Promoting Peace and Security

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

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Foreword

Dear Reader,

We are happy to be with you in this first issue of 2023. We again had to make hard choices in selecting the articles to make it to the journal. Most notably, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its repercussions on the global geopolitical landscape are hard to escape. Yet, our preference to keep important issues alongside the war in Ukraine pushed us to make a selection, that you will judge on its soundness while going through the journal.

As became tradition, this issue also brings deep insight into three different issues of our select. The first article is an assessment of the European microchip industry and its expansion strategy. The author starts with a comparison of global and European microchip industries to build the context where he further discusses the European Chips Act and tests soundness of the aim to increase the European global production share from 9% in 2022 to 20% in 2030. He concludes the article with an array of policy recommendations.

The second article is a discourse-based analysis of the US and Chinese foreign policy making. Leveraging Chinese cultural concept of Tianxia which underscores the importance of harmony and hierarchy, the authors try to give a balanced view on the Chinese policy preferences. Indeed, while Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" and Tianxia which emphasizes that the actor, claiming hegemony in the international system must have the support of other actors are juxtaposed, the reader gains greater insight into differences in policy preferences of the two great powers. This understanding will hopefully help find probable niches to generate collective action among both powers in critical areas such as environment and climate change.

The third and the last article reflects the power of digitalization and connectivity that became increasingly part of daily life after pandemic and how this power can be harnessed for addressing needs of the migrants. Accordingly, in a wide range of activities ranging from social orientation courses to language training and mentoring sessions, digital solutions can be leveraged to facilitate the process and ease burden on incumbent authorities. This does not imply that they will completely replace the social and physical services but rather means they will support them.

Finally, we have a book review on Brian McAllister Linn's book « The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War ». The author offers insight from the US Army's way of preparation for war, its experience of it, and how it adapted itself for the future wars. Based on his categorization of army subcultures as guardians, heroes and managers, the author rings bells for those involved in defense capacity building or planning efforts. For any army, the importance of involving both military and civilian elements to reach a comprehensive vision of future warfare becomes extremely important to be prepared for the future war. Together with the war in Ukraine, the fault lines between the East and the West become more pronounced, reminiscent of the status before the WWII. We thought review of this book will be consequential for those in the process of adaptation in the current global security environment.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG

An Assessment of the European Microchip Industry and Its Expansion Strategy

by Jannis Figura*

Abstract

The microchip industry will probably grow from $575 billion in 2022 into a trillion-dollar industry by 2030. The main obstacles are limited production capacity and unstable production chains. Europe's strengths in the microchip industry are the presence of equipment-producing companies, research institutes, and the region's production of customary microchips for the automotive and industrial sectors that will grow in demand. Europe's challenges are the production capacity, limited and expensive workforce, and potentially threatened supply routes. Europe consumes 20% of the world's chip supply. The €45 billion European Chips Act seeks to increase the European global production share from 9% in 2022 to 20% in 2030. However, this agenda focuses on establishing state-of-the-art microchip factories in Europe, even though there is no demand for these on the continent. Arguably a more all-encompassing approach, including investments in the existing producers of customary chips, R&D, design, and suppliers of microchip material, chemicals, and equipment, is more sensible. A balance between securing the production chain and continuing cooperation with reliable trade partners such as the U.S., South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan is required. China's politics are the main threat to the microchip market. Therefore, its development in this sector should be slowed down, until the government changes to a more cordial stance.

Analysis

1. Introduction

Microchips are part of almost all electronic devices: from smartphones and computers to cars and medical equipment. Generally, they are small flat pieces of silicon with a set of electronic circuits on top of them. Manufacturers use silicon because it is a semiconductor, meaning its conductive properties are increasable by mixing it with other materials. Contemporary state-of-the-art structures are smaller than 10 nanometres. As a comparison, a human red blood cell is approximately 7.000 nanometres wide. The advantage of even smaller designs is that more transistors fit on a chip, thereby increasing its performance. There are two major types of chips. Logic chips process information to complete tasks, whereas memory chips store information (ASML, n.d.).

The microchip industry is extraordinary as it is an oligarchic market with only the most advanced countries able to produce them. Analysts project that the microchip industry will grow from "approximately $575 billion in 2022 into a trillion-dollar industry by 2030" (Starks, 2023, para. 3). The primary producers are Taiwan, South Korea, China, the United States, and Europe. However, only South Korea and Taiwan can economically produce the most advanced microchips. These designs are smaller than 10 nanometres. Noteworthy is the Taiwanese company TSMC, which is the world's largest and most valuable semiconductor company. It has a market cap of $400.1 billion (Reiff et al., 2023). Due to its high market share, the output of Taiwanese production affects almost every high-end industry globally (Haeck & Westendarp, 2022). Figure 1 shows the world's dependency on Taiwanese and South Korean advanced microchip production (especially smaller than 10 nanometres).



Figure 1. The geographical breakdown of global semiconductor wafer fabrication capacity, by type and location in 2019 Retrieved from Statista (2022).

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The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the world's high dependency on microchips as its shortage slowed down many other industries that require them for their functioning. For instance, the automotive industry lost $200 billion in 2021 due to microchip shortages (Banker, 2022). In other words, a stable microchip supply is crucial for the smooth functioning of the world economy (Burkacky et al., 2022a). Consequently, many countries desire higher self-sufficiency in key industries, such as microchips, to increase their industries' resilience (Lewis, 2022). This global rethinking is accelerated by China's repeated threat to conquer Taiwan, the global production leader. A potential war between these two countries would probably stop the production and distribution of microchips by Taiwan and consequently slow down or even collapse the world economy (Sacks, 2022). Another accelerator is Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which shocked the global energy and food markets in 2022. These conflicts show the fragility and interdependence of the world economy. Therefore, more countries strive to enhance economic independence to improve their security and resilience (Maizland, 2022).

In 2022, the U.S. and EU announced substantial investments in the microchip sector. In August, the U.S. passed the CHIPS and Science Act, consisting of a $280 billion investment in high-tech industries, of which $52.7 billion are allocated to increase semiconductor manufacturing (Badlam et al., 2022). Already in February 2022, the EU announced the European Chips Act, a commitment to invest 45 billion in microchip manufacturing. The plan is to increase the European global production share from 9% in 2022 to 20% in 2030. Currently, Europe consumes 20% of the world's chip supply, and the number is rising. The agenda also seeks to reduce Europe's dependency on producers in Asia. However, the EU did not adopt this act yet (Cota, 2022). The following article assesses the position of the European microchip industry with its strengths and challenges, especially in light of its expansion strategy, the European Chips Act.

2. The European microchip industry

a. The strengths of the European microchip industry and its current expansion strategy

Europe's main strength is the presence of manufacturers that produce the equipment needed to build microchips. These companies have unique competencies, and their products are in global demand. Noteworthy is ASML in this regard. The Dutch company has practically a 100% market share in EUV lithography machines, which are needed to produce cutting-edge chips. Another example is Carl Zeiss SMT in Germany. The company is the only producer of mirrors and lenses used in the most advanced chip-producing equipment (Li, 2022). In other words, without these two companies, it would be impossible to produce state-of-the-art microchips. Therefore, Europe's advanced chip-producing equipment is its main strength in this industry.

In addition to the equipment, Europe produces microchips itself (see Figure 1). However, unlike in other regions, European manufacturers do not focus on size reduction but on material innovation. The companies on the continent mainly supply the large automotive and industrial sectors in Europe. There is only a low demand for leading-edge microchips as most electronic production left Europe and moved to Asia and the U.S. Thus, most European companies do not require these advanced microchips. South Korea and Taiwan produce these chips nowadays, where major tech companies are seated and require them (Slijkerman & Nijboer, 2022). Instead, the European market demands more "customary" microchips that do not need the same high-end practices as advanced chips. Luckily for Europe, it is expectable that semiconductor demand will have the highest growth in the automotive and industrial sectors until 2025 (ING, 2022; Omdia, 2022; Gartner, 2023). Consequently, Europe can profit from supplying two markets in the future that are naturally considered its strengths and expect high growth (see Figure 2).



Figure 2 Highest growth of semiconductors by worldwide end market between 2020-2025. Retrieved from Slijkerman & Nijboer (2022).

With the European Chips Act, the continent seeks to enhance its microchip manufacturing capacity again. The volume has steadily declined since the 2000s as many companies moved to Asia. Consequently, Europe's current production share is below 10% of the global market (Timmers, 2022). The agenda addresses two main problems in the microchip industry. Firstly, China's aggressive stance, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and COVID-19 revealed the instability of global supply routes. These developments force a reform of the current supply chain to guarantee more stable growth in the future. Therefore, the European Chips Act aims to ensure more resilient supply chains by growing a European microchip ecosystem less vulnerable to international politics outside Europe (SEMI, 2022).

Secondly, it addresses the simple problem of limited global chip production capacity. The complexity of the microchip industry makes its expansion more difficult compared to other industries that can easily increase their output. Generally, it takes one year to improve the production capacity of an existing facility and three to five years to build a new facility (Burkacky et al., 2022b). Even worse, both options require extensive investment upfront, and it takes years until they pay themselves off. New facilities cost approximately $15 billion to $20 billion, and only eight chip companies can afford these costs at the moment (Farshchi, 2022). The European Chips Act will enable new public and private investments in these factories, thereby increasing the European global market share in the future. It includes support for research and development (R&D), workforce creation, subsidies to reduce the costs of new facilities, as well as new trade, tax, and investment policies (European Commission, 2022). Next to Europe and the United States, also Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and China heavily invest in this sector.

It is worth dedicating a separate section to China as it is the potential primary disturber of the European chip industry. On one hand, there are repeated threats to conquer Taiwan, on the other hand, China continues its predatory trade practices and espionage programmes. China has already done this in other industries to steal knowledge, aiming at "relatively" cheaply acquiring foreign expertise. This knowledge accretion is also done more legally via subsidies to attract international investments. Despite its billion-dollar investments in these practices, China could only establish a few microchip-producing companies so far (Lewis, 2022). However, Europe must carefully avoid indirectly investing in the Chinese market to slow down its growth. For instance, China plans to launch a cross-border semiconductor work committee with leading microchip companies such as Intel or AMD. Europe also seeks to increase cooperation with them (Liu, 2022). European countries identified this threat, and ideas circulate that the EU will pass new legislations to screen European companies' investment in security-critical areas. This policy prevents companies from investing in Chinese programmes to ensure protection against China's malpractices and threats to the microchip market. Similar steps are also observable in the U.S., which began to decouple its economy from China in some industries. This step is necessary as many high-tech companies are about to receive billions in government support. Therefore, a monitored cash flow by the EU is a sensible step, and the union should further pursue this idea. However, it is currently unclear how this balance between free-market economies and national security will work (Aarup, 2023). Figure 3 is an example of the microchip industry's integrated structure based on geographic specialisation.



Figure 3 An example of the microchip industry's integrated structure based on geographic specialisation. Retrieved from Varas et al. (2021).

b. The challenges of the European microchip industry and its current expansion strategy

The global competition puts great pressure on Europe, despite the EU's future investment in the microchip sector. The union lacks production capacity and a consumer base for the most advanced microchips. Figure 1 shows that the continent does not produce microchips smaller than 10 nanometres. The knowledge and expertise gap between Europe and the U.S., South Korea and Taiwan in this category will only grow further if there is no investment in this area. This development began two decades ago when the consumer base moved away from Europe as mentioned previously. Consequently, it implies that the EU must grow a new consumer base instead of just focusing on producing advanced microchips, in other words, establishing companies that require these chips. Increasing the supply without the demand does not make much sense (Kleinhans, 2021).

The unattractiveness of the European market in this sector discouraged Taiwanese and South Korean advanced microchip producers from investing there. Instead, other regions elbowing for the companies' assets received investment from them. Global leader TSMC from Taiwan will invest $40 billion in the U.S. and more than $10 billion in Japan. Both regions have a high consumer base for advanced microchips due to their electronic companies. Therefore, these countries are more profitable than Europe (Takenaka et al., 2022). As TSMC president Mark Liu declared, the company does not have enough European customers to justify such an investment (Scimia, 2022). The practice of attracting leading chip companies to invest in someone's manufacturing capacity is known as "fabless" production. The investing company designs the chips but outsources the manufacturing to other companies. So far, most of these factories are in Asia, with its relatively large and cheap skilled workforce in this sector. Despite that, Europe wishes to become a manufacturing hub to reduce its reliance on trade routes from Asia to produce its own cutting-edge microchip stockpile (Ciani & Nardo, 2022).

Intel, a leading chip-producing company from the U.S., decided to invest in Europe. Intel will allocate $80 billion in Europe over the next decade to strengthen research & development (R&D) and manufacturing capacity there (Intel, 2022). It is unclear whether this investment will meet the expectations as Intel does not have the same capabilities as Samsung or TSMC to produce the most advanced microchips (Kharpal, 2022). Either way, Europe requires more investments and subsidies to catch up with other chip-producing regions. Figure 4 shows how much investment is theoretically needed per region to become self-sufficient in microchip production, thereby showing the regional production maturity.



Figure 4 The theoretical investments needed per region to create self-sufficient microchip production lines. Europe and the U.S. would require the most investments. Retrieved from Varas et al. (2021).

Figure 4 also shows how difficult it is for Europe to expand in this competitive market. Currently, there are plans to build 81 new chip facilities by 2025 around the globe, 10 of these in Europe, 14 in the U.S., and 21 in Taiwan alone. Additionally, Europe's expansion scale is bound to the availability of a qualified workforce (Li, 2022). Compared to Asia, the limited number of skilled workers in this sector in Europe results in higher production costs for Europe, where people usually earn higher wages. Growing a skilled workforce for microchips to meet the European expansion demands will take years (Bish et al., 2022). Additionally, Europe is only slowly increasing support for regional chemical and material suppliers. These are essential to produce microchips but are unheeded by the European chips agenda (Lewis, 2022).

The European Chips Act aims to push Europe into the most advanced chip sector. Due to the lack of European-designed chips in this category, it is questionable whether this is the right approach. The low demand in the European market means that consumers must be found elsewhere, for instance, the in U.S. and Asia. This circumstance raises the question of why companies in these two regions should buy European chips instead of those from their immediate environment, cheaper and already leading the industry. As previously mentioned, manufacturing is generally more favourable in these regions due to lower wages compared to Europe (Baraniuk, 2022).

The current microchip landscape shows the EU must carefully assess where to invest. The European Chips Act reveals that the EU mainly focuses on establishing a new state-of-the-art microchip ecosystem in Europe that can meet the U.S. and Asian markets (Chee, 2022). However, the assessment of the European microchip industry, with its strengths and challenges, revealed that this might be a misguided approach. The following section outlines the most efficient positioning of Europe in the global microchip industry. The allocation of resources should match this regime.

3. Balancing the future development of the European microchip industry

Section 2a showed that the European strengths in the microchip industry are the presence of equipment-producing companies, research institutes, and the region's production of microchips for the automotive and industrial sectors that will grow in demand. Section 2b showed that Europe's challenges are the production capacity, limited and expensive workforce, and potentially threatened supply routes. The European Chips Act, which guides the progress in Europe, does not seem to adequately address these issues as it focuses solely on developing a state-of-the-art industry that is futile in Europe. It also does not go beyond manufacturing and lacks investments in chemical and material suppliers. A long-sighted EU agenda should be all-encompassing and address all aspects of the production chain. Therefore, the EU's chip act should be considered more of a stepping stone in a broader development instead of a ne plus ultra. The overall two goals, increasing Europe's market share and securing the chip supply chain, can be achieved differently.

Based on the current microchip landscape in Europe, three main questions need to be resolved. Firstly, in which parts of the semiconductor chain should the EU invest? Secondly, how should the EU balance between securing the supply chain in Europe and cooperating with external countries and companies? And lastly, how should the resources be distributed across Europe?

The most sensible approach is to increase European investment in existing companies to increase their research and production output. This proposal means focusing more on customary chip production instead of the most advanced chips. Europe already has these production lines and could profit from supplying the growing automotive and industrial industries. Furthermore, Europe is home to excellent research institutes for chip prototypes. To name some of them, there is IMEC in Brussels, the Frauenhofer Institute in Germany and CEA-Leti in France (Li, 2022). It is undeniable that Europe will need more advanced chips in the future. However, it would be more economical to strengthen the research and development (R&D) of these chips in Europe and leave large manufacturing to the U.S. and Asia, or even regions like Mexico, in the future. It is noteworthy that in the long run, the main threat to stable chip supply is China, as explained before, not the U.S., Japan, or South Korea. Therefore, the EU should see them as allies and not compete with them for manufacturing cutting-edge chips, but rather increase the supply of its strengths. Europe can increase its market share and improve its global competitiveness by enhancing "customary" chip production, increasing microchip equipment/machine production, and R&D. The EU should monitor these investments to prevent sponsoring Chinese programmes indirectly until the government changes to a more cordial stance.

Overall, in the long term, it is wiser to strengthen a multinational approach of chip-making democracies instead of pursuing autarkic self-reliance and forced hostility between these democracies. As Lewis (2022) advocates, "An industrial policy among allies and partners could usefully focus on rebuilding microelectronic capacity and other segments of the chip industry, such as testing and packaging, rather than on the more glamorous fabs" (para. 31). This also leads to an answer to the third and final question. The investment in microchips is a chance for the EU to improve its allocation of resources across the bloc. Critics argued that programmes such as the European Chips Act mainly enrich the union's dominant powers, such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands, whereas economically weaker countries are left standing. However, as Lewis (2022) proposes, the EU could establish relatively less complicated parts of the production line in, for instance, Eastern Europe. The lower-wage labour market can be used for steps such as the assembly, packaging & testing of microchips, "which is relatively less skill- and capital-intensive" (Varas et al., 2021, p.4). This step would take some of the production processes back to Europe and improve the supply resilience of the continent (see Figure 5).



Figure 5 The share of the microchip production process per region. Retrieved from Varas et al. (2021).

4. Conclusion

Europe has lost ground to other chip-producing regions over the past two decades. However, the presence of key companies in the chip production chain, such as ASML or Zeiss among others, together with Europe's financial resources and growing demand for "customary" chips provide a good basis to re-strengthen Europe's position in the microchip industry. The EU investments should capitalise on Europe's strengths to increase its competitiveness and market share. Furthermore, the reliance on China must be lowered and cooperation with reliable trade partners such as the U.S., South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan improved to secure the supply routes. The European Chips Act seems counterintuitive to this process as it solely focuses on establishing a cutting-edge industry that seems unprofitable on the continent. However, it will undeniably enhance the growth of a European microchip ecosystem, which is beneficial to grow the whole production chain. In other words, it will lead to a larger workforce and better infrastructure in the microchip sector. Therefore, it should be seen as a first step in a larger economic development in Europe. The EU's approach needs to be more all-encompassing and not just focus on the manufacturing aspect. The union must invest in the producers of customary chips, R&D, design, and suppliers of microchip material, chemicals, and equipment. However, unlike for research and development, Europe's role is not to become a large-scale manufacturing hub of state-of-the-art microchips.

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US-China Relations: Adrift Between Conflict and Tianxia

by Mats Radeck[*] , Fatih Civrillioglu[**]

Introduction

On August 2, 2022, Nancy Pelosi visited the island of Taiwan (officially the Republic of China) to underscore America's "unwavering commitment to supporting Taiwan's vibrant democracy."[1] Consequently, concern arose about whether aggression from China could be expected. Especially when the West was heavily involved in the Ukraine war, the idea of a potential neo-colonial-style invasion of the island nation did not seem too far-fetched. China has been drawing attention to the need for respect to its territorial integrity, for which the West, led by the US, has been answering inconsistently, in the current case by confirming its military support for Taiwan.[2] The Chinese military exercises that followed Pelosi's visit further sparked an array of assumptions that featured another war.

Such assumptions fit well into greater patterns of thought that work as guardrails to International Relations thought. With the bipolar global order having turned unipolar at the end of the Cold War, the international community experienced US hegemony in a liberal rules-based order. Recent events such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan or the 2008 financial crisis, however, reflect popular narratives such as Amsden's "rise of the rest" or the "decline of the West,"[3] and by that an underlying assumption that the unipolar global order is at risk. Especially China has increasingly grown powerful in the global world order, opening the door to questions about what the future world order will look like.

Against this backdrop, a conceptualisation of the arising struggle between China and the West under US leadership as a great power competition and a looming battle for hegemony, suggests itself. Consequently, models such as the "Thucydides Trap" are applied to the situation installing concern about a prescribed and unpreventable war between two superpowers[4] .

However, such a conceptualisation only represents one side of the coin which is closely tied to Western knowledge production. In this framework, the idea of Western hegemony in a unipolar world order being a guarantor for stability has anchored itself so well that a challenge to the overarching system is seen as a threat.

Yet, to understand the competition that arises between China and the US, understanding the other side of the coin is necessary as well before jumping to conclusions. For this, it is imperative to acknowledge that Western assumptions are not necessarily universal and that Chinese International Relations thought has its own dynamics, ideas and beliefs about how the world works. Two key ideas that require a closer examination are the cultural concept of Tianxia ("all under heaven") which also alludes to Qin's Relational theory of International Relations.

Enriching the Western lens to analyse the situation with a Chinese one, opens corridors for new ideas about the alleged inter-state competition. Consequently, the situation forfeits a lot of its fright and paints a better picture of the respective US and Chinese policy approaches. We postulate a more engaging mutual understanding of the assumptions and beliefs held by political players in the two countries could ease tensions and encourage cooperation to counter the global problems of today.

1. US-Centric Western View: Conflict as the Core of Conceptualisation

The current world order features underlying beliefs derived from Western knowledge production. In the short period of the pax Americana, this world order benefitted mainly from the beliefs, assumptions, and standards of the Western powers[5] . This conception of world order also has clear ideas about the meaning of conflict. Referencing the idea of the Westphalian Peace, individual sovereign countries exist in a state of anarchy in which power competition often is a zero-sum game that leads to friction, causing conflicts to escalate.

When adhering to these thought patterns, the greatest looming international conflict is the arising competition between China and the West, headed by the US. As the strongest representative of the "rise of the rest" hypotheses, China presents a challenge to the liberal world order, as it embodies an alternative functioning system of political governance and economic development. Seeing this situation through a realist lens, a China that has invested in hard and soft power is regarded as a threat to the US and the West. Respectively, Western conceptualisations of US-China relations (for the sake of clarity in this paper, the term also comprises the relations between the West and China in general) frame a geopolitical struggle that could eventually transform into an all-out war to attain hegemony.

At least three different conceptualisations of US-China relations are seen in the Western political discourse, each of which will be elaborated on in the following paragraphs. First, especially in the US, the discourse features analogies drawn to the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, hinting at a probable "new Cold War." Second, the idea of strategic competition acknowledges China as a pivotal actor in world politics and problem-solving, but also realises the element of systemic rivalry. Third, the influential, and hard-core realist theory of the Thucydides

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Trap regards China and the US as on the brink of war over hegemony. This last one slightly differs from the first one. We will discuss these discourses concisely below.

In the first conceptualization, the relations between the US and China are seen in the greater context of an all-out great power competition. For this, an analogy to the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US is drawn[6] . This approach has mostly picked up pace in the Trump era, with the US taking a more assertive rhetorical stance towards the People's Republic. The Trump administration not only started a trade war with the Chinese regime but also ratcheted military support to Taiwan by negotiating arms deals and conducting military exercises in the South China Sea[7] . Following the example of the Cold War, the US also relied on its Western allies to stand by its side, operationalizing NATO as a forum of like-minded nations to fight the same cause.

After Trump set the groundwork for an overall hostile relationship in the style of "us-versus-them," his successor Joe Biden even intensified the approach. Biden's foreign policy approach[8] underscores the multidimensionality of this competition which fully maxes out the analogy of the Cold War and extends to all political fields. This is being done by putting the US's military and geopolitical focus completely on the Pacific region. Furthermore, Biden has given US-China relations an ideological touch by intensifying rhetoric that foregrounds an overall competition[9] between political systems which only allows for one winner, effectively asking his allies to take sides. This fundamentalist attitude that the US embodies is also seen in Biden's ideological and dichotomous doctrine of making the confrontation between democracies and authoritarianism a hallmark of his presidency.

US-China relations are, therefore, often conceptualised as a restoration of great power competition. The analogy to the Cold War constructs China as a US opponent in multiple political arenas. Such include ideology, political systems, economy, and military matters. According to this perspective, China is a power in conflict with the West that attempts to shape a world order which is antithetical to the values and beliefs of the US and the West in any regard[10] .

The second conceptualization is more nuanced. It acknowledges the importance of cooperation between China and the West but still puts pivotal emphasis on conflict and competition. While this perspective is less prevalent in the US discourse, it is for example key to the European Union's (EU) China strategy which highlights China likewise as a cooperation partner to tackle international challenges such as climate change, but also as a systemic rival[11] . Either way, this approach foregrounds the assumption of a zero-sum game and the idea that China pursues goals that are in no way beneficial to the West.

These first two conceptualisations respectively mirror the foreign policy approaches of the US and the EU and as such also highlight nuances in different conceptualisations of power politics that exist in the West. While the US has applied a hard stance towards China, at the latest since the Trump era, the EU is less radical in its approach. Not only is this a distinction of practicalities, but also theoretical underpinnings. While the US is all-out realist and regards any win by China as its own loss, the EU mixes the idea of the international to be a playing field of a zero-sum game with the liberal key idea of international cooperation for mutual good. Either way, however, conflict is still a key notion in any Western conception of relations with China.

This notion of conflict culminates in the third conceptualisation of the relations between the US and China. Popularized by Graham Allison in 2017, the Thucydides Trap describes how rising tensions between an international hegemon and an aspiring contestant challenge the ruling superpower. Accordingly, the result of such a dynamic is often war[12] . The prominence of this theory and the intense debates that it has sparked regarding US-China relations are evident in the conflict-driven framing of the relations in the western, and especially in the US political discourse.[13]

The idea of conceptualising US-China relations according to the framework of the Thucydides Trap has been subject to various backlashes. Such critiques often stem from a wider critique of parochialism in Western International Relations. Furthermore, the idea has been condemned, among other things, for teleological assumptions in the related historiography and the issue of historical events not imitating each other. Moreover, critics blame the US to follow a one-dimensional worldview that neglects cosmopolitanism, thus giving rise to radical beliefs such as the Thucydides Trap.[14]

Examining the discourse that surrounds US-China relations, and relations between China and the West in general, therefore, discloses how conceptualisations of these are perhaps limited by an over-focusing on the theme of conflict. This does not play down the matter at hand and is not to say that conflict does not constitute an aspect of US-China relations. However, it critically questions a potential parochialism of Western international relations thought, a critique that is increasingly voiced in general.[15]

Either way, the uncontested hegemony of the US in the political sphere is degrading which also unravels the understanding of the Western conception of world order as a matter of course. The rise of China can arguably be regarded as the greatest challenge to the current world order. Understanding different conceptions of the respective relations between the two countries and not relying on a one-dimensional perspective are therefore pivotal.

2. China's Strategy and View on the World

Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic of China has struggled to find its place in the international system. First, under Mao, it participated in the socialist blog, then it joined the Non-Aligned Movement adopting the Third World view which opposed colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. While relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated in the 1960s, the 1969 Nixon Doctrine[16] reduced China's perception of the US as a threat, and inter-state relations shifted toward mutual cooperation. In 1971, China was granted a seat in the UN Security Council with the enactment of resolution no.[17] 2758. Further adhering to the socialist ideology in the post-Mao era, China partially oriented itself alongside market-economic principles, implemented economic reforms and opening, and attracted foreign investment. Despite the belief that there would be no more socialist state structures after the collapse of the Soviet Union, "socialism with Chinese characteristics" began to emerge, highlighting the intensification of a comprehensive Chinese ideology over time.

The handover of Hong Kong[18] from Britain to China in 1997 marked China's growing diplomatic influence alongside economic growth. Its policy toward Taiwan which was constructed around the same time emphasised China's commitment to territorial integrity and sovereignty. [19]

In the late 1990s, China sought a more harmonious and visible presence in the international system. It joined and became more involved in international organisations, one of such being membership[20] in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. However, these initially positive stances witnessed shifts along the road. In the West, there was a growing concern about China's increasing projection of power. On the Chinese side, events such as the accidental missile strike on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during NATO's military intervention in former Yugoslavia in 1999 or Western abuse of "responsibility to protect" in Libya made China eventually become more cautious toward the West. Thus, the relations started to become more calculated.

Chinese Foreign Policy and Tianxia

Starting in the 2000s, China attempted to address its negative image in international politics, by following soft power politics. The 2000s was a turning point for China when it made peace with its ancient history, culture, traditions and values in one hand, and preserving socialism in the other. The teachings of Confucius started to influence China's peaceful foreign strategy. To promote the Chinese language and culture abroad, Confucius institutes[21] were established in 2004.

In the 2000s, theories such as Organski's "Power Transition Theory"[22] and Mearsheimer's "Offensive Realism Theory"[23] were used by Western scholars as references toward the apparent growing "China threat". The main calculus was that a state would always want to grow stronger because the best way to ensure its security was to achieve hegemony, and that if a rising power was dissatisfied with the status quo, it would eventually adopt an aggressive policy. These ideas were generally repeated in political discourse. It was prophesied that a battle would eventually happen between the West and China, alluding to Huntington's "the clash of civilizations?".[24] The theory that still have its followers posited that Western civilization would eventually come into conflict with Islamic civilization and Chinese Confucianism.

During Hu Jintao's tenure (2003-2013), the foreign policy strategy aimed to allay the current concerns of the international community with the leveraged discourse of "peaceful development" and "harmonious society". Under this strategy, China proposed an alternative ruling structure in the international order. Based on a contemporary adaptation of the historical Tianxia (天下) system,[25] literally meaning "all under heaven", China revised its foreign policy discourse.

Tianxia is an ancient cultural concept that puts harmony over enmity. It emphasises that the actor, claiming hegemony in the international system, must have the support of other actors while governing. In this concept, an inclusive approach is taken as opposed to being perceived as the "other". With the Tianxia system, China places more emphasis on harmony than on equality or democracy, which it assumes cannot be achieved globally either way and can be easily manipulated. It claims the world's need is a system of hierarchical order, rather than the selfishness of nation-states in the Westphalian system, that is regarded as the major reason for the chaos of the international anarchical structure. In the system, states are considered as not separate and independent organisations but sub-actors under the moral governance of Tianxia. In this context, the UN is regarded as the playground of the existing system, which is driven by the self-interests of great powers. In the Tianxia, the hegemon, or a state at the top of the hierarchy, is not allowed to be imperialist or to take aggressive actions, but must adhere to the values. The system does not claim any cultural characteristics to be universal, and as such it does not disregard differences in language, culture, religion, or ideology. Unlike the Western understanding, it is not focused only on advancing one's self-interests and maximization of power. It formulates the relationship model that parties, between strong and weak or which are at the top and bottom of the hierarchy, would be satisfied. It argues for each country to act in accordance with its own circumstances for the resolution of global issues. China's "five principles of peaceful coexistence", the Peaceful Development strategy and Tianxia system have pointed to similar policies that each state, as an actor in the system, should take into account. China has formed its foreign policy within this context. These policies are referred in the 2005 White Paper of China[26] as follows:

Striving for a peaceful international environment to develop itself, and promoting world peace through its own development; Achieving development by relying on itself, together with reform and innovation, while persisting in the policy of opening-up; Conforming to the trend of economic globalisation, and striving to achieve mutually beneficial common development with other countries; Sticking to peace, development and cooperation, and, together with all other countries, devoting itself to building a harmonious world marked by sustained peace and common prosperity.

According to this White Paper, China's basic principles and policies are peace, opening up, cooperation, harmony, and a win-win strategy. Consequently, peace and development should be pursued abroad while maintaining peace and harmony at home. It is stated that these two must coexist for a peaceful world where these two are interconnected and common peace and prosperity are achieved.

In line with overall policy in this period, China maintained its policy of "keeping low profile", which foresaw peaceful development within international order without asserting itself as a world power. In line with this mentality, China wanted to be referred to as "Responsible Power".

Yet, with Xi Jinping's ascendance to power in 2013, China's approach shifted. Xi presented China as a power that was "great and ready to fulfil its commitments." Defining China's relations with the US as a "New Model in Great Power Relations[27] ", he emphasised that China was a great power, just like the US. The 2008-2012 U.S. economic crisis and the impression that the Washington consensus was at an end had a significant impact on Xi taking this initiative.

Along these lines, China launched major initiatives in the military, diplomatic, and economic fields during Xi's tenure. With the "Belt and Road Initiative", the country attempted to revive the historic Silk Road, of a new trade network that will reach as far as Europe, with more than 100 countries already participating, signifying China's growing influence abroad. In addition, Xi declared the "China Dream," or the "Rejuvenation of Chinese Society," for societal transformation. Within this notion, a broad discourse was leveraged that featured, inter alia, the durability of socialism, greater prosperity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, as well as many underlying reforms.

During his tenure, Xi has pursued a strategy to demonstrate China's ability and potential to counter threats, without abandoning its pro-peace stance. In particular, China begun to pursue a more competitive foreign policy in relations with the US, challenging US hegemony which China views as more selfish and irresponsible, without provoking conflict or war. In the "trade and technology war" that began in 2018, China retaliated to the sanctions imposed by the US. The Chinese army's exercise in August 2022 that involved almost encircling the island of Taiwan after Pelosi's visit is another manifestation of this strategy. Yet the reactions that China considers necessary within the context of the current international system are occasionally perceived offensive in the West. But in the far east, China, however, does not consider its current foreign policy to be offensive. In fact, Chinese academics have long attempted to label "Chinese foreign policy" as "sui generis" highlighting its national characteristic underpinning theories and discourses. Among those, Qin Yaqin's Relational Theory[28] , referring to the Tianxia system is a good reference to start with.

In his study, Qin emphasizes the "relationalism" of Neo-Confucianism, which focuses on continuous relationships and processes between countries that unfold over time. In characterizing the current system, Qin compares the intergovernmental system to economies where the rule of law is weak, and he argues that in an environment where laws are frequently not upheld, relational capacity, or Chinese "guanxi," can overcome the shortcomings of the rules-based systems. In this regard, it can be said to be a complementary theory to the current system meaning that it does not completely oppose or reject current theories. However, Qin asserts that morality is essential to IR because he believes that "rules based on normative power or moral power (the Confucian tradition defines morality in terms of behaviour toward others rather than in terms of perfection of the self), will lead to a sustainable order." Qin emphasizes "a shared understanding" in relationships."In relational governance structures, cooperation is more likely when state actors share a common understanding of social norms and human morality" he stresses. Furthermore, relational theory, as in Tianxia, emphasises hierarchical morality, meaning that every actor should adhere to the values. This applies to the hegemon even more, as it is responsible to uphold the moral values in the system. In the international environment, Qin defines "relational governance as a process of negotiating socio-political arrangements that manage complex relationships in a community to produce order so that members behave reciprocally and cooperatively with mutual trust evolved over a shared understanding of social norms and human morality". Relational theory, in addition to hierarchy, expresses that bilateral relations are based on mutual trust and tolerance, regardless of this hierarchy.

3. Putting it both together: Evaluating the US Aims to Outmanoeuvre China?

Differences in Interpretation of Chinese Foreign Policy

As outlined, the assumptions that underpin China's foreign policies towards the West and the West's approach towards China are fundamentally different and rooted in contrasting discourses. A striking example of this is the "keeping low profile" policy that was followed by the Chinese state under Deng Xiaoping. The Chinese meaning of this policy was not to assert leadership while calmly monitoring changes and acting in harmony with foreign partners. Such an approach also mirrors the meanings of Tianxia which values Chinese leadership and harmony over competition. However, this was interpreted differently by the US. In the annual defence report of 2002[29] , this policy "not only suggests a desire to downplay China's ambitions; it also affirms a long-term strategy to build up China's comprehensive national power to maximise China's options in the future." Such differences also result from faulty evaluation, such as the concept of "rise" in Western political discourse. Hence, the Chinese approach to "a peaceful rise" plan was altered to "peaceful development" challenging the original meaning of the policy. Another varying interpretation arises in the very concept of Tianxia itself which is regarded as the foundation for Chinese hegemonic ambitions in the West and not as a foundation for worldwide harmony, for which it could also serve. Eventually, while China's conception has long been positive following the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" in relations, the "China threat" perception has been growing in the West. Along the same lines, NATO Allies articulated commitment to "*address the systemic challenges posed by*" China in their latest 2022 Strategic Concept. [30]

In general, therefore, Chinese and US foreign policy approaches rest on diametric assumptions about the approach of the respective other. This disjuncture plays out in several conflicts between the two countries. One example where such a disjuncture arises is in the technology war[31] that has been fought between the West and China. The technology war is an alleged competition, especially carried out by the US and China over key technologies like 5G, artificial intelligence, or semiconductors. China's ambition to challenge the US leadership in this field is from a Western perception contextualised as a threat. However, when following the principles of Tianxia, such an ongoing action receives a less threatening touch. Accordingly, China does attempt to challenge hegemony, however without actively engaging in destroying harmony. Yet, the conflict arises among the two blocs that conceptualise this "technology war" differently. This further results in responses such as the US employment of protectionist measures whereas China tries to domesticate the supply chains.

Secondly, the Covid policies employed by the US and China respectively exemplify the difference between different approaches to world order as well. When India was hit by one of the world's worst Covid spikes in 2021, the Indian government reached out for international help. Employing a Trumpistic "America First" stance, the US government cited a need to vaccinate American people[32] first before lifting bans on vaccine exports. Meanwhile, people in China slammed the US for a "selfish" response to India's inquiry[33] and for not acting in accordance with American leadership ambitions in the international system. China, on the other hand, has been supporting other countries throughout the pandemic, often opposing its own approach to Trump's "America First" agenda, sticking to principles of Tianxia.

Third, such misunderstandings of divergent assumptions ultimately play a role in the countries' Taiwan strategy. In an understanding that follows Tianxia's assumptions, China insists on a peaceful solution and even offers a "one country-two systems"-solution in which China's hierarchy over Taiwan is recognized while China respects Taiwan's self-governing rights in internal affairs. Such a solution evokes analogies to the historical tributary system, one of the earliest implementations of Tianxia. However, the US's strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issue is causing China to distrust the global order, and it has adopted a more offensive foreign policy discourse, especially since Xi took office. As another major actor in the international system, China expects its territorial integrity and sovereignty to be respected, while the US continues to openly support Taiwan. The Taiwan issue is viewed differently by both the US and China. For China, it is an obvious violation of sovereignty rights, and a threat to its security. For the US, China's Taiwan policy resembles a growing threat to democracy and peace in the region, and the current global order. Especially after Russia's aggression towards Ukraine since February 2022, the international community has been concerned over the Taiwan issue that may turn into a similar conflict.

4. Conclusion:

The relations between China and the West are tense. China's increasing assertiveness on the international scene challenges the hegemony which has been built up by the US in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Cold War. For many political observers, the relations between the two countries feature many fault lines that could turn into conflict.

The theme of conflict is especially foregrounded in Western conceptualisations of the relations. For this, analogies to the Cold War are drawn. Some of the arguments reiterated in the academic and political milieus even predict aggravating relations that would eventually turn into an all-out war. However, in making sense of the relations, these Western conceptualisations often neglect Chinese perspectives which cause the image that is being framed to be comprehensively limited.

While Western perspectives often highlight conflict, Chinese perspectives underscore the importance of harmony and hierarchy. Such a notion stems from the cultural concept of Tianxia (literally meaning "all under the heaven"). The fact that China is challenging the US hegemony without provoking conflict or war can be read as continuum of this Tianxia concept.

Consequently, a huge disjuncture exists between the two countries' perception of each other and their respective policies, leading to strained relations. These fundamental misunderstandings hamper potential cooperation between the two great powers, which is needed to build a resilient world order or tackle global problems like climate change.

For this cooperation to happen, both countries need to move towards each other in their assumptions and beliefs about the functioning of world order and international relations in general. For the West, this would include promoting dialogue instead of creating or reproducing narratives of competition and conflict. For China, this would include explaining its foreign policies and ambitions considering how it is lacking these.

The perception of the “China threat” among Western policy elites is growing. While it is clear that increased cooperation will contribute to peace and stability in the region, the Chinese support to Russia in its war in Ukraine and its actions around Taiwan after Pelosi’s visit has strengthened the hand of the US that is actively trying to bloc accumulation of power by China. As a result, the parties are increasing their military presence in the region, becoming an even greater security threat to each other. However, with mutual dependence and cooperation, more liberal policies prioritising mutual gains could create the basis for future cooperation and abate tensions and prevent eventual far-reaching conflict.

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Digitalisation for Integration of Migrants: Necessity more than an Opportunity

by Fatih Yilmaz*

Digitalisation entered almost every part of human life with the pace of technology's advance, fuelled by the pandemic and lockdown. Internet connectivity has unlocked new and faster modes of communication, and we are now more connected than ever before.

Digitalisation has become a new normal in our social life, which we can certainly not resist or simply ignore. It is out of question that digitalisation brings new opportunities to address various societal challenges we are facing such as integration of migrants including refugees into the receiving societies. But on the other hand, it has its own vulnerabilities and requires new adaptive measures.

Considering the widespread use of digital tools[1] and internet[2] by vast majority of our society (OECD Data) including migrants and refugees, it should be seen as more than only an opportunity but as a necessity to use digitalisation as a leverage to develop and employ innovative solutions for the needs of migrants and their integration into their host communities.

Almost every migrant or refugee is connected to a digital world with a simple smart mobile tool, which is mostly indispensable[3] for them to keep in touch with their families, seek financial help or to get information they require to build their new lives. Thus, it can be a very useful channel to reach out to this group and support their orientation or integration, if used in the right way.

Integration and inclusion is a two-way process[4] between migrants and the host community. The digital solutions can support not only migrants but also the host community and facilitate the interaction between the two sides. All involved parties of the host community in integration, such as government organisations, NGOs, civil society, and volunteers can benefit from these solutions.

There are different instruments, ways, and methods to integrate and include migrants into the host community, such as social orientation courses, language training, social participation initiatives, networking events, mentoring, coaching and counselling, etc. These are mostly undertaken by local authorities, NGOs or the civil society organisations. Digital solutions can facilitate the use of these instruments and ease the burden on these organisations. Resources are limited and we need bigger impacts considering the level of increasing challenges of today.

Then the question is how to support integration with digitalised processes or tools. There are recent inspiring projects developed innovative tools and practices which resulted in successful impacts.

ORIENT8[5] project, co-financed by the EU, developed a smart social mentoring program supported by smart digital tools and tailored activities and piloted it in three European cities (Mechelen/Belgium, Sala/Sweden, Nikaia-Renti/Greece). It smartly pairs newcomers with the volunteer members of the local community in order to help them overcome daily difficulties at the early stage of their integration process.

ORIENT8 developed a welcome application[6] for each city with a lot of useful local information for newcomers in many languages. It is a digital space for information on mobile devices, easy to access and find information and easy to understand both for newcomers and their mentors. ORIENT8 also developed an Artificial Intelligence using smart matching tool[7] for municipalities and mentoring organisations which can make smart matchings among a mass group of mentors and newcomers taking into account the matching criteria[8] identified by HIVA. It can make better matches via its machine learning capacity. Both digital tools successfully raised the impact by reaching out more newcomers, facilitating and improving integration services at the local level.

As innovative solutions, All-in-one4HER[9] project developed a digital networking platform for highly educated migrants to better connect with the local community and Super-mentor project[10] developed a digital e-learning and community platform for mentors to support the labour market integration of migrants.

Digitalisation provides innovative solutions with potential greater impacts, but it also has its own limitations and challenges that need to be considered.

These tools mostly cannot completely replace the social and physical services but support them. From the experience most of these digital solutions need to be accompanied with social and human elements. More comprehensive solutions are needed to include the users with lower digital literacy.

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The digital solutions need to consider the regulations on data protection and privacy (GDPR) from the beginning, which can be a very sensitive and demanding issue for organisations. Late considerations can significantly hinder or delay the deployment of these solutions. On the other hand, digital applications may require collecting and publishing public data. The regular update of data and maintenance of applications need to be considered from the beginning which requires resource investment. The organisations may also need to invest in capable personnel to deal with digital processes and regulations.

Considering the cost efficiency, some costly digital solutions can better fit middle-big size municipalities or organisations dealing with a bigger number of users.

To conclude, digitalisation should be seen as a necessary measure for migrant integration by governments and local authorities in order to increase the impact of solutions and facilitate the processes, while considering its own limitations and challenges.

Endnotes

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Book Review: “The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War” by Brian McAllister Linn



Onur Sultan[*]

The aim of the Linn’s book is to give an insight to anyone trying to understand first how the United States Army prepared for war, second if it found what it expected on the battlefield, third what adaptations it had to make and finally how it changed itself accordingly. One lesson from the book is that the Army certainly changed as the time passed. It changed doctrine, equipment, mindset, organization, vision of future warfare and the way it trained. However it did not happen without struggle.

The very first thing that the author admits is the ever-changing nature of war. In order to support that he says:” Until recently, a common joke at all the war colleges was that the one subject not studied was war”.(pg.2) Then he indicates given that constantly changing concept of war, the vision of future warfare cannot be created solely by soldiers. But the peacetime discussions and scholars together have helped constructively understand, envision and make preparations for the next warfare and thus create The Army’s Way of War.

Then he elaborates on three schools of thought that he traces back to revolution and the war of 1812 after which the professional Army was created. According to him, all those schools of thoughts have created magnificent leaders and incompetent officers, great accomplishments and pathetic failures. The army officers have always fought their fights guided by those schools of thought. Some have been inspired by only one and some have been simply inspired by two or all three of them. In any case though, these schools of thought, namely guardian, manager and hero, have shaped the US Army officers’ concept of warfare during the preparation and execution . Those officers trying to learn from past by army’s lessons learned tradition have evaluated the previous wars based on their future warfare concept. In other words they have heard the same “echo of battle”.

The first and oldest of those military philosophies or schools of thought is the “Guardian”. According to the guardians the war was both art and science. They referred to its nature as science which was governed by laws and principles. If applied correctly, it would bring about the results intended and help predict the outcomes. The art part was simply its application. According to guardians only officers who have mastered this science could be trusted to perform this art. Guardians were the first ones that created the US army and its first adherents were the Corps of Engineer officers. In their early days, the Guardians were the ones that contended a strong US defense system could be only accomplished by strong coastal fortifications along the Atlantic coasts facing the “predatory European great powers”. This strategy was later stretched to cover also western coast and overseas possessions. Linn contends that although this philosophy lost some of its importance starting with WWII and leaps and bounds in naval military technology and aircraft, it is still the guiding beacon in the defense of continental U.S. They claim that the protection of American land can be possible through creation of strong intercontinental ballistic missiles and a strong airforce. When defeated, the Guardians would blame an irrational American society for refusing to accept Guardian defense policies and hence allocating sufficient material and human resources.

Second school of thought is the Heroes which is a strong contrast to Guardians. Heroes always put the personal fortes fore. According to them the fate of future battles would be determined by decisive leaders with military genius, experience, courage, morale and discipline. Because the wars are fought by men, not weapons. So it is the spirit of the [man] who fights and of the [man] who leads which gains the victory. In case of defeat, they would blame US army for being a soulless organization in which warriors are subordinated to technicians and careerists. Or sometimes they would blame American society for lacking the spiritual qualities basic for warfighting. At their best they provide decisive battle leadership and an ability to adapt to whatever they find. At the worst they are the officers in the 1930’s who believed the élan of a cavalry charge could defeat machine guns.

The last school of thought Linn mentions is the Managers, who oppose the views of both Guardians and Heroes. In the second chapter of the book,the author delineates their efforts to understand the true nature of the war be it military and civilian. Especially Civil War’s and The German War of Unification’s effects were immense. Scholars learning from what happened in Crimea, Koeniggratz , Sedan started to make compari~~sons between Civil War, Gettysburg. They were also subjec~~t to many developments in military technology

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like precision and rapidity of fire, increase in range so on and so forth... Then they came to the conclusion that the war was a natural outgrowth of political and economic rivalry and an essential component of the United States' rise as a great power. They encouraged the creation of a mass army that was commanded by professionals, armed with best weapons, and conducted training in peace. They were basically suggesting a Prussian model army, that lived war before its coming. If their overwhelming resources, far better administration and meticulous planning fail to secure victory, Managers would just say reorganize. According to them, WWII was a manager's war and the rescue of Western Europe from Germans is its greatest success. Managers often try to de-emphasize human factor.

Linn asserts that whenever a war is at the doorsill, it is something the Army did not expect for but just something it had to adapt itself to. The latest GWOT, Operation Iraqi freedom and invasion of Afghanistan is no exception in this case. In order to shed light on his claims he gives examples from history. According to him one of the lessons the army learned after the fall of Saigon, Vietnam was never to engage itself in such counterinsurgency operations or irregular conflicts again. They emphasized the dominance of that idea during the Operation Desert Storm in 1991. But still the same army seemed to have forgotten that lesson when it started invasion of Iraq in March 2003. When it was April, army was again fighting insurgency, which was not the card they wanted to play.

Last, Linn claims that the history is abused by soldiers. He says, whenever the history is looked into, there has been a selective study to support the concept it has. So, the same echo of battle has been heard. That's why, Linn thinks that all three schools of thought have failed to prepare the army to the war it is going to fight.

However, Linn has a hopeful outlook for future. He thinks that the current army tries to avoid straightjackets and tries to establish its own doctrine to fight insurgency operation as we witness happening in Iraq. To support that he gives the General Petraus example trying to bring as many elites from different backgrounds as possible to bring together the doctrine for countering insurgency.

Does Linn succeed his aim that was stated in the first paragraph? The answer is yes. To support his arguments, Linn gives well-thought examples. Looking into the clashes around the globe and how they are fought, one is amazed to find that there is nearly no part compatible with conventional warfare that is thought as staple in most military academies. The war fought in Afghanistan, Iraq and nowadays in Ukraine all show divergence. The author really makes a great point saying Army fights the war it has to but not it has prepared for.

Also, the well categorisation of subcultures as guardians, heroes and managers will certainly ring bells for those involved in defence capacity building or planning. The groups in each country often interact, sometimes clash and shape definition of concepts and doctrines under defense planning efforts. The book helps name those subcultures or shools of thought and understand the development of the doctrine compared to history.

Another lessons learned from the book is the great importance of understanding or envisioning the future warfare. Based on this vision, finances are allocated, doctrine and equipment change, the way the army train change, so on and so forth. That is why more and more efforts from both military and civilian environment should be encouraged to help understand how the future war would be like and proponents of all three schools of thought should be present to make up for aspects that a specific school of thought would normally disregard.

All in all, reading the history of one of the world's biggest and overstretched armies from different perspectives builds in the mind of the reader a picture of what kind of reactions were triggered for what events. Leaving the events in the past, the reader can understand if those reactions / assumptions were true, if not what kind of adaptations were necessary to counter them. In the end what lessons can be learned from them. Although the stories are specific to the US Army, the lessons drawn can be applied to any army around the globe.

Overall, the book is well-structured, the ideas have been expressed fluently and can be understood easily.

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