designating fentanyl and other synthetic opioids as “weapons of mass destruction” (WMDs) under U.S. law. The move empowers federal agencies to pursue enhanced criminal penalties, expands the tools available to disrupt production and trafficking networks, and authorises broader use of intelligence and military resources in the fight against the opioid crisis. The designation comes amid record overdose deaths, driven largely by illicit fentanyl, and reflects an administration strategy to recast the crisis from a public health issue to a national security threat requiring aggressive enforcement.

The WMD label significantly alters the legal framework for prosecuting traffickers and could affect international cooperation, particularly with Mexico and China, which U.S. officials say are key sources of precursor chemicals. By framing the epidemic in security terms, the administration aims to accelerate seizures of funds, assets, and communications tied to supply chains. Critics warn that militarising the response may marginalise treatment and harm-reduction strategies, while supporters argue the U.S. needs extraordinary measures given the scale of fatalities. The decision is likely to shape domestic policy and foreign diplomatic engagement on narcotics control in 2026.

UK Intelligence Watchdog: Government Urged to Step Up China Response

In its Annual Report 2023–2025, the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) criticised the government for delaying key decisions on how to treat the China threat, particularly under the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) established in July. The committee highlighted that while Russia and Iran have been placed on the stricter “enhanced tier”, which requires broad disclosure of activities by foreign agents, China has not yet been elevated despite clear evidence of extensive interference operations and espionage. The ISC warned that the government must decide swiftly whether to include China in the enhanced tier and explain its reasoning, arguing that delays risk prioritising economic considerations over national security obligations. This call reflects broader oversight concerns about the UK’s preparedness to confront complex foreign influence campaigns.

The report also underscores lingering concerns about China’s covert activity in the UK, from cyber-espionage targeting critical infrastructure and political figures to influence campaigns within academia and industry. MI5 and other security bodies have repeatedly warned of increased Chinese intelligence efforts that exploit diplomatic, commercial, and professional networks. The ISC’s critique is part of a broader national debate over how London balances economic engagement with Beijing against the need to safeguard sovereignty and democratic institutions, as debates continue over legislative reforms and threat classifications.

Quad Advances Indo-Pacific Logistics Integration Through Field Training Exercise

In December 2025, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia — successfully concluded a multinational field training exercise designed to strengthen the emerging Indo-Pacific logistics network. The exercise focused on enhancing interoperability among the four militaries in areas such as expeditionary logistics, rapid resupply, and sustainment operations in distributed environments. Officials highlighted how improved logistics coordination is crucial for maintaining operational readiness and resilience across vast maritime domains, particularly in scenarios involving humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and potential contingencies.

The training underscores the Quad’s evolving emphasis on practical cooperation that complements broader security dialogues without formalising a military alliance. By rehearsing integrated logistics support — including shared standards, communications protocols, and joint training frameworks — the partners aim to reduce friction in real-world operations and improve response times. Analysts say this development reflects a strategic push to build “quiet connectivity” that strengthens collective capacity and deterrence in the face of increasing contestation over freedom of navigation and regional influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Chinese Carrier Transit Through Taiwan Strait Signals Military Assertiveness

On 17 December 2025, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft carrier strike group sailed through the Taiwan Strait—a rare and provocative transit demonstrating China’s expanding naval reach and operational confidence. Taipei’s defense authorities stated the movement occurred without incident but affirmed that multiple PLA fighter jets and support vessels accompanied the carrier, underscoring the complexity and scale of Beijing’s maritime deployments. The transit follows a pattern of increased Chinese military activities near Taiwan, including frequent sorties into the island’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and joint naval exercises with Russian warships.

Taipei framed the carrier transit as part of China’s broader strategy to normalise pressure on Taiwan and to signal capability for power projection in and beyond the First Island Chain. While no clash occurred, the incident has heightened concerns among Taiwanese defence planners and international observers about the PLA’s evolving doctrine, which increasingly integrates carrier aviation, amphibious units, and missile strikes for potential cross-strait contingencies. The development adds urgency to Taiwan’s ongoing force modernisation and underscores the strategic dilemma facing Indo-Pacific partners as they balance deterrence messaging with avoidance of escalation in one of the region’s most sensitive maritime flashpoints.

Pakistan’s Military Chief Draws Attention Amid U.S. Gaza Peace Plan Debate

General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, has become a focal point in discussions over U.S. President Donald Trump’s Gaza peace plan, highlighting Islamabad’s complex diplomatic balancing act between its traditional Arab partners, strategic ties with Washington, and domestic public opinion. According to Reuters reporting on 17 December 2025, Pakistan’s leadership—including its military establishment—has been under scrutiny after voiced criticisms of the Trump plan, which was widely perceived in many Muslim-majority countries as favouring Israeli positions and inadequately addressing Palestinian statehood and rights. General Munir, wielding substantial influence in Pakistan’s foreign policy calculus, has been central to shaping Islamabad’s response, which seeks to align with broad public sentiment opposing the U.S. proposal while navigating pressure from Western capitals.

The spotlight on Munir underscores the heightened political salience of Middle East policy within South Asian geopolitics and signals Pakistan’s intent to assert an independent diplomatic stance rather than simply echoing traditional allies. Islamabad has reiterated its support for a two-state solution and called for greater international engagement to address Palestinian grievances, framing its position as consistent with both regional security interests and domestic expectations. The episode illustrates how external developments—such as the Gaza peace plan—can reverberate through Pakistan’s civil–military relationship, foreign policy priorities, and its broader efforts to balance competing strategic partnerships.

Apple Explores Deeper Manufacturing Ties in India’s Chip Sector

Apple Inc. has initiated talks with Indian semiconductor firms to expand its assembly and packaging operations for iPhone components within India, Reuters reported on 17 December 2025. The discussions signal a potential shift toward diversifying Apple’s supply chain beyond its traditional bases in China and Southeast Asia. Indian companies in consideration are said to include local players with growing expertise in chip testing, assembly and advanced packaging — key stages in semiconductor production that could bolster India’s ambitions to become a more significant node in global electronics manufacturing.

The move aligns with India’s broader strategy to attract high-tech investment and reduce reliance on China for critical technology supply chains. New Delhi has in recent years offered incentives under its Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes to draw foreign firms and build indigenous capabilities across semiconductors, electric vehicles and other advanced sectors. For Apple, deeper engagement with Indian chip assemblers could accelerate local iPhone production, improve cost efficiencies, and respond to geopolitical risks by diversifying operational footprints. While talks are ongoing and no formal agreements have been announced, the development underscores India’s rising appeal as a strategic partner for global technology firms seeking supply-chain resilience.

China Vows Deeper Strategic Partnership with Saudi Arabia Amid Broader Cooperation Push

During high-level talks in Riyadh in mid-December 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s intent to be Saudi Arabia’s “most reliable and dependable partner,” as both sides agreed to expand cooperation across political, economic and regional affairs. Wang and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman discussed strengthening coordination on Middle East peace initiatives, energy security, and multilateral mechanisms, with Beijing expressing support for stability efforts and a balanced approach to regional disputes. The rhetoric underscored China’s ambition to deepen its diplomatic footprint in the Gulf as part of a broader outreach to Arab states, balancing relations with Western powers while enhancing China-Middle East ties.

Economically, the two countries highlighted progress on bilateral trade and investment, with Riyadh endorsing China’s Global Development Initiative and Belt and Road cooperation, and Beijing praising Saudi leadership in regional infrastructure and energy diversification. Both sides reiterated commitments to broaden people-to-people exchanges and cultural ties, while exploring enhanced cooperation in emerging sectors such as renewable energy, technology and logistics. Analysts view the strengthened alignment not merely as transactional, but as part of Beijing’s longer-term strategy to build resilient partnerships in the Gulf that support China’s global economic ambitions and provide Riyadh with diversified diplomatic and commercial options.

U.S. Approves Major Taiwan Arms Sale Amid Rising Cross-Strait Tensions

The Biden administration has moved forward with a significant arms package for Taiwan, approving the potential sale of long-range missiles and precision-strike munitions worth up to $345 million, a decision aimed at enhancing Taipei’s deterrence capabilities against growing military pressure from China. The proposed sale includes Harpoon coastal defense systems and related support equipment, which U.S. officials contend will strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric defense posture and improve its ability to counter amphibious and aerial threats. The notification to Congress triggered swift reactions from lawmakers and stakeholders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Beijing condemned the arms approval as a violation of its One China principle, warning that such transactions undermine regional peace and stability and could prompt retaliatory measures. Taiwanese authorities, for their part, welcomed the sale as a crucial step in modernising their defense forces and reinforcing strategic deterrence in the face of regular PLA sorties and naval activity near the island. The development underscores Washington’s commitment to supporting Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act while navigating complex U.S.–China ties, and it signals that advanced defense cooperation with Taipei remains a central pillar of U.S. Indo-Pacific policy even amid broader diplomatic challenges.

China Reaffirms Support for Venezuela Amid U.S. Pressure

On 17 December 2025, China publicly voiced its support for Venezuela’s government, condemning what Beijing described as “unilateral bullying” and external interference in Caracas’s internal affairs. The statement, issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, emphasised respect for national sovereignty and non-interference, framing China’s relationship with Venezuela as rooted in mutual respect and cooperative development. Chinese officials reiterated economic and diplomatic ties, including energy cooperation, and criticised sanctions and pressure measures led by the United States, which have sought to compel political concessions from Venezuelan authorities.

Beijing’s stance reflects broader strategic calculations as it seeks to project influence in Latin America while defending a global order based on state sovereignty — a theme consistently highlighted in China’s foreign policy rhetoric. For Caracas, alignment with China offers diplomatic backing and economic lifelines, particularly in the energy sector, amid protracted domestic crises and international isolation. Observers note that China’s support complicates Western efforts to pressure Venezuela on democratic reforms, signalling that Beijing is willing to counterbalance U.S. influence in the region through political backing and sustained commercial engagement.

Japan Signals Willingness for Dialogue with China Despite Ongoing Row

Japan’s newly appointed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reiterated on 17 December 2025 that Tokyo remains “always open to dialogue” with Beijing, even as bilateral tensions persist over a range of security and historical issues. Speaking amid a diplomatic rift triggered by disagreements over Japan’s defence policies and Beijing’s assertive posture in the East and South China Seas, Takaichi stressed that communication channels should stay open to manage differences and prevent miscalculations. Her comments mark a calibrated diplomatic tone aimed at stabilising ties without conceding on core Japanese positions regarding defence cooperation with allies like the United States.

The statement reflects Tokyo’s broader strategy of balancing firm deterrence with continued diplomatic engagement. While Japan has strengthened security cooperation with the U.S., Australia, and other partners in response to China’s military rise, Takaichi’s emphasis on dialogue underscores Tokyo’s interest in avoiding uncontrolled escalation. Analysts say this dual approach seeks to reassure both domestic and international audiences that Japan is capable of defending its interests while pursuing responsible diplomacy. The development highlights the delicate task facing Japanese leadership in navigating a fraught relationship with China—where hard security concerns coexist with practical incentives for communication on economic and regional stability issues.

China Boosts Arctic Shipping with Record 14 Transits

In 2025, Chinese shipping companies significantly expanded their presence along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), completing a record 14 container ship voyages through Arctic waters — more than doubling prior annual transits. The increase reflects greater commercial use of the route, which shortens Asia–Europe maritime journeys by up to two weeks compared with the Suez Canal. Beijing’s state-affiliated carriers transported a mix of general cargo and consumer goods, demonstrating growing confidence in the viability of Arctic sea lanes amid longer ice-free seasons and investments in ice-class vessels and logistics support. Analysts note that Chinese participation helps normalise commercial traffic along the NSR, historically dominated by Russian operators.

China’s Arctic push aligns with its broader Polar Silk Road strategy, which aims to integrate northern maritime routes into global supply chains and secure commercial interests in high-latitude infrastructure. The uptick in voyages also underscores closer Sino-Russian cooperation on Arctic shipping, as Moscow promotes the NSR as part of its economic development plans. While the route remains seasonal and dependent on ice conditions, China’s expanding activity could accelerate infrastructure upgrades — including ports, search-and-rescue facilities, and navigational aids — benefiting all users. However, the trend raises geopolitical considerations among Arctic states wary of China’s long-term intentions, even as climate change reshapes accessibility in the region.

Kazakhstan and Japan Elevate Strategic Ties During State Visit

In mid-December 2025, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev concluded his first official state visit to Japan, meeting Emperor Naruhito and key government leaders to advance a broader strategic partnership. The visit underscored mutual interest in strengthening political dialogue and expanding cooperation in areas including trade, energy, infrastructure, and technology. Tokayev and Japanese officials reaffirmed commitments to increased high-level exchanges and institutionalised mechanisms for regular consultations, reflecting Japan’s interest in deeper engagement with Central Asia as part of its broader Indo-Pacific strategy.

Both capitals also emphasised economic collaboration, with commitments to enhance investment flows, support infrastructure projects under Japan’s development frameworks, and explore cooperation in green energy and digitalisation. Astana highlighted Japan as a key investor in Kazakhstan’s diversification efforts, particularly in manufacturing and renewable sectors, while Tokyo sees Kazakhstan as a gateway to regional markets and critical resources. Observers note the visit signals a mutually beneficial pivot toward stable, diversified partnerships — with Japan balancing China and Russia’s influence in Central Asia, and Kazakhstan seeking diversified economic and geopolitical ties beyond its traditional partners.

U.S.–Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue Strengthens Strategic Partnership

On December 2025, the 14th U.S.–Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue convened in Washington, underscoring the deepening strategic partnership between the two countries amid evolving Indo-Pacific security dynamics. Senior officials from both sides reaffirmed their commitment to increasing defense cooperation, including enhanced training exchanges, maritime security collaboration, and expanded information sharing. The dialogue served as a platform to elevate efforts to counter transnational threats such as trafficking, terrorism, and cyber intrusions, while also improving interoperability in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Participants highlighted progress on prior commitments, including implementation of maritime domain awareness initiatives and support for Vietnam’s defense institution building, framing the partnership as a stabilising force in the region. Both sides reiterated respect for international law, including freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and discussed practical mechanisms to deter coercive behaviours. The dialogue reflects Hanoi’s careful balancing of its strategic autonomy with growing defense cooperation with the U.S., a relationship that seeks to manage shared concerns about regional security without antagonising China. Enhanced dialogue signals a maturing bilateral relationship increasingly oriented toward sustained, higher-level security coordination into 2026 and beyond.

Oman and India Sign Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

On 18 December 2025, Oman and India formalised a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), marking a significant milestone in bilateral economic relations. The deal, agreed after years of negotiations, aims to boost trade, investment, and economic cooperation by progressively eliminating tariffs, enhancing market access, and facilitating services and investment flows between the two countries. Omani state media confirmed the pact underscores a mutual commitment to deepen economic integration and strengthen commercial ties across sectors such as energy, logistics, manufacturing, and technology.

The CEPA reflects both nations’ strategic priorities: for India, it diversifies trade partnerships in the Gulf region and supports supply-chain and energy security objectives; for Oman, the agreement helps attract Indian investment and expands export opportunities beyond hydrocarbons. Analysts note the pact could stimulate higher bilateral trade volumes and joint ventures, driven by complementary economic interests and long-standing historical links. The agreement also has broader geopolitical implications, enhancing India’s footprint in the Middle East while reinforcing Oman’s role as a gateway for economic engagement with South Asia.

China Unveils New Customs Regime and Free-Trade Experiment in Hainan

China has launched a separate customs regime at its Hainan Free Trade Port, introducing streamlined procedures aimed at reducing bureaucratic barriers, accelerating cargo clearance, and fostering trade and investment. The new regime allows imported goods to be cleared, inspected and taxed under simplified rules, with certain products enjoying zero-tariff treatment while stored or processed within designated zones. Officials highlighted that these measures are designed to enhance Hainan’s competitiveness as a regional trade hub and attract foreign businesses by lowering logistic costs and providing a more flexible regulatory environment.

The development accompanies a broader US$113 billion experiment to transform Hainan Island into a comprehensive free-trade port by 2035, part of Beijing’s strategy to deepen economic liberalisation and open wider to global markets. Reuters analysis notes the initiative includes liberalising sectors such as services, finance, and high-tech industries, alongside preferential tax and investment policies intended to rival major global free-trade zones. While the success of Hainan’s reforms will depend on investor confidence and integration with larger supply chains, the move represents a significant step in China’s efforts to balance domestic economic reopening with structural reform amid slowing growth and intensifying global competition.

China Mediates to End Thailand–Cambodia Border Clash and Restore Stability

In December 2025, escalating clashes between Thai and Cambodian forces along their disputed border prompted swift diplomatic intervention by China, which sent a special envoy to mediate between the two ASEAN neighbours. The envoy’s engagement followed deadly exchanges of fire that threatened broader regional stability, with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang personally holding calls with both Thai and Cambodian ministers to urge de-escalation and respect for bilateral dialogue. China’s efforts aligned with broader ASEAN concerns and a parallel initiative by Malaysia to facilitate a peaceful resolution, reflecting Beijing’s interest in maintaining peace among neighbours and its growing role as a diplomatic interlocutor in Southeast Asia.

The mediation momentum yielded concrete results: Thai and Cambodian militaries resumed talks later in December, agreeing to a mutual ceasefire on 27 December 2025, and Thailand subsequently released 18 Cambodian soldiers, a confidence-building gesture that helped sustain calm along the border. The ceasefire has largely held into early 2026, as both sides commit to further dialogue and confidence-building measures. Observers see the successful Chinese and ASEAN-supported diplomacy not only as a containment of an immediate flashpoint but also as a demonstration of regional institutions’ and China’s capacity to manage intraregional conflicts without external intervention.

India and New Zealand Finalise Free Trade Agreement

On 22 December 2025, India and New Zealand formally concluded negotiations on a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA), marking a major enhancement in bilateral economic ties. Under the pact, both countries agreed to eliminate tariffs on a substantial portion of goods, liberalise trade in services, and improve market access across key sectors including agriculture, dairy, wine, and information technology. New Delhi and Wellington framed the agreement as mutually beneficial: India gains preferential entry for its manufactured and services exports into New Zealand, while New Zealand secures enhanced access for its high-value agricultural products into the vast Indian market.

The FTA is expected to boost two-way trade and investment flows, strengthening economic linkages between the Indo-Pacific neighbours amid shifting global trade dynamics. Indian officials have noted that the deal aligns with New Delhi’s broader strategy of deepening economic engagement with like-minded partners and diversifying export destinations. For New Zealand, the agreement underscores its commitment to expanding economic partnerships beyond traditional markets and reinforces its presence in South Asia. Observers say the pact could serve as a template for other mid-sized economies seeking balanced trade cooperation with India, enhancing regional economic integration while supporting growth in both countries.

China Protests Japanese Official’s Taiwan Visit, Intensifying Diplomatic Tensions

China lodged a formal diplomatic complaint on 22 December 2025 after a senior Japanese official visited Taiwan, reaffirming Beijing’s long-standing opposition to any official contacts between Taiwan and foreign governments. The Japanese visitor, a Diet member with defence portfolio responsibilities, met Taiwanese counterparts during the trip, prompting Beijing to accuse Tokyo of undermining the One-China principle and interfering in China’s internal affairs. China’s foreign ministry summoned the Japanese ambassador in Beijing and demanded that Tokyo “stop such misguided actions,” warning of adverse impacts on bilateral ties.

The incident highlights rising friction in China–Japan relations amid broader strategic competition in East Asia. Japan has been increasingly engaging with Taiwan through parliamentary exchanges and unofficial security dialogues, reflecting concerns over regional stability and Taiwan’s defence amid Beijing’s growing military pressure. While Tokyo insists these interactions are within legal and unofficial frameworks, Beijing views them as provocative and destabilising. The complaint signals that even low-key diplomatic engagements with Taiwan remain flashpoints, complicating efforts to manage tensions between major regional powers as geopolitical rivalry in the Indo-Pacific intensifies.

EU and Japan Conclude Association to Horizon Europe Research Programme

The European Commission and Japan successfully completed negotiations on Japan’s association to Horizon Europe, the EU’s €93.5 billion research and innovation funding programme, marking a significant expansion of scientific cooperation between two advanced economies. Under the agreement, Japanese researchers and institutions will gain near-equal access to participate in EU-funded research projects across key areas such as climate science, health, digital technologies, and clean energy. This association is expected to deepen long-term collaboration on cutting-edge innovation and enhance joint contributions to global scientific challenges.

The milestone reflects a strategic alignment on innovation policy and reinforces broader EU–Japan strategic ties, complementing economic and security cooperation frameworks. Japanese participation in Horizon Europe not only unlocks expanded funding opportunities for Japanese science and technology sectors but also strengthens the EU’s research ecosystem by integrating a major Asian partner with high R&D capacity. The agreement, anticipated to be signed in 2026, underscores both parties’ commitment to multilateral cooperation in science and technology amid competitive global innovation landscapes and rising geoeconomic tensions.

U.S. Imposes Tariffs on Chinese Semiconductor Imports to Protect Domestic Industry

On 23 December 2025, the United States announced new tariffs on a broad range of Chinese semiconductor products, marking a significant escalation in tech-related economic measures aimed at restricting China’s access to critical supply chains and bolstering domestic chip manufacturing. The tariffs, targeting advanced integrated circuits and specialized components, are designed to curb what Washington describes as unfair trade practices and overcapacity that threaten U.S. technological leadership. U.S. officials argued that the measures will level the playing field for American firms and incentivise investment in local fabrication and innovation, aligning with broader industrial policy goals under the CHIPS Act.

China quickly condemned the tariffs as protectionist and disruptive to global supply chains, warning of possible countermeasures. Beijing has previously criticised similar barriers as politically motivated and detrimental to international cooperation in technology and innovation. The move comes amid heightened strategic competition in semiconductors — a sector central to economic growth and national security. Industry analysts warn that the tariffs could accelerate decoupling between U.S. and Chinese tech ecosystems, prompting realignment of supply chains in Asia and Europe as firms seek to mitigate costs and compliance risks. The development underscores how economic tools are increasingly being used alongside traditional diplomacy in great-power competition over advanced technology.

U.S. 2025 China Military Power Report Highlights Rapid PLA Modernization

The 2025 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China report — the annual unclassified assessment delivered to the U.S. Congress — underscores Beijing’s accelerating military modernization and growing capability to challenge U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific. The report articulates China’s sustained investment in expanding its naval power, air and missile forces, and joint operations capabilities, with a strategic focus on the First Island Chain and potential contingencies involving Taiwan. Analysts note that the PLA’s evolution reflects a deliberate shift toward integrated multi-domain warfare, enabled by advancements in precision strike systems, naval platforms, and long-range strike networks designed to deter and, if ordered, counter third-party intervention.

A central theme of the 2025 assessment is the historic growth in China’s strategic forces and the narrowing capability gap with the United States, particularly in areas such as missiles and nuclear delivery systems, where Beijing’s arsenal has expanded significantly. Pentagon leadership explicitly warned that this buildup increases the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland and complicates deterrence dynamics, noting projected increases in aircraft carriers, ballistic missiles, and integrated air-sea operations. The report also stresses that the PLA’s progress enhances Beijing’s leverage in regional disputes and requires sustained U.S. and allied focus on deterrence, resilience, and interoperability in defence planning.

China Calls on Ukraine to “Correct Mistakes” Amid Sanctions Dispute

China’s Foreign Ministry publicly urged Ukraine to “immediately correct its mistakes” after Kyiv announced plans to impose a fresh round of sanctions targeting Russian entities and individuals, including non-Ukrainian nationals such as Chinese citizens and firms. At a regular press briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian criticised unilateral sanctions as violations of international law when not authorised by the UN Security Council, framing Beijing’s position as opposed to coercive measures and emphasising China’s commitment to safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of its enterprises and citizens abroad. Beijing reiterated that it has maintained dialogue with both Ukraine and Russia since the conflict began, positioning itself as a potential mediator and reaffirming support for a ceasefire and peace talks.

The statement reflects China’s broader diplomatic posture of advocating sovereignty and non-interference while countering Western-led sanction regimes that implicate Chinese economic actors. By dismissing extended sanctions as improper and urging Kyiv to revise its approach, Beijing reinforces its narrative that external punitive actions complicate conflict resolution and damage neutral parties. This development underscores ongoing tensions over the Ukraine war’s international ramifications, where China seeks to balance its strategic relations with Russia and its global economic interests, even as it calls for de-escalation.

North Korea Showcases Nuclear-Powered Submarine and Condemns U.S.–ROK Deal

North Korea’s state media revealed images of an 8,700-tonne nuclear-powered strategic submarine under construction, a development Pyongyang frames as essential to bolstering its naval deterrent amid heightened regional military dynamics. Leader Kim Jong Un personally inspected the vessel and directed accelerated development of the country’s naval and nuclear forces, emphasising the need for robust seaborne capabilities capable of carrying missiles and sustaining extended operations. The announcement comes as part of a broader pattern of weapons displays, including recent tests of long-range cruise missiles, illustrating Pyongyang’s push to diversify and advance its strategic arsenal ahead of a key ruling party congress in early 2026.

Kim also sharply criticised a nascent nuclear-powered submarine agreement between the United States and South Korea, calling it an “offensive act” that violates Pyongyang’s security and maritime sovereignty. He described the pact as a threat to regional stability and vowed to counteract it by intensifying the modernisation and potential nuclear weaponisation of North Korea’s naval forces, according to state reports. The rhetoric reflects Pyongyang’s growing hostility toward expanded U.S.–ROK military cooperation and underscores how advances in indigenous strategic platforms, like nuclear propulsion for submarines, are being leveraged politically as well as militarily.

North Korea Commits to Sustained Missile Development Over the Next Five Years

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signalled on 25 December 2025 that Pyongyang will continue advancing its missile programmes over the next five years, outlining strategic priorities that include enhancing the range, accuracy and survivability of its ballistic and cruise missile forces. In a keynote speech to military officials and defence industry leaders, Kim described missiles as “core deterrent assets” essential for safeguarding national sovereignty and countering perceived threats from the United States and its allies. The emphasis encompasses further tests and deployments across short-, medium- and long-range classes, with increased focus on solid-fuel technology and mobile launch systems to complicate adversary targeting.

The announcement reinforces North Korea’s long-standing strategy of using missile development as both a deterrent and a diplomatic lever, following a year marked by several high-profile weapons tests. Pyongyang’s rhetoric comes amid growing military cooperation between the U.S. and regional partners — particularly South Korea and Japan — which have bolstered joint exercises and upgraded defence capabilities. Analysts warn that a planned programme of accelerated missile advancement could destabilise regional security dynamics by lowering thresholds for escalation and testing allied responses, while complicating efforts to resume denuclearisation talks dormant for years.

China Rebukes U.S. for “Distorting” Its Defence Policy and India Relations

On 25 December 2025, China’s Ministry of National Defence publicly accused the United States of misrepresenting Beijing’s defence policy and its growing ties with India, pushing back against U.S. characterisations that frame China’s military advancements and strategic cooperation in Asia as aggressive or destabilising. Chinese officials argued that Washington’s narrative selectively interprets China’s military modernisation and bilateral engagements, asserting that Beijing pursues defensive development and mutually beneficial partnerships rather than confrontation. Beijing’s statement emphasised its view that U.S. commentary undermines trust and fuels unnecessary strategic competition in the region.

The rebuke came amid a backdrop of deepening U.S.–India security cooperation, including joint exercises, technology partnerships, and expanded diplomatic coordination, which Beijing views with growing suspicion. Chinese analysts and spokespersons framed such developments as part of broader U.S. efforts to “contain” China, arguing that Washington’s portrayal distorts the nature of India–China ties, which Beijing insists are based on sovereign choice and pragmatism. The public admonition underscores rising rhetorical tensions between Washington and Beijing, as both powers seek to shape international perceptions of their strategic intentions in Asia — a contest that increasingly influences regional security dynamics and diplomatic alignments.

Japan Approves Record $58 Billion Defence Budget

Japan’s government has approved a historically large defence budget of ¥8.3 trillion (about $58 billion) for fiscal 2026, marking a significant escalation in its security spending amid escalating regional tensions, particularly with China and North Korea. The increase — the largest in Japan’s post-war history — funds expanded capabilities across missile defence, air and naval forces, cyber and space domains, and munitions stockpiles. Tokyo also plans to accelerate acquisition of advanced defensive systems, including Aegis Ashore, counter-strike capabilities, and long-range interceptors, while strengthening the Japan–U.S. alliance through enhanced interoperability and joint exercises.

The budget reflects a broader shift in Japan’s strategic posture toward robust deterrence and self-defence, moving beyond traditional constraints that limited military expansion. Officials explicitly cited China’s assertive actions in the East and South China Seas and North Korea’s advancing missile programmes as drivers for the leap in defence commitments. Domestic support for the budget is high, with many lawmakers and security experts arguing that a stronger military is essential to safeguarding national sovereignty and contributing to regional stability. Observers say Tokyo’s spending trajectory signals a long-term commitment to balancing Beijing’s growing military influence while reassuring allies of Japan’s role as a key security partner in the Indo-Pacific.

China Sanctions 30 U.S. Firms and Individuals Over Taiwan Arms Sales

China announced on 26 December 2025 that it is imposing sanctions on 30 U.S. defence companies and individuals in response to recent American weapons sales to Taiwan, including advanced systems meant to strengthen the island’s deterrence against PLA coercion. Beijing’s foreign ministry labelled the arms transfers a violation of its One China policy and a threat to regional stability, asserting that the sanctions are a necessary countermeasure to protect China’s “sovereignty and security interests.” Measures against the targeted firms and executives include restrictions on business dealings with Chinese entities, asset freezes within China, and limitations on travel and cooperation, although specific enforcement details were not fully disclosed.

The sanctions mark a significant escalation in Beijing’s economic and diplomatic retaliation toolkit, broadening punitive measures beyond individuals previously targeted under similar disputes. U.S. defence manufacturers affected include major contractors involved in selling missiles, coastal defence systems and other capabilities to Taipei — moves Washington says are consistent with its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. Beijing’s action reflects growing Chinese willingness to leverage economic pressure to deter support for Taiwan and signal costs to foreign firms and executives participating in arms exports. Observers warn the sanctions could complicate U.S.–China commercial and defence industry ties, even as Taipei continues to diversify and modernise its defence supply base.

China Revises Foreign Trade Law to Strengthen Economic Defence Capabilities

On 27 December 2025, China’s legislature passed a revised Foreign Trade Law aimed at enhancing Beijing’s ability to respond to economic coercion and protect national interests amid intensifying global trade competition. The updated law introduces provisions that allow Chinese authorities to impose countermeasures against foreign entities that engage in “discriminatory” trade restrictions or what Beijing deems unfair practices, while also expanding state support for domestic firms to mitigate external pressure. Officials framed the overhaul as a necessary step to build resilience against trade disputes and geopolitical friction, signalling an assertive trade policy posture as global tension around technology and supply chains grows.

The revision is widely seen as part of China’s broader effort to institutionalise economic statecraft tools that can be deployed in trade conflicts, including more explicit legal cover for retaliatory tariffs, export controls, and legal support mechanisms for strategic industries. Analysts note that the law reflects lessons from recent confrontations with the United States and other partners on issues ranging from semiconductors to rare earths and could embolden Beijing to respond more forcefully to future trade measures perceived as hostile.

China’s Largest Live-Fire Drills Around Taiwan Escalate Cross-Strait Tensions

In the final days of December 2025, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a series of large-scale live-fire military exercises encircling Taiwan, marking the most extensive war games in years. Beginning on 28 December, PLA units — including aircraft, naval vessels and rocket forces — executed simulated joint operations across multiple axes around the island, stressing rapid mobilization, precision strikes and integrated air-sea assault tactics. Beijing framed the drills as preparation for “resolute defence against separatist activities,” directly linking them to perceived provocations from Taipei and external military support. State media described the exercises as routine training, even as they visibly disrupted civilian air and sea traffic and underscored China’s readiness to project force in the sensitive strait.

The drills coincided with heightened diplomatic alignment between Beijing and Moscow, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated opposition to any form of Taiwanese independence, reinforcing the narrative of united support for China’s territorial claims. Taipei condemned the PLA’s manoeuvres as provocative and destabilising, vowing to reinforce its own readiness and seeking reassurance from allies. Regional analysts warn the combined messaging — intense military drills paired with diplomatic backing from Moscow — reflects a strategic effort by China to deter foreign support for Taiwan while signalling that Beijing can escalate pressure without crossing thresholds that might trigger direct confrontation. The episodes sharpen concerns over cross-strait stability as the Indo-Pacific enters 2026.

China Reaffirms Support for Somalia, Opposes Recognition of Somaliland

On 29 December 2025, China reiterated its firm opposition to international recognition of Somaliland’s independence, affirming long-standing support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing’s foreign ministry condemned any unilateral moves that might legitimize Somaliland’s bid for statehood in the Horn of Africa, warning such actions risked fuelling instability and undermining established borders. China underscored its adherence to non-interference and respect for existing nation-state frameworks, aligning its position with the African Union and many Western capitals that have expressed concerns about the potential regional repercussions of Somaliland’s recognition.

The statement reflects China’s broader diplomatic emphasis on stability and legal continuity, particularly in regions where it has growing economic and strategic interests. Beijing has expanded its footprint in the Horn of Africa through infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative and increased engagement with regional organisations. By backing Mogadishu’s territorial claims, China seeks to position itself as a partner that supports African unity and negotiated political solutions, while also safeguarding its own interests in secure operating environments.

Philippines Challenges Chinese Vessel Near Batanes Amid Rising Maritime Tensions

On 31 December 2025, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) confronted a Chinese government-linked vessel operating near the northern province of Batanes, asserting that the encounter occurred within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) amid ongoing cross-Taiwan Strait tensions. The PCG reported that its personnel issued a formal challenge to the Chinese ship for allegedly entering Philippine waters without proper coordination, underscoring increased vigilance over Manila’s maritime domain as China steps up naval and maritime law enforcement activity in the broader region. Philippine officials reiterated their commitment to defending sovereign maritime rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while avoiding escalation.

The incident reflects growing maritime friction between Southeast Asian claimants and China, particularly as heightened military dynamics around Taiwan ripple into adjacent sea lanes. Beijing’s expanding presence near contested or overlapping waters has frequently drawn protests from Manila, which has pursued diplomatic protests and coast guard warnings rather than military confrontation. Observers note that such challenges underscore deepening Philippine resolve to assert its maritime claims and maintain freedom of navigation even as it balances Chinese economic ties and strategic cooperation with external partners like the United States.

China Rebukes Netherlands Over Nexperia Chip Controls

On 31 December 2025, China formally urged the Netherlands to “correct its mistakes” after Dutch authorities imposed tighter controls on Nexperia, a major semiconductor firm with significant Chinese ownership, restricting exports of advanced chip technology. Beijing condemned the Dutch move as politically motivated and harmful to international trade norms, arguing that it unfairly targets Chinese high-tech interests and undermines the stability of global supply chains. The Chinese foreign ministry framed the dispute as part of a broader challenge to China’s technological development and warned that such measures may provoke reciprocal responses if not addressed.

The confrontation highlights the growing tension between technology security policies in Europe and Chinese economic ambitions, particularly in semiconductors — a sector central to both national security and economic competitiveness. The Netherlands’ stricter export controls reflect Western concerns about advanced chip technologies being used to bolster China’s military and surveillance capacities, even as Beijing insists on open trade. Analysts say the dispute underscores how semiconductor governance has become a flashpoint in U.S.–China strategic competition, with allies like the Netherlands navigating pressures from Washington to protect sensitive technologies while managing diplomatic fallout with Beijing. The development adds to a series of tech-related disputes likely to shape Europe–China relations in 2026.

South Korean President Lee to Undertake Four-Day State Visit to China

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is scheduled to embark on a four-day state visit to China, reflecting Seoul’s intent to stabilise and advance bilateral ties amid a complex regional security environment. The visit underscores both countries’ interest in resetting diplomatic engagement after recent strains linked to U.S.–ROK security cooperation and trade tensions. During official talks in Beijing, Lee is expected to discuss deepening economic cooperation, managing North Korean nuclear and missile challenges, and improving cultural and people-to-people exchanges, signalling a pragmatic approach to balancing strategic relationships in East Asia.

The state visit also arrives at a time when China and South Korea are navigating competing strategic pressures, including alliance dynamics involving the United States and regional concerns over Pyongyang’s provocations. Seoul’s outreach to Beijing aims to maintain open communications and reduce friction, particularly on economic issues such as semiconductor supply chains and tourism resumption. Observers suggest that while Seoul will pursue cooperation where interests align, it will also seek clearer understandings on China’s expectations regarding security policies and South Korea’s participation in broader regional frameworks. The visit could set the tone for a more managed, if cautious, China–ROK relationship in 2026.

Türkiye Opens Visa-Free Travel to Chinese Tourists, Boosting Bilateral Ties

Türkiye has announced that Chinese citizens can now enter the country visa-free for tourism and transit purposes, a major step in expanding people-to-people links and economic cooperation between Ankara and Beijing. The policy, aimed at facilitating easier travel for Chinese nationals, reflects Türkiye’s strategy to attract more visitors from one of the world’s largest outbound tourism markets. By removing visa barriers for tourism and short stays, Ankara expects increased Chinese arrivals to spur growth in the hospitality, retail, and service sectors, while strengthening cultural and commercial exchanges.

The move also aligns with broader efforts by both countries to deepen strategic ties, including in trade, investment, and infrastructure cooperation under the framework of enhanced bilateral dialogue. Chinese tourists have increasingly become a priority for global destinations seeking to diversify inbound markets post-pandemic, and Türkiye — positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia — stands to benefit from this trend. Analysts say the visa-free measure signals Ankara’s intention to balance its Western alliances with proactive engagement in Asia, using tourism and mobility as tools of soft power and economic diplomacy.

U.S. Grants Annual Approval for TSMC Chipmaking Tool Exports to China

On 31 December 2025, the United States approved the annual export licenses that allow Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to ship certain advanced chipmaking tools to China, a calibrated decision reflecting Washington’s effort to balance supply-chain controls with commercial and diplomatic priorities. The annual approval mechanism permits a limited set of semiconductor equipment exports under strict conditions, ensuring that the tools do not materially enhance China’s ability to produce cutting-edge chips that could have military applications. U.S. officials framed the decision as supporting both global supply-chain stability and national security constraints, allowing Taiwanese firms to operate within defined parameters without significantly eroding export-control goals.

The move underscores the complexity of U.S. strategy toward China’s technology sector — aiming to slow Beijing’s progress in sophisticated semiconductor manufacturing while avoiding overly broad restrictions that could disrupt global production networks or alienate key partners like Taiwan. TSMC, a cornerstone of global semiconductor supply chains, plays a critical role in providing fabrication services to numerous international clients; unfettered curbs could have ripple effects across consumer electronics and industrial technology markets. Analysts view the annual license approval as evidence of Washington’s preference for targeted, calibrated controls rather than blanket bans, even amid escalating tech competition with China.

China Condemns U.S. Military Strike in Venezuela as “Hegemonic Act”

China strongly condemned a surprise U.S. military operation in Venezuela in early January 2026 that involved airstrikes and the capture and removal of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, branding it a blatant violation of Venezuelan sovereignty and international law. Beijing’s foreign ministry said the strikes constituted “hegemonic acts” that threaten peace and security across Latin America and the Caribbean, urging Washington to abide by the UN Charter and “stop violating other countries’ sovereignty and security.” The Chinese statement also advised Chinese nationals against travel to Venezuela given the volatile security situation.

The U.S. operation — which President Donald Trump publicly described as successful and aimed at countering criminal and security threats — drew broad international criticism, with China joining other governments and multilateral actors in highlighting the risks of unilateral force. Beijing’s reaction is significant given its robust diplomatic and economic ties with Caracas, including energy cooperation and recent high-level engagements prior to the strike. China’s denunciation underscores broader geopolitical tensions between Washington and Beijing over principles of sovereignty, intervention, and influence in the Global South, amplifying diplomatic strains at the outset of 2026.

China–Venezuela Relations: Energy, Debt, and Strategic Leverage

Recent data highlight the depth —and structural asymmetry— of the China–Venezuela economic relationship. Caracas has now cleared roughly $51 billion in historic obligations through oil-for-loan repayment schemes, leaving only about $12 billion outstanding. In practice, this has entrenched a commodities-for-credit dependency dynamic in which Venezuela trades sovereign flexibility for fiscal relief. Meanwhile, the oil pillar has become overwhelmingly China-centric: around 85 percent of Venezuelan crude output is now routed to Chinese refineries. That level of concentration is strategically risky — Venezuela has effectively tethered its recovery prospects to a single market in exchange for financial breathing room and diplomatic cover.

Trade flows reinforce the pattern. Venezuela primarily ships petroleum coke, iron ore, and acyclic alcohols to China — all raw or semi-processed materials. China, by contrast, exports consumer and manufactured goods, including motorcycles, rubber tyres, and video displays. The structure is unmistakable: China supplies infrastructure and finished products; Venezuela supplies extractive inputs. That is not partnership on equal terms — it is a resource-for-manufactures dependency that tightens Beijing’s leverage over Caracas. Against the backdrop of the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and China’s loud condemnation of “hegemonic acts,” these economic realities matter: Beijing is defending not only sovereignty principles, but also a strategically important energy lifeline and decades-long investment footprint.

 

China–Venezuela Relations Energy, Debt, and Strategic Leverage Beyond the Horızon ISSG

https://behorizon.org/china

Where the PLA Is Looking Beyond China’s Shores

This week’s map comes from the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 report on China’s military developments and highlights locations where Beijing is either already operating overseas military facilities — or exploring the possibility. Only one confirmed overseas base is marked in red: Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, where the PLA has maintained a logistical hub since 2017. The blue-shaded countries reflect assessed “locations of interest” where China may seek future access, ranging from the Indian Ocean to West Africa, the South Pacific, and even the Caribbean.

The geographic spread is striking. The PLA’s prospective footprint stretches from Pakistan and Sri Lanka, across Southeast Asia, and deep into Africa, including Tanzania, Kenya, Namibia, Mozambique and Equatorial Guinea, with Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands also noted. Cuba appears too — an indicator that strategic competition is now unmistakably global. The logic is straightforward: as China’s commercial, energy and security interests expand, Beijing wants reliable overseas logistics and naval access to sustain them. The map underscores that what began as “far seas protection” is evolving into an emerging, if still limited, global basing network — reshaping the operating environment well beyond East Asia.

Where the PLA Is Looking Beyond China’s Shores Beyond the Horizon ISSGhttps://media.defense.gov/2025

Beijing’s Stake in Caracas, Hours Before Everything Changed

This week’s image captures a symbolic — and now deeply ironic — moment in Venezuela’s diplomatic calendar. Just hours before U.S. forces removed Nicolás Maduro from Caracas, the Venezuelan leader received China’s special envoy for Latin America, Qiu Xiaoqi, at the presidential palace. The two men exchange an ornate ceremonial gift, smiling in a way that projects continuity, partnership, and calm routine — even as geopolitical fault lines were already shifting beneath their feet. The scene is choreographed diplomacy at its most revealing: Beijing signalling long-term investment and political backing; Caracas publicly reaffirming its place in China’s expanding orbit.

What followed threw that choreography into crisis. Washington’s sudden operation — the most direct U.S. action against a Latin American head of state since 1989 — triggered fierce condemnation from Beijing, which denounced the strike as “hegemonic behaviour” and a violation of Venezuelan sovereignty. The photo therefore reads less as a benign courtesy call than as a snapshot of strategic competition in the Western Hemisphere. China has spent years embedding itself in Venezuela’s oil economy and state infrastructure; the U.S. move bluntly challenges that footprint. The image, in retrospect, records the last calm moment before great-power rivalry over Venezuela moved from influence contest to overt confrontation.

Beijing’s Stake in Caracas, Hours Before Everything Changed Beyond the Horizon ISSG

https://www.chosun.com/english

The Pentagon Warns: China’s Military Build-Up Is Entering a New Phase

This week’s infographic breaks down the U.S. Pentagon’s 2025 Annual Report to Congress on Chinese Military Power, and its message is blunt: the PLA is modernising at pace — and with a timeline. According to the report, Beijing has structured its military planning around a 2027 milestone, by which time the PLA aims to be able to achieve what it calls a “strategic decisive victory” in the event of a Taiwan contingency — including the ability to deter or defeat outside intervention. That is not defensive hedging; it is contingency preparation on an explicitly political timetable.

Beyond new ships, missiles, and aircraft, the Pentagon underscores a wider transformation across cyber, space, and information warfare — capabilities designed to disrupt command systems, infrastructure, and communications before or during conflict. China’s expanding long-range strike and surveillance tools now reach far beyond its immediate region, increasing pressure on U.S. and allied forces. The infographic’s closing image — U.S. and Chinese symbols in stark confrontation — is unsubtle, but accurate. We are not looking at incremental capability growth; we are looking at system-level military competition that is now baked into strategic planning on both sides — with Taiwan at the centre of the risk calculation.

Quiet Connectivity, Strategic Signalling: The Quad’s Logistics Turn in the Indo-Pacific

Introduction

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia — has long been criticised as a political talk shop lacking operational depth. That characterisation is now increasingly out of date. In December 2025, the four partners concluded a multinational field training exercise focused explicitly on military logistics integration — the unglamorous but decisive backbone of modern operations. Rather than headline-grabbing combat drills, the exercise concentrated on expeditionary logistics, rapid resupply, and sustainment in distributed maritime environments, particularly across the vast Indo-Pacific theatre. This choice is revealing: the Quad is moving from shared rhetoric into technical interoperability, the sort that enables real cooperation during crises — whether humanitarian disasters or regional security contingencies.

The Strategic Logic: Deterrence by Preparation

Officials from the participating nations underscored that the logistics exercises were designed to test and refine how effectively forces can move, supply, and maintain operations over long distances. That capability — fuel delivery, ammunition flow, medical evacuation, maintenance — is what determines whether a force can remain operational after the first day of a crisis. In the Indo-Pacific, where distances are extreme and critical sea lanes stretch across contested waters, logistics resilience equals strategic credibility.

The exercise demonstrated a clear desire to reduce friction before a crisis begins, developing shared protocols, communications arrangements, and supply practices. In humanitarian and disaster relief scenarios — where the Quad has frequently operated — such interoperability speeds response time and reduces duplication. In security terms, however, it also builds deterrence capacity without overt militarisation, signalling readiness while avoiding the symbolism of a formal alliance.

The Quad’s Evolving Identity: Partnership Without Treaty

Analysts observing the exercise noted that this approach epitomises the Quad’s trajectory: practical cooperation without alliance branding. None of the four seeks a NATO-style structure in Asia. Yet all are concerned about increasing contestation over maritime access, law-of-the-sea norms, and freedom of navigation. By building what has been called “quiet connectivity” — shared logistics standards, training habits, and operational familiarity — the Quad enhances collective resilience below the threshold of alliance formation.

This makes the Quad distinct from formal treaty arrangements, but not insignificant. The more aligned logistics networks become, the lower the operational barriers to coordinated response — whether for disaster relief, sanctions enforcement, maritime domain awareness, or potential contingency stabilisation efforts.

Regional Signalling and Responses

The exercise also sends a clear — albeit carefully modulated — message to the broader region. It demonstrates that the Indo-Pacific is no longer an arena where strategic preparation is optional. The countries most invested in maintaining open sea lanes are quietly ensuring that their militaries can sustain operations across dispersed environments, even under stress.

That said, the Quad’s restraint matters. By emphasising logistics rather than combat rehearsal, the exercise seeks to reassure Southeast Asian and Pacific states that the grouping is not becoming a hard military bloc, but rather a capacity-strengthening platform aligned with regional public goods provision. This framing also helps insulate the Quad against accusations of bloc-building or containment.

Conclusion: Infrastructure of Cooperation — Before It Is Needed

The December 2025 logistics exercise marks a subtle but important milestone. The Quad’s value is increasingly measured not by joint statements, but by the level of technical interoperability quietly taking shape beneath the surface. Logistics integration is the least visible form of military cooperation — and arguably the most consequential.

In a region defined by distance, vulnerability to natural disasters, and rising strategic competition, reliable networks for sustainment and support are fundamental to stability. The Quad’s latest training effort suggests that the four partners are investing in long-term operational readiness — not theatrics. If the Indo-Pacific is entering a period of structural uncertainty, then building the infrastructure of cooperation before it is needed may prove one of the Quad’s most strategically significant contributions.

From Modernisation to Readiness: How U.S. Assessments of the PLA Have Shifted

Introduction

The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual China Military Power Reports (2020–2025) offer a rare longitudinal window into how Washington interprets the trajectory of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The overarching narrative remains constant: Beijing seeks to transform the PLA into a world-class military by mid-century as part of Xi Jinping’s national rejuvenation project. Yet the emphasis of U.S. reporting has evolved significantly. What began as an assessment of long-term modernisation trends has shifted toward a focus on near-term readiness and operational capability, particularly in the context of a potential conflict over Taiwan. At the same time, repeated upward revisions in assessments of China’s nuclear expansion, cyber-space warfare capabilities, and global military presence have deepened U.S. concern that the PLA is becoming militarily usable — not in the abstract future, but within this decade.

Readiness Over Rhetoric: 2027 as a Real Benchmark

Across the six reports, the Pentagon moves from cataloguing China’s military build-up to scrutinising what the PLA can actually do soon. The key inflection point is 2027 — the PLA’s centennial year — which began as an internal planning target but is now treated by U.S. analysts as a credible operational deadline. By that date, the PLA aims to possess the capabilities needed to fight and win in a Taiwan conflict, including deterring or defeating U.S. intervention. Importantly, this does not replace the longer-term 2035 and 2049 goals; rather, it establishes an intermediate horizon by which meaningful war-fighting capability must already exist. That shift — from aspirational modernisation to near-term force readiness — is perhaps the most consequential development in U.S. assessment.

Taiwan: From Contingency to Central Stress Test

Earlier reports treated Taiwan as one of several regional flashpoints. By 2025, Taiwan is framed as the PLA’s primary planning scenario and the most stressing U.S.–China military contingency. PLA exercises increasingly simulate blockade, encirclement, strike, and seizure operations, while sustained coercive pressure attempts to normalise high-intensity presence around the island. The question is no longer whether Taiwan is a future risk — it is already the organising principle of Chinese operational planning. This progression reflects not only PLA capability growth, but also a perception in Washington that Beijing regards unification as a time-bounded political project.

Nuclear Forces: From Minimal Deterrent to Expanding Arsenal

No area forced more recalibration than China’s nuclear programme. U.S. estimates of Chinese nuclear warheads rose repeatedly as silo construction, force modernisation, and doctrinal evolution outpaced expectations. What had long been described as a minimum deterrent posture now appears closer to a maturing, diversified nuclear force with potential launch-on-warning elements and a growing range of delivery systems. This expansion complicates deterrence dynamics and suggests that nuclear forces are being operationalised as part of broader warfighting readiness, rather than remaining purely symbolic.

Cyber and Space: From Enablers to Combat Domains

In earlier reporting, cyber and space capabilities were described as supporting tools. By 2025, they are cast as core combat domains. The PLA now plans to contest U.S. command, control, communications, intelligence, and space-based sensing from conflict onset, seeking to erode U.S. operational advantage before kinetic escalation. This represents a strategic shift: China no longer relies on asymmetric denial alone — it is increasingly prepared to impose systemic disruption on adversary networks as a deliberate war-fighting method.

Toward a Global Military Footprint

The PLA’s posture has likewise evolved from regional assertiveness to global presence-building. Djibouti is now joined by additional overseas access points and security partnerships across Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, alongside growing alignment with Russia through joint exercises and strategic coordination. U.S. reporting frames this as part of a broader effort to ensure global logistics reach, diversify basing options, and reduce dependence on vulnerable choke-points.

Continuity of Intent — Acceleration of Means

Perhaps the clearest takeaway is this: China’s ambitions have not changed — but the speed and integration of its capability development have. The PLA is transitioning from modernising toward being ready, particularly within the 2027 timeframe. For U.S. policymakers, this accelerates the risk horizon. Military options that once seemed hypothetical are now assessed as increasingly credible — and increasingly soon.

Conclusion

Read across six years, the Pentagon’s reporting traces a decisive shift. China continues to pursue long-term rejuvenation and military modernisation — that is the continuity. But the urgency has increased because the PLA is much closer to fielding usable joint combat power across conventional, nuclear, cyber, and space domains. Taiwan has moved from hypothetical flashpoint to operational centre-of-gravity. The nuclear deterrent is expanding faster than previously assumed. And China’s global military reach — once aspirational — now has visible footholds.

The U.S. interpretation is therefore evolving from strategic caution to operational concern. Not because China’s intent is new — but because its capabilities now matter on a nearer timeline. That shift reframes U.S.–China competition from structural rivalry to a practical planning problem: deterring conflict in an environment where both sides increasingly possess the tools — and readiness — to fight one.

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