
Influencing and Promoting Global Peace and Security

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**EDUC8 to Build Resilience Project can
Contribute to Countering Radicalization
and Polarization**

The Nature of War and Strategic Theory

**The Conflict In The South China Sea: A
Focus On A Possible Solution**

Book Review: Blockchain Revolution

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Foreword

Dear Reader,

We are happy to be with you in this third issue of 2021. As before, this issue also brings deep insight into three different issues of our select. The first article, or more precisely the policy brief brings a fresh perspective to the nexus between religion, radicalization, and polarization. Expanding upon the project's methodology and impact it created during implementation, the article offers EDUC8 as an instrumental tool that can be benefited from in the fight against radicalization and polarization. In the end, the policy brief comes up with policy recommendations at MS and EU level. Accordingly, EDUC8 methodology and products are proposed as a "new school" approach to religious education that will foster more tolerant and inclusive societies and stronger individuals.

The second article is the fruit of years of investigation into publications on war and contemplation on its true nature. Delving deeper into principal elements, contexts, key concepts, levels, and dimensions in an effort to attain a better grasp of the nature of war and strategy, the paper details its findings in a clear tone. Providing base for a better evaluation and understanding of emerging concepts, the article departs from Clausewitz's work to further look into modern interpretations of strategy, grand strategy and strategic theory.

The third and the last article presents a balanced view on the conflict in the South China Sea has been constantly in the spotlight over the last 10 years. As China builds islands in the middle of the South China Sea, with airfields, roads, buildings, and bases for missile systems, the problem transcends regional borders, bringing it to the epicenter of the international power struggles. The author details regional and international dynamics to highlight probable -if any- avenues that could lead to solution.

In our last issue, we also have a book review on Don and Alex Tapscott's « Blockchain Revolution ». The authors that analyses the technology and technical background of the blockchain technology, offer a comprehensive view on how the principles behind its creation will likely show their impacts in seven different realms, namely financial services, the architecture of the firms, business model innovation, the Internet of Things, economic inclusion, government and democracy, and the creative industries. The authors' futuristic vision within the book gives both hope and apprehension at times.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG

EDUC8 - Educate to Build Resilience Project¹ Can Contribute to Countering Radicalization² and Polarization³

Policy Brief

by Onur Sultan⁴, Didier Pollefeyt⁵

"I don't have a single American friend, I don't understand them."

Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older Boston Marathon bomber, to a photographer in 2009 (Olsson, 2014, p. 1)

1. Introduction

Radicalization towards all types of violence (jihadi, extreme right, anti-semitist etc.) and polarization are two major societal challenges that tear at the social fabric of Europe. Radicals incite to baleful action by framing the status quo as "unjust," "exploitative," "oppressive," or "heretical." (Hafez, 2015), while polarizers work in the opposite direction, inviting society to show no mercy to the different and the differences. Overall, the two symbiotically feed each other and catalyze confrontation.

On another far corner of the field, the proponents of the secularization theory, that have been for long arguing the religions would finally disappear from the face of earth in their battle with modernization processes, have proven to be wrong in their premise. Especially the turbulent Middle East and Europe in the last decade have clearly shown the religions do not disappear but persist, change and adapt to keep their important place among their followers.

Against this background, EDUC8 to Build Resilience Project or EDUC8 in short was conceptualized to vehicle religious education and hence religion⁶ to counter pernicious effects of radicalization and polarization. This policy brief aims to bring a fresh perspective to the nexus between religion, radicalization, and polarization, and to offer EDUC8 as an instrumental tool that can be benefited from in the fight against these two societal challenges.

2. Terror - Religion - Polarisation Nexus

The murder of a homosexual man in Beveren, Belgium on 6 March (Belga, 2021) and the Vatican's ruling in less than ten days after the event that priests can't bless same-sex unions (Povoledo & Graham, 2021) prompted media in Belgium to scrutinize the connection between violence and religion. The Belgian Parliament invited all representatives of religions and worldviews to the Parliament for consultation. As it becomes clear from this example, the link between religion and violence – often combined with suspicion that the former fuels intolerance and terrorism – currently is and will be a recurrent phenomenon in the future. There is an obvious need to discuss the role of religion among other factors in leading to radicalization towards violence.

¹ EDUC8 – Educate to Build Resilience Project has received funding from the European Union's Internal Security Fund – Police under grant agreement No: 871090. This work was supported by the same funding instrument

² Radicalization is defined as: "a process during which a person or a group of persons experiences such influences that this person or this group of persons will at some point, be mentally moulded or disposed to commit terrorist acts" (act of 30 November 1998 governing the intelligence and security services – Art 3,15[°]; non official translation). retrieved from Plan R The Action Plan Against Radicalism, Federal Public Services Home Affairs, https://www.besafe.be/sites/default/files/2019-06/planr_en.pdf

³ Polarization can be defined as "the strengthening of opposition between [persons or] groups in society that results or can result in (the exacerbation of) tensions between these [persons or] groups and create risks for the security of society" Source: Plan global de Sécurité et de Prévention de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, Brussels Observatory for Prevention and Security (BPS / BPV), https://bps-bpv.brussels/sites/default/files/2019-05/POLARISATION_ET_RADICALISATION.pdf.

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⁶ Here, we include non-confessional ethics among other religions taught at schools. To maintain integrity and for the sake of conciseness we did not revert to openly state this. Here and in the following lines, religion within context of school contains this critical and equally important world system or life philosophy.

Humans live within a universe of factors that on constant basis shape their look towards life and affect the meaning they attribute to it. Scholars working on radicalization often list factors like grievances, family and social connections, ideologies, socio-economic conditions as important drivers of radicalization. Religion in many cases forms the core of the respective ideology. As there is no single pattern or profile to identify who will likely radicalize and who won't, it is equally not possible to attribute a universally valid weight to the religion among other factors. The context in which the radical grows defines the respective weights in the procedure. Research including semi-structured interviews with 63 ISIS defectors by Speckhard et al. shows how different contexts can create different motivations among target groups. The study shows for the Westerners, "offers of a real salary, arranged marriages, sex slaves for men, traditional living for women, free housing and other amenities, along with the honors bestowed by ISIS on foreign fighters who come to Syria and Iraq were real attractions as many felt their lives to be lacking dignity, purpose, significance, and honor" (Speckhard, Shajkovci, & Yayla, 2018, p. 7) The research corroborates Hafez's position that there is need for multifactor and contextual approach that evades looking at radicalization as a uniform and linear process (2015).

Speckhard's study does not list religion among the motivations either. Along the same lines, one deradicalization officer in Brussels told the first author in an interview: "In each case we see a person making the travel to Syria and Iraq, if we scratch the surface [if we delve deeper into the issue], we find a familial, social or economic problem. The perceived urgency or greatness of that problem pushes the person to think if he goes, he will have a better life there and leave that problem behind." (Sultan, 2020, p. 17)

In cases where religion is openly stated, the veracity of this statement also requires further scrutiny. Redouan Safdi is a Belgian imam who is involved in the deradicalization of foreign terrorist fighters alongside homegrown terrorists and radicals in a Belgian prison. He says:

"When dealing with such a person, trying to start a deradicalization program, the first question I would always ask is, 'Why did this person go [to a conflict zone]?' During his inquiries into the real causes for travels, Safdi says: "They would usually start talking about that they have love for Islam, they want to live in an Islamic state, they want to live somewhere where shariah is implemented. When you go deeper with them in the conversation, when conversations are more meaningful, I would hardly hear them speak about Islamic state or the implementation of shariah. All I would hear are the injustices they have experienced in the past: racism, discrimination, poverty, lack of opportunity. [...] The majority of them are very young people. Many of them haven't even reached the age of 18. They are frustrated, alienated socially. Young people who are in search of identity, a meaning in life. Young people that did not feel at home in their own countries where they were born, who felt they were not appreciated" (Safdi, 2020)

Examples testifying to the same fact can be multiplied. In his piece where he presents the case of two ISIL terrorists, Mehdi Hassan says before their journey to Syria, the two books they bought from Amazon were "Islam for Dummies" and "Koran for Dummies." He further continues:

In 2008, a classified briefing note on radicalization, prepared by MI5's behavioural science unit, was leaked to the Guardian. It revealed that, "far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practice their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could . . . be regarded as religious novices." The analysts concluded that **"a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalization"**, the newspaper said. (Hassan, 2014)

A recent study conducted by German security authorities by analyzing data on 910 individuals who traveled to the Levant actually supports the argument that "a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalization". The study revealed that 17% of the total number were converts. What is more, converts comprised at least one third of female departees (Heinke, 2017).

Safdi's testimony also hints at the interaction between radicalization and polarization. In line with this, in their article on challenges to create counter-narratives, Prof. Speckhard and Dr. Shajkovci say:

The main recruiting pool for groups like ISIS are Muslim converts and second-generation Muslim immigrant communities who have not found the promises of the EU to match their daily realities. In formal and informal interviews with hundreds of EU citizens to date, ICSVE researchers have found sentiments of Islamophobia, discrimination, and marginalization to be widely prevalent in their daily lives and experiences. (Speckhard, 2018)

So where is religion in this equation? "Religion" comes actually into play mainly in two areas. The first one is the fact that religion is in most cases an inalienable part of an individual's identity. The rise of far-right, xenophobia and identity-based discriminatory approaches among politicians and society has been a factor to deepen the divide among different religion groups and polarize them.

Second and more importantly, religion plays an important role in the justification of the violence. It should be acknowledged that worldviews are open to different interpretations (hermeneutics) and the violent interpretation is not unavoidable. These violent interpretations do not constitute the essence and original reading of respective religions but form perversions of it. Those perversions create foundations of ideologies that feed and fuel violent groups. According to Walter, irrespective of whether they believe in underlying core tenets or not, embracing extremist ideologies help leaders of such groups overcome collective action problem, using the ideology as vehicle or tool to raise units of men ready to accept the cost of fighting and death (Walter, 2017).

3. One Important Survey to Become Source of Inspiration for EDUC8

Pew research conducted between April – August 2017 influenced conceptualization of EDUC8. The non-Muslim respondents in 15 European countries were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that "In their hearts, Muslims want to impose their religious law on everyone else in the country." The survey results show, there is less of a difference between those who say they know "a great deal" or "some" about Islam and those who know "not very much" or "nothing at all." On the contrary, a sizable difference is observed among respondents that personally know a Muslim and those do not. In statistical terms, the mean of difference for 15 countries is 21,31 percent. It is of note that in two countries, Switzerland and UK, more than eight-in-ten (85%) of those who say they know a Muslim disagree with the statement, compared with just 48% of those who do not know a Muslim. This brings us to the conclusion that getting to know each other among individuals from different faiths helps to overcome prejudices or stereotypes (Gardner & Evans, 2018).

4. REDCo and Its Findings

REDCo is the first substantial research project on religion and education financed by the European Commission, which ran from March 1, 2006 until March 31, 2009. Qualitative and quantitative research was conducted in eight countries (Germany, England, France, The Netherlands, Norway, Estonia, Russia, Spain) mainly focusing on religion in the lives and schooling of students in the 14–16 age group. The study dealt with different perspectives of the general question on how far religion is a factor of stereotypes and conflicts or a source of dialogue and peaceful living together. Here are some key findings of the study:

- Those who learn about religious diversity in school are more willing to enter into conversations about religions and world views with students from other backgrounds than those who do not have this




Figure 1. Pew Research on Public Perception about Muslims

opportunity for learning.

- Students believe that the main preconditions for peaceful coexistence between people of different religions are knowledge about each other's religions and worldviews, shared interests, and joint activities.
- Students for whom religion is important in their lives are more likely to respect the religious background of others and value the role of religion in the world.
- Most students would like to see school dedicated more to teaching about different religions than to guiding them towards a particular religious belief or worldview (REDCo Consortium, 2009).

5. EDUC8 Connects the Dots to Propose “Original” Methodology, Content and Tools

Based on abovementioned facts and insight, EDUC8 Project was conceptualized with the aims to answer especially the following EU needs:

- Radicalization and polarization are two faces of the same coin that feed and catalyze each other. There is need for developing a comprehensive effort to build resilience against radicalization towards all types of violence while building tolerance towards the “other” and differences.
- Religions and worldviews are open to different interpretations (hermeneutics). While the **violent interpretation is not unavoidable, it does not constitute the essence of the respective worldview system and is even a perversion of it. A well-established religious identity protects against violent radicalization.** It is crucial to build resilience by convincing the young people that there is no religious legitimacy in killing innocent people let alone being incumbent upon them.
- In any authentic religion and worldview, there is a potential to change, to criticize, to overrule, to transform violence into tolerance and peace. There is urgent need to recognize this potential in the other and feel invited and challenged to discover this potential.
- There is need for preventive work that will target the young as early as secondary school level, teach them representation of different religions, to help them develop respect and mutual understanding, and teach them how to understand religion and religious texts to enable them to withstand extremist ideologies. Diversity and friendships among diverse groups is the remedy of intolerance and violence.

To attain those goals, EDUC8 proposes a four-step methodology that involves equipping the audience with knowledge of the other (shallow module), a good understanding of the own worldview (deep module), reaching mutual understanding and appreciation through dialogue (in-class discussion) and building friendships through smart encounters (socialization). The key component of this methodology is in-class discussion which develops required skills in 5 steps. Those are:

- **Knowledge** of the tradition on the topic + critical issues (from the exterior): Presenting the basic facts and figures of a certain ethical or religious tradition on a topic, including also misunderstandings, prejudices and pitfalls for people who are not involved in this tradition.
- **Understanding** the tradition from within: Explaining the inner dynamic of an ethical or religious tradition on a topic, trying to understand from within.
- Respect, acknowledgment, **appreciation** of the other: Opening oneself to the witness of the other, to the strength and beauty of his/her tradition, to the philosophical, moral, esthetic or spiritual splendor of the other living his or her tradition. Giving and accepting hospitality in the tradition of the other.
- Learning from the other through **dialogue**: Entering into dialogue with the other, trying to understand, asking questions, formulating critiques, looking for communalities and differences, etc.
- Being **transformed** oneself through the encounter with the other: Returning to one's own tradition or beliefs, see how the encounter with the other has changed (challenged, enriched, deepened, etc.) my understanding of the other and of myself.




Figure 2. EDUC8 Methodology

Alongside its methodology, EDUC8 also introduces “new-school” elements for the target groups. Its main outputs, the religious education program, is embedded onto web- and tablet platforms in three languages: English, French and Dutch⁷. The whole program is structured around storytelling (scenario-based), interactive, and harnesses popularity of tablets and their ability to address three senses (sight, hearing, touch). So far, EDUC8 has built up a [religious educational program](#) that extends over six religions / philosophies / world systems (Judaism, Catholicism, Islam, Orthodoxy, Protestantism and Non-Confessional Ethics) in 26 modules on four main subjects:

1. Encounter with the other: dealing with diversity
2. Encounter with sacred texts: texts of violence
3. Encounter with the environment: social and ecological issues
4. When encounter becomes conflict: just war and just peace

The project was implemented in PHTI, a public secondary school in Ghent, Belgium for 8 weeks between 22 March – 28 May, covering it in entirety. The project received extremely positive feedback from both teachers and students. The principal of the school commented on the project saying:

We believe very strongly in the strength of this way of working together across ideological boundaries. You have launched a wonderful project that certainly deserves to be further rolled out and refined. We also want to thank you warmly for the warm cooperation and we hope that in the near future we will be able to walk the same road together. In my opinion, this form of coteaching and participation of students and teachers in a critical and at the same time very respectful dialogue is a nice alternative to the LEF story which, in my opinion, does not contain the same powerful ‘coat hooks’ as your story!

⁷ At the time of writing this policy brief, the work to build the application is underway. But the final version will be found on android and apple stores.

Philip Quarles van Ufford, the Protestantism teacher in the school of implementation shares his thoughts as follows:

The strength of the project, in my opinion, lays in the right combination of a well-prepared presentation of the 6 recognized philosophies of life on the one hand and - building on that - the critical reflection on the difficult themes on the other hand. This critical reflection was first done within the own circle, after which a meeting and discussion took place about these themes together with students of other confessions. This set-up had a unifying effect, clarified questions and created understanding.

Currently the project is in implementation in one prison (Antwerp, Belgium), one juvenile penitentiary (Kempen, Belgium), one NGO in Finland (implementation in youth work), four schools in Slovenia and four schools in Greece. It is of note that there is no formal religious education in Slovenia and EDUC8 will be the first to make an exception with the ongoing implementation.

6. Policy Recommendations

EDUC8 Project with the excellence of its methodology, strong pedagogical foundations, an engaging narrative style and an attractive visual design is candidate to offer a sound approach to build resilience among secondary school students across Europe against radicalization and polarization. To better exploit the project results, we recommend:

- a. Development of innovative approaches to learning about different religions and worldviews in their complexity and inner diversity. EDUC8 shallow modules can be used for this purpose in MS lower secondary schools as part of religious educational curriculum. In the shallow modules, EDUC8 offers a learning from within (a presentation of the religion by a member of that religion, with a positive attitude towards it).
- b. Development of innovative approaches to tackle generally avoided hard questions in religions and real dangers. EDUC8 deep modules, especially if used after completion of shallow modules can create a starting point. EDUC8 does not avoid a presentation of the dangerous potential of a religion around a certain topic and often this challenge is brought in the form of a 'Fremd prophecy': someone from an external perspective challenges pre-supposition. There is a two steps method:
 - A first naivety violent interpretation
 - A second naivety peaceful re-interpretation
- c. Development of an intra-class interfaith approach founded upon mutual respect and tolerance. The main element of EDUC8 methodology, in-class discussion, can be operationalized and become a norm within schools. The "Teacher's Training Guide" showcases one form of co-teaching and participation of students and teachers in a critical and at the same time very respectful dialogue.
- d. The project can be further funded by the EC or MS to add more subjects to the existing four modules to increase its impact.
- e. The project can be further funded by more MS or third countries to adapt its products extended to the funder's native and / or additional languages.

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Dr.Murat Caliskan¹

1. Introduction

We need to discuss what war is, whether there are certain fundamentals of war that do not change through time and circumstances—namely the nature of war—or whether war has been changing. Our understanding of war's nature inherently influences how we approach the conduct of war, how we develop military strategy, doctrine and concepts, and train and equip combat forces². Every state has a policy goal, and it has to have an understanding about war and the conduct of war to ensure its security. Yet, policy should not ask the armed forces to engage in actions or activities which are not consistent with their capabilities or with the true nature of war³. While war—or the threat of war—has always been one of the most powerful influences that has shaped the course of international relations, there have been relatively fewer studies about war and warfare in the international relations domain. Considering the current lack of knowledge about war and security matters⁴, at the risk of adopting flawed concepts, it becomes important to understand the fundamental themes about war, policy and strategy before discussing and evaluating any emerging concept. This article aims to present the fundamental knowledge about the nature of war and strategy. While the initial sections about war, policy and the nature of war will be mainly based on Clausewitz's work, the following sections will be based on modern interpretations of strategy, grand strategy and strategic theory.

2. War and Policy

Clausewitz states, “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means⁵.” This sentence may be the most quoted passage of Clausewitz's work which represents “the primacy of policy” and is usually regarded as his core message. There are numerous other passages where he has emphasized the primacy of policy such as: “the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose,” or “war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy” and “policy, then, will permeate all military operations and have a continuous influence on them.”⁶

However, the primacy of the policy should not be understood as political determinism. While “political purpose remains the supreme consideration,” it is “not a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means.” Policy permeates all military operations; however, it does “as far as their violent nature will admit.” Clausewitz' statement “war has its own grammar, but not its own logic,”⁷ can be understood as the summary of the relationship between war and policy. War has its own restrictions as grammar does on speech, but this does not change the fact that it is merely a political instrument.

The scale of the political objective determines the scope of the military aim. However, another factor which determines the military aim is the enemy's response. In the very beginning of *On War*, Clausewitz begins by going straight to the heart of the matter and states:

War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order

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² Antulio J. Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 58.

³ Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 77.

⁴ Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic Theory* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 23. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203088999>.

⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 87, 605.

⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 87-88.

⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 87-88, 605.

to make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.⁸

The enemy's role is at the centre as it captures the essence of war, simply because war is a bilateral use of violence rather than a unilateral use; violence met by violence. The fact that "war is a duel" has a number of impacts on the entire theory of war. For instance, the military objective of the war may vary depending on the type of war. In an unlimited war, as in the Second World War, a military objective might be rendering the enemy totally defenceless while in a limited war a military objective can be coercing the enemy to affect his will.

Once the interaction begins, both sides start a series of activities to make a judgement about enemy's character, their institutions, and general situation, and this can only be made by using the laws of probability in the real world.⁹ Because of the imperfect knowledge of the situation, and usually unreliable intelligence, any given situation requires that probabilities be calculated in light of the circumstances. This is why, "no other human activity [other than war] is so continuously or universally bound up with chance." Through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war.¹⁰ Chance, together with danger and courage, from the very start requires the interplay of probabilities and possibilities. As Clausewitz noted, "so-called mathematical factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards¹¹." [emphasis added]

All of these may sound banal, but it is crucial to know that history is replete with cases where actors underestimated the strength of their opponents, worse, they did not even take their opponents into consideration before they embarked on their military operation. The US's "War against Global Terrorism" may represent a good example of an actor who does not pay attention to their enemy and the dire consequences. Clausewitz's idea that escalation was not determined by the laws of necessity, but by the laws of probability, was also truly a revolutionary one in the military theory of Clausewitz's day.¹²

3. The Nature versus Character of War

According to Clausewitz, war has two natures: objective and subjective. The objective nature of war represents those qualities common to all warfare in all periods."¹³

On War is a quest for objective knowledge, namely, the universal and eternal nature of war. On the contrary, the subjective nature of war corresponds to the actual, dynamically changeable, highly variable detail of historical warfare, as it is valid only for a specific time and place. Military forces, their doctrines, and the weapons that are used in each war are examples of this subjective nature. In today's language, the objective nature of war is called "the nature of war" while the subjective nature of war is called "the character of war."¹⁴

So, what is the nature of war? What are the common features of all warfare in all periods? If we are to follow Clausewitz, all wars are driven by unstable relations among three forces: "passion and enmity," "chance and creativity" and "policy reason." He wrote:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.¹⁵ [emphasis added]

⁸ Ibid, p. 75.

⁹ Ibid, p. 80.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 85.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 86.

¹² Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, p. 66.

¹³ Clausewitz, On War, p.606.

¹⁴ Gray, War, Peace and International Relations, p. 23.

¹⁵ Clausewitz, On War, p. 89.

According to Clausewitz, these three tendencies are present in every war and yet vary in their relationship to one another. He maintains, “Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.” The weight of each tendency depends on the context of each war. More importantly, the remarkable trinity demonstrates that war’s nature is inseparable from the historical and socio-political contexts in which that war arises, so therefore, war cannot be examined in isolation as a thing-in-itself.¹⁶

He attributes objective (unchanging) tendencies to subjective ones (ever-changing): namely, he attributes passion and enmity to the “people,” chance and probability to “the commander and army,” and political reason to the “government.” However, this should not be understood as a rigid, inflexible, and mutually exclusive relationship, as he does not equate them exactly. “The government” in this case stands for any ruling body; any “agglomeration of loosely associated forces;” the military represents any warring body in any era, while the “populace” suggests the population/citizenry of any society or culture in any period of history.¹⁷ For example, policy may be the responsibility of the government, but in the modern world it is likely to be influenced by a public opinion that could prove volatile. Additionally, policy can be influenced by those military commanders who are shaping strategy, in a process of dialogue with politicians.

Danger, physical exertion, uncertainty and chance are four elements comprise the “climate of war” that is common to all wars.¹⁸ They can also be grouped into a single concept of general friction, which is one of the unique concepts invented by Clausewitz. Friction can be described as “the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” Clausewitz states “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and produce a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” In theory, everything may seem reasonable and flawless, however in practice; every individual has the potential to cause problems. Danger and physical exertion can aggravate any problems to such an extent that they must be ranked among its principal causes.¹⁹

In summary, the nature of war rests on the fundamental cause–effect relationships involving the forces of purpose, chance, and hostility. These principal elements, though always present, were constantly in flux, both influencing and influenced by one another. The interaction of these forces occurs in an atmosphere of war where danger, physical extortion, chance, uncertainty and friction reigns. All wars, whether major or limited, are instrument for political goals. Before moving on to the strategy, which is mainly about the essentials of achieving those political goals, following section will discuss recent alternative.

4. Alternative Approaches to Clausewitzian War

The trinity constitutes the heart of Clausewitz’s theory, but it has been the most targeted by other academics and experts as well. Following the end of the Cold War, certain scholars claimed that Clausewitz’s trinitarian war is the product of his own time and is now obsolete. His world picture, which is premised upon governments, armies and nations, is outdated. According to Martin Van Creveld, we now live in a post-Clausewitzian era wherein war is no longer conducted solely by governments with armies on behalf of their societies. Instead, the state as understood by Clausewitz is in decline and contemporary warfare is instead being waged by non-state actors often for non-political purposes²⁰. According to Van Creveld, if low intensity conflict is indeed the wave of the future, then strategy in its classical sense will disappear.²¹ John Keegan objected to Clausewitz’s famous dictum, and at the beginning of his seminal book “A History of Warfare” penned that: “war is not the continuation of politics by other means.” Instead, according to Keegan, the conduct of war was “culturally determined,” and the sort of war which Clausewitz was describing belonged to a short period of history and to a limited part

¹⁶ Antulio J. Echevarria, *Globalization and the Nature of War* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.A.W.C., 2003), p. 9.

¹⁷ Echevarria Ibid, p. 10.

¹⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 104.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 119.

²⁰ Martin Van Creveld, *Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 33–62.

²¹ Ibid, p. 207.

of the globe.²² For Mary Kaldor, like for Martin van Creveld, new wars were “irregular,” being fought for economic as well as political purposes. These wars were usually waged by warlords not only for policy but also for economic reasons, which is why armed conflict is sustained by the warlords.²³ All three authors believe that the current notion of the state is not the same as what Clausewitz described in his own era and wars are being fought between states and non-state actors as opposed to the state-on-state wars of Clausewitz’s time. Thus, in the words of van Creveld, future wars will be “non-trinitarian.”

Furthermore, the proponents of fourth generation warfare (4GW) also based their concept on the notion of “non-trinitarian” war and presumed that future wars will increasingly be waged outside the nation-state framework.²⁴ According to this concept, “war has entered a new generation. It is not the high-technology war but rather an evolved form of insurgency which uses all available networks to convince the enemy’s political decision-makers. 4GW does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, combining guerrilla tactics or civil disobedience with the soft networks of social, cultural and economic ties, disinformation campaigns and innovative political activity, it directly attacks the will of enemy decision-makers. Therefore, decisive Napoleonic battles and wide-ranging high-speed manoeuvre campaigns are irrelevant to 4GW.”²⁵ Clausewitzian scholars have argued that the notion of non-trinitarian war is simply the result of a misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s trinity. The proponents of non-trinitarian war identify the “people, army, and government” as being the primary trinity, while according to Clausewitzian scholars, they are merely representations of the actual tendencies of “passion, reason and the play of chance.”

These forces or tendencies are universal, and we find them at play in every war, even including in the war on terror, which van Creveld refers to as “non-trinitarian.”²⁶ To reduce Clausewitz’s trinity to an allegedly obsolete social paradigm of “people, army and government” in an attempt to marginalize Clausewitzian theory is not valid nor is it useful.²⁷ According to this understanding, even organizations that are motivated by religion today, such as Hezbollah, Taliban or ISIL, organize themselves around certain policy goals and strategies that are developed to achieve those policy goals, and they frequently use religion as a tool. In other words, the impact of religion on their activities is indisputable; however, this does not negate the fact that they develop policies and strategies to achieve their purposes.

5. Strategic Theory, Strategy and Grand Strategy

Strategy is one word that is so widely used but hardly understood. While it was borne out of politics, it has become popular in other fields as well, including economics and management. The term has acquired such universality that it has been robbed of meaning.²⁸ Policy and strategy, despite their vital importance to the security of any nation, are not well understood and these two terms are widely conflated by officials, even by those in key governmental positions.²⁹ Clausewitz provides a brilliant and very concise, albeit narrow, definition: “strategy is the use of the engagements for the purpose of the war.”³⁰ Sir Basil Liddell Hart defined strategy as: “the art of distributing and applying military

²² John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p.3.

²³ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, Third Edit (Polity Press, 2012).

²⁴ Antulio J. Echevarria, ‘Deconstructing the Theory of Fourth-Generation War’, *Contemporary Security Policy* 26, no. 2 (4 August 2005): p. 235, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260500211066>.

²⁵ Thomas X. Hammes, ‘War Evolves into the Fourth Generation’, *Contemporary Security Policy* 26, no. 2 (4 August 2005): pp. 205–206, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260500190500>.

²⁶ Echevarria, ‘Deconstructing the Theory of Fourth-Generation War’, p. 235; Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 48–49; Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic Theory*, p. 227; Lukas Milevski, ‘The Nature of Strategy versus the Character of War’, *Comparative Strategy* 35, no. 5 (19 October 2016): 438–46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2016.1241007>.

²⁷ Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, ‘Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity’, accessed 2 May 2020, <https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TRININTR.htm#top>.

²⁸ Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 27.

²⁹ Paul Van Riper, ‘From Grand Strategy to Operational Design: Getting It Right’, *Infinity Journal* 4, no. 2 (2014): pp. 13–18.

³⁰ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (New Jersey: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 132.

means to fulfil the ends of policy.”³¹ Contemporary strategic theorist Colin S. Gray defines strategy as “the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.”³² For Wylie, strategy is “a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end: a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.”³³ Beatrice Heuser makes a similar definition with an emphasis on the enemy’s will: “Strategy is a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills.”³⁴ It is obvious that strategy is closely related to the conduct of war. This is why, not surprisingly the terms “strategy” and “art or conduct of war” have been nearly synonymous at times.³⁵ Although there are other definitions worth being discussed here, to keep it short, strategy can be summarized as the use of ways and means to achieve the desired ends, and functions as a link between policy and the military. What is common in all definitions is its function of instrumentality.

When it comes to grand strategy, it is defined as the direction of many or all of the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy goals. In a sense, it can be considered as a synonym for “statecraft.”³⁶ Grand strategy identifies and articulates how a political actor’s security objectives will be achieved using a combination of instruments of power—including military, diplomatic, and economic instruments.³⁷ Posen describes it as “a political-military, means-end chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.”³⁸ Gaddis defines grand strategy as “the calculated relationship of means to large ends.”³⁹ As one can easily discern, while strategy is more related to the conduct of military tools, grand strategy comprises all national power tools. This is why strategy is frequently called “military strategy” instead of merely strategy, supposedly to separate it from grand strategy. Echevarria notes that military strategy refers to the “concern of the general” while grand strategy can be thought of as the “concern of the head of state” of which the general’s business is but one aspect.⁴⁰ Ideally, a military strategy should be formulated within the parameters established by a grand strategy because a security community cannot design and execute a strictly military-based strategy. Every military activity—whether it is a total war or a limited conflict—has political diplomatic, social cultural, and economic, inter alia, aspects to the war.⁴¹

As for strategic theory, it amounts to an entire framework of concepts and principles regarding strategy and grand strategy. Strategic theory postulates that all wars in history share certain characteristics in common. It is a system of interlocking concepts and principles pertaining to strategy and grand strategy, which postulates that a system of attributes common to all wars exists and that war belongs to a larger body of human relations and actions known as politics.⁴² It provides guidance on how to manage the complexities of using force to achieve policy ends⁴³ and comprises thoughts about making effective strategy.

³¹ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *The Strategy of Indirect Approach* (London: Faber, 1946), p. 187.

³² Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 29 doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579662.001.0001.

³³ Joseph Caldwell Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1967), p. 59.

³⁴ Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, pp. 27–28.

³⁵ Antulio J. Echevarria, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction* Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. (New York: Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition., 2017), p.3.

³⁶ Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, p. 18.

³⁷ Tami Davis Biddle, ‘Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need To Know’, U.S. Army War College Press, no. December (2015): 1–97.

³⁸ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 13.

³⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, ‘What Is Grand Strategy?’ *American Grand Strategy After War*, 2009, p.7 as cited by Lukas Milewski, *The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought* (Oxford University Press, 2016), p.2.

⁴⁰ Echevarria, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction* Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

⁴¹ Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, p. 28; Echevarria, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction* Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition, p. 4.

⁴² Joseph M. Guerra, ‘An Introduction to Clausewitzian Strategic Theory: General Theory, Strategy, and Their Relevance for Today,’ *Infinity Journal* 2, no. 3 (2012), p. 31.

⁴³ Thomas M. Kane and David J. Lonsdale, *Understanding Contemporary Strategy* (Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, 2012),

⁴⁴ Since it is not linked to a particular historical context, strategic theory allows the strategist to extricate himself from situational bias.⁴⁵

For these reasons, it may serve as a “basis of valuation” in understanding the validity and soundness of emerging concepts. However, one should be cautious because strategic theory is too comprehensive to grasp all at once as it deals with intricate phenomena such as war, policy and strategy. As Frans P.B. Osinga noted, “it is a strange animal indeed,” which deviates from “proper” scientific theory. It rather belongs to the domain of social science, in which parsimony is only occasionally appropriate.⁴⁶

As mentioned above, in theory, military strategy cannot be rendered alone. It should be nested in a broader framework, where other dimensions such as the diplomatic, economic and social dimensions are taken into consideration. However, in practice, there might be cases where military strategy drives grand strategy and operates independently. For instance, as in the case of Napoleon or Hitler, this occurs when military and grand strategy is embodied in the same person. At other times, grand strategy might be dominant and prevents military strategy from being carried out effectively.⁴⁷ This is reminiscent of General Wesley Clark’s—Supreme Allied Commander of NATO during the Kosovo War— eye-catching story about when he first heard about the US decision to go to war against Iraq.⁴⁸ General Clark explains how he learned of the decision from one of his ex-colleagues who used to work in the US Department of Defence and illustrates how the US military was isolated from the decision-making process when the US government ultimately made the decision to go to war against Iraq.

Before proceeding further, it is important to note that strategy, and hence strategic theory, is an attempt to explain what has already been practiced throughout history. It is a depiction of the universal and eternal features of strategy-making. Strategy, as a term we would understand today, was first utilized in the 1770s,⁴⁹ however, as Gray noted, the basic logic of strategy can be found in all places and periods of human history, regardless of which term was used by distinct societies or cultures. Strategy is unavoidable because humans, the common denominator between the past and the future, always need security and it is in their nature to behave politically and strategically against potential dangers.⁵⁰ The human need for security requires political activity, and that activity generates the need for strategy. The interdependencies of security, politics, and strategy render strategic theory both necessary and possible.⁵¹ As Johnson noted, despite enormous advances in technology, it seems clear that decisions will still be made some humans and strategic planners will continue to make decisions on perennial problems such as how one may convert operational success into a strategic advantage. The fundamentals in the conduct of war are unchanged.⁵²

Military strategy is usually expressed by the magic formula proposed by the retired U.S. Army Colonel Arthur Lykke. It consists of three simple aspects; policy ends, strategic ways, and military means (EWM), where policy end denotes the goals we aspire to achieve, strategic ways correspond to the alternative courses of action to follow, and military means are the resources that we could employ. Ends, Ways and Means logic can be used at all levels of decision-making, from the tactical level all the way up to grand strategy.⁵³ Built on the Clausewitzian definition of strategy, Lykke’s formula is an excellent construct to explain the essence of strategy in a concise manner. However, it is also a mechanistic explanation which is

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203801512>.

⁴⁴ Frans P B Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd* (Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, 2007), p. 11. <http://www.tandfebooks.com/isbn/9780203088869>.

⁴⁵ M.L.R. Smith and John Stone, “Explaining Strategic Theory,” *Infinity Journal* 1, no. 4 (2011): p. 30.

⁴⁶ Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, p. 11.

⁴⁷ Echevarria, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction* Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition, p. 4.

⁴⁸ “General Clark on the Iraq Invasion | American War Generals”, Youtube video, 2:59, “National Geographic”, 12 September 2014.

⁴⁹ Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 5. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511762895.

⁵⁰ Colin S. Gray, *The Future of Strategy* (London: Polity Press, 2015), p. 28.

⁵¹ Colin S. Gray, *Theory of Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 137.

⁵² Rob Johnson, ‘The Changing Character of War: Making Strategy in the Early Twenty-First Century’, *RUSI Journal* 162, no. 1 (2017): 6–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2017.1301489>.

⁵³ Gray, *Theory of Strategy*, p. 146.

far from reflecting the true nature of strategy where complexity, dynamism, uncertainty and chaos reign.⁵⁴ It is not that we should not use the construct, but we should know that there is much more to strategy than this formula. The strategic level where strategy is developed and directed corresponds to one level of war. For this reason, it is more helpful to examine strategy in relation to other “levels of war,” namely the political, operational and tactical levels, for a deeper grasp of its function and its meaning.

5.1 Levels of War and Strategy

There are four levels of war adopted by most armies: namely policy, strategy, operations and tactics. Traditionally, the construct has been discerned as three levels, but a fourth level was added with the introduction of the operational level in the 1980s. In theory, politics produces policy. Strategy connects policy with military assets, which means that strategy determines military forces and their tasks that can lead to the achievement of the desired aims of policy. The operational and tactical levels execute those concrete tasks decided by the strategy (Figure 1). The levels are different in nature and they answer different questions. Policy answers to the question of “why and what,” while strategy seeks an answer for “how,” and tactics do so. The main challenge in strategy is to convert military power into political effect. “A good strategy” is expected to be one in which all three components are tuned, that is, the means are sufficient to accomplish the ends through the designated ways.⁵⁵ It is extremely difficult because there is no natural harmony between levels⁵⁶ and it requires an exceptional talent to determine which actions match which policy ends. This is what strategy does—it fills the gap between political goals and military activity and ensures all levels function properly. Despite the huge advances in technology, there is no scientific method to determine how much military power—or other instruments—is/are enough or when this balance has been achieved. It is more of an art than a science,⁵⁷ and success largely depends on strategic sense and judgement.⁵⁸

Strategy is highly difficult to execute because warfare is inherently complex. It is “a function of interconnected variables”⁵⁹ whose weights differ in each context. Apart from its sheer complexity, ‘the friction’ and the presence of an ‘independent enemy’ are two leading factors that contribute to this difficulty.




Figure 1 Levels of War and Strategy

Gray employs a bridge metaphor to explain the instrumentality function of the strategy. A bridge must operate in both ways; therefore, the strategist needs not just to translate policy intentions into operations but

⁵⁴ Robert Mihara, “Strategy: How to Make It Work,” *Infinity Journal* 3, no. 1 (2012): 20.

⁵⁵ Antulio J. Echevarria, *Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction*, Kindle Edition, p. 4.

⁵⁶ Gray, “Strategy: Some Notes for a User’s Guide”, p. 7.

⁵⁷ Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy in Theory; Strategy in Practice’, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42:2, 2019, p. 190, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1559153>.

⁵⁸ Gray, “Strategy: Some Notes for a User’s Guide”, p. 6.

⁵⁹ Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 18, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511762895>.

also to adjust policy in light of operations.⁶⁰ This is done through negotiation; the strategies are developed in an ongoing process of negotiation among potential stakeholders, through a civilian-military partnership. Usually it consists of a committee-driven process, but it is always led by the characters of key leaders and strategic inspiration is usually a product of a single person, not a committee. However, this person, no matter what if they are a genius, needs a staff and confident subordinate commanders to translate their ideas into actionable plans.⁶¹

It is important to discern that the strategy is not simply the application of force itself. The forces of all levels are designed to achieve strategic effect⁶², but strategy can only be practiced tactically. All strategy has to be done via tactics, and all tactical effort has some strategic effect. Significant strategic impact results from the cumulative effect of numerous tactical events while sometimes a small tactical unit can cause more significant consequences than major forces.⁶³ A special forces team, a tactical level unit, performing behind enemy lines can play a more significant role strategically than a division or corps, an operational level unit, carrying out a conventional front attack. Therefore, the strategic meaning of action is not contained in the behaviour itself, but instead by the context in which it occurs. While the action itself is tactical-or operational-by definition, it is only strategic in ultimate meaning for the entire conflict. Strategy is all about the consequences of tactical behaviours.

Despite their differences, all levels constitute a unity. If one level is absent, or not functioning well, it jeopardises the entire project. When political guidance is weak or missing, the strategists cannot be sure of the end-state to which they should lead their tactical enablers. If a strategy is weak or absent despite the existence of adequate political guidance, tactical forces might prosecute an unjust war, however they are excellent in their fighting capabilities as there is not necessarily a “bridge” converting political goals to actions. If there is no competent tactical ability, political and strategic endeavour becomes worthless, so they do not exist.

Strategy summarized here represents the narrower understanding, which takes military resources as the main instrument to achieve policy goals. The following section will discuss the grand strategy, which has evolved from this narrow meaning of strategy since the beginning of the twentieth century.

5.2 Grand Strategy

As Hew Strachan indicated, there has been an evolution in the meaning of the term “strategy” since it was first conceptualized by classical theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini. By 1900, strategy had been used to explain anything concerning the actions of generals in the conduct of operations in a particular theatre.⁶⁴ It usually referred to a relationship below the level of politics, between strategy and tactics. But following the experience of two World Wars, where all national resources were used, alongside the Cold War, during which deterrence became the essence of strategy, the function of strategy shifted to higher levels. The operational level, which became effective in the 1980s, took the place of what classical theorists called strategy, whereas strategy in practice became something between strategy and policy. In fact, strategy has even begun to be used as a synonym for policy.⁶⁵

In the nineteenth century, grand strategy was not a well-anchored concept, but certainly had currency. Of all the early authors mentioning grand strategy, it was General William Tecumseh Sherman who may have been most interested in contextualizing the term. However, Julian Corbett was the first to use grand strategy in a manner which is identifiably modern.⁶⁶ In 1911, Corbett, addressing the officers at the Royal Naval War College, stated; “major strategy in its broadest sense has to deal with the whole resources of the nation

⁶⁰ Emile Simpson, “Constitutional Stability versus Strategic Efficiency: Strategic Dialogue in Contemporary Conflict,” *Infinity Journal* 2, no. 4 (2012): p. 14.

⁶¹ Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, 138.

⁶² Gray, “Strategy: Some Notes for a User’s Guide”, p. 5.

⁶³ Kane and Lonsdale, *Understanding Contemporary Strategy*.

⁶⁴ Strachan, *The Direction of War*, p. 29.

⁶⁵ Strachan, *The Direction of War*, p. 18; Lukas Milewski, “Strategy and the Intervening Concept of Operational Art,” *Infinity Journal* 4, no. 3 (2015): pp. 17–22.

⁶⁶ Lukas Milewski, *The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought* (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 5, 18–19.

for war. It is a branch of statesmanship.”⁶⁷ Distinguishing between ‘major strategy’ and ‘minor strategy,’ Corbett was actually drawing our attention to a greater strategy which postulates keeping an eye on all the resources of a nation while conducting military strategy during a war. Following the First World War, further scholars such as J.C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, Edward Mead Earle and André Beaufre brought forward other, non-military aspects in strategy. With a notion similar to Corbett’s major strategy, in 1923, Fuller introduced the term “grand strategy” and claimed that strategy is not only a war-time business.

According to Fuller, how a nation fights in a war largely depends on the preparation that it has conducted in peace time. Highly impressed by Fuller’s ideas, Liddell Hart further developed and advocated the concept of grand strategy. Interestingly, although the concept had been discussed before Liddell Hart, it is generally assumed that no concept of grand strategy existed prior to his discussion of it in 1929.⁶⁸ Liddell Hart interpreted that grand strategy is “practically synonymous with the policy which governs the conduct of war” and it serves to bring out the sense of “policy in execution.”⁶⁹ Another theorist highlighted together with Liddell Hart in the literature was American wartime theorist Edward Mead Earle. In his famous book, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (1943), he emphasized that strategy is an inherent element of statecraft at all times, both in war and peace. But as war and society have become more complicated – and war ... is an inherent part of society – strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of non-military factors, economic, psychological, moral, political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times ... In the present-day world, then, strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation – or a coalition of nations – including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.⁷⁰

Writing in the middle of the Second World War, Earle indicated the importance of non-military factors and implied that strategy inevitably must be rendered as grand strategy. Two World Wars demonstrated that the conduct of war involves more than a military strategy, there are political, social or economic dimensions to war as well. Similarly, André Beaufre also argued that all warfare is ‘total,’ and is carried on in all fields of action, political, economic, military, cultural, and so forth.⁷¹ In the same vein, modern strategic theorist Colin S. Gray postulates that strategy indispensably has to be grand.

All strategy is grand strategy. Military strategies must be nested in a more inclusive framework, if only in order to lighten the burden of support for policy they are required to bear. A security community cannot design and execute a strictly military strategy. No matter the character of a conflict, be it a total war for survival or a contest for limited stakes, even if military activity by far is the most prominent of official behaviours, there must still be political diplomatic, social cultural, and economic, inter alia, aspects to the war (...) Whether or not a state or other security community designs a grand strategy explicitly, all of its assets will be in play in a conflict. The only difference between having and not having an explicit grand strategy, lies in the degree of cohesion among official behaviours and, naturally as a consequence of poor cohesion, in the likelihood of success.⁷² As Gray eloquently stated, whether it is a limited conflict or a major war, all conflicts inherently include non-military dimensions. In a limited war, a smaller number of dimensions can be in play whereas in a major war, almost all of a nation’s resources and powers are mobilized. Moreover, there might be cases where the military plays no part. Only the threat of force, instead of the direct use of force, can sometimes provide the desired effects. But whether it is the leading component or not, the military is indispensable in designing and executing grand strategy.

Another important aspect that Gray draws our attention to is the fact that the notion of grand strategy

⁶⁷ Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Eric Grove (London: Annapolis, 1988), p. 30, as cited by Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*, p. 32

⁶⁸ Lukas Milevski, “The Mythology of Grand Strategy,” *Infinity Journal* 3, no. 1 (2012): p. 29.

⁶⁹ Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*, p. 34.

⁷⁰ Edward Mead Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton University Press, 1943), p. viii, as cited by Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*, p. 26.

⁷¹ André Beaufre, *Strategy of Action* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 29, as cited by Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*, p. 8.

⁷² Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, p. 28.

functions whether we are aware of this fact or not. However, consciousness obviously increases the likelihood of success.

Against this background, Figure 2 represents a simple depiction of how grand strategy works. While military strategy forms a bridge between policy and the military, and it is concerned with the use of military forces for the purpose of war, grand strategy aims to determine the best possible combination of various dimensions including the military.




Figure 2 Grand Strategy

Lonsdale & Kane grouped the instruments of grand strategy into four categories: military, diplomacy, intelligence and economy.⁷³ The “intelligence” can be replaced by “informational”, which is a broader aspect that includes propaganda and information warfare as well. Furthermore, the “social” dimension is too broad to be included under any other category, and therefore needs to be separated. Although these categories are the aspects most relevant to national security, the process of strategy/grand strategy-making is so complex that there might be other instruments which are not foreseen depending on the context and the characteristics of the state. The dotted boxes in Figure 2 refer to this fact.

5.3 Key Factors of Strategy-Making

Besides the non-military dimensions, in each war, there are certain factors that need to be taken into the consideration in strategy-making. Arguably, there are eight dimensions in strategic theory, namely adversary, complexity, human, culture, technology, geography, logistics and doctrine, which are valid for all wars, whereas their relative weights depend on the context of the specific war in question. Each dimension plays its part with ever-changing importance in every conflict. (Figure 3)




Figure 3 Grand Strategy and Key Features

⁷³ Kane and Lonsdale, *Understanding Contemporary Strategy*, p. 14.

6. Strategy in Context

While the main principles of strategic theory explained above applies all times and places, one should understand that strategies in a particular time is commanded significantly by its context. Colin S. Gray makes a distinction between general theory of strategy and historically specific strategies. He states that “strategy in real world specificity derives from, and is shaped by and for, no fewer than the seven distinctive context: political, social cultural, economic, technological, military strategic, geopolitical and geostrategic, and historical” and general theory of strategy tries to ensure that none of these contexts is neglected in making strategy.⁷⁴

However, the context is not only important for specific strategies drafted but also for the military theory developed in a certain period. Frans Osinga argues that understanding the strategist's sources of influence helps understanding his theory because strategic theorists are influenced by both intellectual and social factors, both internal as well as external to the discipline. Referring to Avi Kober's work⁷⁵, he presents following formative factors that shape and explain the development of a certain theory of conflict in a particular period, in a particular country or by a specific author: 1) the nature of war during successive periods; 2) the specific strategic circumstances of the countries involved; 3) the personal and professional experience of the particular thinker; 4) the intellectual and cultural climate of the period in question.⁷⁶

This means that any theory cannot be understood without formative factors that create that specific theory. For instance, Azar Gat attributes the difficulties interpreting in Clausewitz to the fact that *On War* is a classic case where the text cannot be understood without its context; not only the military and intellectual context but also that provided by the evolution of Clausewitz's own thought. Although he defines Clausewitz' work as “a unique achievement that has never been equalled, the most sophisticated formulation of the theory of war, based on a highly stimulating intellectual paradigm, and brought the conception of military theory into line with the forefront of the general theoretical outlook of his time”, he argues, “reading *On War* as it stands, without the necessary preliminary knowledge is bound to result in misunderstanding.”⁷⁷ As Osinga expounded, it is difficult to understand Clausewitz' theory without knowing the total war concept, which was initiated by the French Revolution and continued during the Napoleonic wars, the Prussian geo-strategic situation of the time, his personal experience in the Napoleonic wars or the impact of the Enlightenment and Romantic Period.⁷⁸

7. Strategy as a Whole

None of the aspects mentioned above, whether the ends-ways-means construct or its key features, can be ruled out in the conduct of war or strategy. War and strategy are interactively complex systems, a nonlinear phenomenon, where all these factors are in flux and play their own role. Technology has a huge impact on war, yet human, ethics, geography and logistics have an impact as well. It is so complex in its working parts that it is not possible to approach war through solely one or two perspectives. Clausewitz stated, “In war, more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together.”⁷⁹ There is no scientific formula to calculate the exact share of each factor. As Paul Van Viper indicated, it is useless to approach war with linear methods as the Americans do.⁸⁰

All of the key factors explained above are valid for all wars. Strategists—and/or commanders—articulate a different combination of these factors in each war. As Heuser suggested, war is “a function of interconnected variables”⁸¹ whose weights differ according to the context and circumstances. As the purpose and the

⁷⁴ Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, p. 41-42.

⁷⁵ Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, p. 41-42.

⁷⁶ Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, p. 15.

⁷⁷ Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought : From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz*, Oxford Historical Monographs, 1989, p. 252-53.

⁷⁸ Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, p. 16.

⁷⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 13.

⁸⁰ Van Riper, “The Foundation of Strategic Thinking”, p. 6.

⁸¹ Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*, p. 18.

intensity of the warfare could vary from one war to the next, or even multiple times within the same war, these factors are dynamic, influencing the outcome of war but also being influenced by one another. Strategy must be considered as a whole, and an effective strategy requires careful analysis including a weighing of the options where a number of variables must be considered to decide whether tactical deeds can be converted into political capital, in a continuously fluid and context-dependent environment. Echevarria's weather metaphor is simple, yet concisely explains the logic:

To be sure, Clausewitz believed all wars were things of the same nature. However, that nature was, like the nature of the weather, dynamic, and its principal elements, even if always present, were constantly in flux. Like war, the weather consists of a few common and inescapable elements, such as barometric pressure, heat index, dew point, wind velocity, and so on. Nevertheless, the difference between a brief summer shower and a hurricane is significant, so much so, in fact, that we prepare for each quite differently. Indeed, the difference in degree is so great, the danger to our lives and property so much higher in the latter, that we might do well to consider showers and hurricanes different in kind, though both are certainly stormy weather. We might apply some of the same rules of thumb for each kind of weather, but also many different ones.⁸²

This article explained the principal elements of war that we need to take into consideration in each war. They have different values in each type of warfare as the principal elements of weather have different values in each type of weather. These principal elements are crucial to understanding the nature of weather and to measuring their impact on the weather. The same rule applies to war as well. However, there is one important difference between the two. While it is possible to measure principal elements of the weather scientifically, this is not possible in the case of warfare.

⁸² Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, p. 56.

The Conflict in the South China Sea: A Focus on a Possible Solution

Yunus Erbas¹

1. Introduction

Over the last 10 years, the conflict in the South China Sea has been constantly in the spotlight. As China builds islands in the middle of the South China Sea, once underwater reefs have become sandy islands with airfields, roads, buildings, and bases for missile systems. In less than two years, China has turned seven reefs into seven military bases, making the South China Sea one of the most contentious areas of sea in the world (Damn, 2020).

Its importance is not limited to that. The ocean area is estimated to contain 11 billion barrels of oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021), and 10% of the world's fishery resources. Even more importantly, roughly 30% of the global maritime trade passes through the South China Sea on its way to the highly trafficked ports in Southeast Asia (Khoury, 2017). Thanks to these aspects, the South China Sea is a contested maritime area which is subject to claims of partly possession by five countries currently.

The conflict among the five states, namely the Philippines, Vietnam, China, Brunei, Taiwan, and Malaysia, has remained unresolved for decades. The claimant states, have divergent and sometimes overlapping territorial claims based on a variety of historical and geographical data (Wang, 2015). For instance, China currently claims over 80 percent of the islands, while Vietnam claims entire sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratly Islands (Storey, 2014).

In this article, I aim to analyse the conflict in the South China Sea from a historical and legal point of view. Therefore, I will first examine the historical context and the roots of the conflict and then describe how it has turned into a frozen conflict and why no solution has been found so far. Finally, I will discuss whether a solution is possible with regional actors and whether an international solution has potential to materialize.

2. The Origin of the Conflict

The main conflict in the South China Sea dates back to 1279, when China drew a territorial map of its influence that included the entire South China Sea. Since then, control over the region has changed hands between regional powers and, later, colonial states. However, most people agree that the bulk of the current problems stem from the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, which followed Japan's defeat in World War II. Within the terms of its surrender, Japan gave up its rights to its islands in the South China Sea, leaving a power vacuum in the region. No country was explicitly granted sovereignty over these waters, and China (the Kuomintang Government) asserted its advantage by submitting the now infamous "nine-dotted line" claim covering almost the entire South China Sea in 1947. This line became its official claim and is known today as the "Nine-Dash Line" (Khoury, E., 2017). In 1982, the United Nations law established the exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Right after, China reiterated its nine-dash line, refusing to clarify the limits of this line and rejecting the claims of other claimant countries. Ever since, tensions have built up over who owns the South China Sea. In the meantime, the conflict has focused on the Paracels and Spratly Islands, an archipelago located in the heart of the South China Sea. Currently, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam claim part of the Paracels and Spratly Islands chain. They have asserted their claims by setting up small ships, ports and even people on what is essentially a rock in the middle of the ocean.

A. The reasons for the conflict

What are the real stakes of these territorial disputes? First and foremost, the natural resources of the region are a very distinctive feature of the South China Sea, which is, in fact, a very rich area from this point of view, owing to its very extensive continental shelf, its relatively shallow waters, the contribution of several fast-flowing rivers, and also its great biodiversity (Roche, 2013).

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Another issue, just as vital, is the geostrategic situation of the disputed area. The gateway to the strait of Malacca and the port of Singapore, on one of the world's most important merchant shipping routes, a stranglehold on the Paracels and the Spratlys islands also ensures control over the supply of the economies of Northeast Asia (Roche, 2013).

Moreover, for the countries around it, the South China Sea is the primary source of food, accounting for 8% of the world's total commercial fishery production, and is responsible for feeding many of today's most populous nations, from Pakistan's 226 million people to China's 1.4 billion citizens (Khoury, 2017).

As a result, the South China Sea, being one of the most important economic and strategic regions in the world, is undeniably essential to Southeast Asia's way of life (Khoury, 2017). A region having such importance is not limited to the states' interest around it, it goes beyond the claimant states in the region and also brings the region to the attention of the other actors.

B. The dispute as a frozen conflict

The South China Sea is particularly attractive to littoral states that claim sovereignty over islands and islets in the hope of being able to control part of them. These states do not always share a common position. The sea is at the heart of a rapidly changing Asia Pacific, which accounts for a larger share of global trade and economic activity each year. Thus, regional and even international actors such as the United States are taking a close interest in the region (Congressional Research Service, 2021).

Tensions escalate from time to time to stop just short of turning into armed conflict not exceeding beyond the stage of medium-intensity tensions and clashes. Although, the states having interest push provocation to the maximum, but they have never risked the war that would be particularly deadly in this region, and that would have terrible consequences for the economy and world peace.

All in all, the dispute in the South China Sea shows the characteristics of a frozen conflict where none of the states is ready to give up any ground to reach a common solution accepted by all and thus, any armed conflict could break out at any time.

3. The Search for a Negotiated Solution

The territorial dispute in the South China Sea is far from being resolved. Despite notable progress and reassuring official statements, the situation remains tense, and even dangerous, due to a continuing arms race that makes any possible escalation potentially even more worrying.

For better understanding whether a resolution of the dispute in the South China Sea at least soon is possible, it is required to re-examine regional and international actors which could contribute to mitigating the tensions and to ending off the conflict by offering a solution.

A. Regional dimension

Since its establishment, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is the only international organization that has rather regional impact in tackling this dispute, has played to an extent a role in ensuring dialogue, expansion of overlapping regional interests, and development of trust and cooperation between the parties of the region.

ASEAN's 2002 declaration in fact supports the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by Beijing in 1997, which called for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea. Since then, the organization has initiated several attempts to create conflict resolution forums (Sakamoto, 2021). Yet, those have simply proven that ASEAN does not have a capacity to play a leadership role and that it cannot adapt its reflexes to the current political context and challenges.

Unfortunately, ASEAN's decision-making process depends on consensus among its members, an increasingly difficult task when most of its members are entirely dependent on China for their development and trade. Cambodia and Laos, for example, have decided to stay out of this dispute because of their almost total reliance on a smooth Chinese partnership, officially supporting China's claims. Simply put, China is ASEAN's largest trading partner, from Singapore to Vietnam, and opposing China would mean misery for most of its members and even bankruptcy for a few (Congressional Research Service, 2021).

Additionally, China has long opposed dealing with East Asian issues in multilateral institutions and has preferred bilateral negotiations with other countries in the region. For this reason, China tends to build relationships bilaterally rather than in the multiple forums of ASEAN (Storey, 2014).

B. International dimension

In a complex region such as the South China Sea, it is important to have well established and recognizable rules of international law. In this regard, the 1982 Treaty of Montego Bay, part of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), constitutes a turning point in the dispute over the South China Sea. Together with the many concepts and rules put forward by UNCLOS, the treaty establishes the rights of a sovereign state over the continental shelf surrounding it and the creation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs). As such, it forms a primary and prominent source of international law for dealing directly with the conflict (Poling, 2013).

Another major reference for informing the future of the dispute can be said to be the International Court of Justice decision, in the summer of 2016. The Court in The Hague ruled against China's claims in the South China Sea, declaring them to have no legal basis by rejecting its claim of the "Nine-Dash Line", as part of the case the Philippines first brought against China in 2013. But China, which does not recognize the international court's ruling, has warned that it will do everything in its power to protect its sovereignty (Sakamoto, 2021).

International actors have urged countries to resolve disputes over maritime claims peacefully and in accordance with international law (Wiranto et al., 2015). On the other hand, pointing out that the problem can only be solved between the states in the region, China has expressed and made known at every opportunity that it is not comfortable with the internationalization of the situation by international actors (Congressional Research Service, 2021). In this regard, it is also doubtful that the court ruling will completely resolve the aforementioned problem in the South China Sea. However, the emergence of an international legal ruling on the issue may lead to a new perspective on the debates on sovereignty in the South China Sea.

4. Conclusion

Throughout the article, the South China Sea conflict has been approached from several perspectives in order to determine its historical and current causes and to further discuss possible solutions in the regional and international sphere.

Following an analysis of the causes and actors of the conflict, attention was turned to whether there is a resolution at the regional and international sphere. But, it is clear that the conflict in the South China Sea is deadlocked now because the actors will not compromise on their claims soon due to the very large size of the region and the imbalance of power between the actors. In particular, the presence of a strong and aggressive country like China makes the conflict intractable because China intends "to prevent an internationalization or regionalization of the dispute and would like to prevent or weaken any move towards solidarity within ASEAN on these issues and continue to address them on a bilateral basis." (Congressional Research Service, 2021).


Pending resolution of the conflict, the South China Sea is looking more and more like a Chinese lake, despite United States' efforts and to the detriment of neighbours who, in their own interests, tend to align themselves with Chinese power. Even, recent developments such as the creation of AUKUS, new alliance group in the region among Australia, United Kingdom and United States, and the formation of QUAD make more increasingly China aggressive and the tensions in the region blow up.

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Book Review: Blockchain Revolution

Tom Peeters¹



In 2008, the world was in financial turmoil. To solve this problem, a person named Satoshi Nakamoto came up with an idea that would soon spread like wildfire among computer scientists, banks, and anyone who had ever tried to establish trust on the Internet. We don't know who the person behind the name Satoshi Nakamoto is, honestly that doesn't matter anymore. What matters is his/her idea of virtual money that gave birth to "bitcoin" and "blockchain" technology. Blockchain is Cryptographically Secure. So, you might be wondering why it is called Blockchain. It's because every record, which could contain multiple transactions, is called a block on the ever-growing database. And each new block links to all previous blocks in a chain. This makes the system very secure and safe from tampering or hacking.

Special nodes called miners create new blocks. These contain new sets of transactions as well as links to the previous blocks and so on. When a new block is added, the miner who found it broadcasts that information to other nodes in the network. All those nodes check the

data and if they agree on what's in the block, then everything is fine.

In their book, *Blockchain Revolution*, the Authors Don and Alex Tapscott, co-founders of the Blockchain Research Institute, give information about the importance of Blockchain. The book explains how the power of this new technology behind Bitcoin can transform our world financially by improving the way we store our money and do business to make it more fair, transparent, equal, and free from corruption. Via Blockchain, you can eliminate corruption globally (however, there is still a long way to be successful).

The authors present their key points by explaining what blockchain technology is, how it can be used and why it has the potential to change the world. They also share their thought on the future of banking and how a few companies are making it obsolete. They explain why Airbnb and Uber aren't part of the sharing economy, as well as which is faster: sending an anvil to China or sending money through banks.

The book underscores the importance of identity and the end of digital feudalism. We saw what some called "surfing the Internet" as throwing off our data for the Internet landowners to expropriate and monetize. The notion of a self-sovereign identity for each of us, with our personal data stored in a virtual black box, is one of the most foundational concepts of our time. Realizing this "Virtual You" through blockchain technologies could restore our control over our own identities, the data we create, and the rest of our rights.

As a thought experiment, the writers try to get inside Satoshi's mind and tease out his design principles for Blockchain. It turns out there were seven. After Chapter 2 which revolves around the technical background of the technology, they apply these seven principles to seven domains, namely financial services (chapter 3), the architecture of the firm (chapter 4), business model innovation (chapter 5), the Internet of Things (chapter 6), economic inclusion (chapter 7), government and democracy (chapter 8), and the creative industries (chapter 9)—and argue that Blockchain would create seven new substructures for a distributed economy.

The writers explain how Blockchain would radically reduce the transaction costs of search, coordination, contracting, and building trust in an open market. Inexorably, this efficiency will lead to more decentralized models for orchestrating the capabilities needed to create new products, services, and wealth.

It's almost impossible to cheat with the Blockchain; The proof-of-work algorithm is a way Bitcoin ensures that records are accurate without a central authority figure. Using Blockchain makes everything about

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finances quicker, cheaper, and more equal than our current banking system. Banks are unnecessarily slow and complicated. Via Blockchain, everything will be much more private and transparent, Blockchain users can choose their level of privacy by using cryptographic keys that can be their signature. Anyone can protect their privacy by choosing to use a new signature each time they make a transaction. But they can decide whatever level of privacy they want.

Blockchain is a system of verification that makes it impossible for hackers to make changes without being noticed. It also doesn't allow old entries to be changed since no one entity controls the Blockchain.

The Internet as we know it is excellent for collaboration and communication but is deeply flawed when it comes to commerce and privacy. The new blockchain technology facilitates peer-to-peer transactions without any intermediary such as a bank or governing body. The Blockchain validates and keeps a permanent public record of all transactions by keeping the user's information anonymous.

The Blockchain can hold any legal document, from deeds and marriage licenses to educational degrees and birth certificates. It enables smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations, decentralized government services, and transactions, among other things.

Blockchain solves the double-spend problem, as cryptographers call it. Now for the first time, we have a native digital medium for value, through which we can manage, store, and transfer any asset as money and music securely and privately.

The writers also discuss some implementation challenges/arguments in chapter 10, like "inadequate incentives for distributed mass collaboration", "the blockchain is a job killer", "governing the protocols is like herding cats" and "criminals will use it". According to me, one of the most important challenges about Blockchain is "black money" and there is still a long way to tackle this issue.

Blockchain is the ingeniously simple technology that powers Bitcoin. But it is much more than that, too. It is a public ledger to which everyone has access but which no single person controls. It allows for companies and individuals to collaborate with an unprecedented degree of trust and transparency. It is cryptographically secure but fundamentally open. And soon, it will be everywhere.

The writers explain in detail about Blockchain, and you can find a comprehensive approach in the book, however, if you are not familiar with the Blockchain, it might be a little hard to understand precisely. I recommend everybody who would like to get in-depth information about Blockchain to read this book. This is a revised version of the groundbreaking book that came out in 2016. There is an entirely new preface to this edition of the book.

Don Tapscott is currently one of the world's leading authorities on the impact of technology on business and society having authored 16 widely read books and his son Alex Tapscott is following his father's path.

It is crystal clear that Blockchain technology, especially crypto currencies (around \$2,8T market cap) will be permanent in our life in the future even though there are many questions and gaps about implementation for now.



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