Disruptive Technology Applications for Integrated Air and Missile Defense

Soft Power & Global Ambition: The Case of China's Growing Reach in Europe

CSDP Partnership in EUFOR RCA

Book Review: Polarisation: Understanding the Dynamics of Us Versus Them

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Foreword

Dear Reader,

We are happy to welcome you again with this second issue of 2020. There are three articles and also a book review in this second issue as usual. Here's a quick look inside...

The first article is about disruptive technology and its applications for Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD). In an era of complex and fast-paced technological developments, disruptive technological innovations provide a wide range of futuristic military possibilities for defence planners. In his article the author, Bahri Kosar gives some examples of possible technological applications, which may change the conventional thinking of IAMD. Furthermore, he argues that disruptive technology will contribute primarily to non-kinetic operations in the realm of IAMD.

The second article focusses on China's current efforts to project power through investments in strategic infrastructure and sensitive technologies. The author, Len Ishmael argues countries in different regions of the world increasingly feel economically 'beholden' to China, seeding the development of entirely new classes of client-state relationships. Accordingly, current geopolitical conditions are optimal for China to advance in power, prestige, and legitimacy and they come at a particularly difficult period of fracture among the transatlantic allies and general crisis of confidence in the West.

The third article aims to analyse EU's partnership practice in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in a case study, EUFOR RCA. By definition, it is far from providing an overarching narrative on partnerships or whole interrelations among all partners. Yet, the author, Saban Yuksel aspires to provide explanations to the question if CSDP Partnership worked smoothly in the case of EUFOR RCA. Besides, the EU-International Organisations (the UN and to some extend AU) cooperation is sufficiently discussed in literature. However, the EU-Third State cooperation remains uncharted at large. This article would be a small step in this direction.

Last, but not least, we have a book review. Ilse Van den Berckt reviews "Polarisation: Understanding the dynamics of Us versus Them" by Bart Brandsma. Her work comes at a critical juncture where the issue of radicalization and polarisation debate is raging the domain and the seminal work shows thinkers and practitioners alike a methodology on how to keep collaborating with those not sharing the same world views and proposes an approach.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG

Disruptive Technology Applications for Integrated Air and Missile Defense

Bahri Kosar[*]

Introduction

The world has witnessed enormous and continuous technological developments in recent years, some of which have changed our lives dramatically. What is striking about recent technological surge though, unlike the situation after World War I and II, the developments usually originated from the non-military world. Such technological evolution forced private companies to adapt themselves to emerging conditions because they would otherwise face the risk of vanishing. The main driving factor in such a competitive environment is disruptive technology, a term coined by Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen in 1995 (HBR, 1995). It was not the invention of this term, of course, that expedited the technological development, nevertheless, this phenomenon changed the way private commercial sector approached to innovational thinking. On the other side, this change caused a shift in the defense industry, toward a new paradigm in which the disruptive innovations emanating from the commercial sector undermines an emphasis on technology-driven capability development.

Consequently, such technological advancements also resulted in a very complex strategic environment, since the rogue states, as well as non-state actors, have the ability to obtain capabilities which can asymmetrically affect the nature of conventional warfare. With the help of growing availability and flow of information around the world, it is now increasingly challenging to predict how global threats and opportunities will evolve. Therefore, the countries sharing democratic values should find solutions to cope with a diverse range of challenges. Generally speaking, the majority of the technological military innovations are used by modern armies to boost their offensive capabilities. Nevertheless, we also have to think about the other side of the coin, i.e., defensive capabilities. This diverse range of challenges also necessitates robust, adaptable, and up-to-date defensive thinking. While disruptive technological innovations are giving an advantage to the multi-dimensional threats and adversaries, at the same time, they provide a wide range of futuristic military possibilities for defense planners. With this article then, we will take a look at some possible disruptive technological applications, which may change the conventional thinking of Air and Missile Defense.

The conventional way of Air and Missile Defense

NATO defines Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) as follows: *"NATO IAMD is the defensive part of the Alliance's Joint Airpower, which aims to ensure the stability and security of NATO airspace by coordinating, controlling and exploiting the air domain. It incorporates all measures to deter and defend against any*

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air and missile threat or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. (NATO, 2019)" Similarly, U.S Joint Doctrine 1-02 states that IAMD is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend their country and its interests, protect their forces and negate an adversary's ability to create adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities (Joint Publication 1-02, 2010). Those definitions simply mean that Air and Missile Defense (AMD) helps to win wars by defeating or mitigating enemy air and missile attacks.

Conventional IAMD briefly comprises active (means to intercept air-breathing targets and missiles) and passive defense (such as the use of cover, concealment, and camouflage, protective cover, and deception) measures. Command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) is a crucial part of it as well. Indoctrination of these principles dating back to 1996, where the United States incorporated history's AMD lessons and added command and control to tie it all together within a doctrinal concept known as the "Fours Pillars of IAMD": passive defense (survive the attack), active defense (neutralize the attack), C4I (detect and respond to the attack), and attack operations (prevent the attack) (Joint Publication 3-01.5, 1996). Although the 'four pillar concept' is no longer formally part of the U.S. doctrine, it is still valid and crucial in understanding the fundamentals of IAMD.

Directly speaking, in a typical active air defense scenario, the threats are handled by ground-based air defense systems and air defense aircraft. The ground-based defense systems are usually located in a way that they provide a layered defense and, therefore, redundancy. Air-breathing defense platforms are the gap fillers and assist the ground-based systems,

especially in case those systems are saturated by electronic warfare and decoys.

In a missile defense scenario, things are a little bit different and complicated. When a missile is launched, it is initially detected by satellites with IR sensors. Nevertheless, this initial warning from the satellites does not provide necessary and precise information to the weapon systems. In this case, ballistic missile tracking radars comes into play. This radar then acquires the target and pass the necessary information to the ground-based interceptor systems. Those systems track the target missiles by their radars and fire the interceptors (missiles) for a 'hit to kill' destruction (Kosar, 2019).

The ways mentioned above are the expensive and risky ways to intercept an incoming aircraft or missile. There are also other means for effective IAMD, such as passive, non-kinetic, C4I, and left-of-launch[1] (Ellison, 2015) options. These options are essential for a cost-effective IAMD solution because it is clear that first responsibility of IAMD should be to deter an adversary by convincing them that attack is futile, then to prevent an attack in the first place by "killing the archer" rather than shooting down or absorbing his arrows. Should deterrence and prevention fail, joint IAMD melds active and passive defenses to mitigate and survive the assault (Weiss, 2015). However, when it comes to swarm attacks of ballistic or cruise missiles, most of the active defense systems fall short. Furthermore, when we think about the submarines capable of firing ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, it is easy to realize how serious are the challenges of IAMD.

The defense companies are working hard and try to implement some of the disruptive technologies to cope with such challenges.

Contrary to the impression that the defense industry is not leading the cutting-edge technological developments nowadays, there are numerous areas in which such disruptive technologies are implemented successfully. Some of these areas are robotics and autonomous unmanned systems, hypersonic, new undersea systems, stealth metamaterials, directed energy weapons, information and big data analytics, additive manufacturing, 3D printing and cyber capabilities.

Possible disruptive technology applications in the realm of IAMD

High Energy Laser & Directed Energy Weapons

A directed-energy weapon is not a new development in the defense industry at all. The U.S., for example, was developing a space-based neutral particle beam, a directed energy project that has its roots in the 1980s and aiming to use neutral particles to bombard incoming targets with enough energy to disrupt, incapacitate or kill the threat (Werner, 2019). Easier said than done, the challenge has always been how to deliver enough energy focused on the right spot on a high-speed target, say a ballistic missile. Since a ballistic missile is most vulnerable during the missile's boost phase when all the warheads are still on the boosting rocket, and the boosting missile's prominent infrared signature makes detection and tracking straightforward, and the missile is not entirely up to speed yet, it was not a surprise that the first innovations came with an airborne laser (ABL). Although the first ABL

project of the U.S. military, namely Boeing YAL-1 aircraft, was canceled in 2011, U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) still has efforts to deploy a more powerful laser on a high-altitude UAV.


Figure 1: An image of Boeing YAL-1 aircraft, that cancelled in 2011.

The problem with High Energy (H-E) Lasers is though; they are not yet powerful enough. If lasers in the 0.5–1-MW power range can be developed, multiple weapon applications would be possible. As stated above, currently, the U.S. MDA is following a path of developing increasingly more powerful H-E lasers capable of being deployed on a UAV and other platforms up to 100 kW laser (Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2018). The plan is to take the power of the H-E Laser system up to 50–300 kW, and eventually 500 kW over time (Drew, 2018). DARPA's High-Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense System (HELLADS) program is developing a 150-kW H-E laser weapon system with a weight goal of less than 5 kg/kW, approximately 750 kg. This development will enable UAVs to carry the HELLADS significantly increasing engagement ranges to hundreds of miles. Scaling this figure up from 150 kW to a power level of 1 MW, which approaches an ICBM lethality level, would require a laser of about 5000 kg., which becomes feasible for a large UAV (Bidwell & MacDonald, 2018).

Figure 2: 100 kW-class High Energy Laser with scalable output (Courtesy of General Atomics).

practical weapons applications. H-E lasers would offer the potential of enabling low-cost, speed-of-light multiple shots, increasing the likelihood of destroying the missile. Recent regional conflicts showed us that UAVs, especially the armed ones, will play a critical role in future warfare. For that reason, H-E Lasers would be one of the most effective defense options for such threats.

On the other side, China already fielded a vehicle-mounted laser weapon, the LW-30 air defense system showcased at the Zhuhai Air Show in 2018. According to Army-Recognition, the LW-30 fields a 30-kilowatt laser capable of intercepting unmanned aerial vehicles and light aircraft at a distance of up to 25 kilometers (Space Daily, 2020). Furthermore, China's Anti Satellite (ASAT) program has been under development for decades, and according to a disclosed report by the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China's military is expected to deploy a laser weapon capable of destroying or damaging satellites in low earth orbit by 2020 (Military & Aerospaces Electronics, 2019).

Many other countries are working on H-E Lasers, as advances in the last few years in solid-state lasers have increased prospects for

Figure 3: The image of lW-30 unveiled at Zuhai Airshow China 2018.

Low-Cost Overhead Persistent Sensing Technologies

Almost 60 years have passed after the first satellites were sent to space. At that time, the images provided by those satellites had low-resolution and were mostly not available for the public. Today, even small companies can

provide good quality satellite imagery, thanks to the sheer number of satellites owned by private entities. Excluding a growing number of satellites weighing less than 50 kg, more than 600 observation satellites are expected to be launched by 2026 (Military & Aerospaces Electronics, 2017). The enormous number of satellites in orbit now ensures 360-degree pole-to-pole coverage and allows for some points on the planet to now receive nearly continuous coverage. In addition to greater availability and lower costs, these advances in sensor technology, coupled with big data analytics, small satellite and drone technology, improved inter-satellite coordination, and other relevant technologies advance the prospect of maintaining a continuous monitoring capability over strategic targets of interest (Ibid).

When we think about the importance of timely intelligence, possessing such continuous coverage will bring significant advantages to AMD forces. While such a capability would be of limited interest against silo-based ICBMs, Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) bases, and strategic bombers, it could provide the basis for a more substantial capability to maintain a track of mobile ICBM launchers, even when they are flushed from their bases. Besides, the advent of technology enabling cooperating swarms of usually smaller vehicles designed to seek out targets holds the potential to change, even disrupt, submarine operations, including SSBNs (Ibid).

One of the crucial aspects of Missile Defense is the early warning. We have witnessed not long ago, how timely intelligence helped U.S forces in Iraq to have no casualties after Iranian ballistic missile attack on 8 January 2020. The U.S. has a vast network of radars and satellites dedicated to tracking missile launches around the globe, and that worked well on that night.

However, these early warning systems are helpful, especially after the launch. In order to change the posture level of defense forces in crisis time, military leaders require indications and warnings, and satellites and other intel sources provide such indications. With the help of low-cost persistent sensing capabilities, it should be possible at some point shortly to continuously monitor mobile ICBMs and an adversary's preparations before ballistic missile launch. Such a persistent surveillance capability, coupled with offensive forces, would enable offensive strikes against mobile ICBMs, especially given that, when deployed out of garrison, mobile ICBMs are much softer targets to strike than silo-based ICBMs (Ibid).

Artificial Intelligence (AI), Big Data Analytics

Since Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become our eras' reality and would act as a force multiplier for future military operations, it is taking much attention among the defense agencies as well. With the help of AI, machine learning and big data analytics, analysis can be produced with greater efficiency and speed at a reduced cost. According to the predictions of analysts, by 2020, the world will produce 44 trillion gigabytes of data annually, an annual rate of growth of almost 60 percent (Vernon, 2018). Similarly, the satellites, UAVs, and other intel sensors are collecting terabytes of data every day. We mentioned above how vital, timely intelligence is when it comes to taking decisions within a short time. The introduction of AI to the intelligence process will, therefore, affect the speed of analysis. As an example, electro-optical change detection (EOCD) software is the first fully automated processing capability to work with panchromatic imagery, producing reliable detections, highlighting changes, and identifying second and third-order indicators. Thus, the analysts are saving time and catching those changes that the human analysts

working a manual process might not even have noticed. The extension of this, in conjunction with persistent surveillance capabilities, to the detection of deployed bulky transporter-erector-launchers carrying ICBMs, is an apparent potential application. One such firm is a deep-learning company that specializes in using big data analytics to review large amounts of satellite and aerial imagery to pick isolated objects, some small, based on subtle clues in the imagery (Ibid).

and would have the ability to act as a network or "swarms."

Figure 4: A raster image of EOCD software highlight the changes at the Rio de Janerio Airport. Vehicles and aircraft arrivals (blue) and departures (red) can be easily identified. (Courtesy of Observera)

AI has important implications for defense organizations. The impact of the AI technology itself is one side. The other side is, the combination of AI with other technological developments associated to offensive military operations (such as underwater drones, aerial drones, mobile missile launcher locations, antisubmarine warfare, counter-C3I, and the development of swarm tactics). Even though it seems that antisubmarine warfare has little to do with IAMD, when we think about the missile threats emanating from the submarines, they are always a big concern point among defense planners. Therefore underwater robotic devices (unmanned underwater vehicles or UUVs), like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) "Sea Hunter," could, for example, perform search functions associated with antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare (Savitz & et al, 2013). Such robotics, with the help of AI, would have more specific functions

Cyber- Warfare and Security

Some argue that Cyber Warfare and Cyber Security are not (yet) disruptive technology. Nevertheless, thinking about the modern militaries have become extremely reliant on moving vast amounts of data around the battlefield as a regular part of operations, it is impossible to underestimate the risk of a cyber-attack and how disruptive such attacks could be. Cyber-attacks have the potential and ability to shut down both offensive and defensive systems. Furthermore, given that cyberattacks are very difficult to attribute to a specific country, group, or person, they are a viable

weapon of choice for adversaries. Attacked parties will have very little evidence with which to make an attribution determination, and there appear to be limited political consequences for the conductors of cyberattacks (Ibid). That is why some countries are already establishing or considering to establish a separate Cyber Command structure within their military organization.

IAMD and especially BMD, is heavily dependent on complex C4I structures because not only the time required for decision making is relatively short, but also such structures are essential for effective battle management between highly sophisticated technologies, datalinks, sensors, and interceptors. It is no secret that one of the first targets for an adversary's cyber-capability would be such battle management structures. Preserving a robust defense capability, therefore, depends on hampering such attacks, if not achieved, then mitigating the consequences.

As stated previously, "Left-of-Launch" defines a strategy based on a preemptive 'strike' with new non-kinetic technologies to defeat nuclear ballistic missile threats before they are launched. So, cyber capabilities could easily be considered as a left-of-launch non-kinetic option to neutralize the adversary, thus providing an excellent means of AMD. Such options are especially critical because, when we think about the vast number of threats versus limited interceptor capability, it is almost impossible, even for the most advanced militaries, to counter a large number of salvo missile attacks with kinetic defense systems only. In short, cyber technology may not be yet disruptive technology, indeed. However, cyber capabilities, coupled with AI, Big Data Analysis, and Robotics, will undoubtedly be a disruptive feature.

Conclusion

For years the defense industry was the driving force behind technological improvements. Nevertheless, private non-military companies are now leading the cutting-edge technology. It seems likely that the already incredible level of technological innovation the world has witnessed over the last 30-40 years will continue to accelerate going forward, with the private sector playing a predominant role. Accelerating technological change is not just the stuff of science fiction, nor is it downgraded only to technology communities. Increasingly it is affecting every aspect of global civilization. At the same time, it enables new modes of warfare and tools for hostile behavior, which also have different effects on the future security environment.

Countering threats emanating from the future security environment could only be achieved by maintaining a robust, versatile, and up-to-date defense mechanism. IAMD was and is always the crucial element of this mechanism. In an era of disruptive technologies, the defense organizations and communities do not have the luxury of waiting 10-15 years and spending tons of money on a single defense project anymore. Instead, they should pursue programs with realistic cost, schedule, and performance parameters. They can take advantage of such technological improvements, on the way of achieving an IAMD architecture that incorporates affordable, innovative capability improvements to all four pillars of IAMD— active, passive, C4I, and attack operations. Disruptive technology will, without doubt, contribute to all facets of IAMD but especially to non-kinetic operations, since they have the potential to turn an enemy's advancements in sophistication into vulnerabilities, and at significantly reduced cost relative to kinetic options.

Some of the technology mentioned above, which have the potential of changing the conventional way of thinking in the realm of IAMD, is not yet mature enough. That is true. However, if it is possible to surpass a certain technological threshold and, besides, considering the combination of a few of these technologies, in couple of years, the defense mechanisms will likely be different from today.

Endnotes

1 *Left of Launch* defines a strategy based on a preemptive strike with new non kinetic technologies, such as electromagnetic propagation, cyber as well as offensive force to defeat nuclear ballistic missile threats before they are launched. The strategy is to attack by electronic embedment or through the electronic radar signatures of the threat's command and control systems and the targeting systems of the threatening ballistic missiles.

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Soft Power & Global Ambition:
The Case of China's Growing Reach in Europe[*]

Len Ishmael[**]

Abstract

This paper argues that Chinese state-owned enterprises and financial instruments facilitate China's exercise of soft power and the execution of its grand strategy. Chinese investments provide an increasingly dense network of commercial links through which China extends the scope and reach of its influence and projection of power in a manner that has implications for the international system. In the process, countries in different regions of the world increasingly feel economically 'beholden' to China, seeding the development of entirely new classes of client-state relationships. China's growing reach into Europe is no exception. The financial crisis of 2008 exposed vulnerabilities in Europe's southern and eastern flanks and provided optimal conditions for the accelerated pace of China's investments in strategic infrastructure and sensitive technologies. Today, these vulnerabilities undermine European cohesion, exacerbate historical fault lines, and contribute to conditions of instability which in turn dramatically influence EU policy, particularly with respect to its "Near Neighborhood" and Southern European members. Today, China is invested in strategically positioned ports along Europe's Mediterranean rim and Atlantic shore, and established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. These and other investments, extending from Europe through Central Asia and to the Pacific, are connected by a vast network of marine and land links that form part of China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Current geopolitical conditions are optimal for China to advance in power, prestige, and legitimacy. China's rise comes at a particularly difficult period of fracture among the transatlantic allies and general crisis of confidence in the West. China's rise and the expression of its soft power through commercial and investment conduits in Europe have stretched the country's influence from the Pacific, through the heart of the Western alliance, to face the United States on the Atlantic Ocean. China is at the gates and seeks accommodation. This brings significant challenges to the Western liberal order, and with it, the international system itself.

Context for the Chinese Model

The Chinese model of "influence via investment" has been the source of much examination, especially with respect to the implications for growing Chinese influence and leverage across the developing world. Chinese investments in Latin America, Central America, Asia, and Africa have long been studied for clues regarding Chinese intentions and geopolitical ramifications beyond those of a purely economic or commercial nature.

Less discussed, but of great strategic importance, is China's growing reach and influence into the heart of Europe, which has sharply escalated over the last ten years. The 2008 collapse of international financial

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markets and resulting world-wide recession was fortuitous in that it brought opportunities for major acquisitions and investments in seaports, railways, airports, and sensitive technologies in several parts of Europe-particularly in the cash-strapped countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. The fact that this spending spree involves mainly Chinese-state owned or state-backed enterprises (SOEs) has raised red flags in the European Union about the reach and scope of China's influence in Europe and the nature of its ambi tions. The ability of Chinese investments to threaten EU cohesion has also prompted a refinement of EU polices in a number of vital areas.

The increasing presence of China in Europe has implications regarding the nature of the EU-China relationship and implications for the status quo. These developments have particular the current integrity of the Western liberal world order that has been in place for the last seventy plus years-even more so when viewed in the current context of an apparent retreat of the United States from its traditional role as guardian of the liberal world order that it created, shaped, and led.

The Rise of China

In many ways, the China of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 has undergone significant transformation and change. It has made tremendous advancements in material wealth, and in turn, its international prestige has risen, and the material welfare of its people has improved. Some things, however, have remained constant. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control of state institutions, and the Chinese model of centrally planned, state-led capitalism within authoritarian political structures, have both proven to be remarkably resilient and adaptable[1]. If anything, in recent times, the dominant power of the CCP has become even more entrenched.

Scholars of international relations view China's rise as unprecedented, given the speed of its achievements. While China's rise does not immediately threaten the international system-based on measurements of its economic and military capability and level of technological advancement relative to that of the United States[2]- pundits are unable to deliver preci sion with respect to timing, beyond notions of the status quo remaining for "several decades.[3]" However, they admit to the absence of a modern histor ical precedent for assessing the implications of China's rapid rise given its characteristics[4]. They also consider the concept of polarity as "too blunt an instrument" with which to determine "how much of a shift in power is required before the system is no longer unipolar[5]."

China is nonetheless changing the regional distribution of power across East Asia, while increasing its influence globally. Among the Great Powers, the country is viewed in a class of its own[6]. It has translated economic capability not only into soft power but also into military capability to defend its territorial integrity, with the potential to limit the range of military options available to the United States within that zone[7].

China's rise today is also unique, not only in terms of its speed, but also its lack of association with threats of war. However, the notion of China's "Peaceful Rise" associated with former leaders has been increasingly replaced by President Xi Jingping's rhetoric with respect to China's "resurgence," and resumption of its "rightful place" in the world-a significant break from the past[8]. These principles have been translated into a multipronged program centered on economic development, globalization, technology, and international institutions-a strategy backed by significant financial resources and soft power

tools to extend China's influence, increase its prestige, and shape perceptions of its power[9].

While China's rise is due to its own prowess and factors such as labor-in which it holds a competitive advantage-it is also true that recent changes in the dynamics of international politics, such as the power vacuum created by the Trump administration's retreat from traditional U.S. leadership roles have provided opportunities upon which China has adroitly seized. This was demonstrated in both Xi's speech in Davos in January 2017 and in the aftermath of the U.S. decision to pull out of the Paris Accords[10].

In addition, Xi's presidency and his stature as a leader have played an important role in shaping the rise of China. The Communist Party has bestowed on him a level of personal authority and honor reserved for the most highly regarded Chinese leaders. On March 11, 2018, in its first constitutional amendment in fourteen years, the Communist party reversed previous term limits on the office of the President, and-in a major departure from past practice dating to 1989-a successor to the President was not appointed at the National People's Congress of March 18, 2018.

China & The Use of Soft Power

The rise of China and its global influence is hard to ignore. China has successfully translated its economic resources into increasing standards of living for the Chinese people, and it has done so in a shorter period of time than any other country in history. It is also converting economic wealth into soft power in a highly effective display of power projection and influence around the world. Indeed, China today is deemed to have the status of the lone emerging potential superpower, with implications for the international system[11].

China is making strides militarily within its own sphere of influence across the East and South China Sea, and, in the process, reducing maneuvering space for the United States in the Pacific through its militarization of contested islands and shoals. The view remains that China will not displace the United States as a military superpower any time soon, but its rise and projection of global influence and power are nonetheless indisputable[12].

Scholars and political pundits studying China's advancement within the international structure and its engagement in world politics have linked China's increased visibility and influence with its deployment of soft power as a strategic tool of foreign policy[13]. Power has traditionally been portrayed as being generally grouped into "the hard power of coercion or the soft power of persuasion," each having different forms of utility and limitations with neither being easily substituted for the other[14]. Joseph Nye, who coined the term in the late 1980s[15], describes soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.[16]" It is perhaps in the reach and scope of its increasingly dense network of global investments that we see the full expression of China's soft power in service of its global ambitions.

While power as a concept is at once complex and hard to define or measure, power considerations are important in the shaping of statecraft. The exercise of power through war, while of vital importance historically, is no longer the sole means of accommodating change in the international system. We saw this in the dismantling of the Soviet Union's status in the bi-polar configuration of the early 1990s[17]. There are also a range of other mechanisms by which states seek to shape power structures and secure their interests. Where China has felt disaffected by the global

institutions, such as the post-World War II Bretton Woods institutional architecture, it has created its own-establishing and financing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in December 2015, for example[18].

Conditions today seem to favor China's ability to convert economic capability into far-reaching soft power. The global financial crisis of 2008 provided such an opportunity. Western sources of capital had shrunk, and major economies were in recession, but China retained over USD 4 tril¬lion in foreign exchange reserves and accelerated the pace of its investments worldwide. The Trump administration's retreat from important areas of traditional leadership in global governance and multilateral frameworks has provided another opportunity through which China is able to project soft power and gain prestige, status, and legitimacy[19]. The Trump administration's treatment of allies is also providing opportunities for traditional American allies, such as those in Europe, to become odd bedfellows with China, with whom they seek common ground in areas ranging from climate change, to global trade, to a variety of commercial and other geostrategic interests[20].

The China-EU Foreign Policy Enviroment

China's EU Strategy

China and the EU established diplomatic relations in 1975. In a policy paper released in October 2003, China identified its interests in the EU as largely reflected in the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement negotiated between the two parties[21]. In April 2014, China, in updating its EU policy, identified the EU as a "strategic partner" and cited joint efforts to

pursue "peaceful development in a multipolar world [emphasis added]." The relationship is presented as an important element in China's bid to "build long term steady and healthy relations with major powers" as a priority of its foreign policy[22].

The lifting of the EU's arms embargo and agreement on China's market economy status are thorny elements on the agenda that remain unresolved[23]. Even more striking is the manner in which relations between the two sides are framed given the compelling differences that exist. The EU is a democracy while China's model is that of state-led capitalism with a unique approach to the organization of societal, political, and economic life. In spite of this, the EU has been China's most important trading partner for the last decade, with trade volumes exceeding USD 550 billion annually and total trade in excess of USD 610 billion in 2017[24]. Trade in goods between the two sides is estimated at more than USD 1.5 billion per day[25].

Chinese investment in ports, energy grids, and vital infrastructure now skirts along the Balkans, the Mediterranean rim, the Atlantic, and Northern Europe. One such grid is the planned 1500-km electricity corridor from Israel to Greece, via Cyprus and Crete[26]. Through these conduits, China's influence stretches from the Pacific, across Central Asia, across Europe, and into the Atlantic. China now faces the United States on the fronts of two great oceans, the Pacific and the Atlantic-the former with an increasing military capability and the latter through commercial and investment links through the heart of the Western Alliance.

China's military presence has also increased in Europe. Since 2011, China's naval presence has been growing in the Eastern Mediterranean. Chinese warships are increasingly visible

at ports in the region, including Greece's strategically located Piraeus port, in which China now owns a commanding stake, raising questions regarding the potential for its dual use as both a commercial and military asset. These fears are not without foundation. In June 2015, the Chinese government stipulated that all civilian shipbuilders must ensure that all new vessels are suitable for military use in emergencies[27]. With this new strategy, China has the potential to trans form its considerable civilian fleet into military resources with which to protect important "maritime support capabilities" and communications[28]. On August 1, 2017, China officially inaugurated its first overseas military base in Djibouti, a tiny country at the southern entrance to the Red Sea in the geostrategically important Horn of Africa-and notably the home port for military assets of NATO, the United States, Japan, Italy, France, Germany, and Spain.

The EU's China Strategy

EU policy with respect to China is guided by several instruments central to its multilateral relations[29]. The relationship between the parties exists at two levels, that between China and the EU as a bloc, led by the EU Commission, and that between China and individual EU member states through a series of bilateral relations. Reconciliation of national domestic policies and objectives with those of the common EU agenda is not an easy task and generates friction and tension within the EU.

As individual, state-led bilateral relations have deepened, the EU has found it necessary to develop new guidelines for the EU-China relation ship[30]. One of the key imperatives for seeking to refresh this framework is based on the EU's assessment that the "unprecedented scale and speed of China's rise... [and] its increased weight and a renewed emphasis on 'going global' mean that it is seeking a bigger

role and exerting greater influence on an evolving system of global governance." The EU recognizes that "China is seeking space and a voice.[31]" Not explicitly stated but nonetheless evident is that this new strategy is in no small measure prompted by EU concerns regarding China's growing presence in Europe, its increasing clout, and the threat to EU cohesion.

The EU is also intent on engaging China on a number of difficult issues, including the promotion of universal values and desired Chinese reforms in areas including trade and investment, economic and social development, environmental concerns, fair competition, rule of law, human rights, global public goods, sustainable development, and inter national security. The EU seeks to bring China in line with G20 and UN responsibilities in these areas. Most importantly, the new strategy speaks of the need to maximize EU cohesion and effectiveness in dealing with China through new instruments, including a proposed comprehensive agreement to manage investment flows between the two sides-a response to the exponential rise in Chinese investments over the past ten years.

The EU considers China an important partner in areas of global governance, security, and defense, pointing to China's constructive engage ment in the Iran nuclear deal; conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya; and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. China is also consid¬ered a key actor for cooperation on matters pertaining to Africa, given its influence on the continent and existing cooperation on security matters, including counter-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa. China's partnership in achieving the UN's Agenda 2030 sustainable development goals, climate change goals, and renewable energy objectives are also viewed by the EU as significant aspects of the relationship. While the EU-China relationship does not have

the layers of complexity associated with that of the Sino-American relationship, it does, however, have its own areas of tension in negotiating agreements on investment policies and standards, market access, and normative issues pertaining to the rule of law and human rights.

Foreign Policy Tensions & Opportunities

Some scholars have made the point that China's "dual identities," which combine a "developing country reality with the power ambitions of a Great Power," is characteristic of its foreign policy objectives, and also creates "issue oriented national interests, which can easily conflict with the type of value-based relationship most preferred by the EU.[32]" This reality, together with a sense of mistrust with respect to China's wider ambitions, continues to shape the relationship between the two sides. There can be no doubt that the EU views Chinese investments as a double-edged sword. Europe welcomes the injection of investments into the bloc's productive capacity and appreciates the cooperation on global issues, but it remains wary of additional competition on the home front and concerned for the Union's integrity, cohesion, and status.

Misconceptions?

The principle of shared values is typical of the EU approach to cooperation agreements and is reflected in both the EU-China 2020 Strategy and the EU 2016 Guidelines for Engagement with China[33]. Some Chinese scholars consider this emphasis on shared values to be a major "cognitive error" on the part of both parties and a source of considerable tension and frustration on both sides[34].

Perceptions surrounding the concept of multilateralism are identified as one of the more obvious differences in interpretation that exist between China and the EU[35]. Multilateralism to Europeans is a principle useful in forging alliances between multiple countries in pursuit of common goals. It is central to the European sense of ideational power and a means of managing their many transnational issues. China's interpretation of the concept is as a "continuation of realpolitik by other means"-a tool utilized by the West to "entrap China and curb its rise and influence.[36]"

Fundamental challenges to the relationship exist in the omnipresent role of the CCP and in the EU's self-perception as a champion of political reform. Such a reformist role, while feasible in the context of inducing former Eastern European states to EU membership, is not feasible in the context of EU-China relations. The EU ignores this reality at its own peril. Dabbling in China's internal affairs and "pursuing its values-driven approach to engagement provides for less rather than more scope for constructive engagement with China on a range of important matters.[37]"

Threat to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance?

Closer relations between China and Europe over the last decade have raised questions about an emerging axis as a check on U.S. power[38]. While Europe, its member states, and China have a stated interest in a more balanced international system based on multilateral institutions, there is little evidence to support the EU's interest in such a shift. The EU does not share China's security concerns in the Asia Pacific region, and the rapid increase in economic and political relations between the EU and China seem based on interest bargaining-as opposed to coalition-building in an attempt to check the United States.

There is, however, a school of thought in Europe that calls for the EU to be clear-eyed about the current state of the transatlantic relation ship,

to move on, and to seize opportunities for new relations that benefit its interests[39]. In a nod to this thinking, Donald Tusk, President of the EU Council, recently made the point of thanking Donald Trump for confirming to Europe that its only reliable ally remained at "the end of your arm." Tusk noted, "With friends like that, who needs enemies?[40]"

There is a sense that the West is in disarray and that Asia is increasingly the more coherent front. If the old order is unraveling and a new one emerging, the thinking is that Europe should position itself to shape the rules and to fashion a more modern multilateral order. The foundation for Eurasian cooperation already exists through the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), a platform that could foster a "new 21st Century cooperative rules based multilateral order co-created and jointly designed by Europe and leading Asian powers.[41]" While this ambition has not been realized, the importance of cooperation between the two sides was emphasized recently at the ASEM Summit in Brussels, where leaders stressed the importance of multilateralism in meeting the challenges of the day[42].

China's Global Commercial Empire

Today, China's OBOR initiative joining Europe and Asia, and spanning at least sixty countries, is hailed as the world's most ambitious development project since the Marshall Plan[43].

At the time of the Marshall Plan and establishment of the Brettons Woods institutions, the United States was the largest creditor to other countries and dominated global trade. In an astonishingly short time, the baton has shifted towards China. China is expected to spend more than USD 1 trillion over the next ten years on its OBOR initiative and has already expended more than USD 300 billion[44]. In the Western Hemisphere, in the United States' own backyard, China has quietly assumed primacy as a trading partner for much of Latin America. While differences of opinion exist regarding the net effects of Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa, and while the matter of debt sustainability is increasingly becoming an issue, China remains the partner of choice for many of the continent's governments[45].

While in the 1980s and early 1990s China was the biggest recipient of development financing from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, China today, on its own, finances more of the developing world's commercial and infrastructural requirements than the World Bank does[46]. Over the next few decades, this vast network of Chinese-financed infrastructure will increase in density and span much of the world, providing countries with great economic potential access to global value chains. This dynamic is also creating conditions for some countries to become economically beholden to China-seeding the development of new client-state relationships[47]. The scale of this change is dramatic. "Within the span of 100 years China has evolved from being a client state (quasi colony) of Britain, France, Japan, and Russia, to having its own network of client states, many of whom are outside East Asia.[48]"

China's Investment in Europe

Europe ranks as the number one destination for Chinese investment flows[49]. China's investments in the continent run the gamut from large-scale infrastructure in parts of South and South Eastern Europe, to high-tech companies in the Western part of the continent. Since 2008, it is estimated that China has made over USD 318 billion worth of investments in Europe, reflecting an increase in Chinese-related activity across the continent more than 45 percent greater than U.S. activity over the same period[50].

Since 2008, annual Chinese investments in Europe have increased steadily, with 2016 identified as the year of the greatest investment, including the purchase of Swiss pesticides company Syngenta AG for over USD 46.3 billion[51]. Top sectors attracting investments include chemicals, traditional and renewable energy, property, mining, internet and software, utilities, automotive parts and finance. While more than half of Chinese investments in Europe are channeled through its five largest economies, the largest infrastructural investments, including the purchase of Greece's Piraeus port, are across Europe's southern periphery and eastern flank, adding important links to the maritime and land components of the OBOR initiative.

Of significance is the fact that of the 670 Chinese or Hong Kong based corporations that have invested in Europe since 2008, one hundred are SO Es, and were involved in more than 63 percent of all transactions.[52]" More complex, however, is the fact that the distinction between private and public companies is not clear. China's COSCO group of companies, for example, incorporates publicly traded components of state-owned enterprises that own stakes or operate in "ports from the Baltic to the Bosporus.[53]"

China's Inroads into Eastern & Southern Europe

Beijing's acquisitions in and closer ties with Southern European countries, such as Greece, is a cause for concern in Brussels. Also of concern, is the ever-closer relationship between Beijing and the EU's poorer Eastern countries and the non-EU European states-now arranged in a sub regional grouping known as the "Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries," more commonly known as "the 16+ l." Led by China, the 16+1 configuration includes eleven

EU members and five non-EU countries from the Balkans[54]. Though not a member, Greece has attended the group's annual summit.

The launch of the 16+1 group initiative in April 2012 was billed as cooperation around the OBOR initiative, based on investment and trade. Indeed, many of the large-scale investments made to date have been in infrastructure, including the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed railway that was built by Chinese companies. However, despite the focus on infrastructure development, i is instructive that Qi Xuchun, vice chairman of the Chinese Peoples' Consultative Conference, has called for enhanced cooperation between the sixteen European members and China on international and regional affairs. This was followed at the group's 2017 summit in Riga with a call from Chinese Premier Li Keqiang for the assembled leaders to "properly resolve hot issues and maintain world peace and regional stability.[55]"

The European countries of the 16+1 seek Chinese investments and capital to finance critical infrastructure, including ports, railways, power stations, and roads. Investments are also needed to stimulate the creation of much-needed jobs. For some, like Serbia, Chinese investments also represent an important source of capital to facilitate reforms needed to qualify for EU membership. The importance of this relationship was underscored in Hungarian Prime Minister's Viktor Orbin's statement:

> The world economy's center of gravity is shifting from west to east: while there is some denial in the western world, that denial does not seem reasonable. We see the world economy's center of gravity shifting from the Atlantic region to the Pacific region. This is not my opinion-this is a fact[56].

While Eastern European countries have welcomed the USD 15 billion in new investments since 2012, with promises of more, their significance to China lies in their importance as a bridge to the EU. Indeed, Milos Zeman, president of the Czech Republic has spoken of his country as a "gateway" for the People's Republic of China to the EU[57]. Eastern European countries are using their relationship with the EU to leverage closer ties with China, in pursuit of additional Chinese resources. At the same time, the tightening ties with China are also being used as leverage in negotiations with Brussels on a number of issues.

The matter of China is one which does not lend itself easily to an EU-wide approach, given both the structural economic differences within the EU divided along a North-South axis, and the historical East-West divide with respect to values, norms, and ideology. Recent pronouncements regarding plans for EU expansion with respect of Serbia, for example, are viewed as an attempt to counterbalance growing Chinese influence and power. These increasing Chinese investments in Europe require a very deli cate balance between conflicting interests and alliances between Beijing and Brussels.

European member countries, like Greece, have presented opportunities for Chinese investments and influence-wielding. On February 8, 2017, the land-sea OBOR trade route between China and Central Europe through the Greek port of Piraeus officially opened when two Chinese trains arrived in Hungary carrying Chinese made goods. Containers had been shipped from the eastern Chinese port of Ningbo to the Greek port, and then onwards by train to Hungary, inaugurating this section of the OBOR initiative and commissioning the 67-percent stake in the port acquired by China's COSCO[58].

Greece had suffered devastating effects from the economic recession of 2008 and 2009 and then was significantly impacted by the European refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016[59]. For China, the Greek economic crisis offered the opportunity to snap up investments at cut-rate prices-and crucially, in the part of the EU closest to the strategic Suez Canal shipping lane. Importantly, the majority of Chinese companies operating in Greece are subsidiaries of large SOEs, and China is itself the "common parent" of all the companies with current investments in the country[60]. While these companies function primarily as commercial entities, they do not operate independently from the Chinese political system.

In Europe, the Greek crisis and resulting political turmoil threatened the very stability of the Union, further straining the long-simmering North-South divide over issues of economic and monetary governance. As Greek leaders struggled with Brussels and Germany over the bitter pill of austerity measures, privatization of state-owned assets, and bailout conditions, China offered the beleaguered country an economic lifeline one that could not be ignored. It acquired Greece's largest port, in Piraeus, and unveiled plans to transform it into a major hub linking Asia and Europe[61]. In many ways, this investment was made possible by the conditions for Greece's third bailout arranged by EU and IMF creditors, who demanded the privatization of major state-owned assets. By liberalizing the Greek economy, the EU provided a windfall of investment opportunities to the Chinese and seeded the ground for future challenges to its own unity of purpose.

Since 2008, close to EUR 9 billions of Chinese investments have poured into Greece-an equivalent to 5 percent of the country's GDP[62]. Investments have flowed mainly into

telecommunications, energy, ports, real estate, and tourism, including stakes in Athens International Airport[63]. "The Greek economy is thirsty for investments, and the presence of Chinese companies is important and we welcome it," said Greece's Prime Minister in September 2017[64]. The China Development Bank has also established a foothold in the country, providing capital for infrastructure and other projects-investment that has proven vital given national banks' limited ability to provide that type of liquidity.

Within the EU, Greece has become a leading voice in demanding that the Union take a softer line toward China. In doing so, it is reducing the status of human rights relative to other EU values and priorities. In June 2017, Greece blocked an EU resolution criticizing China's human rights record at the UN Council on Human Rights. It has sided with Eastern European countries on several other matters pertaining to China. Already, Chinese investments are yielding important conduits by which China's interests are served at the expense of those of the European Union[65].

EU Concerns with Chinese Investment

The concern in Brussels is that China's bilateral relationships with EU member states creates a channel through which Beijing engages in wedge diplomacy-exploiting East-West tensions and undermining the integrity of the Union, while securing its own interests. While China stresses the commercial intentions behind its investment inroads into Europe, the EU views China's wider geostrategic motives as self-evident. This line of thinking is supported by the fact that the 16+1 secretariat is located within China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that most initiatives are executed bilaterally through Chinese officials identified as "national coordinators.[66]" The bilateral format enables China in deploying divide and

conquer tactics to secure its interests. China now controls 10 percent of European port capacity and is pushing for exemptions for Chinese companies from EU Single Market rules in procurement-behavior reinforcing the EU's over arching concerns.

There is also growing suspicion that these Chinese investments are part of the state driven "Made in China 2025" initiative, launched in 2015, which explicitly calls for China's transformation into a dominant actor in robotics, aeronautics, and offshore exploration. The attractiveness of European specialized technology firms to China has fueled concerns regarding the potential use of European know-how at the expense of Western firms. The Chinese buyout of the German robotics firm KUKA in 2016 for USD 5 billion has augmented these fears[67].

There are other reasons for concern. Brussels was alarmed by the Greek veto of EU criticism against China's human rights record, but this instance of Greek opposition was preceded in March 2017 by Hungary's refusal to sign a joint letter rebuking China for torture of detained lawyers. This EU alarm dates back even further to the year before when it debated an EU response to the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling that China's claims in the South China Sea were without merit. Following three full days of "difficult" discussions among member states, "opposition, mainly from Greece and Hungary, succeeded in weakening the EU statement to the extent that it did not directly mention China.[68]"

A more recent source of tensions within the bloc lies in EU President Claude Junker's September 2017 call for the EU to "protect its collective security," by allowing acquisitions or investments in major infrastructure and

military technology companies to proceed only on the basis of "transparency, security and debate.[69]" This raised additional tensions regarding the rights of individual sovereign states to exercise discretion over investment and trade flows via bilateral arrangements, rather tJ-ian with EU over sight. Several EU member states lobbying on behalf of China successfully reduced the ambition of the investment review process with a non-binding legal remit, limiting Brussels' powers to provide guidance and to request pertinent details on takeovers[70].

EU member states with ties to China have taken advantage of EU unanimity requirements to undermine the bloc's ability to create policy based on its values. This trend has led to concern about the EU's ability to project power-not only at home and within regional power structures, but also globally. These developments are undermining EU unity, EU relations with partnership countries, and EU coherence in its policy on China. The seriousness of the situation was underscored by the German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel's call, in September 2017, for Beijing to "respect the concept of one Europe." He added, "If we do not succeed in developing a single strategy towards China, then China will succeed in dividing Europe.[71]" Cui Hongjian, a director of a Chinese think tank in China's foreign ministry, delivered an instructive rebuttal, saying, "One Europe is feasible geographically, but not in terms of politics and the economy.[72]"

The Europen Union's Response to Chinese Investments

Unlike the United States, neither the EU nor its member states have historically considered China a strategic adversary. China has primarily been viewed through the commercial lens-as a competitor, partner, and occasional threat[73]. However, particularly in recent times, growing concerns about Chinese ambitions, and the sense that Chinese investments are but a Trojan Horse for more sinister motives, have prompted the EU to engage in a range of policy reviews that seek to contain China. But the EU must exercise caution. Given the reality of Brexit and the waves of populism sweeping across the continent, the last thing the Commission needs is a revolt within its ranks.

The new strategy for EU-China relations speaks to the need to hold China to a rules-based international order. Importantly, the new strategy recognizes the need for the EU and its member states to project a "strong, dear unified voice[74]" and to keep matters "relevant to the EU ... in line with EU rules, laws and policies.[75]" Since February 2017, the EU, led by member states Germany, France, and Italy, has been working on a framework for an investment screening mechanism. However, while this failed to garner traction because of opposition by Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, more recently, on June 13, 2018, EU Ambassadors agreed to the Council's "stance regarding regulations for the screening of investments from third countries in strategic sectors, requesting that negotiations commence with the European Parliament as soon as possible.[76]"

Several other EU policy responses are of special significance, given their systemic break from past policies. The first is the fact that EU spending on its near neighborhood, Eastern Europe, over the last four years has increased by more than four times normal spending levels. This is especially significant given the EU policy of support for "the poorest of the poor" and "countries most in need.[77]" Eastern European countries receiving support are all middle income and ineligible for official development assistance under OECD

Development Assistance Cooperation rules. EU special support for Eastern European countries has recently been confirmed in its new budget[78]. This support is clearly a response to the need to balance Chinese influence on the EU's Eastern flank by significantly increasing the amount of funds deployed in support of the Near Neighborhood policy.

A third observation relates to the fact that, despite much talk regarding "expansion fatigue," the EU has also officially unveiled plans to restart talks on extending the carrot of EU membership to Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. None of these countries are expected to qualify for some time, but applications are being processed in accordance with steps identified in the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, and Article 49 of the Treaty of Maastricht.

Finally, in an effort to shore up its southern flank, the EU has reduced by 90 percent the stabilization funds that had previously gone to Hungary and Poland and shifted this support to Greece and Spain. In this way, EU strategy, which in previous budgetary cycles was focused on development cooperation abroad, seems to be now turning inwards, seeking to preserve its coherence and integrity in face of threats to its influence in Europe from an ascendant China.

Conclusion

What is the ultimate implication of China's strategy of power-by investment for the liberal international order that has been upheld for the last seven decades by the United States, Europe, and other Western allies? The answer is not entirely clear.

The current times, marked as they are by American isolationism and retreat even from its allies, coupled with the rise of China's own

commercial, economic, and political assets, raise significant debate about the future of the liberal international order. While there is no consensus regarding the full extent of what is at stake, it is clear that other great powers, like China, have their own vision of the international system and seek to act upon it.

Weighing and balancing the Chinese challenge to the Western liberal order is made harder by a "simultaneously and not coincidental crisis of confidence in the West.[79]" With its growing projection of power and influence through commercial-led conduits around the world, including Europe, China's rise is causing status problems for both Europe and the United States. It is difficult, however, to determine how to balance China effectively without a united transatlantic alliance. The transatlantic dialogue is fractured. In response, the EU is trying to accommodate China through a blend of pragmatic realism and cooperative relationship building, while remaining determined to preserve notions of shared values and common principles. However, the wider geostrategic implications of China's rise and challenges to the liberal international order require that the United States assert a more active leadership role- one which "differentiates between allies and others, and keeps Europe engaged and on the radar in its dealings and planning on the China question.[80]" Current U.S. practices and policies put this prescription in doubt.

Despite its increasing power, China is still a developing country trying to balance growing international responsibilities with domestic realities and concerns. China, as a "geo-economic" bank with USD 1 trillion to invest, can do much to improve the world and to provide the infrastructure that allows many countries to improve their access to

supply chains, increasing prospects for global prosperity and stability. China is also well positioned to contribute meaningfully to the status quo and to jointly share responsibilities on matters on which interests converge. But a certain amount of accommodation will have to take place. Perhaps the focus should be less on containment of China and more about bringing the country to the table-not in the hope that it becomes more Western, but in recognition of its role in promoting development around the world.

Having engaged in a very visible anti-corruption crusade at home, China now seems eager to put its relationships with other states on a new footing. As these relationships mature, China itself is coming to terms with its increasingly global responsibilities and the need to improve its image. One cannot help but note that China cherry-picks the Western norms and values that benefit its interests at home and abroad. It is engaging the EU and World Bank in these efforts. In 2017, China published new guidelines for Chinese external investments, and the AIIB spoke of a commitment to "world class standards.[81]" Importantly, China recently requested EU support to develop mechanisms to provide for due diligence, transparency in procurement, training in compliance, and the development of project management skills in preparation to further its commercial relations in Africa and elsewhere[82]. China has also requested EU support in designing a social protection system and health and safety provisions for workers, as it continues to make the transition to a consumption-driven economy.

The World Bank is also providing training to hundreds of Chinese project managers and accounting specialists. While this is encouraging, China is not a democracy, does not pretend to be one, and does not aspire to

move in that direction. The West needs to come to terms with this reality. The tactic of trying to isolate China has had limited success. Many Western allies have deepened cooperation with China, and Asia has seen quickly expanding Chinese ties-trade and otherwise. It is time to consider a different approach.

That there will be conflicts cannot be doubted, but conflicts with China-outside of the South China Sea-seem unlikely to escalate on their own accord any time soon. China's ascendancy stems from a convergence of circumstances that are part of the changing dynamics of international politics. Today, we see a world order less tightly grouped around ideology, and the lines between east and west, north and south are becoming blurred. We are witnessing coalitions of states and non-state actors drawn together around agendas of global public goods, such as climate change, equity, and terrorism. A more consciously cosmopolitan world is emerging and taking root[83]. Western and other societies are increasingly reluctant to face the costs of war. While the threat and tools of war have their place among foreign policy options at the disposal of states-especially among those of the nuclear club-the reality of mutual deterrence is a powerful constraint on their utility. As Princeton's Aaron Friedberg assesses, different elements of power possess different utilities at different times[84]. Despite its deficiency in military capability, China boasts a unique blend of soft and hard power today that seems well-suited to these times.

Pundits such as Graham Allison suggest the time might be right to put to bed approaches to isolate China and work instead to "sustain a world order safe for diversity-liberal and illiberal alike.[85]" Such an accommodation would transcend differences in social systems and ideologies, and create conditions allowing China to sit at the table with other great powers,

to participate in designing rules of engagement that are fair and just, to engage constructively on matters of global governance, and to define China's role in shared prosperity. The world might just become more stable in the process. The zero-sum game seems an option whose utility has been expended; it should be put to rest.

Endnotes

1   Jeffrey W Taliaferro, "The Rise of China and Balance of Power in East Asia" (Lecture, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, September 12, 2017 to September 18, 2017).

2   Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position," International Security 40 (3) (2016), 35.

3   Ibid. The authors point to the conversion of economic capability into the more complex types of technology utilized in U.S. military systems as a major obstacle precluding China's advancement as the United States' military peer until the mid twenty-first century.

4   Ibid., 42.

5   Ibid., 44.

6   Ibid., 34.

7   Ibid., 52.

8   Matthew Carney, "President Xi Jinping's address to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," October 18, 2017, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017- l 0-18/xi-jinping-had-something-for-everyone-but-li tde-detail/9063882> (accessed November 20, 2018).

9   China is assisting countries in the Caribbean, particularly in the north, such as Jamaica, with major investments in port expansion in preparation for the bigger vessels which will transit the Panama Canal. The period of Eurozone stagnation was used to significantly increase Chinese investments in European ports, particularly in countries like Greece.

10   Noah Barkin and Elizabeth Piper, "In Davos, Xi makes case for Chinese leadership role," Reuters, January 17, 2017, <https:/ /www.reuters.com/articles/us-davos-meeting china-idUSKBNl5l l 8V> (accessed December 10, 2018).

11   Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 44.

12   Brooks and Wohlforth, 51.

13   Jie Yu, personal communication, June 21, 2018.

14   Colin S. Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 48.

15   Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: 1he Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

16   Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 11.

17   T.V. Paul, "Recasting Statecraft: International Relations and Strategies of Peaceful Change," International Studies Quarterly 61 (1)(2017), 12.

18   Despite American-led best efforts, fifty-seven countries, including the UK and other Western European allies and most Asian countries, are listed among the Bank's founding members.

19   Nye, Soft Power, 4.

20   On May 31, 2018, the U.S. government announced trade levies on rolled steel and aluminum on China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Mexico. Canada, Chinese, Mexican, and EU retaliatory tariffs were announced within days.

21   Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, China's Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-Win Cooperation, April 2, 2014, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ wjdt_665385/wjzcs/tl143406.shtmb (accessed November 20, 2018).

22   Ibid.

23   On June 26, 1989, the European Council of Ministers agreed to an arms embargo as part of a raft of EU-wide diplomatic and economic sanctions in response to the violent state-led suppression of protests in Beijing known as the Tiananmen Square protests of April 15, 1989 to June 4, 1989.

24   European Union, Trade in Goods with China, European Commission, April 16, 2018, <http:/ /trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2018).

25   EU-China Relations Factsheet, ID 171027_16, May 30, 2018, <https://eeas.europa. eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_is/34728/EU-China%20Relations%20 factsheet> (accessed November 20, 2018).

26   Plamen Tonchev and Polyxeni Davarinou, Chinese Investment in Greece and the Big Picture of Sino-Greek Relations, Institute of International Economic Relations, December 4, 2017, 50.

27   Tonchev and Davarinou, 55.

28   Ibid., 56.

29   These include the EU Global Strategy dealing with its Foreign and Security Policies, which reflects EU Grand Strategy published in June 2016 and the revised European Consensus for Development (2017). The EU's approach to the bilateral relationship is expressed in the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which guides execution of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

30   Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for a New EU Strategy on China, European Commission, June 22, 2016.

31   Ibid.

32   Jie Yu, "After Brexit: Risks and Opportunities to EU-China Relations," Global Policy 8 (4) Qune 2017), 109.

33   Over time, many groups which are party to such cooperation agreements have ques tioned the degree to which such values are genuinely shared. There has been significant pushback by several African countries on EU action on behalf of LBTG rights and those relating to the role of civil society in governance matters.

34   Jie Yu, ''After Brexit: Risks and Opportunities to EU-China Relations," Global Policy 8 (4) Qune 2017).

35   Ibid, 112.

36   Jie Yu, personal communication, June 21, 2018.

37   Ibid.

38   Shada Islam, "Stop Whining and Start Rethinking the Global Rulebook," Friends of Europe, June 19, 2018, <https:/ /www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/stop-whining and-start-rethinking-global-rule-book-shada-islam> (accessed June 29, 2018).

39   Ibid.

40   Megan Specia, "EU Official Takes Donald Trump to Task: 'With Friends Like That"..." New York Times, May 16, 2018, <https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/world/ europe/europe-donald-tusk-tweet-trump.htmb (accessed November 20, 2018).

41   Islam.

42   European Commission, Press Release, October 19, 2018, ''ASEM Summit: Europe and Asia - Global Partners for Global Challenges," <http://europa.eu/rapid/press release_IP-l8-6l36_en.htm> (accessed October 27, 2018).

43   Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Soft Power Offensive, One Belt One Road, and the Limitations of Beijing's Soft Power," Council on Foreign Relations, May 16, 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-soft-power-offensive-one-belt-one-road-and-limita tions-bei jings-soft-power> (accessed November 20, 2018).

44   Manuel.

45   During the most recent Summit of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation in September 2018, African leaders stressed the need for changes to the model of development cooperation between the two parties and requested that financing supports the continent's social services and local job creation.

46   Manuel.

47   Ibid.

48   Jeffrey W Taliaferro, personal communication, July 12, 2018.

49   Andre Tartar, Mira Rojanasakul, and Jeremy Scott Diamond, "How China is Buying its Way into Europe," Bloomberg, April 23, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/ graphics/2018-china-business-in-europe> (accessed November 20, 2018).

50   Ibid. Holdings are said to encompass at least 360 companies, including iconic European companies such as Pirelli & C. SpA, Scandinavia's premier car maker Volvo Personvagnar, German industrial and technological robotics company Kuka AG, and Irish aircraft leasing giant Avolon Holdings Ltd., plus "four airports, six seaports, wind farms in at least 9 countries, and 13 professional soccer teams."

51   Ibid.

52   Ibid.

53   Ibid. State-owned or backed companies were among eight of the top ten firms involved in acquisitions of European assets over the period and several other entities were found to be owned by Chinese provinces or municipalities demonstrating a clear official Chinese interest in the continent of Europe. Deeper evaluations have found that the most valuable companies hnk back to a single parent company, the Chinese State.

54   The countries involved include: Hungary, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Montenegro, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, out of which Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia constitute the eleven EU members.

55   James Kynge and Michael Peel, "The Big Read: Chinese Trade. Brussels Rattled as China Reaches out to Eastern Europe," The Financial Times, November 27, 2017, <https:/ /www.ft.com/ coment/16abb-f2a-cf9b-11e7-9dbb-291 a884dd8c6> (accessed November 20, 2018).

56   Ibid.

57   Angela Stanzel, "Xi's Visit to the Czech Republic," European Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2016, <https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_xis_visit_to_the_ czech_republic6083> (accessed November 20, 2018).

58   Tonchev and Davarinou, 14.

59   Ibid, 15.

60   Ibid, 6.

61   Helena Smith, "Greece Blocks EU's Criticism at UN of China's Human Rights Record," The Guardian, June 18, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ jun/18/greece-eu-criticism-un-china-human-rights-record> (accessed November 20, 2018). The port of Piraeus has partnered with the port of Shanghai in a deal that multiplies the containerized shipping between the two ports. China has also recently acquired a controlling stake in Greece's public sector power grid operations, injecting additional foreign exchange into Greece.

62   Tartar, Rojanasakul, and Diamond.

63   Ibid.

64   Ibid.

65   In the meantime, China's SOE, COSCO, has purchased major shares in several other Mediterranean ports, including Kumport in Turkey, Naples in Italy, and Valencia and Bilbao in Spain, as well as other investments in northern European ports at Zeebrugge in Belgium and Rot erdam in the Netherlands.

66   Kynge and Peel.

67   China's Relatiom with US. Allies and Partners in Europe: Testimony before the US. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 115'h Congress (2018) (statement of Erik Brattberg, Carnegie Endowment for Peace).

68   Kynge and Peel.

69   Ibid. Hungary's failure to follow EU procurement rules on the construction of the USO 2.9 billion

Chinese-financed high speed 350 km rail link with Serbia catalyzed an EU Commission inquiry regarding the possible breaching of EU law _regarding procurement.

70   Ibid.

71   Ibid.

72   Ibid.

73   Kynge and Peel.

74   Joint Communication to the European Parliament.

75   This caution was inserted as a clear warning to countries such as Greece, Hungary, and others that participate in the annual 16+1 summit with China and have in recent years used the consensus vote to block EU censure of China's human rights record and activities in the South China Sea.

76   "Screening of Investments: Council Agrees Its Negotiating Stance. European Council Press Release." June 13, 2018. <https:/ /www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press releases/2018/06/ l 3screening-of-investments-council-agrees-its-negotiating-stance/> (accessed November 20, 2018).

77   "The (New) European Consensus on Development," 2017, European Commission, <https:/ /ec.europa.eu/ europeaid/ policies/european-development-policy/european consensus-development_en> (accessed November 20, 2018).

78   The European Union makes decisions with respect of its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) every seven years. The EU's next budget will commence on January l, 2021 and was presented in early June 2018. It will be the EU's first as a Union of 27 members and is meant to respond to a number of new realities, one of which is the Article 50 withdrawal of the United Kingdom and the resultant financial implications.

79   "Briefing China and the West," The Economist, March 3, 2018, 20, <https:/ /www.economist.com/ briefing/2018/03/01/decades-of-optimism-about-chinas-rise-have been-discarded> (accessed November 20, 2018).

80   Brattberg, testimony on China's Relations with US. Allies and Partners.

81   Ibid.

82   EU official, per§onal communication, April 26, 2018.

83   Paul, 10.

84   Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experiences of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 308.

85   Graham Allison, "The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018 issue.

CSDP Partnership in EUFOR RCA[*]

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Introduction

EUFOR RCA was the EU's military operation in the Central African Republic[1] , launched on 1 April 2014. The EU started to search for partners from the very beginning and cooperated with the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and the selected third states.

This kind of partnership in security and defence policy is vital with the shrinking[2] defence budgets in a more complex, insecure and destabilized security environment. Though having 27[3] member states (MSs) in this field, the EU is in need of partners to gain legitimacy and secure resources or capability. Thus, the EU has been endeavouring to expand partnerships in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) citing multilateralism, cooperation and (strategic) partners.

This research aims to analyse EU's partnership practice in CSDP in a case study, EUFOR RCA. By definition, it is far from providing an overarching narrative on partnerships or whole interrelations among all partners. Yet, the study aspires to provide explanations to whether CSDP Partnership worked smooth in the case of EUFOR RCA.

Literature manifests an institutionalised cooperation between the EU and the UN in security and defence. In this regard, Tardy (2013) cites regular meetings of the EU High Representative (HR/VP) with the UN Secretary General, EEAS Deputy Secretary Generals with UN Under Secretary Generals and Steering Commit-

tees gathering on bi-annual basis. On the other hand, despite recent endeavours of institutionalisation, EU-AU relations have a more ad hoc nature and still have a way to go. In any case, security and defence cooperation with the UN and to some extend the AU is sufficiently discussed in literature. However, the EU and the third state cooperation remains uncharted at large. This research would be a small step in this direction.

CSDP Partners

Partnership and multilateralism is at the core of EU's world view as stated in official documents and treaties.

> "The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations... It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations." (TEU, 2008)

There is a dedicated EEAS web page[4] on CSDP partners (EEAS, n.d.1). Apart from quotations, lists of countries participated CSDP missions and operations as well as those concluded framework participation agreements, it systematically mentions international organisations to cooperate with. Nonetheless, it falls short of providing a clear cut CSDP partnership description and a clear category of partners. Thus, it would be safe to start with a gen-

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eral definition of CSDP Partnership;

"Cooperation of the EU with third parties (states, organizations) who share similar interests and common understandings in security and defence related issues."

In this context, third parties can be motivated to enhance their relations with the EU or to leverage the EU in a field where their individual role would pose problems. The EU, on the other hand, aspires to legitimise its actions, to secure resources (funds, troops, capabilities) or to get the most of third parties' expertise.

The partners can be categorized mainly in two groups; international/regional organisations and third states. While the former is comprised of the UN, NATO, AU and to a lesser extend OSCE and ASEAN, the latter is vague with ever changing and increasing nature.

Taking into account EU's practice in EUFOR RCA case, the focus would be on the UN and the AU as partner organisations and Serbia, Turkey and Georgia as partner third states in this research. Other partner organisations (such as NATO or OSCE) or third states have little relevance, if any.

The United Nations (UN)

The UN has a very special place in the official EU literature as being "…in the apex of international system" (European Council, 2008) and at the core of "effective multilateralism" (EEAS, n.d.2).

The EU and the UN deployed subsequent and parallel operations in Africa and Western Balkans as early as 2003. They issued successively a joint declaration to enhance mutual coordination in training, planning, communication and best practices (Council, 2003) as well as a joint statement with measures to boost cooper-

ation and coordination through regular meetings, information exchange, establishment of coordination mechanisms and systematic lessons learned processes (Council, 2007).

The EU approved an *implementation plan*[5] which frames five different deployment *scenarios*[6] to realise the discourse and institutionalize inter-organisational cooperation on the ground (European Council, 2004). The next step was to introduce a 2-year *plan of action*[7] to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping" (Council, 2012) which was used in Mali and EUFOR RCA planning phases.

Apart from these documents facilitating cooperation on the ground, some modalities are designed for coordination between the headquarters. The first and the foremost is the *steering committee*. This is a high-level biannual gathering, co-chaired by EEAS Deputy Secretary General and UN Under-Secretary General (USG), that enables dialogue on geographic and thematic issues of common interest. Despite the limited timeframe (1-working day), it attracts representatives from a wide spectrum of the respective secretariats and enable them communicate directly, derive action points and delegate tasks (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

The second modality is the *reciprocal briefings* by the HR/VP to the UNSC and UN USGs to Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), COREPER or PSC on as-needed basis (Tardy, 2013; UN Official, Interview, 2015). *Video teleconferences (VTCs)* and telephone contacts are more relax, flexible and practical forms of cooperation while headquarters are separated from each other by thousands of miles. In this regard, VTCs are carried out quite effectively so that even steering committee conclusions are reached by VTCs before committee meetings (UN Official, 2015). In this regard, the UNSC and the PSC holds biannual informal VTCs for coordina-

tion and information exchange (UNSG, 2015). A last resort is *desk to desk dialogue* for conflict prevention which is mostly used by UN DPA[8]. Yet, cooperation is very limited and ad hoc in nature because of EU-UN policy discrepancy in this domain (UN Official, 2015).

While it is argued that the EU-UN partnership is ad hoc in nature and not structured enough (Hummel & Pietz, 2015), inter-organisational cooperation and partnership enhanced substantially and the political will seems to facilitate this tendency.

The African Union (AU)

The EU MSs and African States has a long common history from colonialism. Following the African states' independence declarations and gathering under umbrella organisations (which would become later the EU and AU), the relation has continued with successive agreements[9] to enhance cooperation.

The EU and the AU organised summits to institutionalise their cooperation[10]. Joint Africa[11]-EU Strategic Partnership (JAES) is an overarching political channel framing inter-organisational cooperation established in the first summit. Two action plans and a roadmap as well as implementation documents for cooperation in security and defence matters were signed during these series of summits. The outcomes were minor and specifically on peace and security. Nevertheless, the AU aspires to include other domains such as trade and economy on the agenda and develop relations thereof (AU Official, Interview, 2015).

Except for the informal, near-daily contact between the AU and the EU delegation in Addis Ababa (AU Official, Interview, 2015), there are five formal modalities for cooperation (European Commission, 2015):

    a.   Summits (every 3 years),

    b.   Ad hoc ministerial meetings,

    c.   Annual College to College meetings,

    d.   Joint Annual Forums,

    e.   Regular high-level dialogues and expert level meetings, (e.g. annual EU PSC-AU PSC).

Third States

The EU-Third State relations are generally bilateral in nature. It might be a strategic one guided by summits. In this regard, Renard points out ten strategic partners[12] (2013), yet, this is not acknowledged in the EU Global Strategy in 2016. Some other relations might be overarching (span from trade to security) or political (candidacy). The EU provides two agreements to formalise its relations with third states: framework participation agreement[13] (FPA) and security of information agreement.

Despite these arrangements, most of the interaction is ad hoc. The EU organises informal meetings as needed, generally when more resources are required in CSDP missions and operations. There is a standardised list of third states[14] in this respect, unless there is a sensitivity or interest with participation of a particular third state (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

One unique formal venue for multilateral (with a group of third states) cooperation is PSC+7 and EUMC+7 meetings[15] established through framework agreements with NATO. This modality facilitates political and operational consultations with candidate countries to the EU and non-EU European NATO Allies.

In the cadre of EUFOR RCA, Georgia, Serbia and Turkey will be scrutinised further as they were the contributor third states. Yet, the research will reveal that the complicity of bilateral arrangements is appalling and hinders the cooperation considerably. Not being a Europe-

an Ally nor an EU candidate, Georgia, the second biggest contributor of the operation, could not attend PSC+7/EUMC+7 meetings. Despite having concluded FPA with the EU, Georgia and Turkey had problems to reach classified documents in the absence of a security of information agreement. Serbia on the other hand, had concluded both of the agreements and could attend PSC+7/EUMC+7 meetings together with Turkey for further consultations.

Historical Background of the Crisis and the Security Actors

The Central African Republic is one of the poorest countries in the world and in perennial conflict with a tradition of *coup d'état* government handover following its independence from France in 1960.

The latest circle of violence came with the Nordic rebel groups (mainly minority Muslims) with logistical and personnel support of Chad and Sudan. They were fighting against the government forces to share power in the scarcity of security and social services in the North. Following such an agreement (Libreville Agreement 2008) between the government and the rebels, the situation worsened when these groups united under the umbrella of Séléka (coalition) from 2012. Libreville Peace Agreement in 2013 did little to peace as Séléka militias continued their attacks till they reached Bangui (capital). Michel Djotodia, leader of Séléka militias, ousted President Bozizé and became the first Muslim president of RCA and declared dissolution of Séléka. However, unleashed militias dispersed to the country and led to further violations (EEAS, 2014a; Bouckaert, 2013) which started a "vicious cycle of widespread ethnoreligious based violence" (Bouckaert, 2013) between Séléka and Anti-Balaka[16] (Anti-Machete), alarming the UN of a possible genocide against Muslim minority (EDD, 2013). The violence caused more than

825,000 IDPs and 245,000 refugees to neighbouring countries from the 4.6 million country as of late 2013. Nearly half of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance (EEAS, 2014a).

International and Regional Organisations

As a consequence of the long-standing conflict, there was already a mission, MICOPAX[17], acting under the auspices of ECCAS[18] (UNSG, 2008). However, it was far from stopping the violence with limited number of troops. Thus, AU decided to deploy a mission, MISCA[19] to protect the civilians, restore public order and security. The UN Security Council mandated MISCA on 5 December 2013 (AU PSC, 2013; UN Security Council, 2013) and it took over responsibility from MICOPAX on 19 December 2013 (EEAS, 2014a).

Nevertheless, MISCA also fell short of protecting civilians, restoring public order or supporting DRR [20] process. Accordingly, UNSC decided to transform MISCA into a UN Peacekeeping Operation with the same mandate (UNSCR2127). UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions require substantial time which was scarce as the situation was worsening. To overcome this time gap, some 17 months, between two missions, a bridging operation was needed and eventually this gap was covered by EUFOR RCA which was the second[21] bridging operation (Smith, 2014). France facilitated and accelerated the process as a member of UNSC and FAC (Tardy, 2014a).

EUFOR RCA had a limited mandate in time[22] and area of responsibility[23] (EDD, 2014a), yet it provided the UN sufficient time to launch MINUSCA[24] many of whose personnel re-hatted from MISCA[25] (UN News, 2014; United Nations Security Council, 2014). Ultimately, EUFOR RCA transferred to an advisory mission, EUMAM RCA[26], to support the RCA authorities in

FACA security sector reform (Tardy, 2015).

Individual States

France had troops in RCA under Operation Boali since 2002 to support FOMUC[27] and to provide training to FACA[28] based on bilateral agreement with RCA (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a). Following the escalation, the mandate of the operation became irrelevant. France reinforced its troops, renamed it as Operation Sangaris and re-mandated under UN-SCR 2127[29] to support MISCA (Ministère de la Défense, 2013b). It was the 7th intervention to her ex-colony (France Inter, 2013).

CSDP Partnership in EUFOR RCA

Working with ad hoc coalitions require considerable effort and one-time partners tend to be non-committal in the long run. Thus, the EU yearns for formalising its relations with its partners since this enables efficient cooperation (Mattelaer, 2010). In the research at hand, the CSDP partnership in EUFOR RCA will be scrutinized in three phases; planning, execution and termination.

The Planning Phase

The EU and the UN had a very early contact in RCA, especially on the ground with BINUCA, UN's political mission in RCA and the EU delegation in Bangui. BINUCA head had dialogues with EU officials in Brussels (UN Official, Interview, 2015) and PSC was briefed by UN DPO via VTC (Tardy & Gowan, 2014). Meanwhile, the EU delegation in the UN facilitated cooperation with the UN and the AU while desk to desk dialogues (EU-UN) were ongoing (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

On the other hand, subsequent EU-AU PSC meetings served as a basis to discuss RCA crisis at political level (AU PSC, 2013; EEAS, 2014b).

Technical and operational contacts were carried out on the ground or through delegations in New York and Addis Ababa as the AU Delegation to the EU is severely undermanned (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015; AU Official, Interview, 2015).

As soon as the EU expressed concerns on RCA and its readiness to use every tool, the issue was raised in a regular PSC+9 meeting in January 2014 (Turkish Official, 2015). Yet, this forum was not suitable for other third states, such as Georgia, the second biggest contributor. Thus, the Council authorized PSC to invite relevant third states for their possible participation and contributions (OJ, 2014). Accordingly, PSC invited Canada, Georgia, Norway, Serbia, Turkey and the US to participate in the operation (EDD, 2014b).

The first EU-UN conflict analysis workshop, which enabled to have a shared analysis of RCA crisis and its root causes, was conducted in February 2014. This innovative setting enabled a practical cooperation and the outcomes became input to subsequent planning documents. Yet, it fell short of inclusivity with no other partners (UN Official, 2015).

The EU fact finding mission to Bangui was another venue for further cooperation with the UN and AU representatives on the ground, triggering a successful bottom-up approach in EUFOR RCA case (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

All in all, the reason for such a smooth EU-UN cooperation and coordination in planning phase is a document which explains *mutually agreed modalities on planning* and provides the entry points for respective organizations in this phase as successfully used in Mali and RCA (EUFOR RCA and MINUSCA) (Pietz & Tardy, 2014). However, the absence of an EU security of information agreement with the UN

and the AU hindered cooperation considerably. To overcome the impasse of classified information exchange, an innovative way found was to make informal meetings and share necessary information such as area of responsibility, tasks, caveats, etc. with the partners (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

The Execution Phase

As soon as launched, EUFOR RCA exchanged liaison officers and designated points of contacts with MISCA (and later with MINUSCA) to facilitate coordination (EEAS Official, Interview, 2015). Informal daily contacts and meetings allowed to share classified information without exchanging classified documents in the absence of a security of information agreement (EEAS Official, 2015). Although the Council decision establishing EUFOR RCA authorizes classified information exchanges with the UN and the AU up to "Restricted" level[30] (OJ, 2014), it was not effective on operational basis (UN Official, 2015). As a last point, absence of a *mutually agreed modalities on execution*[31] was another downside in cooperation.

Although, the EU has strict end strategies with a definitive date and any extension request causes friction between the EU and the UN (Koops, 2011) (Mattelaer, 2008), direct contact and a timely briefing to PSC enabled DPKO to get a 3-month extension for the last preparations of MINUSCA (UN Official, 2015). As a result, the interviewees of both organisations acknowledged better cooperation and division of labour on the ground pursuant to their mandates instead of necessities (UN Official, 2015; EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).

With regards to third states cooperation and exchange of classified information, Serbia had no problems as it had previously concluded a security of information agreement with the EU. Officials from both sides confirmed smooth cooperation and coordination on the ground (Serbian Official, 2015; EEAS Official, Interview, 2015).Turkey, on the other hand, a NATO ally and a candidate country to the EU, didn't have such an agreement because of political confrontation with specific EU MSs (i.e. Greece and Cyprus). Georgia, the second biggest contributor to EUFOR RCA, was not a candidate country nor concluded a security of information agreement. Yet, the latter designated a liaison officer to operational headquarters in Larissa for a better coordination. Even so, both Georgia and Turkey received classified documents up to "Confidential" level (Georgian Official, 2015; Turkish Official, 2015).

Termination of the Operation

Following termination of EUFOR RCA on 15 March 2015, two venues for cooperation came to the fore; lessons learned process and logistical cooperation.

All of the partners were eager to participate to the lessons learned process. Georgia was more enthusiastic in taking the initiative to prepare its own process and to offer the EU to organise a seminar including all partners (Georgian Official, 2015). The UN was also eager to conduct a regular, structured and common review as already jointly documented in *plan of action* (UN Official, Interview, 2015) whereas the AU officials were expecting more concrete results in the coming joint annual forum (AU Official, Interview, 2015).

Alternatively, transferring UCATEX, the accommodation site of EUFOR RCA, to MINUSCA manifests an innovative way to common or sequential use of real-life support. It was included in UN Secretary General's report on partners (UNSG, 2015) and the UN officials started to work on a draft framework agreement to formalise this new form of cooperation without delay (UN Official, 2015). Common

use of real life support also requires further cooperation on, for instance, camp security or exchange of classified information, as in this case between EUMAM RCA and MINUSCA (EEAS Official, 2015).

Analysis of CSDP Partnership

The state of play in CSDP Partnership is analysed in three focus areas; namely whether they have an ad hoc or structured nature, whether international organisations or third states cooperate better and the importance of security of information agreement.

Ad Hoc vs. Structured

A.   The UN

The EU-UN relationship in security and defence commenced in 2003 with operations on the ground and subsequent attempts to formalise it, i.e. joint declaration (2003), implementation plan (2004) with deployment scenarios and the so-called *plan of action* (2007) which brought a fresh start to the formalised cooperation. Both secretariats insist on using the formalised scenarios, revisit them in the following documents if unsuccessful and to pursue on *mutually agreed modalities on execution* (EEAS Official, 2015). It should be admitted that despite some criticism (Gowan & Witney, 2014; Smith, 2014), *plan of action* successfully completed some of its actions (even modestly) and transposed the unfinished actions to "Action Plan 2".

Thanks to *mutually agreed modalities on planning,* the EU-UN cooperation in EUFOR RCA worked well. The contacts started with steering committees, high level briefings and desk to desk dialogues, followed by an RCA conflict analysis workshop which gave birth to a shared analysis and thus enabled harmonised future plans (EEAS Official, 2015; UN Official, Inter-

view, 2015), contrary to the operational design in Libya (Tardy & Gowan, 2014). An initial contact on the ground in planning phase was provided by EU Fact Finding Mission.

On the *execution phase*, EUFOR RCA and MINUSCA exchanged liaison officers and points of contact. Though up to 'Restricted" level, classified information exchange enabled them joint actions, like joint patrols.

After the completion of EUFOR RCA, two venues appeared for coordination: lessons learned process and real-life support. While the partners are keen in common lessons learned process, which is a part of plan of action, there is still way ahead for a multilateral format as this includes confidential information and not all of the partners have the same level of security of information, if they have any. In terms of the latter, transferring UCATEX to MINUSCA was a good start in this domain.

B.   The AU

The EU-AU relations is formalised first and foremost with JAES and two complementary implementation plans which do not include concrete and time based items compared to EU action plans with the UN. Thus, there are minor outcomes, if any (AU Official, Interview, 2015).

RCA was an agenda item in EU PSC-AU PSC meetings in 2013 and 2014. Yet, it is clear that two political level meetings in two consecutive years is not sufficient to produce the intended outcome. In this regard, technical cooperation was done through the AU and the EU delegations in New York (UN) and Addis Ababa (AU) instead of the AU Mission to the EU which was short of security and defence experts in the capital of CSDP operational planning. On the other hand, AU is the third pillar of the conflicts in Africa at large and in RCA in particu-

lar. Yet, it is generally the missing link in planning phase. This could be overcome by either mutual EU-AU or trilateral EU-UN-AU agreed modalities in planning phase. It's worth also to remember that the AU was excluded in EU-UN conflict analysis workshop. The cooperation in the operational side was better starting with EU's Fact Finding Mission and exchanging of liaison officers and point of contacts. Despite the absence of a security of information agreement, sufficient meetings were conducted and classified information exchanged on need basis.

C. Third States

The EU-Third State partnership depends on mostly bilateral relations which is selective and ad hoc in nature. A unique alternative is a partnership through PSC+ or EUMC+ meetings with non-European NATO Allies and candidate countries to the EU thanks to a framework agreement concluded with NATO. In both cases there are two main documents to structuralise the relation in security and defence domain: Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) and Security of Information Agreement. The number of countries that conclude these agreements are in constant increase whereas the number of the former is far greater than the latter. In any case, these agreements do not provide sufficient modalities and procedures for third state participation in CSDP planning. Furthermore, not a single third state could attend the planning phase or the EU-UN conflict analysis workshop.

All of the third states participating to EUFOR RCA concluded FPAs in advance, yet only Serbia had a security of information agreement. Council decision enabled up to 'Confidential' level classified information exchange with the third states (but not to organisations) on the ground.

Organizations vs. Third States in CSDP Partnership

The relationship between the EU and the international organisations are generally quite good, mostly structured and ever evolving in planning phase. In this regard, the EU-UN relations are better and more improved compared to cooperation with the AU. There are some agreed EU-AU modalities, yet further cooperation is hindered either with insufficient frequencies or undermanned missions. On the other hand, one can observe hardly any cooperation, ad hoc or structured, between the EU and the third states in planning phase. Although, some selected third states were informed through briefings and force generation conferences to cover operational gaps, this is far from a mutual cooperation, putting third states as "second-class stakeholders" (Tardy, 2014b).

In the execution phase, the comparison is just the opposite, i.e. the interorganisational cooperation is not structured and parties try to find ad hoc solutions whereas third states enjoy a structured cooperation thanks to the FPAs, security of information agreements and Council decisions (Serbian Official, 2015; Georgian Official, 2015).

A Big Hindrance: Absence of Security of Information

The research revealed that all partners without a security of information agreement agree that it is the most important drawback on the way to a better cooperation.

In the case of international organisations, the EU has not concluded such an agreement, even not with the UN. This affects less in the planning phase where the EU provides sufficient classified information through agreed modalities, yet it is a big hindrance on the execution

phase when parties need to make more ad hoc, informal meetings to exchange information.

The same goes for third states but in the opposing phases. No third state can receive a classified planning document before PSC invites respective third state to contribute to the operation, even those with security of information agreements, making these agreements to be dysfunctional. On the execution side, Council permits third states to receive classified documents up to 'confidential' level, again causing those agreements dysfunctional[32] as well as wiping the differences between those who concluded such an agreement and those who did not.

Conclusion

The existing research reveals some basic findings on the nature of CSDP partnership, the quality of cooperation based on this nature and the importance of the security of information agreement.

The EU-UN interorganisational cooperation was mostly structured in EUFOR RCA and improved coordination testifies for an interorganisational learning (Smith, 2014). Formalized modalities were exploited sufficiently and some innovative venues (i.e. conflict analysis workshop) were discovered along the way in planning. Although cooperation on the ground was sufficient, formal modalities are necessary for the execution phase.

On the other hand, the EU-AU cooperation in the case under study manifested both ad hoc and structured features. The interorganizational contacts made in mutually agreed formal structures without sufficient modalities and timelines. Hence, mutually agreed modalities in sufficient frequencies are yet to be put in place, if possible, trilaterally including the UN.

The overall EU-third state cooperation is still ad hoc in nature. Although FPAs and security of information agreements or council decisions with regards to classified information exchange facilitated cooperation on the ground, third state participation in the planning phase was negligible, if any, as a result of insufficient modalities.

By comparing partners; the EU can be argued to have a better cooperation with international/regional organisations in planning phase, despite existence of several shortfalls with the AU. In fact, it is hard to make a comparison in this phase, because of EU's few relations with third states. The comparison yields though contrary results as regards execution phase where the inter-organisational relations are not that formalized or smooth and parties strive to find ad hoc solutions.

Last, but not least, execution of joint military operations entails sharing sensitive information in immense volumes. Without a security of information agreement, it's hard to cooperate with partners be it international organizations or third states in any phase.

Endnotes

1   In accordance with the name of the operation, the French acronym RCA (République centrafricaine) will be used for Central African Republic throughout the article.

2   Though the defence budgets increased following 2015, the levels were far from being sufficient.

3   The EU had 28 members -including the UK- at the time with an opt-out of Denmark in CSDP.

4   Unfortunately, the page is not live anymore.

5   EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration.

6   Clearinghouse, stand-alone mission, modular approach, bridging model and standby model.

7   The document is called either plan of action or simply action plan throughout the research.

8   Department of Political Affairs.

9   Yaoundé Conventions (1963, 1969) and Lomé Conventions (1975, 1979, 1984, 1990) Cotonou Agreement in 2000 (AU Official, Interview, 2015; Toth, 2007).

10   Cairo 2000, Lisbon 2007, Tripoli 2010, Brussel 2014, Abidjan 2017.

11   Although the summit was after the transformation of OAU to AU, the document is titled Africa rather than AU as Morocco, a non-member of the AU, was included.

12   The US, Canada, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, India, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa.

13   A framework participation agreement is more or less a template, which hardly differs one another apart from the names of the states and their reference documents, regulating the interrelation between the EU and the relevant third state in contribution of the latter's to CSDP missions and operations. These are; the US, Canada, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine, Colombia, South Korea, Georgia, Chile, Australia, Moldova, Albania, former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam and New Zealand.

14   The United States, Canada, Georgia, Western Balkan Countries and Turkey.

15   The number changes from time to time as the number of the candidate countries or non-EU NATO Allies changes (PSC+7, PSC+9, etc). These include Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia.

16   These were Christian villages' former self-defence forces formed by ex-President Bozizé in 1990s against road bandits.

17   La Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique.

18   The Economic Community of Central African States.

19   Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine.

20   Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

21   The first one was EUFOR Chad/RCA, also in RCA to facilitate UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) (EEAS 2009; Mattelaer 2008).

22   4-6 months after reaching full operational capability.

23   The airport and two more districts in Bangui.

24   Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

25   In fact, it was initially destined to hand over to AU mission MISCA, but later turned out to bridge a UN Mission, MINUSCA.

26   EU Military Advisory Mission in RCA.

27   The predecessor of MICOPAX.

28   French acronym for Central African Armed Forces (forces armées centrafricaines).

29   UNSCR 2127 mandates both MISCA and Operation Sangaris.

30   Whereas third states could receive up to "Confidential" level which is a level higher classification.

31   Contrary to *mutually agreed modalities on planning.*

32   Unless the level is not 'Secret' or higher.

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Book Review: Polarisation: Understanding the Dynamics of Us Versus Them [*]

Ilse Van den Berckt[**]

Bart Brandsma's book at hand is a timely and precious contribution considering the time we live in. The book opens up the debate on how to manage divergent voices and preserve public order while respecting the democratic right of free speech and free articulation of thoughts. Declaring war on bigotry and dualistic (black-white) world view but at the same time taking into stock the need to address the societal reality, the author delves deep into minute dynamics of public debate, mechanics of argumentation and idiosyncrasies of human behaviour.

Polarisation versus conflict

Polarisation is about reinforcing "us-them" thinking, which can easily escalate into a violent confrontation. It differs from "conflict" in the sense that a conflict features directly involved parties, problem owners who you can identify. But in polarisation, the question is, who is owning the conflict, who is playing a decisive role and who should be addressed?

Who owns the conflict?

Polarisation is a game between pushers, joiners and the silent. The most visible role is for the **'pusher',** which has the simple task of supplying fuel for the us-them thinking. While the pusher at one side increases the pitch, the counterpart at the opposite pole does exactly the same. They possess one thing in particular: a conviction of (moral) self-righteousness. The 'other' is 100% wrong and should be defeated at all cost. Pushers want to stay on the edge, in the spotlight. If this means seeking a more extreme viewpoint, then that is what they do. Moderating their behaviour means losing face.

The **'joiners'** are not as extreme as pushers and will often try to accentuate this difference to situate themselves in a more favourable position in the eyes of the audience. But they have chosen a side, and especially when the polarisation escalates it becomes almost impossible for them to switch sides. In a way, they have committed themselves.

The **'silent'** are in the middle field, a group of people who choose not to take sides. They resist the pressure of polarisation. Sometimes because of indifference, people are motivated by neutrality. The silent are invisible but are, in fact, the target group of the pusher: this is where the pusher gains ground, by getting this middle group to choose.

Polarisation is an identity creator and that's why we need it

Polarisation has three main characteristics. Firstly, polarisation is made in our head. This is what sociologists call a **"construct."** Constructs are temporary and never reflect reality, but nevertheless can cause severe problems. The starting point of constructs is: 'we know with great certainty that…'. In polarisation this results in two identities set against each other. By assigning certain characteristics to the "other" group, each group in fact define their own identity. This means polarisation is an identity creator and that's why we need it. Secondly, polarisation is **gut feeling dynamics.** However well-picked words and arguments are, they do not land. They don't reach the rational mind but are more likely to strike in the gut, adding fuel to the polarizing dynamic. This brings us to the third characteristic: polarisation needs **fuel.** This is provided by attention, and positive as well as negative statements do contribute.

But polarisation is not about identity

Many people think conflicts arise because people are different, and that polarisation is about identity. In his book, Bart Brandsma introduces a contrasting approach. He argues conflict arises not from difference but similarity. We resemble each other as we all want the same things ranging from wealth to social status, respect, you name it. The difference in identity is not the divisive element, although it may seem like that. Essentially, it's a fight over scarce goods all involved want. Fundamentally, polarisation is an ego-business: every member of each group wants a certain good for him- or herself. And this is more important than the interests and the well-being of the greater good.

Peace is a long series of conflict we have dealt with successfully

Interestingly, Bart Brandsma postulates that the phenomenon of conflict is part of being human,

part of society. Conflict is the normal situation, not the exception. In this view peace is a long series of conflict we have dealt with successfully. If the conflict is a way of personal or societal development, it is then more or less 'part of the human journey'. Consequently, conflict is neither good nor bad, and there's no question of guilt (blame). Another result of this perspective is that as conflict is part of life, we can/must train ourselves to deal with it. Stronger even, conflict does not disrupt cooperation, it is an opportunity to build good cooperation. Whether one follows this perspective or not, the question of guilt is anyway counterproductive. If we make guilt and blame central, and link it to the difference between identities, we keep on fuelling polarisation.

Police, fire brigades and ambulance companies as scapegoats

It happens more and more that police, fire brigades and ambulances are attacked during riots. How does this make sense? Civil services like police, fire brigades and ambulances are expected to be in the middle, which means neutral and without taking a stand. People in the middle are never really trusted by either group, but they are tolerated as long as they serve the interest of the opposite poles. There is seldom a relationship of mutual trust. When polarisation pressure increases, the central position becomes no longer tolerated and people 'in the middle' become the scapegoat and are often the target of aggression. This scapegoat provides a safety valve for guilt and anger. As we will see later, these civil services will be challenged to stay in the middle and communicate and connect from a curious, respectful and non-judgmental internal state, while at the same time respecting their own boundaries.

Dialogue doesn't work unless right timing

When confronted with conflict, we tend to think that dialogue is the solution, and the best way to reconnect with each other and to find reconciliation. Yet this is a misconception. We first have to be aware that a polarisation process goes through several

stages. **In the prevention stage** (the period up to escalation) dialogue in the sense of exchanging knowledge about each other's identity can be useful. In the heat of the conflict **(intervention phase)** dialogue is impossible, useless, counterproductive. In the heat of anger, there is stronger interest in sticking to the conflict than in finding a way out of it. But fortunately, in every conflict there is a limit to the duration of this phase, and when keeping the conflict going costs more energy than it needs to end it, a new phase is entered **(mediation phase).** Now is the time for each pole for some self-reflection and expression. Both parties become aware of their model of the world and learn skills in handling conflicts. After all, real training in peace is about practising the skills to handle conflict. Only in the **reconciliation phase,** the timing is right for a 'real dialogue' where both poles are ready to start listening and curious to really get to know each other.

Can polarisation be managed?

As a leader or manager, or as a society, it's possible to learn to play an effective role and 'manage' somehow polarisation. Having knowledge of the characteristics of polarisation, recognizing the different roles and stages and being able to define the right interventions with the right timing is a prerequisite. Moreover, there are four game-changers, four crucial factors that can influence the game. First of all, it's possible to **change the target group.** As the most effective way to polarize is to force the middle group to choose, de-polarisation can be achieved by investing in the middle. Through role models, or key figures in the community, the silent group in the middle can be addressed and engaged for common goals. In this way they will be less prone to take sides. This closely resembles the second option of **changing the subject** of polarisation in a subject that binds. Talking about identities can, for example,

Table 1. Characteristics of effective dialogue (p.74)

Stage	Prevention	Intervention	Mediation	Reconciliation
Agenda	Harmony	X	Conflict	Beliefs
Design	Identity – the other	X	Own experience – "I"	The relationship – "We"
Level	Knowledge	X	Skills	Attitude
Participation	Open enrolment	X	Recruitment – us & them separate	Recruitment – us & them together
Characteristic	Talking	X	Training & talking	Reflection, training & talking

be transformed into conversation about security or desired way of living together. The last two game-changers are related to the internal state of the person concerned. Expressing opinions pushes people towards the poles. But **changing the position** towards the middle and listening to people reduces the stress of the conflict. Never underestimate the power of deep listening and genuine respect and connection. If one, on top of that, succeeds in **changing the tone** from judging and defending one's own opinion into showing real interest and respect (s)he can speak in a mediative attitude and approach, which can cause 'miracles'.

Bart Brandsma's this book certainly contributes to the work of influencers and critical voices within our societies in understanding the causes and effects of polarisation. It contributes to efforts for mending the social fabric that witnesses challenge from time to time. Especially at a time where the issue of radicalization and polarisation debate is raging the domain, it shows thinkers and practitioners alike a methodology on how to keep collaborating with those not sharing the same world views and proposes an approach. To us, to the society as a whole, it well teaches the conflict is part of being human and progress and how to deal with it. Overall, the book accomplishes well to get its main message across and is certainly a must-read.

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