CSDP Partnership in EUFOR RCA*

Introduction

EUFOR RCA was the EU’s military operation in the Central African Republic[1], launched on 1 April 2014. The EU started to search for partners from the very beginning and cooperated with the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the selected third states.

This kind of partnership in security and defence policy is vital with the shrinking[2] defence budgets in a more complex, insecure and destabilized security environment. Though having 27[3] member states (MSs) in this field, the EU is in need of partners to gain legitimacy and secure resources or capability. Thus, the EU has been endeavouring to expand partnerships in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) citing multilateralism, cooperation and (strategic) partners.

This research aims to analyse EU’s partnership practice in CSDP in a case study, EUFOR RCA. By definition, it is far from providing an overarching narrative on partnerships or whole interrelations among all partners. Yet, the study aspires to provide explanations to whether CSDP Partnership worked smooth in the case of EUFOR RCA.

Literature manifests an institutionalised cooperation between the EU and the UN in security and defence. In this regard, Tardy (2013) cites regular meetings of the EU High Representative (HR/VP) with the UN Secretary General, EEAS Deputy Secretary Generals with UN Under Secretary Generals and Steering Committees gathering on bi-annual basis. On the other hand, despite recent endeavours of institutionalisation, EU-AU relations have a more ad hoc nature and still have a way to go. In any case, security and defence cooperation with the UN and to some extend the AU is sufficiently discussed in literature. However, the EU and the third state cooperation remains uncharted at large. This research would be a small step in this direction.

CSDP Partners

Partnership and multilateralism is at the core of EU’s world view as stated in official documents and treaties.

“The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations… It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.” (TEU, 2008)

There is a dedicated EEAS web page[4] on CSDP partners (EEAS, n.d.1). Apart from quotations, lists of countries participated CSDP missions and operations as well as those concluded framework participation agreements, it systematically mentions international organisations to cooperate with. Nonetheless, it falls short of providing a clear cut CSDP partnership description and a clear category of partners. Thus, it would be safe to start with a general definition of CSDP Partnership;

“Cooperation of the EU with third parties (states, organizations) who share similar interests and common understandings in security and defence related issues.”

In this context, third parties can be motivated to enhance their relations with the EU or to leverage the EU in a field where their individual role would pose problems. The EU, on the other hand, aspires to legitimise its actions, to secure resources (funds, troops, capabilities) or to get the most of third parties’ expertise.

The partners can be categorized mainly in two groups; international/regional organisations and third states. While the former is comprised of the UN, NATO, AU and to a lesser extend OSCE and ASEAN, the latter is vague with ever changing and increasing nature.

Taking into account EU’s practice in EUFOR RCA case, the focus would be on the UN and the AU as partner organisations and Serbia, Turkey and Georgia as partner third states in this research. Other partner organisations (such as NATO or OSCE) or third states have little relevance, if any.

The United Nations (UN)

The UN has a very special place in the official EU literature as being “…in the apex of international system” (European Council, 2008) and at the core of “effective multilateralism” (EEAS, n.d.2).

The EU and the UN deployed subsequent and parallel operations in Africa and Western Balkans as early as 2003. They issued successively a joint declaration to enhance mutual coordination in training, planning, communication and best practices (Council, 2003) as well as a joint statement with measures to boost cooperation and coordination through regular meetings, information exchange, establishment of coordination mechanisms and systematic lessons learned processes (Council, 2007).

The EU approved an implementation plan[5] which frames five different deployment scenarios[6] to realise the discourse and institutionalize inter-organisational cooperation on the ground (European Council, 2004). The next step was to introduce a 2-year plan of action[7] to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping” (Council, 2012) which was used in Mali and EUFOR RCA planning phases.

Apart from these documents facilitating cooperation on the ground, some modalities are designed for coordination between the headquarters. The first and the foremost is the steering committee. This is a high-level biannual gathering, co-chaired by EEAS Deputy Secretary General and UN Under-Secretary General (USG), that enables dialogue on geographic and thematic issues of common interest. Despite the limited timeframe (1-working day), it attracts representatives from a wide spectrum of the respective secretariats and enable them communicate directly, derive action points and delegate tasks (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

The second modality is the reciprocal briefings by the HR/VP to the UNSC and UN USGs to Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), COREPER or PSC on as-needed basis (Tardy, 2013; UN Official, Interview, 2015). Video teleconferences (VTCs) and telephone contacts are more relax, flexible and practical forms of cooperation while headquarters are separated from each other by thousands of miles. In this regard, VTCs are carried out quite effectively so that even steering committee conclusions are reached by VTCs before committee meetings (UN Official, 2015). In this regard, the UNSC and the PSC holds biannual informal VTCs for coordination and information exchange (UNSG, 2015). A last resort is desk to desk dialogue for conflict prevention which is mostly used by UN DPA[8]. Yet, cooperation is very limited and ad hoc in nature because of EU-UN policy discrepancy in this domain (UN Official, 2015).

While it is argued that the EU-UN partnership is ad hoc in nature and not structured enough (Hummel & Pietz, 2015), inter-organisational cooperation and partnership enhanced substantially and the political will seems to facilitate this tendency.

The African Union (AU)

The EU MSs and African States has a long common history from colonialism. Following the African states’ independence declarations and gathering under umbrella organisations (which would become later the EU and AU), the relation has continued with successive agreements[9] to enhance cooperation.

The EU and the AU organised summits to institutionalise their cooperation[10]. Joint Africa[11]-EU Strategic Partnership (JAES) is an overarching political channel framing inter-organisational cooperation established in the first summit. Two action plans and a roadmap as well as implementation documents for cooperation in security and defence matters were signed during these series of summits. The outcomes were minor and specifically on peace and security. Nevertheless, the AU aspires to include other domains such as trade and economy on the agenda  and develop relations thereof (AU Official, Interview, 2015).

Except for the informal, near-daily contact between the AU and the EU delegation in Addis Ababa (AU Official, Interview, 2015), there are five formal modalities for cooperation (European Commission, 2015):

1. Summits (every 3 years),
2. Ad hoc ministerial meetings,
3. Annual College to College meetings,
4. Joint Annual Forums,
5. Regular high-level dialogues and expert level meetings, (e.g. annual
   EU PSC-AU PSC).

Third States

The EU-Third State relations are generally bilateral in nature. It might be a strategic one guided by summits. In this regard, Renard points out ten strategic partners[12] (2013), yet, this is not acknowledged in the EU Global Strategy in 2016. Some other relations might be overarching (span from trade to security) or political (candidacy). The EU provides two agreements to formalise its relations with third states: framework participation agreement[13] (FPA) and security of information agreement.

Despite these arrangements, most of the interaction is ad hoc. The EU organises informal meetings as needed, generally when more resources are required in CSDP missions and operations. There is a standardised list of third states[14] in this respect, unless there is a sensitivity or interest with participation of a particular third state (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

One unique formal venue for multilateral (with a group of third states) cooperation is PSC+7 and EUMC+7 meetings[15] established through framework agreements with NATO. This modality facilitates political and operational consultations with candidate countries to the EU and non-EU European NATO Allies.

In the cadre of EUFOR RCA, Georgia, Serbia and Turkey will be scrutinised further as they were the contributor third states. Yet, the research will reveal that the complicity of bilateral arrangements is appalling and hinders the cooperation considerably. Not being a European Ally nor an EU candidate, Georgia, the second biggest contributor of the operation, could not attend PSC+7/EUMC+7 meetings. Despite having concluded FPA with the EU, Georgia and Turkey had problems to reach classified documents in the absence of a security of information agreement. Serbia on the other hand, had concluded both of the agreements and could attend PSC+7/EUMC+7 meetings together with Turkey for further consultations

Historical Background of the Crisis and the Security Actors

The Central African Republic is one of the poorest countries in the world and in perennial conflict with a tradition of coup d’état government handover following its independence from France in 1960.

The latest circle of violence came with the Nordic rebel groups (mainly minority Muslims) with logistical and personnel support of Chad and Sudan. They were fighting against the government forces to share power in the scarcity of security and social services in the North. Following such an agreement (Libreville Agreement 2008) between the government and the rebels, the situation worsened when these groups united under the umbrella of Séléka (coalition) from 2012. Libreville Peace Agreement in 2013 did little to peace as Séléka militias continued their attacks till they reached Bangui (capital). Michel Djotodia, leader of Séléka militias, ousted President Bozizé and became the first Muslim president of RCA and declared dissolution of Séléka. However, unleashed militias dispersed to the country and led to further violations (EEAS, 2014a; Bouckaert, 2013) which started a “vicious cycle of widespread ethnoreligious based violence” (Bouckaert, 2013) between Séléka and Anti-Balaka[16] (Anti-Machete), alarming the UN of a possible genocide against Muslim minority (EDD, 2013). The violence caused more than 825,000 IDPs and 245,000 refugees to neighbouring countries from the 4.6 million country as of late 2013. Nearly half of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance (EEAS, 2014a).

International and Regional Organisations

As a consequence of the long-standing conflict, there was already a mission, MICOPAX[17], acting under the auspices of ECCAS[18] (UNSG, 2008). However, it was far from stopping the violence with limited number of troops. Thus, AU decided to deploy a mission, MISCA[19] to protect the civilians, restore public order and security. The UN Security Council mandated MISCA on 5 December 2013 (AU PSC, 2013; UN Security Council, 2013) and it took over responsibility from MICOPAX on 19 December 2013 (EEAS, 2014a).

Nevertheless, MISCA also fell short of protecting civilians, restoring public order or supporting DRR[20] process. Accordingly, UNSC decided to transform MISCA into a UN Peacekeeping Operation with the same mandate (UNSCR2127). UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions require substantial time which was scarce as the situation was worsening. To overcome this time gap, some 17 months, between two missions, a bridging operation was needed and eventually this gap was covered by EUFOR RCA which was the second[21] bridging operation (Smith, 2014). France facilitated and accelerated the process as a member of UNSC and FAC (Tardy, 2014a).

EUFOR RCA had a limited mandate in time[22] and area of responsibility[23] (EDD, 2014a), yet it provided the UN sufficient time to launch MINUSCA[24] many of whose personnel re-hatted from MISCA[25] (UN News, 2014; United Nations Security Council, 2014). Ultimately, EUFOR RCA transferred to an advisory mission, EUMAM RCA[26], to support the RCA authorities in FACA security sector reform (Tardy, 2015).

Individual States

France had troops in RCA under Operation Boali since 2002 to support FOMUC[27] and to provide training to FACA[28] based on bilateral agreement with RCA (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a). Following the escalation, the mandate of the operation became irrelevant. France reinforced its troops, renamed it as Operation Sangaris and re-mandated under UNSCR 2127[29] to support MISCA (Ministère de la Défense, 2013b). It was the 7^th intervention to her ex-colony (France Inter, 2013).

CSDP Partnership in EUFOR RCA

Working with ad hoc coalitions require considerable effort and one-time partners tend to be non-committal in the long run. Thus, the EU yearns for formalising its relations with its partners since this enables efficient cooperation (Mattelaer, 2010). In the research at hand, the CSDP partnership in EUFOR RCA will be scrutinized in three phases; planning, execution and termination.

The Planning Phase

The EU and the UN had a very early contact in RCA, especially on the ground with  BINUCA, UN’s political mission in RCA and the EU delegation in Bangui. BINUCA head had dialogues with EU officials in Brussels (UN Official, Interview, 2015) and PSC was briefed by UN DPO via VTC (Tardy & Gowan, 2014). Meanwhile, the EU delegation in the UN facilitated cooperation with the UN and the AU while desk to desk dialogues (EU-UN) were ongoing (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

On the other hand, subsequent EU-AU PSC meetings served as a basis to discuss RCA crisis at political level (AU PSC, 2013; EEAS, 2014b). Technical and operational contacts were carried out on the ground or through delegations in New York and Addis Ababa as the AU Delegation to the EU is severely undermanned (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015; AU Official, Interview, 2015).

As soon as the EU expressed concerns on RCA and its readiness to use every tool, the issue was raised in a regular PSC+9 meeting in January 2014 (Turkish Official, 2015). Yet, this forum was not suitable for other third states, such as Georgia, the second biggest contributor. Thus, the Council authorized PSC to invite relevant third states for their possible participation and contributions (OJ, 2014). Accordingly, PSC invited Canada, Georgia, Norway, Serbia, Turkey and the US to participate in the operation (EDD, 2014b).

The first EU-UN conflict analysis workshop, which enabled to have a shared analysis of RCA crisis and its root causes, was conducted in February 2014. This innovative setting enabled a practical cooperation and the outcomes became input to subsequent planning documents. Yet, it fell short of inclusivity with no other partners (UN Official, 2015).

The EU fact finding mission to Bangui was another venue for further cooperation with the UN and AU representatives on the ground, triggering a successful bottom-up approach in EUFOR RCA case (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

All in all, the reason for such a smooth EU-UN cooperation and coordination in planning phase is a document which explains mutually agreed modalities on planning and provides the entry points for respective organizations in this phase as successfully used in Mali and RCA (EUFOR RCA and MINUSCA) (Pietz & Tardy, 2014). However, the absence of an EU security of information agreement with the UN and the AU hindered cooperation considerably. To overcome the impasse of classified information exchange, an innovative way found was to make informal meetings and share necessary information such as area of responsibility, tasks, caveats, etc. with the partners (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

The Execution Phase

As soon as launched, EUFOR RCA exchanged liaison officers and designated points of contacts with MISCA (and later with MINUSCA) to facilitate coordination (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015). Informal daily contacts and meetings allowed to share classified information without exchanging classified documents in the absence of a security of information agreement (EEAS Official, 2015). Although the Council decision establishing EUFOR RCA authorizes classified information exchanges with the UN and the AU up to “Restricted” level[30] (OJ, 2014), it was not effective on operational basis (UN Official, 2015). As a last point, absence of a mutually agreed modalities on execution [31] was another downside in cooperation.

Although, the EU has strict end strategies with a definitive date and any extension request causes friction between the EU and the UN (Koops, 2011) (Mattelaer, 2008), direct contact and a timely briefing to PSC enabled DPKO to get a 3-month extension for the last preparations of MINUSCA (UN Official, 2015). As a result, the interviewees of both organisations acknowledged better cooperation and division of labour on the ground pursuant to their mandates instead of necessities (UN Official, 2015; EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

With regards to third states cooperation and exchange of classified information, Serbia had no problems as it had previously concluded a security of information agreement with the EU. Officials from both sides confirmed smooth cooperation and coordination on the ground (Serbian Official, 2015; EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).Turkey, on the other hand, a NATO ally and a candidate country to the EU, didn’t have such an agreement because of political confrontation with specific EU MSs (i.e. Greece and Cyprus). Georgia, the second biggest contributor to EUFOR RCA, was not a candidate country nor concluded a security of information agreement. Yet, the latter designated a liaison officer to operational headquarters in Larissa for a better coordination. Even so, both Georgia and Turkey received classified documents up to “Confidential” level (Georgian Official, 2015; Turkish Official, 2015).

Termination of the Operation

Following termination of EUFOR RCA on 15 March 2015, two venues for cooperation came to the fore; lessons learned process and logistical cooperation.

All of the partners were eager to participate to the lessons learned process. Georgia was more enthusiastic in taking the initiative to prepare its own process and to offer the EU to organise a seminar including all partners (Georgian Official, 2015). The UN was also eager to conduct a regular, structured and common review as already jointly documented in plan of action (UN Official, Interview, 2015) whereas the AU officials were expecting more concrete results in the coming joint annual forum (AU Official, Interview, 2015).

Alternatively, transferring UCATEX, the accommodation site of EUFOR RCA, to MINUSCA manifests an innovative way to common or sequential use of real-life support. It was included in UN Secretary General’s report on partners (UNSG, 2015) and the UN officials started to work on a draft framework agreement to formalise this new form of cooperation without delay (UN Official, 2015). Common use of real life support also requires further cooperation on, for instance, camp security or exchange of classified information, as in this case between EUMAM RCA and MINUSCA (EEAS Official, 2015).

Analysis of CSDP Partnership

The state of play in CSDP Partnership is analysed in three focus areas; namely whether they have an ad hoc or structured  nature, whether international organisations or third states cooperate better and the importance of security of information agreement.

Ad Hoc vs. Structured

a.The UN

The EU-UN relationship in security and defence commenced in 2003 with operations on the ground and subsequent attempts to formalise it, i.e. joint declaration (2003), implementation plan (2004) with deployment scenarios and the so-called plan of action (2007) which brought a fresh start to the formalised cooperation. Both secretariats insist on using the formalised scenarios, revisit them in the following documents if unsuccessful and to pursue on mutually agreed modalities on execution (EEAS Official, 2015). It should be admitted that despite some criticism (Gowan & Witney, 2014; Smith, 2014), plan of action successfully completed some of its actions (even modestly) and transposed the unfinished actions to “Action Plan 2”.

Thanks to mutually agreed modalities on planning, the EU-UN cooperation in EUFOR RCA worked well. The contacts started with steering committees, high level briefings and desk to desk dialogues, followed by an RCA conflict analysis workshop which gave birth to a shared analysis and thus enabled harmonised future plans (EEAS Official, 2015; UN Official, Interview, 2015), contrary to the operational design in Libya (Tardy & Gowan, 2014). An initial contact on the ground in planning phase was provided by EU Fact Finding Mission.

On the execution phase, EUFOR RCA and MINUSCA exchanged liaison officers and points of contact. Though up to ‘Restricted” level, classified information exchange enabled them joint actions, like joint patrols.

After the completion of EUFOR RCA, two venues appeared for coordination: lessons learned process and real-life support. While the partners are keen in common lessons learned process, which is a part of plan of action, there is still way ahead for a multilateral format as this includes confidential information and not all of the partners have the same level of security of information, if they have any. In terms of the latter, transferring UCATEX to MINUSCA was a good start in this domain.

b.The AU

The EU-AU relations is formalised first and foremost with JAES and two complementary implementation plans which do not include concrete and time based items compared to EU action plans with the UN. Thus, there are minor outcomes, if any (AU Official, Interview, 2015).

RCA was an agenda item in EU PSC-AU PSC meetings in 2013 and 2014. Yet, it is clear that two political level meetings in two consecutive years is not sufficient to produce the intended outcome. In this regard, technical cooperation was done through the AU and the EU delegations in New York (UN) and Addis Ababa (AU) instead of the AU Mission to the EU which was short of security and defence experts in the capital of CSDP operational planning. On the other hand, AU is the third pillar of  the conflicts in Africa at large and in RCA in particular. Yet, it is generally the missing link in planning phase. This could be overcome by either mutual EU-AU or trilateral EU-UN-AU agreed modalities in planning phase. It’s worth also to remember that the AU was excluded in EU-UN conflict analysis workshop. The cooperation in the operational side was better starting with EU’s Fact Finding Mission and exchanging of liaison officers and point of contacts. Despite the absence of a security of information agreement, sufficient meetings were conducted and classified information exchanged on need basis.

c.Third States

The EU-Third State partnership depends on mostly bilateral relations which is selective and ad hoc in nature. A unique alternative is a partnership through PSC+ or EUMC+ meetings with non-European NATO Allies and candidate countries to the EU thanks to a framework agreement concluded with NATO. In both cases there are two main documents to structuralise the relation in security and defence domain: Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) and Security of Information Agreement. The number of countries that conclude these agreements are in constant increase whereas the number of the former is far greater than the latter. In any case, these agreements do not provide sufficient modalities and procedures for third state participation in CSDP planning. Furthermore, not a single third state could attend the planning phase or the EU-UN conflict analysis workshop.

All of the third states participating to EUFOR RCA concluded FPAs in advance, yet only Serbia had a security of information agreement. Council decision enabled up to ‘Confidential’ level classified information exchange with the third states (but not to organisations) on the ground.

Organizations vs. Third States in CSDP Partnership

The relationship between the EU and the international organisations are generally quite good, mostly structured and ever evolving in planning phase. In this regard, the EU-UN relations are better and more improved compared to cooperation with the AU. There are some agreed EU-AU modalities, yet further cooperation is hindered either with insufficient frequencies or undermanned missions. On the other hand, one can observe hardly any cooperation, ad hoc or structured, between the EU and the third states in planning phase. Although, some selected third states were informed through briefings and force generation conferences to cover operational gaps, this is far from a mutual cooperation, putting third states as “second-class stakeholders” (Tardy, 2014b).

In the execution phase, the comparison is just the opposite, i.e. the interorganisational cooperation is not structured and parties try to find ad hoc solutions whereas third states enjoy a structured cooperation thanks to the FPAs, security of information agreements and Council decisions (Serbian Official, 2015; Georgian Official, 2015).

A Big Hindrance: Absence of Security of Information

The research revealed that all partners without a security of information agreement agree that it is the most important drawback on the way to a better cooperation.

In the case of international organisations, the EU has not concluded such an agreement, even not with the UN. This affects less in the planning phase where the EU provides sufficient classified information through agreed modalities, yet it is a big hindrance on the execution phase when parties need to make more ad hoc, informal meetings to exchange information.

The same goes for third states but in the opposing phases. No third state can receive a classified planning document before PSC invites respective third state to contribute to the operation, even those with security of information agreements, making these agreements to be dysfunctional. On the execution side, Council permits third states to receive classified documents up to ‘confidential’ level, again causing those agreements dysfunctional[32] as well as wiping the differences between those who concluded such an agreement and those who did not.

Conclusion

The existing research reveals some basic findings on the nature of CSDP partnership, the quality of cooperation based on this nature and the importance of the security of information agreement.

The EU-UN interorganisational cooperation was mostly structured in EUFOR RCA and improved coordination testifies for an interorganisational learning (Smith, 2014). Formalized modalities were exploited sufficiently and some innovative venues (i.e. conflict analysis workshop) were discovered along the way in planning. Although cooperation on the ground was sufficient, formal modalities are necessary for the execution phase.

On the other hand, the EU-AU cooperation in the case under study manifested both ad hoc and structured features. The interorganizational contacts made in mutually agreed formal structures without sufficient modalities and timelines. Hence, mutually agreed modalities in sufficient frequencies are yet to be put in place, if possible, trilaterally including the UN.

The overall EU-third state cooperation is still ad hoc in nature. Although FPAs and security of information agreements or council decisions with regards to classified information exchange facilitated cooperation on the ground, third state participation in the planning phase was negligible, if any, as a result of insufficient modalities.

By comparing partners; the EU can be argued to have a better cooperation with international/regional organisations in planning phase, despite existence of several shortfalls with the AU. In fact, it is hard to make a comparison in this phase, because of EU’s few relations with third states. The comparison yields though contrary results as regards execution phase where the inter-organisational relations are not that formalized or smooth and parties strive to find ad hoc solutions.

Last, but not least, execution of joint military operations entails sharing sensitive information in immense volumes. Without a security of information agreement, it’s hard to cooperate with partners be it international organizations or third states in any phase.

 

 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   *Research Fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG

 

 

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* This article is abbreviated and updated from the author’s Master Thesis submitted to Vrije Universiteit Brussel in 2015 with the title “Does CSDP Partnership Work Smooth? Case Study: EUFOR RCA”.
[1] This article is abbreviated and updated from the author’s Master Thesis submitted to Vrije Universiteit Brussel in 2015 with the title “Does CSDP Partnership Work Smooth? Case Study: EUFOR RCA”.
[2] In accordance with the name of the operation, the French acronym RCA (République centrafricaine) will be used for Central African Republic throughout the article.
[3] Though the defence budgets increased following 2015, the levels were far from being sufficient.
[4] The EU had 28 members -including the UK- at the time with an opt-out of Denmark in CSDP.
[5] Unfortunately the page is not live anymore.
[6] EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration.
[7] Clearinghouse, stand-alone mission, modular approach, bridging model and standby model.
[8] The document is called either plan of action or simply action plan throughout the research.
[9] Department of Political Affairs
[10] Yaoundé Conventions (1963, 1969) and Lomé Conventions (1975, 1979, 1984, 1990) Cotonou Agreement in 2000 (AU Official, Interview, 2015; Toth, 2007).
[11] Cairo 2000, Lisbon 2007, Tripoli 2010, Brussel 2014, Abidjan 2017.
[12] Although the summit was after the transformation of OAU to AU, the document is titled Africa rather than AU as Morocco, a non-member of the AU, was included.
[13] The US, Canada, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, India, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa.
[14] A framework participation agreement is more or less a template, which hardly differs one another apart from the names of the states and their reference documents, regulating the interrelation between the EU and the relevant third state in contribution of the latter’s to CSDP missions and operations. These are; the US, Canada, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine, Colombia, South Korea, Georgia, Chile, Australia, Moldova, Albania, former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam and New Zealand.
[15] The United States, Canada, Georgia, Western Balkan Countries and Turkey.
[16] The number changes from time to time as the number of the candidate countries or non-EU NATO Allies changes (PSC+7, PSC+9, etc). These include Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia.
[17] These were Christian villages’ former self-defence forces formed by ex-President Bozizé in 1990s against road bandits.
[18] La Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique.
[19] The Economic Community of Central African States.
[20] Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine.
[21] Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
[22] The first one was EUFOR Chad/RCA, also in RCA to facilitate UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) (EEAS 2009; Mattelaer 2008).
[23] 4-6 months after reaching full operational capability.
[24] The airport and two more districts in Bangui.
[25] Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.
[26] In fact, it was initially destined to hand over to AU mission MISCA, but later turned out to bridge a UN Mission, MINUSCA.
[27] EU Military Advisory Mission in RCA.
[28] The predecessor of MICOPAX.
[29] French acronym for Central African Armed Forces (forces armées centrafricaines)
[30] UNSCR 2127 mandates both MISCA and Operation Sangaris.
[31] Whereas third states could receive up to “Confidential” level which is a level higher classification.
[32] Contrary to mutually agreed modalities on planning.
[33] Unless the level is not ‘Secret’ or higher.