Key Takeaways

NATO’s core strategic assumption has changed irreversibly. The Alliance no longer treats major war as a distant contingency preceded by ample warning. Senior political, military, and intelligence leaders now operate on the premise that confrontation could emerge rapidly and ambiguously, demanding continuous readiness rather than delayed mobilisation.
Russia should not be misread as a declining power. Despite heavy losses in Ukraine, Moscow has demonstrated an ability to adapt, regenerate forces, and sustain high-intensity conflict through a wartime economy.
The concept of “long warning time” is effectively obsolete. Hybrid warfare, grey-zone activity, cyber operations, and covert sabotage have collapsed the distinction between peace and war. NATO can no longer rely on clear escalation ladders or obvious mobilisation signals before a crisis erupts.
Industrial capacity is now a decisive determinant of deterrence credibility. Deterrence increasingly rests not on declaratory policy or force posture alone, but on the ability to produce, replace, and sustain military power at scale.
Ukraine is central to NATO’s security, not peripheral to it. Support for Ukraine is best understood as forward defence: degrading Russia’s military capacity now reduces the likelihood of direct confrontation later.
Political will is the Alliance’s most critical vulnerability. Threat awareness is no longer the limiting factor; execution is. Sustained increases in defence spending, industrial prioritisation, and societal preparedness remain politically uncomfortable but unavoidable.
Deterrence by preparation is time-bound. NATO retains overwhelming advantages in aggregate power, but these advantages only matter if translated into visible, deployable, and sustainable capability before they are tested.

Introduction

NATO’s defensive posture is being reshaped by a newly urgent sense of threat on Europe’s horizon. The Alliance now finds itself bracing like a shield against a gathering storm – a storm symbolized by Russia’s sustained aggression and military resurgence. In late 2025, NATO leaders delivered stark warnings that the post-Cold War era of assuming peace is over. For example, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte cautioned that the Alliance’s members must treat Moscow’s threat with immediate seriousness, saying they could be “Russia’s next target” if deterrence falters. This was not mere rhetoric to jolt complacent publics, but a reflection of a growing consensus among political leaders, intelligence services, and military commanders that the old security model has expired. No longer is Russia seen as a contained regional problem cantered on Ukraine; it is viewed as a systemic adversary capable of testing NATO directly if the Alliance’s guard slips. The critical question NATO now faces is not whether a real threat exists – that is broadly acknowledged – but whether the Alliance can adapt quickly enough to meet that threat before it’s too late.

From Warning to Reckoning

Mark Rutte’s recent statements mark a decisive inflection point in Euro-Atlantic security thinking. In a keynote address in Berlin, he warned starkly, “We are Russia’s next target. And we are already in harm’s way,” noting that Moscow could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years. British defence leaders have echoed this urgency. Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton – the UK’s new Chief of the Defence Staff – plans to tell the public that “Putin’s willingness to target his neighbours threatens the whole of NATO, including the UK”. Meanwhile, Britain’s MI6 intelligence chief cautions that “the frontline is everywhere” in this “new age of uncertainty,” calling Russia’s “export of chaos” a deliberate strategy to keep the West off-balance.

Taken together, these warnings signal a profound shift from the optimism and “peace dividend” mentality that prevailed after the Cold War. Where NATO once assumed that major conflict was unlikely and would come with long advance warning, it is now bracing for the possibility of sudden crisis. Alliance officials openly acknowledge that the post-1991 era of treating Russia as a troubled partner or a manageable local aggressor is over. The reckoning is that Europe faces a revanchist power willing to use force beyond Ukraine – a power that must be deterred not by hopeful assumptions, but by tangible, visible preparedness. The stakes are exceptionally high: failure to adapt NATO’s deterrence and defence posture could invite the very aggression everyone wishes to prevent.

Russia’s Strategic Adaptation, Not Collapse

A key premise underpinning NATO’s new urgency is the realization that Russia has adapted to prolonged war rather than collapsing under its strain. Western analysts who predicted that Moscow’s battlefield setbacks and economic sanctions would lead to swift decline have been proven wrong – at least in the short to medium term. Despite suffering grievous losses in Ukraine, the Kremlin has reorganized its state apparatus and economy onto a war footing. Military production has surged: defence factories are running 24/7 and output of missiles, drones, tanks, and artillery shells has expanded dramatically. In fact, Russia’s annual defence and security spending for 2025 is projected at 17 trillion Rubles, accounting for 41% of total government outlays – the highest share since the Cold War. The defence sector has become “the primary driver of economic growth” in Russia as civilian industries take a back seat. In short, President Vladimir Putin’s regime has pivoted to a “wartime economy”, dedicating nearly half its budget to sustaining aggression.

This war mobilization has enabled Russia to replenish and evolve its military capabilities even while fighting. New conscripts and volunteer fighters are being thrown into battle as fast as others are lost, demonstrating an unsettling capacity to absorb losses and regenerate forces. Crucially, Moscow is leveraging all domains of warfare – not only conventional arms but also cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage operations, and covert action. Over the past year, Russian drones have violated NATO airspace in Eastern Europe, Russian military jets have tested NATO’s air defences, and suspected Russian operatives have targeted undersea infrastructure. These actions show an adversary able to operate simultaneously across military and non-military domains, keeping NATO guessing and off-balance.

All of this means NATO can no longer comfort itself with assumptions that Russia is a declining or exhausted power. Russia is down but not out. Its economy has taken hits but adjusted; its armed forces have been bloodied but are learning and rearming. As Mark Rutte observed, “Putin’s war machine is speeding up, not slowing down”. For NATO planners, this compresses any notion of warning time and shatters the belief that escalation would be slow, linear, or easily observable. An adversary that is regenerating strength and probing for weaknesses is one that could exploit any lapse in the Alliance’s vigilance.

The Collapse of the “Long Warning Time” Assumption

For decades, NATO’s defence posture rested on the comforting idea that a major war would be preceded by clear strategic indicators – mobilizations, economic shifts, menacing political signals – providing time to react. During the Cold War, this concept of “strategic warning time” underpinned Alliance planning. However, the events of recent years have fatally undermined that assumption. Hybrid warfare tactics and the blurring of peace and conflict mean that hostilities can effectively begin without a formal declaration or a traditional buildup. As the UK’s MI6 chief bluntly put it, “the export of chaos is a feature, not a bug, in the Russian approach”– suggesting the Kremlin will pursue destabilization and probing as a constant background noise, rather than a single, obvious wind-up to war.

Indeed, elements of conflict are already underway on NATO’s periphery. Cyberattacks on Western infrastructure, disinformation campaigns aimed at European populations, and covert operations (such as sabotage of critical pipelines or cables) have occurred even during what is nominally “peacetime.” Russian drones and missiles have strayed into NATO-adjacent territory; for example, Alliance jets have been scrambled to investigate drone incursions over Romania as Russia strikes targets near the NATO border. There have been instances of Russian military aircraft briefly violating NATO airspace, and intelligence services warn of Russian spies or proxies conducting espionage and subversive activities within NATO countries. All this blurs the line between peace and open conflict. The notion that NATO will enjoy a leisurely interval of unambiguous warning before a confrontation is increasingly seen as a dangerous illusion.

NATO’s senior leadership is responding by insisting on a posture of continuous readiness rather than reactive mobilization. In practical terms, this means maintaining forces, stockpiles, and command-and-control structures at high readiness every day, not just after an obvious alarm bell rings. Governments are dusting off or reinventing Cold War-era plans for rapid mobilization of society. For instance, the UK is rapidly developing plans to ready the entire country (industry, infrastructure, and public services) for the possibility of war, after discovering it had no comprehensive national defence mobilization scheme in place as of last year. The implicit message: deterrence built on delayed reaction or ad hoc crisis response is no longer sufficient. To prevent a potential surprise attack or sudden escalation, NATO must project a constant state of high alert and capability, denying any would-be aggressor the window of opportunity that ambiguity or unpreparedness might offer.

Industrial Capacity as the New Strategic Centre of Gravity

One of the most striking elements of NATO’s evolving strategy is an intense focus on industrial capacity and logistics as the linchpin of credible deterrence. In the past, NATO debates often revolved around troop numbers, nuclear posture, or the positioning of battalions. Today, alliance leaders are just as likely to stress factory output, supply chains, and workforce skills. The reason is straightforward: Russia’s ability to wage a long war of attrition has exposed a critical weakness in NATO’s readiness – the limited surge capacity of Western defence industries.

NATO’s Secretary General Rutte has highlighted sobering comparisons. “In terms of ammunition, Russia produces in three months what the whole of NATO produces in a year,” he noted, underscoring how Moscow’s armaments industry massively outpaces the West’s. He further warned that Russia’s defence industry was aiming to roll out 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armoured vehicles, and 200 new missiles in a single year – a scale of output unthinkable for any individual European state today. European officials echo this concern: by some estimates, Russia still produces more ammunition in one year than all NATO countries combined, while Europe’s current output is only about 50% of what is required for a sustained high-intensity conflict. These disparities highlight that without robust industrial backing; NATO’s deterrence could become merely declaratory – impressive on paper but hollow in reality.

As a result, allied governments are scrambling to boost defence-industrial production and stockpiles. The Alliance is moving beyond abstract spending promises to concrete production targets and procurement reforms. NATO adopted a new 5% of GDP defence spending guideline (up from the longstanding 2% baseline) to fund this buildup. But even more important than the money is how it is used. Leaders are emphasizing investments in munitions factories, shipyards, and other facilities, along with multi-year contracts to give industry confidence to expand capacity. The European Union, for instance, has launched initiatives like the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and other funding tools to spur rapid expansion of shell and missile manufacturing. Thanks to such measures, annual European artillery shell output is projected to climb from only ~300,000 rounds in 2022 to 2 million rounds by the end of 2025. New high-tech factories are springing up across NATO countries – one new plant in Germany was built from the ground up in just 14 months, an unheard-of pace, to produce hundreds of thousands of artillery shells per year.

NATO’s emerging capability goals illustrate this shift toward material readiness. Key areas being prioritized include:

Air and Missile Défense: A 400% increase in air and missile defence systems is sought to counter the kind of aerial terror Russia has unleashed in Ukraine. Rutte argues NATO needs nearly five times more air defence assets than it has now to credibly shield alliance territory.
Armoured Forces and Firepower: Allies are being urged to acquire “thousands more armoured vehicles and tanks” and “millions more artillery shells” to equip their armies for high-intensity warfare. This also means ramping up production lines for everything from basic artillery rounds to advanced precision munitions.
Logistics and Sustainment: NATO seeks to double its enabling capabilities – such as logistics, transportation, and medical support – which are vital for moving and sustaining large forces in the field. Long-neglected parts of the defence enterprise like depots, rail capacity, and heavy airlift are now recognized as key determinants of warfighting endurance.

This focus on industrial and logistical strength reflects a hard truth learned from Ukraine’s experience: wars of attrition are won as much in the factory as on the battlefield. NATO still possesses overwhelming aggregate economic and technological advantages over Russia – but those advantages matter only if converted into real military power in a timely manner. The coming years will therefore see an Alliance-wide push to rebuild munitions stockpiles, modernize supply networks, and ensure that defence industries can surge output when crisis looms.

Ukraine as Forward Defence, Not Peripheral Conflict

Another profound change in NATO’s strategic outlook is the way leaders frame the war in Ukraine. What once might have been viewed as a peripheral conflict – tragic but geopolitically limited – is now increasingly seen as “forward defence” for the Alliance itself. The logic is straightforward: every Russian tank destroyed and every battalion bogged down in Ukraine is one less that could be used in a future confrontation against NATO. Thus, helping Ukraine to withstand and degrade Russia’s military is understood as directly reducing the threat to NATO’s own borders.

This view has been voiced by numerous officials. NATO Secretary General Rutte described support to Ukraine as part of ensuring “the alliance’s forces have what they need to keep us safe,” implicitly linking Ukraine’s fight to NATO security. Central and Eastern European states are even more explicit. Poland’s government, for example, has consistently argued that “if Russia wins [in Ukraine], we will be in danger next”, treating Ukraine’s survival as essential to Poland’s own defence. British defence leaders similarly emphasize that Ukraine is fighting on NATO’s front line by proxy. As Air Chief Marshal Knighton noted, Putin’s ambitions – “to challenge, limit, divide and ultimately destroy NATO” – would only be emboldened by success in Ukraine. A Russian victory or a frozen conflict on Moscow’s terms would give the Kremlin’s forces time to regroup and possibly turn their attention toward the Baltic states or other vulnerable Allies in the future.

In this unsentimental strategic framing, Ukraine’s fight is NATO’s fight, albeit without NATO’s own troops directly engaged. Every piece of equipment and training provided to Kyiv’s forces serves to attrit Russia’s military, expose its weaknesses, and deter it from broader aggression. Indeed, from NATO’s perspective, “degrading Russia’s military capacity in Ukraine reduces the probability of a direct NATO confrontation later.” This helps explain why, despite the costs, NATO members have committed tens of billions in military aid to Ukraine since 2022 and are moving toward longer-term support commitments. It is essentially self-defence by proxy. As long as the Ukrainian army is willing and able to blunt Moscow’s advance, NATO’s strategy is to make sure that army does not run out of the means to fight.

Conclusion – Deterrence in the Age of Urgency

Mark Rutte’s warning that NATO must shift from “deterrence by assumption” to “deterrence by preparation” should be read as a final wake-up call – a call to shed the remnants of strategic complacency built up in quieter times. The Alliance is now entering an age of urgency, where deterrence depends less on past reputation and more on present, visible readiness. NATO still possesses overwhelming advantages in aggregate: a vastly larger economy than Russia’s, superior technology, a network of powerful allies, and the moral cohesion of a defensive pact. Yet those latent advantages only deter aggression if they can be swiftly marshalled and demonstrated. Tanks and aircraft that exist on paper, or units that are under-equipped and unpractised, will not impress a potential aggressor. Only forces that are well-armed, well-trained, and obviously prepared to fight tonight will give pause to Moscow’s calculus.

The coming years will severely test NATO’s ability to act on its own analysis. The Alliance has essentially predicted the challenge: a revanchist Russia, regenerated and possibly willing to gamble on a lightning strike if it perceives weakness. Now NATO must pre-empt that gamble by making itself an unassailable porcupine – too ready and too prickly to attack. This means fulfilling the ambitious defence spending and industrial goals that have been set, re-learning the art of rapid mobilization, and reinforcing every vulnerable link from the Baltic to the Black Sea. It also means aligning the Alliance politically – maintaining unity and steady commitment despite potential distractions or dissent. The window for preparation is limited, as Rutte noted, potentially just a few years. Every month of peacetime must be treated as precious time to fortify peace.