by Jonathan Reep, Elina Kuokkanen, April Holm
Abstract
This paper presents research on the prominent cases of Russian information manipulation and interference as a part of its hybrid warfare strategies and resultant “infodemics”, focusing on oppositional rhetoric and actions from Russia toward the West. It focuses on three topics that are most salient in understanding the Russian interference;
- Russian interference in elections
- Information overload
- Russia’s ideological warfare
In the first one we explore some incidents where Russia aimed at influencing elections worldwide. The second topic explores a technique designed to overwhelm both truthful, factual reporting and the abilities of factcheckers by brute force of the amount of disinformation created. The third explores narrative framing, necessary to understanding how Russia sees itself and its mission, helping to explain and predict its actions in the past, present and future.
This research paper is written as a part of Immune 2 Infodemic 2 project, funded by the EU. The selected 3 cases were validated by the FIMI workshop[4] organised by Beyond the Horizon ISSG with participation of FIMI experts in Europe.
- Background
According to the European External Action Service (EEAS), “Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) describes a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character, conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner. Actors of such activity can be state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory”.[5]
Based on this definition, FIMI can be distinguished from other forms of information manipulation common in the infodemic. The distinction rests on several defining characteristics. First, FIMI often exploits the weaknesses in the current information flows, especially in the digital space and social media, thus spreading it does not require illegal action. Second, this definition centres the importance of intent. The activity does not need to cause actual harm; merely presenting a threat to a target society or political system is sufficient. Third, the acts in question are part of a demonstrable pattern, not isolated or committed alone. Forth, the disinformation may be propagated by states or non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations or organised criminal groups.
FIMI falls within the scope of a hybrid warfare — a situation where conventional military action is either not present or shares space with alternative, non-conventional strategic methods for conducting war. After the Second World War and the creation of increasingly powerful nuclear weapons and delivery systems, it became less and less feasible for countries to invade one another in conventional kinetic wars where armies, navies and aircraft fired ammunition at one another like mankind had in the past. This norm became especially strong after the collapse of the USSR, and states turned to methods by which they could apply pressure and cripple their opponents without technically crossing the threshold of a military response. For example, a state could hire a merchant vessel to sabotage underwater pipeline or telecommunications infrastructure with its anchor and make it look like an accident to cause damage to a rival’s economy, or maybe a poorly guarded internet connection could allow an enemy to remotely damage public infrastructure such as a power plant. Such actions can be destructive and, in many cases, illegal; however, they do not meet the legal threshold of an armed attack and therefore cannot be met with a military response. The same applies to FIMI. It must be stressed that although FIMI operations are often not explicitly illegal, this does not mean that they are inherently lawful. Rather, their legality often remains ambiguous due to the challenges of tracing and regulating the methods through which FIMI is typically carried out.