23 JUNE 2025
Weekly Outlook: Asia on the Horizon
As the world’s diplomatic tempo accelerates, the Indo-Pacific region is not merely adapting to global turbulence—it is actively redrawing the lines of influence. This week’s edition captures a moment of strategic convergence, intensifying contestation, and emerging fault lines across Asia and its broader periphery. At the heart of it all lies China’s expanding diplomatic reach: from Astana, where President Xi Jinping joined the Second China–Central Asia Summit, to Kunming, where China inaugurated a new trilateral format with Pakistan and Bangladesh, Beijing is institutionalizing its role as a regional anchor—through treaties, multilateral frameworks, and strategic dialogues.
Yet this projection of influence is not without friction. In the Middle East, the Israel–Iran war has pushed Beijing’s long-maintained neutrality to the brink. Our in-depth analysis explores how China’s careful balancing act between Tehran and Tel Aviv is faltering, revealing the limits of soft-power diplomacy when confronted with hard-power escalation. Meanwhile, Xi and Putin’s coordinated condemnation of Israel, presented in this week’s infographic and dissected in our analysis section, reflects the deepening Sino-Russian alignment in global conflict narratives.
The Indo-Pacific’s traditional U.S. allies are also recalibrating. Australian Prime Minister Albanese prepares for a consequential meeting with Donald Trump, hoping to secure AUKUS continuity in a post-rules-based world. At the same time, New Zealand’s Christopher Luxon engages in high-stakes diplomacy in Beijing—aiming to preserve economic ties while voicing concern over China’s Pacific activities. Further west, India’s Modi visits Cyprus in a bid to expand the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, signaling a long-term geoeconomic vision that could rival China’s Belt and Road.
Our Regional Alliances section breaks down the China–Central Asia treaty and what it means for Eurasian power dynamics, while the Analysis section offers a sobering reflection on China’s eroding neutrality in Middle East crises. The Map of the Week presents a vibrant overview of Asia and Oceania’s top exports and our Statistics of the Week explores the ASEAN public’s alignment preferences in the U.S.–China rivalry. This week’s Photo of the Week, taken in Astana, visually encapsulates China’s Central Asian pivot, and our Infographic of the Week captures the geopolitical weight behind Xi and Putin’s coordinated messaging.
As alliances shift, summits multiply, and crises cascade across continents, this edition of Asia on the Horizon brings you the insight, structure, and foresight to track how Asia is shaping—rather than merely navigating—this global moment.
- Key Developments
- Statistics of the Week
- Map of the Week
- Photo of the Week
- Infographic of the Week
- Regional Alliances
- Analysis
Albanese Reaffirms AUKUS Commitment Amid Trump Meeting Fallout
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has reiterated Canberra’s unwavering support for the AUKUS security pact ahead of—and despite the cancellation of—his scheduled meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump during the G7 summit in Canada. Albanese had planned to press Trump on expediting the trilateral submarine deal, emphasizing that boosting Australia’s nuclear-powered fleet is critical to regional stability and aligned with U.S. strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific. While facing domestic calls to raise defense spending above the current 2.3% of GDP, he affirmed Australia would meet its AUKUS obligations—including financial contributions to joint production, maintenance access at Darwin, and integrated fleet operations. He also signaled intentions to discuss U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs affecting Australian exports—embedding AUKUS within a broader economic-security framework.
Following the summit, Albanese expressed confidence that AUKUS remains on track, bolstered by U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s assurance that “we’re proceeding with that, it’s a really important deal.” Despite Trump’s ongoing Pentagon-led review of the pact under an “America First” lens, Albanese described the trilateral alliance as a “great advantage” for all three countries. His remarks sought to dispel uncertainty surrounding the multibillion-dollar submarine partnership and reaffirm Australia’s strategic alignment with Washington and London amid China’s growing assertiveness in the region.
Modi Advances India–Cyprus Trade and Strategic Corridor Goals
During his first visit to Cyprus in over two decades on June 15–16, 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi underscored India’s commitment to the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), pitching Cyprus as the strategic gateway to Europe. Speaking alongside President Nikos Christodoulides, Modi highlighted Cyprus’s geographic advantage and its role in enhancing sea and rail connectivity, framing IMEC as a potential catalyst for regional peace and prosperity amid rising Middle Eastern tensions. He also announced India’s expectation of a finalized free‑trade agreement with the EU by the end of 2025, with Cyprus pledging backing during its EU presidency in early 2026 .
Beyond trade ambitions, Modi and Christodoulides signed multiple accords to strengthen bilateral defense, maritime, cybersecurity, and anti‑terror cooperation. These included an information‑sharing mechanism, increased Indian naval visits, joint training, and trilateral business collaborations with Greece to deepen economic engagement. Modi also received Cyprus’s highest civilian honour, the Grand Cross of the Order of Makarios III, symbolizing a deepening of historical and cultural ties between the two democracies.
Vietnam Joins BRICS as 10th Partner Nation to Deepen South–South Ties
Vietnam has officially been accepted as the 10th “partner country” of the BRICS bloc, following a decision by the Brazilian presidency in 2025. This new status grants Hanoi access to BRICS summits and policy discussions, reflecting its growing role in global South diplomacy. Brazil’s statement praised Vietnam’s alignment with BRICS priorities—South–South cooperation and sustainable development—and underscored its emergence as “a relevant actor in Asia”.
Vietnam’s inclusion signifies a strategic pivot in its foreign policy to diversify international partnerships and increase its influence amid great-power competition. The partner country category, introduced during the 2024 summit in Kazan, positions Vietnam alongside nations like Belarus, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Thailand. Analysts note that this status underlines Hanoi’s preference for multilateral engagement over aligning solely with Western-led structures—allowing Vietnam to hedge its bets in a multipolar world
EU and Trump Align on China Rivalries, Spotlight Transatlantic Tensions
At the G7 summit in Canada, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took a bold diplomatic approach, publicly aligning with former President Donald Trump over a shared concern about China’s strategic use of critical raw materials. She stated, “Donald is right” in warning against China weaponizing its dominance in minerals essential for green technologies—a rare moment of solidarity amidst broader transatlantic friction. Von der Leyen framed this stance as a jointly embraced challenge, saying both sides would “accelerate their work” toward a fair trade deal, even as they remain locked into high-stakes tariff negotiations.
This brief diplomatic convergence, however, masks deeper tensions. The EU is grappling with Trump’s looming threat of sweeping tariffs—up to 50% on European exports—a deadline set for July 9 if no deal materializes . Although Brussels has proposed measures such as a unified flat tariff and enhanced defense collaboration with the U.S., von der Leyen’s endorsement of Trump on China fails to ease pressure on trade. Instead, it offers a narrow opportunity for compromise on strategic issues even as the broader transatlantic relationship remains strained over economic security policy and defense burden‑sharing .
Philippines and Japan Strengthen Ties with Post‑RAA Joint Naval Drills
Following the December 2024 ratification of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), the Philippines and Japan conducted one of their first major maritime exercises in the West Philippine Sea this past weekend, marking a significant escalation in bilateral defense cooperation. The drills come on the heels of the RAA—a treaty enabling mutual deployment and military exercises on each other’s territory—which analysts view as a strategic response to increasing regional assertiveness, notably from China. Manila’s Senate unanimously approved the pact on December 16, 2024, followed by Japan’s Diet approval on June 6, 2025, setting the stage for this first round of operational collaboration.
The weekend drills, conducted under the RAA framework, highlight both nations’ intent to deepen interoperability and joint readiness, reinforcing a de facto “quasi‑alliance” amid shared security concerns. The exercises served not only to operationalize the RAA’s provisions but also to send a strategic signal in the South China Sea—where Philippines–China tensions have recently spiked. Philippine observers and defense experts characterize these drills as a tangible demonstration of trust built through late-night negotiations and rapid ratifications—and as a milestone in Tokyo–Manila security ties designed to uphold a free and open regional order
Shoigu’s Sixth Visit Marks Deepening Russia–North Korea Security Nexus
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu made his third trip to Pyongyang in under three months on June 17, 2025, reportedly acting on “special instructions” from President Vladimir Putin. During his visit, he met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to follow up on agreements stemming from their comprehensive strategic partnership treaty signed last year. The discussions centered on implementing mutual-defense commitments, with both governments expressing intent to solidify cooperation in security and military affairs.
Notably, Shoigu announced North Korea’s deployment of approximately 6,000 personnel to Russia’s Kursk region—1,000 sappers and 5,000 construction workers—to aid in post-conflict rebuilding efforts following Ukraine’s incursion. These troops include North Korean combat engineers who allegedly helped repel Ukrainian forces in the region earlier this year. Shoigu also revealed plans to honor North Korean soldiers who suffered casualties during these operations with memorials in both countries, underscoring the extent of this growing alliance. The visit highlights an escalating military-technical relationship that has drawn concern from South Korea, Western governments, and UN sanctions enforcers due to its implications for regional security and sanctions compliance.
China and Central Asia Cement ‘Permanent Good‑Neighbourliness’ Treaty to Boost Connectivity
At the Second China–Central Asia Summit held June 16–18 in Astana, Kazakhstan, President Xi Jinping signed a landmark treaty of “permanent good‑neighbourliness and friendly cooperation” alongside leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This pact enshrines a long-standing diplomatic framework into law and launches a broad agenda to enhance regional connectivity—bolstering rail and road links, increasing direct flights, streamlining visa regimes, and modernizing port infrastructure—with China exploring new consular platforms in the region. Reuters reports highlight commitments to open more direct air routes, upgrade transport corridors, and coordinate visa policies to foster trade, energy, and infrastructure integration.
Xi’s announcement included pledging ¥1.5 billion in grant aid and championing an accelerated China‑Kyrgyzstan‑Uzbekistan rail link, geared toward bypassing Russia and cutting transit times to Europe. The treaty also expands cooperation into green energy, justice, security, and cultural exchange. Initiatives include anti‑terror and cybersecurity cooperation, parliamentary and media partnerships, and the establishment of cooperation centers in Astana. Chinese state narratives emphasize a “China‑Central Asia Spirit” based on mutual trust and equitable multipolarism—signifying a strategic pivot to deepen influence across what has traditionally been a Russian-dominated periphery.
Modi Declares “Bullets with Shells” in Call Rejecting US as Mediator
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi conveyed a forceful message to former U.S. President Donald Trump during their 35-minute phone call on June 18, 2025. He reaffirmed that India’s Operation Sindoor, initiated in response to the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, is an ongoing, non-escalatory yet decisive campaign targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Modi bluntly stated that India “will respond to Pakistan’s bullets with shells,” and emphasized that any pause in hostilities resulted solely from direct military-to-military communications—rejecting Trump’s repeated claims that the U.S. brokered a ceasefire.
Modi made clear that New Delhi “has never accepted mediation, does not, and will never do so,” underscoring India’s preference for bilateral mechanisms over third-party involvement. He also dispelled Trump’s suggestion of linkage between the military pause and an India–U.S. trade deal, stating no such discussions took place during the conflict. Modi took the opportunity to invite Trump to the upcoming Quad summit in India—a proposal Trump accepted—and the two leaders agreed to engage in further high-level dialogue on regional security issues including the Indo-Pacific and the Russia–Ukraine conflict
Ishiba Flags Persistent Tensions in US–Japan Tariff Talks
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba emphasized after the G7 summit in Calgary on June 18, 2025, that Tokyo and Washington have yet to reach a comprehensive trade agreement, with significant disagreements enduring particularly over U.S. auto tariffs. Despite sincere and detailed discussions—including a 30-minute face-to-face meeting with President Trump—no breakthrough emerged on suspending or reducing the 25% tariff on Japanese automobile imports and the broader 24% “reciprocal” tariffs set to take effect in July. Ishiba stressed that negotiations persisted “until the last moment,” driven by Japan’s commitment to protecting its national economic interests, though key sticking points remain unresolved.
The impasse is already impacting Japan’s economy. In May 2025, exports fell by 1.7% year-on-year—the first decline in eight months—led by a sharp 24.7% slump in U.S.-bound auto shipments, although automakers largely absorbed the cost to maintain competitiveness. With a July 9 deadline looming before tariffs fully apply, Japan faces mounting pressure: economists warn that continued duties could shave up to 1% off GDP, and the political fallout may affect Ishiba’s standing ahead of the July upper-house elections. Tokyo is now bracing for intensified negotiations at upcoming forums, including the NATO summit in the Netherlands later this month.
Lee and Ishiba Pledge Closer Cooperation Amid Trade Headwinds
South Korean President Lee Jae‑Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba met on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Calgary on June 17, 2025, signaling a strategic reset in Seoul–Tokyo relations. Lee described their relationship as “inseparable,” likening their countries to neighbors “sharing the same front yard,” and underscored the importance of future‑oriented cooperation amid global trade volatility. Ishiba echoed this sentiment, affirming that trilateral collaboration with the U.S. remains vital in the current strategic environment and extending the dialogue to economic challenges—including facing U.S. reciprocal tariffs.
Both leaders acknowledged mounting trade pressures, with Lee calling on Japan to join forces in countering U.S.-imposed duties, which threaten sectors like autos and chips critical to their export‑driven economies. Lee’s administration is accelerating working-level negotiations with Washington to minimize tariff impacts, while Ishiba has mobilized a government-wide response to what he describes as a “national crisis” over looming U.S. auto tariffs. Their joint commitment at Calgary reflects a pragmatic shift—from historical friction toward mutual economic resilience and security alignment in the Indo‑Pacific.
Historic White House Lunch Deepens U.S.–Pakistan Rapprochement
On June 18, 2025, President Donald Trump hosted Pakistani Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir for a one-on-one lunch at the White House—marking an unprecedented meeting without civilian officials present. Trump lauded Munir’s role in helping defuse the recent India–Pakistan conflict, stating their efforts alongside Indian Prime Minister Modi had prevented a potential nuclear war. The gathering also touched on broader regional security concerns, including Iran, while underlining Trump’s pivot to strongman engagement and reviving ties that had cooled in recent years.
Trump’s assertion that U.S. mediation helped end hostilities is staunchly rejected by India, with PM Modi reiterating that the ceasefire resulted from direct military-to-military talks—emphasizing India’s long-standing policy against third-party intervention. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s military has welcomed the U.S. involvement, with officials even proposing to nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize—underscoring Islamabad’s gratitude and signaling its diplomatic resurgence. The meeting sharpens U.S.–India tensions and highlights South Asia’s shifting strategic fault lines, as Washington seeks to balance its relationships with both nuclear-armed nations.
Putin and Xi Condemn Israeli Strikes on Iran, Urge Diplomatic Solution
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping jointly denounced Israel’s military strikes on Iran in a June 19 phone call, expressing “strong” condemnation of actions that they say violate the UN Charter and international law. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov confirmed that both leaders agreed that the use of force against Iran’s nuclear facilities is counterproductive and that a diplomatic pathway is the only viable solution to address regional tensions.
They also agreed to remain in close communication in the coming days and voiced support for potential Russian mediation—a strategy Xi believes could help de-escalate the conflict. This joint stance underscores Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to position themselves as responsible global actors and offers a rare display of cohesive Sino-Russian diplomacy amid escalating NATO and Western involvement in the Middle East.
Luxon Seeks Closer Economic Bonds and Pacific Stability in Beijing Talks
New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, on his first visit to China since taking office in November 2023, met President Xi Jinping at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People on June 20, 2025, to reinforce bilateral trade and address regional security concerns. With China remaining New Zealand’s largest trading partner—2024 exports reached NZ$20.85 billion—Luxon emphasized boosting cooperation in education, tourism, infrastructure, and science & technology. Concrete agreements included expanded flights with China Eastern and a trial visa-waiver program from November to facilitate visitor and student mobility. These moves align with New Zealand’s broader Pacific engagement and support for Pacific Islands Forum-led initiatives.
Despite economic warmth, Luxon also introduced messages of caution amid growing geopolitical complexity in the Indo‑Pacific. He underscored the importance of peace and stability, referencing tensions stemming from China’s military activities in the Pacific and recent diplomatic friction over the Cook Islands’ new China-style agreements, which prompted a temporary aid suspension by Wellington. Xi countered by urging mutual respect and accurate handling of differences, noting that no fundamental conflicts exist between the two nations. The meeting thus balanced reinforcing economic ties with cautious alignment on security matters—a testament to New Zealand’s nuanced diplomacy amid intensifying U.S.–China competition.
Kunming Trilateral Signals New South-South Axis
China hosted senior officials from Pakistan and Bangladesh in Kunming on June 20 for the first China-Pakistan-Bangladesh Trilateral Summit, chaired by Vice-Foreign Minister Sun Weidong. Acting Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary Ruhul Alam Siddique and Pakistan’s Additional Secretary Imran Ahmed Siddiqui attended in person, with Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch joining virtually. The three sides adopted principles of “good-neighborliness, equality, mutual trust, openness and inclusiveness” and agreed to launch a follow-up working group to translate plans into joint projects across trade, industry, maritime logistics, water management, agriculture, climate action, health, education and think-tank exchanges—insisting the framework is “not directed at any third party.”
Regional analysts see the Kunming format as the latest step in Beijing’s effort to knit India’s neighbours more tightly into its orbit—coming just weeks after a similar China-Pakistan-Afghanistan dialogue and raising talk of an “eastern spur” to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Indian media note Dhaka’s interim leadership is quietly expanding security contacts with both Beijing and Islamabad, prompting concerns that China is “ring-fencing” India with overlapping economic and strategic corridors. Although the summit’s communique emphasised “true multilateralism,” the working-group mechanism gives China a new channel to deepen influence in South Asia’s Bay-of-Bengal rim while reinforcing its long-standing partnership with Pakistan.
U.S. Moves to Restrict Allied Chipmakers’ China Operations
The U.S. Commerce Department is reportedly preparing to revoke blanket waivers that allow major foreign semiconductor firms—Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, and TSMC—to freely use U.S.-origin equipment in their Chinese plants. Jeffrey Kessler, Under Secretary for Industry and Security, has informed these companies that such waivers will be terminated, shifting toward a stricter licensing regime similar to the one applied to China’s use of rare-earth minerals. While U.S. officials emphasize this policy is about “ensur[ing] equal and reciprocal” regulatory treatment rather than outright bans, the move would significantly raise red tape for overseas operations—and signals renewed export-control pressure from Washington under Trump-era national security priorities.
The anticipated policy will strain relations with South Korea and Taiwan, whose semiconductor giants rely heavily on Chinese plants for memory and logic chips in automotive and consumer markets. U.S. equipment suppliers like KLA, Lam Research, and Applied Materials already saw stock declines on the news. Industry insiders warn that, while short-term shutdowns are unlikely, long-term operational complications are probable—and firms may turn to Japanese or European suppliers or seek case-by-case licensing. This move comes amid broader U.S.–China trade tensions and a delicate détente agreed in London, raising questions about the future alignment of allies within Washington’s tech-security agenda.
ASEAN’s Alignment Dilemma: China vs. the United States
A new ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute poll of Southeast Asian thought-leaders asked an uncomfortable counter-factual: “If ASEAN were forced to align with one strategic rival, which should it choose?” The answers reveal a region almost perfectly split. On average, 47.8 percent of respondents across the ten ASEAN states would side with China, while 52.2 percent would pick the United States. The outliers are stark: the Philippines (86 % USA / 14 % China) and Vietnam (74 % / 27 %) anchor the pro-Washington end, whereas the populous maritime states Indonesia (72 % China / 28 % USA) and Malaysia (71 % / 29 %) tilt strongly toward Beijing. The strategic “swing states” sit near the fifty-fifty mark: Laos (51 % / 49 %), Singapore (47 % / 53 %), Cambodia (43 % / 57 %), and Myanmar (42 % / 58 %).
The pattern underscores the Indo-Pacific’s evolving fault lines. Mainland Southeast Asian countries with deep Belt-and-Road infrastructure ties, plus energy-hungry Indonesia and Malaysia, lean toward China’s economic gravity. Conversely, frontline South China Sea claimants—Vietnam and the Philippines—heavily favor the U.S. security umbrella, a sentiment reinforced by recent defense pacts and joint patrols. Thailand, Brunei and Singapore exemplify hedging: economically intertwined with China yet reliant on U.S. market access, technology and strategic guarantees. The nearly even regional split signals that great-power competition remains finely balanced—and that ASEAN’s much-prized “centrality” will depend on how deftly its members navigate an alignment spectrum rather than a binary choice.
What Drives Asia and Oceania’s Export Engines? A Patchwork of Priorities
This week’s map offers a snapshot of the top exports from countries across Asia and Oceania, highlighting the economic diversity that underpins the region’s global trade footprint. The map—based on data from CEPII’s International Trade Database—reveals striking sectoral contrasts: petroleum dominates as the leading export in six countries (including India, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Timor Leste), while tuna also leads in six Pacific Island nations, underscoring the continued significance of ocean-based economies like Kiribati, Micronesia, and Palau.
High-tech exports shape the profiles of more industrialized states: electric circuits top the charts in South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, while vehicle engines lead Japan and data processors dominate Thailand. The region also offers a few quirky outliers—bras are Sri Lanka’s top export, and scrap gold ranks highest in Cambodia. Meanwhile, traditional commodities still prevail in parts of South Asia: Pakistan leads with rice and Nepal with olive oil. Together, the map reflects the deep segmentation of Asia–Pacific’s economies—from mineral-rich energy exporters to electronics powerhouses and agricultural traders—each weaving its own thread into the region’s global economic fabric.
A New Silk Road Snapshot: Xi and the Central Asian Five in Astana
This week’s standout image captures a moment of growing regional gravity: Chinese President Xi Jinping stands flanked by the heads of state from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan at the Second China–Central Asia Summit in Astana, held on June 17, 2025. The carefully choreographed photo—blue-carpeted, flag-anchored, and flanked by five strategically pivotal presidents—symbolizes not just formality, but Beijing’s increasingly institutionalized influence in post-Soviet Eurasia.
Beyond the optics, the summit yielded a landmark treaty of good-neighborliness and cooperation, pledging expanded Belt and Road infrastructure, energy connectivity, digital partnerships, and security collaboration. Xi’s speech invoked “a community with a shared future,” while leaders from Central Asia praised China’s reliability amid shifting global alliances. The photo illustrates how China is recasting traditional spheres of influence with soft power, trade, and transcontinental vision—marking Astana not just as a host city, but as a diplomatic junction on the modern Silk Road.
Xi and Putin Close Ranks on Israel–Iran Crisis: “Only Diplomacy Can Resolve This”
This week’s featured infographic highlights a rare show of rhetorical unity between China’s President Xi Jinping and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, following a joint phone call on June 19, 2025 amid escalating Israeli strikes on Iran. Xi urged a ceasefire “especially by Israel”, reaffirming China’s role as a potential mediator and emphasizing the need to restore peace through multilateral coordination. Putin went further, issuing a forceful rebuke of Israel’s actions as violations of international law and affirming that “only diplomacy can resolve this crisis.”
Both leaders positioned themselves as champions of the UN Charter and critics of unilateral military action, signaling a bid to fill the diplomatic vacuum left by a more transactional U.S. stance. Their coordinated messaging—visually mirrored in the infographic—reflects deepening Sino-Russian strategic alignment in the Middle East, not only in military terms but as alternative voices of conflict mediation. With Gaza and Tehran still in the crosshairs, the crisis has become a stage for broader geopolitical contestation over who gets to manage peace in the post-American order.
Blueprint for the Heartland: China and Central Asia Cement Strategic Partnership in Astana
As great-power competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia, Beijing has turned to its western frontier to consolidate a zone of political trust and economic dependency. This week, the Second China–Central Asia Summit, held on June 17, 2025, in Astana, Kazakhstan, brought together the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The summit marked a turning point in China’s regional diplomacy: it transformed loose bilateral economic ties into an emerging multilateral architecture of partnership, infrastructure, and security cooperation under Beijing’s leadership.
From Dialogue to Treaty: Institutionalizing a Shared Vision
The central outcome of the summit was the signing of a landmark Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, setting a normative framework for future engagement. In his keynote address, President Xi Jinping hailed the treaty as the foundation of a “China–Central Asia community with a shared future,” invoking familiar Belt and Road themes of “win-win cooperation,” sovereignty, and non-interference. For Central Asian leaders, the treaty represents a calculated embrace of Chinese capital and technology without the governance demands typically associated with Western or multilateral funding.
While the first China–Central Asia summit in 2023 was largely symbolic, this second iteration introduced substantive deliverables. Agreements were reached on energy grid integration, digital Silk Road corridors, and industrial parks—particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Xi proposed the formation of a permanent China–Central Asia Secretariat, a move widely interpreted as an effort to institutionalize Beijing’s role in the region akin to ASEAN+1 frameworks.
Strategic Signaling and Soft Power Balancing
The Astana summit served more than just economic goals. It also projected China’s soft power alternative to Russia’s lingering influence and the West’s normative ambitions. China positioned itself as a predictable, apolitical partner—offering infrastructure without conditions, vaccines without interference, and trade without moral lectures. At the same time, Xi echoed broader anxieties over “external interference” and “color revolutions,” suggesting that security cooperation—including anti-terrorism and cyber defense—would be scaled up under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) umbrella.
Yet, the optics of the summit also reflect the evolving regional calculus of the Central Asian states themselves. While none of the five leaders openly criticized Russia, their full attendance and endorsement of China’s initiatives signal a desire for strategic diversification—balancing Russian legacy influence with Chinese economic momentum. With the United States largely absent from the region and the European Union focused on energy diplomacy, China has seized the moment to fill the diplomatic vacuum with long-term vision and hard infrastructure.
Conclusion: China’s Inner Asian Arc Tightens
The Second China–Central Asia Summit in Astana marks the emergence of a new diplomatic center of gravity in the Eurasian heartland. By binding the region through treaties, projects, and summits, China is not only securing its western frontier but also shaping a continental order that reinforces Beijing’s global ambitions. As the U.S. focuses on maritime Asia and Russia becomes preoccupied with European fronts, China’s deepening entente with Central Asia could prove to be a quietly transformative pivot in 21st-century geopolitics—one built less on alliances and more on networks of dependency, infrastructure, and trust.
Beijing Between Tehran and Tel Aviv: China’s Balancing Act Faces a Reckoning
The eruption of full-scale hostilities between Israel and Iran has become a defining test of China’s diplomatic tightrope in the Middle East. For over a decade, Beijing had carefully cultivated parallel strategic relationships with both Tehran and Tel Aviv—positioning itself as a neutral economic partner and aspiring peacemaker. But as missiles rained down and global tensions spiked, China’s long-cherished balancing act faltered, revealing the growing difficulty of navigating an increasingly polarized regional landscape.
Beijing’s Calculated Tilt: Sympathy Without Sacrifice
China’s initial reaction to the war revealed a cautious but unmistakable lean toward Iran. In statements issued through its Foreign Ministry and official media, Beijing denounced Israeli strikes as violations of international law and urged “all parties—especially Israel” to cease hostilities. Iran’s right to self-defense was affirmed, echoing the language China has used in support of other partners facing Western pressure. While these messages were framed in the idiom of diplomacy and multilateralism, they drew a sharp line in terms of optics: China stood with Tehran, not Tel Aviv.
This positioning reflects more than rhetorical alignment. Beijing has invested heavily in Iran’s economy under the 25-year strategic partnership signed in 2021, and it views Iran as a pivotal node in its Belt and Road Initiative and energy security calculus. Moreover, aligning with Iran allows China to confront the West without direct confrontation, portraying itself as the voice of the Global South against Western double standards. Yet this tilt comes at a price: Israel now views China as a partisan actor, while the United States sees a confirmation of Beijing’s alignment with revisionist powers.
Strategic Constraints and Diplomatic Erosion
The war has also spotlighted China’s limits as a conflict mediator. Despite its calls for de-escalation, Beijing has neither the leverage nor the trust required to shape events on the ground. Its outreach to both parties lacks the institutional depth of U.S. security partnerships or the moral clarity that many regional actors seek in times of crisis. For Israel, China’s reaction has been perceived as passive at best, and hostile at worst—eroding years of bilateral goodwill built on trade, technology, and investment. For Iran, while China remains a valued economic partner, its reluctance to provide security guarantees or vocal support during critical moments fosters distrust.
This erosion of trust on both sides illustrates a central dilemma in China’s foreign policy: Beijing aspires to global influence, but remains risk-averse in conflicts where stakes are high and neutrality is unsustainable. Unlike the United States, which operates through alliance networks and hard power deterrence, China’s model of influence relies on trade corridors, development finance, and soft diplomatic engagement. That model may suit a world at peace—but it struggles in a region at war.
Conclusion: The End of Strategic Ambiguity?
The Israel–Iran war has become more than a regional flashpoint—it is a geopolitical test of China’s ambition to be a global stabilizer. By attempting to preserve ties with both Tehran and Tel Aviv, Beijing has found itself distrusted by both, and increasingly sidelined as events unfold. If China wishes to play a lasting role in the Middle East, it must redefine its role from reactive economic actor to proactive diplomatic force—a shift that entails real costs, real commitments, and real risks.
As the world watches the fallout from this conflict, one thing is clear: China’s era of strategic ambiguity in the Middle East is nearing its end. The question now is whether Beijing will double down on selective engagement or embrace a bolder, more responsible posture in global crisis management. The answer may define not just its regional relevance—but its credibility as a global power.