

IMMUNE 2 INFODEMIC 2 recommendations

These recommendations build upon insights from **a survey** conducted with 220 respondents age 18 to 65+, from 11 EU countries, between September 2025 and April 2026, and **three expert workshops**: October 2024 in Helsinki, in January 2025 in Brussels, and in February 2025 in The Hague. The events brought together participants from governments, media, security agencies and academia, to establish a shared understanding of AI-enhanced disinformation, FIMI, and climate disinformation, and to promote cross-sector collaboration in mitigating societal harms.

About the project

IMMUNE 2 INFODEMIC 2 (I2I2) is an EU-funded project aimed at strengthening European citizens' resilience to disinformation and misinformation. Building on the first edition (IMMUNE 2 INFODEMIC), the project equips citizens with three core competencies—digital literacy, media literacy, and critical thinking—and applies them to specifically selected topics in the field of disinformation. While the first edition focused on elections, health, and migration, the second edition expands to include **AI-driven disinformation, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI)**, and disinformation in the areas of **climate and the environment**.

The project specifically targets **vulnerable groups** with limited awareness of disinformation risks but high social media usage, including young people (18–25) and seniors (65+). Outreach activities include in-person and online workshops, youth events, campaigns, and a final conference, all carried out with the support of multipliers such as media professionals, social media influencers, and civil society organizations.

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Survey background

To find out how disinformation affects citizens and to what extent they are able to recognize it, we conducted a survey with 220 participants from 11 EU countries.

The survey consisted of four parts:

- 1) information on democratic factors and media usage habits,
- 2) critical thinking skills and confidence in identifying misinformation,
- 3) identification tasks using images and headlines from authentic news stories and disinformation reports, and
- 4) the impact of disinformation on daily life and political participation.

The survey consisted primarily of multiple-choice questions, as well as a few open-ended questions and images.

Survey findings

Passive consumption dominates: Over **a third** of respondents get their **news primarily** through algorithmic feeds, and **social media** is the most important source overall. This represents a structural vulnerability, as **85.5%** also acknowledge the **role of algorithms** in the spread of misinformation.

Self-confidence ≠ skills gap: While **75.5%** feel **confident** in their ability to **recognize misinformation**, only **38.6%** have **completed media literacy training**. This overconfidence warrants attention in policy recommendations.


Access to reliable news is **unevenly** distributed: Nearly a quarter find this difficult, which is not insignificant, and over a third have no opinion on the matter at all, suggesting **widespread disinterest** in this issue.

Satisfaction is moderate: Less than half are satisfied with their **own media habits**, and one in five is actively dissatisfied, suggesting that the public is **open to guidance** or tools that promote better habits.


Only 27,1% considered messages to be potentially created with **malicious intent**, (manipulate and deceive or create confusion and social unrest), even when the post was clearly aligning with Russian interests (allegedly Euro News showing a caricature of president Zelensky asking for money). This might leave citizens vulnerable to manipulation, if they don't question the motives behind.

Online content has an overwhelming **emotional impact** on more than half of the respondents. **Concern on the AI's role** in amplifying disinformation was strongly present (78,7%), and 71,4% were really worried on **climate disinformation**.


42. How often do you encounter online content that triggers strong emotional reactions




28. What do you think the original motive was behind sharing this image? (Select all that apply)



6. Where do you usually get your news or information? (Select all that apply)



44. When you want to discuss a societal/political topic, which platform do you choose?




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I2I2 activities

Between 2024 and 2026 the consortium reached in total 509 women and 392 men from 16 European countries in 16 event series.

The project targeted young adults, teachers, elderly people, citizens with migration background, social workers, parents and families, experts, and journalists, both in cities and in rural areas.



The events included co-creation, interactive workshops, webinars, trainings, lectures, multiplier events, and fairs. The event type was chosen based on the needs of the target group, and the content was tailor-made for each occasion.

Findings from the events

- 1) Fear and worry caused by disinformation were clearly present, especially related to AI-enhanced disinformation.
- 2) The audiences might have been quite aware of some aspects related to disinformation (such as scams done with AI-generated voice cloning). However, they were not very aware of the multiple forms of disinformation, motives of actors, and coordinated actions orchestrated by Russia.
- 3) Some participants felt at first uncomfortable discussing Russian influence (FIMI). They seemed to assume that as an EU funded project the partners were just offering “the other side of the coin”, and that the project events were meant to “sell the European propaganda” to overshadow the Russian narrative.
- 4) Reaching some target groups was challenging at first, but making connections with local civil society organisations (such as Avansa Kempen) opened doors to them. Building a community and trust within it takes a lot of time and effort, and it would not have been possible without these organisations to carry out events with these target groups.

Our recommendations for effective immunity against disinformation



Add prebunking to EU guidelines for teachers

Why it matters: Inoculation is proven to build resilience against disinformation, especially when repeated. Concrete examples make learning tangible. The acquired skills are transferable across topics.

1



Targeted methods for different target groups

Why it matters: Inoculation works best when the language and the examples are adjusted to the target audience. This includes working with simple language, multilingually, and with diverse formats.

2



Training should include reflecting on motives

Why it matters: Not being aware of potential malicious intent or economic gain through spreading fake content makes media consumers more susceptible to manipulation

3



Benefiting from existing community settings

Why it matters: Reaching beyond schools — through social work, community networks, libraries, cultural centres, language courses, and influencers — ensures diverse audiences, such as elderly and people in rural areas. Thanks to these existing structures, target groups can be reached cost-effectively and training can be conducted efficiently.

4



Develop a unified strategy on AI and disinformation, and its emotional impacts, at EU and national levels

Why it matters: Cognitive skills and reactive strategies alone are insufficient. Disinformation also causes emotional harm, and a proactive, forward-looking strategy must address both dimensions systematically. This becomes especially important considering the role of algorithms in people's news feeds and passive consumption of news.

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