The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a sharp shift in American policy towards Europe and the transatlantic alliance. It recasts NATO and European security in transactional terms, prioritizes U.S. sovereignty and economic interests, and treats Europe as both a vital partner and a potential rival. The document emphasizes “burden-sharing” in defence, calls for a cease-fire–style “strategic stability” in Ukraine, reframes global order around national sovereignty (often criticizing the EU), and stresses economic competition alongside cooperation.
Rebalancing NATO: Burden-Sharing and Defense Shifts
The NSS bluntly declares that the era of the United States “propping up the entire world order like Atlas” is over, and it demands Europe pay much more for its own security. It celebrates the “Hague Commitment,” under which NATO allies pledged to spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035, and says the U.S. will now “organize a burden-sharing network” so that “all our efforts benefit from broader legitimacy”. In practice, this means the U.S. will aid—through trade benefits, technology sharing, arms sales, etc.—only those allies that take on more regional security responsibility. In the words of the strategy, the U.S. is ready to reward “countries that willingly take more responsibility for security in their neighborhoods”.
This emphasis on allied defense spending and “primary responsibility” echoes and amplifies previous U.S. pressures on Europe. During the 2017 NSS, the Trump administration first made NATO burden-sharing a priority, and later administrations (Obama, Biden) had also pushed for meeting the 2% guideline. The 2025 NSS doubles down: allies must commit to 5%, or else face diplomatic consequences. Atlantic Council analysts note that “throughout 2025…the administration’s aim in Europe has been to shift the burden of conventional defense onto the shoulders of European allies”. At last year’s NATO summit, the U.S. secured a defence pledge of 5% GDP, but as Atlantic Council’s Torrey Taussig observes, “the NSS does nothing to help further U.S. national security interests…on the European continent”. Critics warn this could weaken assurances, especially on NATO’s eastern flank. For example, allies see Russia as a real threat, and Washington’s focus on burden-sharing without underscoring collective defence may undermine Europe’s confidence in U.S. commitment.
European analysts similarly highlight the consequences. A recent EU Institute for Security Studies brief points out that the U.S. intends to “reduce its contributions to European conventional deterrence”, shifting forces to the Indo-Pacific and “assuming risk” elsewhere. Washington may even pressure Europe by withholding capabilities; the EU’s defence planning now anticipates a significant increase in its own forces. In short, NATO is being reshaped: European governments must invest far more (and quickly) if they hope to fill the gap left by a partially withdrawing U.S. presence. This is not a gentle recalibration but a forceful rebalance: “stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe,” Secretary Hegseth has declared.
Ukraine and “Strategic Stability”
On Ukraine, the 2025 NSS defines the war’s end as a “core interest” for the United States. The strategy calls for an “expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation…, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia”. In other words, the U.S. goal is a negotiated freeze or settlement that keeps Ukraine viable but halts the fighting. This formulation contrasts with previous U.S. commitments to Ukraine. Both Republican and Democratic predecessors spoke of defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and defeating aggression; by contrast, the new NSS treats ending the war as a businesslike objective, to be achieved by diplomatic means. As one expert notes, the NSS “counsels an expedient peace” and frames Ukraine’s survival as a key to stability.
However, the strategy’s language is ambivalent. It does not, for example, explicitly state that Russia is a U.S. adversary in the war; instead, it notes only that “many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat”. Analysts point out that Russia itself hardly appears as an enemy in the strategy. Instead, the NSS places responsibility on European governments, criticizing them for supposedly “unrealistic expectations” and minority coalition politics that hinder peace. Critics see this as blame-shifting: Egmont Institute commentator Sven Biscop calls the NSS’s narrative about Ukraine “pernicious”, suggesting the war drags on due to European leaders’ failings. In effect, the NSS wants Europe to deliver an end to the war, tying that outcome to broader strategic stability.
For Europe, this raises a dilemma. On one hand, the U.S. is no longer asking Europe to win the war, but merely to bring it to a close. On the other hand, some Eastern allies fear that asking Europe to seek a negotiated equilibrium could be seen by Russia as a green light to press its advantage. Atlantic Council analysts warn that reducing U.S. conventional involvement while pushing for peace may embolden those European parties (e.g. German or Hungarian nationalists) least inclined to tough defence policies. Indeed, experts note that the NSS’s approach “undermines the administration’s stated objectives…on the European continent”. The transatlantic gap over Ukraine is a clear consequence: U.S. policy now privileges stability (even at the cost of frozen conflict), whereas many EU leaders still hope for Ukraine’s eventual recovery of territory.
Sovereignty, the EU, and Ideology
A central theme of the 2025 NSS is unapologetic nationalism. The strategy repeatedly proclaims that the United States will “protect our own sovereignty” and treat alliance members fairly, not as perpetual safety nets. For example, the NSS vows to guard against “sovereignty-sapping incursions of the most intrusive transnational organizations”, promising to reform or resist international institutions that limit U.S. freedom of action. This ideological framing makes explicit what previous strategies only hinted at. Gone are the calls for shared liberal values; instead, the NSS denounces “elite-driven, anti-democratic restrictions on core liberties” among allies. Even issues like immigration are cast in sovereignty terms: the U.S. wants full control of its borders and urges “sovereign countries…to stop rather than facilitate destabilizing population flows”.
In Europe’s case, this stance translates into strong scepticism of the European Union and multilateralism. The NSS’s chapter on Europe warns that “national and transnational regulations…undermine creativity” and that the EU is guilty of policies that “undermine political liberty and sovereignty”. It speaks of Europe’s “civilizational erasure” if it continues on its current path, implicitly blaming Brussels and liberal governments for cultural decline. The strategy even endorses cultural nationalism: “We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence, and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation.” And it praises the “growing influence of patriotic European parties” as a positive sign. In short, what the NSS calls for is a Europe with weaker supranational bonds, clearer borders, and more assertive national governments.
This ideological turn is notable. U.S. NSS documents since 1949 (and especially NSC-68 in 1950) consistently described America’s interest as defending a “liberal international order”: building alliances, supporting democracy, and promoting free trade. The 2025 NSS inverts that model. A recent analysis observes that NSC-68 “considered a robust system of alliances, multilateral organizations and…the promotion of free trade” as indispensable, whereas today’s strategy views those very elements as working “against the strategic and economic interests of the United States”. Indeed, many commentators note that the NSS’s language toward Europe is almost polemical. One Atlantic Council expert notes the strategy’s “ideological hostility toward Europe” which drives a withdrawal from the old “concept of the free world”. In practice, the U.S. says it will still work “in concert” with Europe against rivals like China, but only insofar as it advances U.S. interests and not out of shared values.
Economics, Technology and “Fairness”
Economics and technology are prominently featured. The NSS frames the global economy as a battleground where the U.S. must defend its workers and industries. It argues that in alliances and trade “the United States will insist on being treated fairly”, and that it will “no longer tolerate…free-riding, trade imbalances, predatory economic practices”. In this view, Europe has been a beneficiary of globalization that hollowed out the U.S. middle class. Accordingly, the strategy calls on Europe to open its markets to American goods and to align its trade practices with U.S. demands. For example, a bulleted policy goal is “Opening European markets to U.S. goods and services and ensuring fair treatment of U.S. workers and businesses”. Another goal is “Encouraging Europe to take action to combat mercantilist overcapacity, technological theft, cyber espionage, and other hostile economic practices.”.
At the same time, the NSS acknowledges that Europe remains an important economic partner. It notes that “transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the global economy and of American prosperity”. European industries in manufacturing, technology and energy are described as “among the world’s most robust”. But these facts are presented as reasons the U.S. needs a strong Europe to help compete with China, rather than as evidence of a seamless alliance. Indeed, the NSS ties economic cooperation to strategic competition: it urges the U.S. and its allies (including Europe) to rebalance China’s economy by shifting their own trade policies. In sum, Europe is portrayed as both a vital market for the U.S. and a region that must tighten its economic alignment with America.
Analysts warn that this creates friction. European governments may chafe at being lectured on trade while American tariffs (e.g. on EU steel/aluminium) have already angered Brussels. Atlantic Council scholars note that U.S. trade policy (including abrupt tariffs) has made many allies less confident in Washington as an economic partner. If European publics perceive American demands as unfair, cooperation in other areas (from security to climate) could suffer. Yet the NSS is clear: American policy will be pro-worker and transactional, not simply pro-growth. In the U.S. view, Europe must “see that it is in their interest” that America remains prosperous, just as the U.S. expects to benefit from any expanded U.S.–EU trade agreement.
Implications for Europe: Autonomy, Division, and Dilemmas
The NSS’s upheaval of the transatlantic bargain puts Europe in a difficult position. Brussels and the capitals face three intertwined challenges: how to rearm and cooperate without U.S. backing; how to deal with the Ukraine war; and how to manage relations with the U.S. when its rhetoric is hostile.
First, the emphasis on self-reliance forces a debate on strategic autonomy. Some EU leaders (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) reluctantly welcome the call to boost defence spending – they have long advocated more NATO support, not less. Others worry that the U.S. is signalling a retreat.
Second, the NSS’s populist tone risks inflaming Europe’s internal divisions. The strategy openly encourages “resistance to Europe’s current trajectory” by supporting nationalist, “patriotic” parties. This amounts to U.S. backing for forces that often question liberal democratic norms and EU integration. Whether or not the U.S. administration directly meddles, its message strengthens populist factions. So a nationalist-led Europe might quickly diverge from American economic goals and even embrace Russian gas and isolationism.
Third, the U.S. strategy leaves Europe with strategic dilemmas. The Atlantic partnership was built on mutual support: the U.S. promised nuclear umbrella and military aid, Europe provided troops and markets. Now Washington says it will limit its role to nuclear deterrence and trade, urging Europeans to handle everything else. This inevitably forces Europe to ask tough questions: Can NATO survive this bargain? Should the EU pursue its own defence identity faster? What if U.S. policy reverses in four years, or in a later administration? The bottom line is loss of U.S. influence: if Europe either becomes more independent or is run by radicals, the transatlantic special relationship will not be the same.
In sum, European capitals face a “heightened responsibility and adaptation” environment. They must navigate U.S. demands for defence spending, negotiate peace in Ukraine with limited U.S. help, and manage public opinion at home that largely supports EU integration even as they are pressured to accept a more transactional U.S. stance. The NSS itself acknowledges this conundrum: “We will need a strong Europe to help us… compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe”. But it gives little prescription for how to maintain unity or shared values while pushing Europe in this new direction.
Conclusion
The 2025 NSS represents a distinct break from past U.S. strategies toward Europe, yet it also reflects an evolution of recent trends. In the post–Cold War era, U.S. NSS documents (from Clinton’s to Obama’s) emphasized sustaining a liberal order: collective defence through NATO, expanding alliances, and promoting democracy in Europe. By contrast, the 2025 strategy dismisses the consensus of that era as “ideologically mistaken”, blaming it for hollowing out American interests. It openly replaces idealism with nationalism: democracy and human rights appear only as slogans, if at all, when it comes to allies, and are entirely absent when dealing with rivals like China and Russia.
Compared to Donald Trump’s first-term NSS (2017), the new strategy takes similar America-First ideas to an extreme. The 2017 NSS had already spotlighted great-power competition and demanded more burden-sharing, but it still spoke of a free and open order. Today’s NSS largely abandons great-power competition as its organizing principle. A CFR analysis notes that the 2025 NSS removes the “north star” of China–Russia rivalry and instead treats economics as “the ultimate stakes”. In effect, Europe’s importance is measured by how well it serves U.S. economic and security interests, not by shared history or values.
In sum, the 2025 NSS recalibrates transatlantic relations along transactional, nationalist lines. It prescribes a tougher bargain for Europe: pay more for defence, take charge in Ukraine, liberalize trade in America’s favour, and even shake off some EU common policies. While the strategy still recognizes Europe’s value – “American diplomacy should continue to stand up for genuine democracy, freedom of expression… and unapologetic celebrations of European nations’ individual character and history” – it is clear that America now views Europe as an important but unequal partner. As one European commentary puts it, alliances are “mutually supporting processes”, but only the strong can negotiate them advantageously.
Ultimately, the 2025 NSS is less a blueprint than a warning: Europe must adapt to a more constrained and transactional U.S. role, or risk finding itself alone. The coming years will test whether Europe can unify its strategy – and its values – in the face of this strategic turn by Washington.
