
Influencing and Promoting Global Peace and Security



Horizon Insights

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**Changes of The Border Notion from
A Historical Perspective and China's
Approach to the ENP**

**China's Use of Crises To Deepen
and Extend Power and Influence
In Europe and the World**

**Who will Govern the Cyberspace?
A Debate on Multi-stakeholderism
vs. Multilateralism**

**Book Review: Rethinking Security
Governance The problem of
unintended consequences**

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For more information visit www.behorizon.org



Beyond the Horizon ISSG Head Office
Davincilaan 1, 1930 Zaventem
+32 2 801 13 57-8
info@behorizon.org

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Foreword

Dear Reader,

We are happy to welcome you again with this first issue of Horizon Insights in 2020. In this newest issue, we have three articles and also a book review, all on extremely important and interesting subjects as usual. Let's start with some info about them...

The first article is about the possible confrontation of China and the EU in the doorsteps of Europe. More specifically, the author provides a Chinese historical perspective on the evolution of border notion, followed by contemporary policies of China and the EU, namely Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and cooperation or confrontation possibilities in intersections.

The second article is also about China. Drawing parallels between the financial crisis in 2008 and the latest coronavirus crisis, the author succeeds in illustrating how both provided opportunities for the country to extend the reach and scope of its power and influence. More specifically she questions if the Covid-19 pandemic will ultimately consolidate China's claim to superpower status in a bi-polar world?

The third article focusses on cyber space. The cyberspace is governed in an environment where decisions are taken by multiple actors, including governments, businesses, civil society, and individuals or briefly "stakeholders." This bottom-up policymaking aims to place

all stakeholders on an equal level for a decentralized governance; however, it fails to stop US government and American companies from becoming more equal than others. The author argues Before the militarization or de facto fragmentation of cyberspace will make it even harder, the U.S. has to decide to lead multinational efforts to regulate cyberspace with other states and should find ways to preserve the freedom of internet in this new system.

We have also a book review touching upon security governance. "Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences" by Christopher Daase and Cornelius Friesendorf. After the 9/11 attacks the "security governance" has become a buzzword in the security domain. There are a few empirical studies on the undesirable consequences of security governance, but there is no study on conceptualization and theorizing of the concept. In order to fill this gap Friesendorf and Daase undertake this study by organizing this book to include nine chapters contributed by security scholars. The book overall explores the unintended consequences of security governance actions and examines how to mitigate their effects.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG



Changes of The Border Notion from A Historical Perspective and China's Approach to the ENP

Tuba Yalinkilic*

Introduction

European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in a way relates to a geographical and political border concept. To understand how China looks at the EU and the world, first we need to understand China's perception of border. Accordingly, the main objective of this article is to introduce the way China views its borders. This article will focus on the changes in meaning of borders, what the effects of ENP regulations are and also how China has changed its political stance throughout history. I will refer to things that both sides avoid, are open to and those which intersect.

China has existed in the same geography for thousands of years, it has developed a more steadfast view. However, due to the rapid changes in other parts of the world China will now be challenged more on its openness towards the rest of the world. As I started writing, the question of whether China is looking at the world from this central point in international relations arose.

If China and the EU will have conflicts, this would not be caused by borders. Since they will interact due to their effects on mutual grounds, this might be the countries they work and invest in together.

China's Understanding of Border

Since our subject is regional strategy, I would like to touch upon China's perception of the region first.

In the past, China accepted itself in the center of the world which is why China classified other countries by region and distance from its own centre. China's borderlands include the boundary areas in contact and those who take part in the tributary system.

From the 3rd century BC until the end of the 19th century, what existed in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia was a hierarchical network-like political order system with China's Central Plains Empire as its core. This system was often referred to as the treaty system and the colonial system and was one of the major international relations models in the world at that time. "Space" and "power" are the two basic elements of tributary system. The tributary system includes two aspects: one is to arrange the relationship between the centre and the surrounding area according to the geographical distance; the other is to determine the obligations to the centre according to the relationship between the centre and the periphery.

* Dr. Tuba Yalinkilic Non-resident Research Fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG.




Figure 1. Sinocentric System¹

The formulation of geopolitical strategy in ancient China was mainly thinking from the inside out and it was the central thinking. For instance, The Han Dynasty focused on the bilateral relations between the Han Dynasty and the Huns, without considering the influence of the relations between the two countries and other countries or the surrounding geopolitical pattern. Moreover, there were four barbarians for Han Dynasty, yet they mention and take consider only Huns, and consider the others as foreigners. Chinese scholars² complain that this way of thinking still remains in the current geopolitical research especially for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) researches. For example, domestic geopolitical research still mainly analyses China's relations with neighboring countries based on China's interests, and there is less analysis of global geopolitical patterns.

On the other side, boundary concept started when the Qing Emperor Shihuang built the Great Wall at 3rd century B.C. Though the concept of city-state at that time was widespread, and the wall was built around the place of reign, Chinese called there

chengshi, which can be translated 'state within the wall'. The basic government scheme of former China consists of squares. This square scheme has contributed largely on China's impression and perspective of the world (and international relations).




Figure 2. "Jifu"³ (basis of tributary) System of Ancient China⁴

This square system mentioned above doesn't mean closed-door policy per se, it's just the administration concept in Chinese history. The actual closed-door policy occurred in Ming in 16th century and Qing Dynasties in 17th century. The theory and practice of the tributary system also reflected China's world-view, and played a huge role in restricting the relationship between the Qing Dynasty and the West. In the 85 years before China opened to the West in 1842, Guangzhou was the only port open to foreign trade. During this period, China's foreign relations were basically about Guangzhou trade.

China, a country with no previous trade agreement then started to pursue an Open-Door Policy from 1899/1900. They made this

agreement to allow equal trade access to the US, Japan and some European countries. The Open-Door Policy lasted 50 years, until the communist party's victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949.

Peking's foreign relations have been undermined during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). China's foreign policy has returned to a diplomacy of relative moderation with Deng Xiaoping who initiated the economic transformation of modern China after he took office in 1978. It has been deemed so successful that, starting with the seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-92), China's economic strategy is being oriented to give priority to the development of its southern and eastern coastal regions (Europa Publications, 2003).

After a series of reforms, China's approach to international relations has changed a lot nowadays. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Luo Zhaohui said that China is committed to building borders for cooperative development. Today's borders are no longer synonymous with remoteness and backwardness, but the frontiers for opening up to the outside world and the gateways to the development of strategies at The First International Boundary Cooperation Symposium 2019.

China's Approach to the ENP

The ENP is a framework for co-operation between the EU and its North African, Middle Eastern, Eastern European and Caucasian 'near abroad'. The common and central goal in relation to this whole group of countries is to promote a set of political, economic and security-related reforms (Ponjaert & Bardaro 2013).

The way the EU classifies its neighbors and

cross-border countries ('friendship ring' or 'geographic other') will further clarify China's further attitude. In the comments made so far, it is seen that China perceives the ENP rather as a manifestation of an enlargement approach. Moreover, scholars mention '2004 enlargement of the European Union' as "empire reconstruction". They add *"Today's EU enlargement to the east is to a large extent the embodiment of empire clues, so it must be subject to the logic of the rise and fall of the empire—excessive expansion leads to "security dilemmas" ... The "unity" hint has the potential to be a new historical paradigm that dominates the future of Europe but not all historical hints that arise will disappear. The future of Europe is therefore filled with turbulence and uncertainty."* (Zhang & Lai 2018).

Europe is the intersection of the "Silk Road Economic Belt", the "Maritime Silk Road" and the western end of the "Belt and Road" route system. The projects to be implemented within the framework of BRI provide China connectivity with cooperating European neighbor countries. So the attitude of the EU is of great significance to the promotion of the "Belt and Road" strategy.

China's BRI project has the potential to touch the European's interests in several industries. Through the observation of news collected in the corpus, several verbatim show the doubt and mistrust of European elites on the project "China 16 + 1", because this project seeks to diverge Western European countries' interests by exporting Chinese infrastructure to Central Europe at a low price (Arifon et al. 2019).

In a way, ENP is a border (immigration, economic, political) policy for the EU, while Eastern Europe or Europe's neighbors are

a chance for China to break its shell. In other words, Europe intends to control the boundaries, while China intends to consolidate their sphere of influence. With the following statement, General Secretary Xi Jinping confirms my opinion: *“Returning the sea of the world economy to an isolated small lake is impossible and inconsistent with the historical trend.” “China’s door to openness will not be closed, it will only open more and more.”* The report of the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed that *“to promote the formation of a new pattern of comprehensive opening up, we must focus on the construction of the ‘Belt and Road’ and insist on both import and export”*.

When we scrutinise the starting point of both the ENP and the initiatives of China on this common geography, the ENP is clearly decoupled from EU membership. As such, the ENP was not developed with the neighbours in mind, it was “the result of a process in which the EU was primarily concerned with itself” (Del Sarto & Schumacher 2005).

Although the ENP report stated that this is the main goal of maintaining a boundary with this dimension, as well as activating the relationship in these regions, China will still consider this as the EU’s project to expand the borders, and try to use the donors in its sense of counter-attack. Perhaps the first example of this can be considered as BRI. China wants to be more recognized in Central and Eastern Europe. This kind of initiative by China, which we see, is incomparable with the international attitude of ancient China. This is just like an effort to raise the baby quickly in the womb and deliver it as soon as possible because China’s perception of the world and foreign relations were not like today. The fact that it was an agricultural society, stability in the

economic cycle, living conditions naturally led to the tributary system and subsequent closure to the outside. China did not undergo its Renaissance or Reformation, nor did they experience the process of changing from traditional to modern thought. In short, Chinese traditional political thought has a development path different from that of the West.

Thus, Chinese scholars argue that China should be modernized to lead the economic world with the BRI initiative.

Caucasus: The Intersection of ENP and Chinese Policies

China frames the BRI⁵ as a new version of globalization and international relations model. Currently the relevant countries and regions of the Belt and Road Initiative have approximately 2,400 official languages and national languages. China wants to contact people directly in their native languages at the existing area.

Georgia is located on the Silk Road Economic Belt and it has an important geographical location. It is the shortest and most convenient channel between Eurasia with Europe and Asia. China is becoming a major player in the region while the Chinese language is now the third foreign language taught after English and Russian in Georgian universities. Like Georgia, other Black Sea countries; Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova has a huge amount of trade agreements with China. Even Kremlin hopes to take advantage of the BRI to develop its infrastructure, particularly in the Siberian region (Beijing has issued the possibility to use the Trans-Siberian for freight transport to Western Europe).

China has several construction projects in Georgia under the BRI. One of the projects is

"The Georgia Railway Modernization Project T9 Tunnel". Located in the Kvishkheta region of central Georgia, it will be the longest railway tunnel in the Trans-Caucasus with a total length of more than 8.3 kilometres. Upon completion of the railway in 2020, the duration from Georgia's capital Tbilisi to Black Sea Batumi will be shortened from more than 5 hours to 3 hours, and the annual railway freight capacity will also increase by 100%, which is of great significance to promoting Georgia's future economic development.

On the other hand, ENP has more inclusive projects on social aspect. Caucasasia would be a good test bed to observe how different the policies of the EU and China are. For instance, in Georgia, the EU is working on developing the education system and the labour market. More specific objective is to improve the employability of women and men in the selected regions which are far away from the city of Tbilisi. To illustrate, with the projects in Kakheti region of Akhmeta, ENP aims to improve healthcare, education and development opportunities for mothers and children and offer after-school programmes and social support to vulnerable families.

In another ENP country, Armenia in the Caucasus, ENP projects focused on human rights and legislation. The EU supports a more sustainable democracy in Armenia in the implementation of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law.

It ensures the implementation of the equal rights and equal opportunities law for women and men, including taking further steps to align legislation in this field with the EU acquis. In Armenia, the EU has a number of projects to protect social welfare, human rights and freedom of thought. These

include the safety of family members, adopts the domestic violence law; investigating the attacks and intimidation of human rights defenders and enforcing effective laws; freedom of conscience and religion works on finalizing the draft law. For example, making the judiciary more independent, improving the training of judges, reviewing the Code of Criminal Procedure and introducing legislation on torture in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention against torture; assigning a contact point to Eurojust to facilitate closer judicial cooperation; continue public administration reform by doing more to prevent and combat corruption and so on.

Unlike ENP, China's social and cultural development projects are insufficient. According to Chinese scholars, these investments will yield positive results (indirectly) in social domain.

Financing is an important incentive for the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative. The channels of financing channels include "deepening financial cooperation", "expanding bilateral currency exchange, settlement scope and scale of countries along the route", "jointly promoting the establishment of Asian infrastructure investment banks" and so on.

Chinese scholars claim that BRI will help Georgia's economy to improve quickly and to ameliorate people's livelihoods. In Georgia's "National Security Conception", maintaining long-term stable economic growth is important for its national interest component. The "National Security Conception" clearly states that the long-term low economic growth will lead to a sharp decline in national income and an increase in unemployment, which will in turn lead

to public tension and social unrest. The country’s development, stability and security will face great challenges. In order to enable the country to achieve stable and secure development, it is extremely important to maintain long-term stable economic growth (Lv 2016).

From the point of view of the Caucasus region, the studies and projects produced under ENP definitely display a much more crystallized image compared to China’s initiatives. China’s cultural activities, film festivals, tourism initiatives and fairs provide a familiarity to China and Chinese culture for the time being. Contrary to Chinese major economic inputs, ENP’s efforts seem to be more long-lasting. Based on the Caucasus example, China will be able to establish trust to the extent that it fully meets the promises of construction and investment. Moreover, China’s economic investments seem unlikely to result in as much social development as they claim in the long term. It can only bring prosperity if economic development can be achieved in the short and medium term. Although we will see the results of ENP’s social, cultural, human rights and employment projects in the long term, ENP studies are much more important in terms of permanence.

China’s Efforts

The “Belt and Road” Cultural Heritage International Cooperation Alliance was established by North-Western Polytechnic University in Xi’an on May

2019 to that end. The Alliance promotes international cooperation and people-to-people communication between the countries and regions along the “Belt and Road”. Initial members include cultural institutions such as the National Museum of Kazakhstan, the National Museum of History of Ukraine, and the National Museum of Mongolia, as well as universities and research institutions such as the University of Salento in Italy, the Polytechnic University of Madrid in Spain, and the North-Eastern University in the United States.

Under the Ministry of Culture’s “Belt and Road Cultural Development Action Plan”, the objective is to establish Chinese cultural centres in a number of countries along the proposed BRI routes. This action plan also prioritises a BRI artistic creations initiative, a BRI cultural heritage corridor, a Silk Road cultural industries belt, a BRI international co-operation action plan for the video game industry.




Figure 3. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Map⁶

China’s new rules and norms might mean a newly emerging alternative in these

countries. Scholars comment that a large number of new European stories imply that Beijing seeks to export its political values, norms, and model (Arifon et al. 2019). In fact, they are not wrong on their guess. Chinese scholar Ou Yangkang also asserts China will lead a new world with a Chinese Type of Socialism:

China has entered a new era of independently pioneering the road to socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics. The "Belt and Road" construction is an important and unique internal component of China's roads. By implementing the Belt and Road Initiative, China can not only solve its internal development problems more effectively, but also provide a more attractive Chinese solution for world modernization. (Ou 2018)

BRI is different from the Ancient Silk Road of the history when buyers came to China and demanded products. China was a market per se and the real beneficiaries of the Silk Road were middlemen. Yet with the initiatives in this century, China brings its goods to the markets all over the world at the moment, created by investments and projects. This can be explored under railway work, cultural activities, investment agreements. The Jifu system which was mentioned above looks like a rock that is already cracked. An image similar to water arc occurs on the BRI interference map. BRI map is like water flowing out of these cracks. These water currents will be one of the things ENP initiatives will encounter on the route.

Even though China was only a supplier and not a customer in ancient times, it has still left deep traces in the world. Currently China is existing with the initiatives in all over the

world, in this manner, China will surely have a lasting effect in the countries it has entered into with its investments and projects. At least China will increase its existence in ENP areas through the initiatives.

Conclusion

China is competing with Europe in the latter's doorstep though not being a neighboring country. This situation will push China to make more powerful attempts. While China expects to move more comfortably in neighboring non-EU countries, it will also confront with EU activities and thus obliged to produce more effective projects. Here I am going to put 'border' in a slightly different sense:

China is striving to break its shy (abstainer) attitude over the millennium and take an interactive stance today, that is, expanding its boundaries in international relations by breaking its usual hard shell. Transcending its economic efforts, China wants to be credited also for being a great civilization. Europe, on the other hand, strives to maintain its sphere of influence, at least around its periphery, without disrupting its power.

According to China's new approach to the international relations, China will go on initiatives all over the world. Regardless of the progress or success rate so far, China's initiatives will somehow give it the opportunity to fix its place. I think that every entrepreneurial move of Europe, or any other power, will be perceived by China as 'my turn' and will take Chinese moves further.

As in China's understand of the world⁷ since they are not physically and purposefully alienated from the existing lands, the places they will accept from now on will be the details to be built around this center.

A flow started out from these break points. The BRI initiatives also remind us of the water arc in terms of the shape on the map. The water flowing through this arc extends into the interior of Europe today. Over time, we will observe that this water causes different reactions in different parts of the world. Furthermore, the rising of theories such as 'fear of China' are the crackling noises of this break.

Until modern means of communication were invented and used, the spread of culture could only be through people, words, and specific objects. Without people and specific dissemination, even in the same era, there can be no communication and influence between different cultures (Ge 2016). And today, China has brought itself closer to this geography by living the time simultaneously with its peers and their actions.

In addition, even though China will leave a big trail, this trail can have a devastating effect on China, based on claims⁸ that the promises made so far have not been met. Partnering countries may lose trust and destroy the relations of the future that have not been implemented yet.

China has found a space for action in Europe, and in the first place, they have destroyed the fear of alienation to the world. They had the opportunity to read the dynamics of the society in this new geography. This initiative, which can be considered as the first in modern time in terms of its diameter, will appear in different ways at the point where it loses its continuity. But in any case, the best thing to do is let China exist in neighboring countries but make a strong negotiation.

Endnotes

- 1 Source: https://enacademic.com/pictures/enwiki/84/Tianxia_en-zh-hans.svg
- 2 See, for example, Wang F. L., Liu Y. G. (2019). Lun Zhongguo gudai diyuan zhanlve zhiding zhong de 'quanheng'--yi 'yantie lun' weilie (On the "balance" in the formulation of geopolitical strategy in ancient China: Taking "Salt and Iron" as an example.) *Scientia Geographica Sinica*, (39)9.
- 3 The 'Jifu' is a system of etiquette and law described in the literature of the Zhou Dynasty and the Qin and Han Dynasties. This system arranges the relationship between the center and the surrounding area based on geographical distance, and also stipulates the surrounding obligations to the center. The obedience system in the pre-Qin literature had a profound impact on the handling of internal and external relations between the dynasties of later China. A thousand miles is an area under the direct jurisdiction of Chinese Emperor. According to the close relationship with emperor, the service can be divided into multiple levels from near to far.
- 4 Source: https://m.sohu.com/a/232217953_327187
- 5 China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a multifaceted economic, diplomatic and geopolitical undertaking that. It was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2013. China establishes a Chinese-led investment program under the BRI creating a web of infrastructure, including roads, railways, telecommunications, and ports. BRI has two primary components that they form the "belt" and "road": the overland Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and the sea-based 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Silk Road Economic Belt is one of the components of Belt and Road Initiative. Xinjiang is the core region for the Silk Road Economic Belt. The other component is the 21th century Maritime Silk Road, Fujian as the core region for that.
- 6 Source: <https://www.asiagreen.com/en/news-insights/the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-rising-importance-of-china-s-western-cities>.
- 7 According to China's world conception, at the centre of the system stood China. For centuries Sino-centric world order was based on a distinction between China and barbarians.
- 8 See, for example, "Experts say that nearly four years after the initiative began most projects remain on the drawing board" (Phillips, 12/05/2017, *The Guardian*).

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The Making of a Superpower

China's Use of Crises To Deepen and Extend Power and Influence In Europe and the World

Len Ishmael*

*Standing in solidarity with countries in Europe and elsewhere in the fight against COVID-19
China scores a diplomatic coup and extends its claim to global leadership.*

Overview

In 2008 international financial markets collapsed triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA, sending shock waves around the world. The global response, led by the West, was coordinated by France and the USA supported by the G-20 (Burns, 2020). Today, a new crisis presents different sets of challenges. The contagion this time is biological not financial, and ground zero is China. The Covid-19 pandemic¹ and its associated human and economic costs is already being projected as the most severe and disruptive crisis since the Second World War.

The financial market collapse of 2008 and its effects on banking and liquidity provided the opportunity for China to extend influence and soft power through an array of strategic investments, not only in the developing world in which it already had a significant presence, but also in rich countries such as those in Europe. The country's One Belt One Road project (OBOR), supported by a number of bilateral and regional frameworks, including the 17+1 Forum in eastern Europe, and new, Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), played important roles in securing China's interests.

Even before the banking crisis of 2008, China had been quietly amassing economic and political clout beyond its regional sphere of influence. Rising standards of living backed by growing economic and financial resources had transformed the country and were also fueling its rapid rise in the international world order. Chinese-led overseas investments and development cooperation agreements provided conduits through which China extended and deepened its power and influence, in the process creating a series of client-state relationships around the world (Ishmael, 2019a). The crisis of 2008 provided opportunities for China to deepen the reach and scope of its influence. Today, as the west tries hastily to mount responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, China is flexing soft power muscle in leading a global response. In so doing, it asserts its claim to superpower status in an evolving bi-polar world order.

The Financial Collapse of 2008: A Crisis Too Good to Waste

The financial crisis of 2008 coincided with growing levels of public and private debt across much of the world. Access to cheap money, aided by a mix of innovative financing and accounting practices which masked risks

* Len Ishmael PhD Senior Fellow Policy Center for the New South.

ultimately precipitated the USA centered sub-prime mortgage crisis (Baily, 2008). While the rest of the world was engaged in profligate spending, the Chinese people had been thrifty, building unmatched levels of national reserves and undertaking strategic investments. By 2011, China had invested almost \$1.3 trillion in US bonds, making it the biggest creditor to the world's largest economy (Yongzhong & Freeman, 2013). China's reserves of \$3.3 trillion in 2012 (Yongzhong & Freeman, 2013) had grown to almost \$4 trillion by 2014, the highest levels recorded by any country (Bradsher, 2017).

When the financial crisis exploded, contagion effects spread quickly, catalyzing a sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone which pushed several European economies to the brink of collapse. Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece on Europe's southern flank, plus the Republic of Ireland, were among those most heavily impacted. Economies contracted, the middle class shrank, unemployment soared and a steady stream of young and bright talent migrated to northern Europe and other parts of the world, including Latin America, in search of jobs. Despite a massive bailout, the prospect of Greece's exit from the euro-zone (GREXIT), seemed imminent.²

In a bid to reduce its own high-level exposure to US capital markets, despite the European sovereign debt crisis, China commenced a process of asset diversification by purchasing European bonds (Bradsher, 2017). As state owned capital infrastructure and other assets were put on the market in response to bail-out conditions imposed by the Troika³, these were purchased by China. In so doing, commanding stakes were acquired in state owned assets in Greece, for example, including Piraeus, the country's largest sea port, together with Athens airport and vital railways (Ishmael, 2019a).

Investments were also made in infrastructure and industrial sectors in the poorer countries on Europe's eastern borders.

By 2018 Europe ranked as the top destination for Chinese investment flows (Tartar, 2018). Within a relatively short period, China had amassed a growing arsenal of infrastructure and assets vital to Europe's integration, providing the means to project itself into the heart of the European Union (EU).

COVID - 19: Opportunity to Consolidate Influence & Power

In December 2019 the news of viral pneumonia cases caused by an unknown pathogen in the city of Wuhan, in China's Hubei province, broke around the world (Yoon, 2020). Speculation that the likely source could be China's wet markets (Li, 2020) was subsequently confirmed by scientists (Marcus, 2020). When China imposed draconian measures aimed at containment on millions of its citizens, the world took notice. Such measures indicated that there was reason for serious concern, but the measures themselves were repudiated as being symptomatic of China's authoritarian rule, an impression reinforced by the lack of information from Chinese officials during the early stages of the crisis.

Three months later, containment measures largely successful, the people of Wuhan are taking tentative steps to resume normal life. Quarantine measures are expected to be lifted by April 8th. In the meantime, infections have spread world-wide, the epicenter of the crisis has moved from China to Europe and hotspots have appeared in the USA. Fatalities in Italy and Spain have already both surpassed China's (Mayberry, Stepansky & Gadzo, 2020)⁴ and the Covid-19 outbreak has officially been listed a pandemic (Luthi, 2020). The decoupling of global supply chains and interruptions to

world trade and commerce sparked by the US-China trade war which started in July 2018, has deepened. Many countries have imposed lockdown conditions on all but essential activities, and borders have been closed in the face of an invisible enemy.

In response to urgent requests for support from European and other countries, China has mounted and leads the global response, sharing not only its own experience in managing the crisis, but also providing vital supplies, equipment and personnel. This comes at a time when the USA seems not only to have been slow in its initial assessment of the threat, but also ill prepared and equipped to ratchet up its national response quickly and efficiently.

The Chinese were the first to respond to Italy's urgent calls for assistance, sending critically needed support and the first of 300 intensive care doctors to the beleaguered country (Rachman, 2020). A coordinated response has been initiated with central and eastern European countries through the 17+1 Chinese-led intergovernmental forum.⁵ Serbia's President Aleksandar Vucic refers to Chinese President Xi Jinping as "a brother and a friend," and China, "the only country that can help us. (Penney, 2020)"

China manufactures between 40-50 per cent of the world's production of surgical face masks and has significantly expanded capacity to meet increasing world demand (Mitchell & Liu, 2020). It has been reported that more than 1.8 million masks have been sent to Italy and Spain, 1 million gloves and masks have been sent to France, and that both Poland and the Netherlands have also received supplies (Ibid). Teams of Chinese doctors, medical supplies and equipment have now been sent to several countries in Europe and the rest of the world.⁶

China is also leading the regional response in south-east Asia and has pledged to build Africa's first center for disease control in Addis Ababa on the grounds of the African Union (AU) headquarters which it had previously funded and constructed as a gift to the continent, in 2012 (ENA, 2020) The country's private sector is also engaged in this effort. The Jack Ma and Alibaba Foundations have sent hundreds of thousands of testing kits and millions of masks to the USA and have announced significant supplies for distribution to every country in Africa, as well as countries in Asia, including India.⁷ China's President has identified this concerted effort at solidarity as part of the "Health Silk Road" initiative launched in September 2017 as a component of the OBOR project through which it sought engagement as a major actor in global health issues (Editorial, 2017).

The Chinese display of leadership, efficiency and capacity is undeniable. In the process, the country has blunted the early criticism regarding the absence of adequate information sharing. Importantly, China's assistance to Italy came at a time of considerable Italian frustration at the lack of support provided by the rest of its EU neighbors, though EU support has since been scaled up. This was followed by European Central Bank (ECB's) President Lagarde's remark, that the central bank's mandate was not "to close spreads," which sent Italy's stock market tumbling (Smith, 2020). In addition, memories of the European migration crisis of 2015 during which Italy struggled to manage the waves of refugees and migrants seeking safe haven, are still fresh and raw, adding to the sense of isolation.

During the financial crisis, it was China who provided the lifeline of much needed investment financing into Europe's struggling southern and eastern economies, a point which

is not lost today, and one which in the past has undermined EU policy coherence especially in relation to EU policies on China (Ishmael, 2019a). *As EU member states remain locked in discussions regarding the nature and shape of support measures, China has once again stepped swiftly into the breach inserting a wedge in the oftentimes difficult relationship between southern and eastern European countries and their western and northern neighbors.*

The Intervening Years: 2008 - 2020

China was able to exploit opportunities presented by the crisis of 2008 not only as a result of having been thrifty, but also due to the strength of its economy. By 2008 China's presence as an economic powerhouse was being felt in many parts of the world. The country's insatiable demand for raw materials drove a commodity boom in mineral rich countries. Its manufacturing sector flooded markets with cheap goods. Modernization of its economy and the opening of various sectors to foreign investment combined with relatively low wages and the skills of the world's largest labor force, quickly turned the "Made in China" label, the world's most common.

Over a very short period China had also become the first or second trading partner for most of the world's countries (Ishmael, 2019b). In the process, the country had become an engine of global growth and output, recording double digit levels of domestic growth and lifting millions out of poverty (Ishmael, 2019a). As credit constraints compromised export markets following the collapse of global financing, domestic demand from China's growing middle classes kept the economy afloat. Though formerly impressive double-digit growth rates dipped to levels lower than had been experienced in the preceding two decades, Gross Domestic Growth (GDP) growth still averaged 6-7% per year⁸, relatively

low rates for China, but enviable for much of the world.

The need to secure markets for China's over capacity in several sectors including steel, cement and aluminum, prompted China's President Xi to launch the OBOR project in 2013 (Hancock, 2017). While the project includes initiatives relative to the energy sector, a big thrust has been the development of infrastructure corridors linking ports, highways and railways in integrated sea and land networks across more than 60 countries in Central Asia, Africa and Europe, to facilitate greater trade efficiencies (Huang, 2017). The OBOR has been labelled the world's largest project since the Marshall Plan to rebuild western Europe after world War II.⁹

For many years, emerging economies, including China, had agitated for greater levels of influence in the Bretton Woods¹⁰ and other institutions of global governance commensurate with their growing contribution to world growth and output. Frustrated in its own efforts to create change, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016 with a mix of both developing and developed countries as founding members.¹¹ Despite US pressure on its allies to forgo membership, close to 100 countries, many of them American allies, are today members of the Bank which provides more capital for infrastructure projects than the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) combined (Ishmael, 2019a).

China's growing weight as an economic power has been accompanied by an increasing assertiveness geopolitically, and greater willingness to assume responsibilities of global leadership both of which have coincided with implementation of the USA's "America First" policy. The latter, in place over the last three years, has effectively resulted in a US retreat

from leadership positions in several global fora and institutions which it had designed, and previously shaped and led, with the support of allies. The American stance with respect of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for example, contributed to the demise of the organization's dispute settlement mechanism and has cast its future in doubt. The US has also withdrawn its membership of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) among others, and has also withdrawn from a number of agreements in which it previously had played a pivotal role, including the Paris Climate Accord and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Program) to name a few.

America's retreat has created a leadership vacuum on the world stage which China has quickly commandeered. In response to pronouncements of 'America First' policies as these relate to global trade, President Xi spoke of China's commitment to principles of free trade and globalization in Davos, in January 2017 (Barkin & Piper, 2017).¹² The Chinese President met with France's President Macron, Germany's Chancellor Merkel and EU Commission President Juncker for an unprecedented summit at the Elysee Palace on March 24th 2019 at which he reiterated China's solidarity in promoting the Paris Climate Accord and principles of multilateralism.¹³ China also continued to work with Europe in attempting to salvage the Iranian Nuclear Agreement (Ishmael, 2019b).

While China has gone to great lengths to portray itself as a steady and reliable partner, the USA's America First policies have resulted in a framework for unilateral decision making which has proven to be unsettling for her allies. The US's abrupt decision to withdraw troops from Syria in January 2020, for example,

caught allies by surprise. The US-China trade war which started in July 2018 with the announcement of US tariffs on steel allegedly aimed at China, instead caught America's allies unprepared. While Chinese steel exports to the USA are small, the largest share of American steel imports are from her allies: Canada, Japan, South Korea, Mexico and Europe (Ishmael, 2019a).

The perception of American unreliability has left Europeans of the view that the continent must formulate decisions with respect of foreign policy, defense, security and relations with China, which are in its best interests (Islam, 2018). This growing sensibility has spilled over into US attempts to persuade allies to curtail China's Huawei involvement in 5G roll-out in western economies. European countries, including the UK for example, while concerned about the lack of viable alternate systems to compete with Huawei on quality and price are also fully alert to China's status as a trade, commercial and investment partner of vital importance to their economies. They are also weary of following America's lead to the detriment of their own national strategic interests (Morrison, 2020).

Countries within China's regional sphere of influence in south-east Asia have additional cause for apprehension. Several, like South Korea, have important security treaties with the USA but China is their most important commercial partner and also the dominant power in their own backyard. Leaders like Singapore's Prime Minister Lee have indicated strong reservations with respect of any suggestions that they choose between the two dominant world powers, firm in the view that *"this would be bad for the world."* (Ting, 2019)"

The Covid-19 pandemic has done little to dispel the concern among American allies that America First policies will be deployed,

even when the interests of allies are at stake. President Trump's announcement of the closure of American borders to European travelers with seemingly little consultation with Europe, took European leaders by surprise and came at a period when cooperation between allies under stressful conditions, would have been much valued (BBC, 2020). Today it is China, supported by Russia and Cuba, who is consulting with American allies in Europe and elsewhere, and leading the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

From Russia, and Cuba, With Love

Despite sanctions imposed by Europe since 2014, on March 22, 2020, nine military Russian aircraft loaded with supplies and medical personnel left Moscow for Italy in response to an urgent request from Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte for support. Messages of solidarity from the Russian people, "From Russia with Love," were emblazoned on the aircraft fuselage (Foy & Peel, 2020). Russian delivery was being shipped while the EU, in the midst of its own unfolding crisis, was still attempting to agree a region-wide response, helping to feed Italy's sense of isolation and raising questions about European solidarity the latter brusquely dismissed by Serbia's President: "European solidarity does not exist (Ibid)." Meanwhile, for Russia, the pandemic provides an opportunity for the Russian State to seek out friends in Europe.

Cuba has provided doctors and other medical personnel to Italy, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Suriname and Grenada, upholding its home-crafted model of medical diplomacy for which it is well known (Latina, 2020). The extraordinary Cuban efforts in supporting public health sectors and providing training for thousands of medical professionals over the decades, are debts which the tiny countries of the Caribbean can never repay.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic is far from over. Many countries are bracing for the surge in new infections. The EU is not deaf to the troubling questions which have been raised regarding European solidarity and is aware of the contours of the geopolitical landscape within which the pandemic is being played out. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell Fontelles speaks of the need to demonstrate that the *"EU shows it is a Union that protects and that solidarity is not an empty phrase,"* summing up the support provided to the various European countries as one bound up in competing narratives, *"including a struggle for influence through spinning and the 'politics of generosity."* (EEAS Blog, 2020)"

The Covid-19 pandemic has also exposed differences in the ability of states to organize and manage the engines of economic production and the freedoms enjoyed by citizens under different political systems. In an article examining China's response to the virus, a Financial Times columnist relates a conversation with a Chinese political commentator in January 2020, in which the latter posited that, "state capacity and a collective culture are the two uniquely strong characteristics of China's political system... that will ultimately enable the country to successfully combat this crisis. (Rachman, 2020)" It is difficult to dispute such an assessment.

China's ability to clamp down on the movement of millions of its citizens very early on, turned out to be an important factor in its ability to contain the virus both in terms of rates of infection and fatalities, despite the scale of its population. Images of deserted streets in Hubei province at the beginning of those measures contrast starkly with those of hundreds of

people crammed on Australia's Bondi beach, college students partying and enjoying spring break on Florida beaches, ("corona virus or no corona virus"), and hundreds out in city parks in London and elsewhere, even while measures relating to social distancing were already in place.¹⁴ While countries like the USA invoke wartime powers contained in the Defense Production Act (Bushey, Johnson & Stacey, 2020) to compel private companies to switch production in times of national emergencies, others, like China, are able to dramatically expand or command shifts in production processes, not only because of the level of state control over critical economic assets, but also as a result of the real threat of the sanctions which obtain with failure to support State policies (McGregor, 2020).

For some time now, there has been a growing sense that economic power is shifting from west to east (Ishmael, 2019a). Today, the scales of geopolitical power seem also to be tipping in the same direction. The degree of this tilt, like all else to do with power, is hard to measure. There is the view that, *"the last global crisis - the financial meltdown of 2008 - triggered a loss of western self-confidence and a shift in political and economic power towards China. The coronavirus of 2020 could force a much bigger shift in the same direction"* (Rachman, 2019)" Others are somewhat more definitive: *"the coronavirus could reshape the Global order."* (Campbell & Doshi, 2020)"

Whatever happens, there seems to be general agreement that the world will not be the same. China has proven adept at turning crises into opportunities; both words are organically linked in their language. The Chinese words crisis and opportunity possess one character in common, imparting an understanding that crises contain the seeds of opportunity (De-Freitas, 2020). The financial crisis and the

coronavirus pandemic have both provided opportunities which China has seized and used as means to extend the reach and scope of its power and influence. Could the Covid-19 pandemic be the crisis which ultimately consolidates China's claim to superpower status in a bi-polar world? Time will tell.

Endnotes

- 1 The World Health Organization officially labeled the Covid-19 virus as a pandemic on March 11, 2020.
- 2 Since 2010, Greece has undergone three bailouts worth a total of nearly €310 billion (\$360 billion). The aid money was made available to Greece's government from other euro-zone member states and the International Monetary Fund over the past eight years <https://qz.com/1311113/how-much-money-has-greece-received-in-three-bailouts/>
- 3 The Troika included the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. the group responsible for overseeing the terms of bailouts extended in the European Union.
- 4 Kate Mayberry, Joseph Stepansky and Merisha Gadzo. Italy reports 602 new coronavirus deaths: Live updates. As of March 24, Italy's death toll stood at 6077 with numbers infected rising to 63, 928. AlJazeera.com. March 24 2020. This compares to total deaths in China of 3200 and an infection rate of more than 80,000. Deaths top 16,500; Lockdowns Dent Europe's Economy: Virus Update. Bloomberg News. March 24, 2020.
- 5 The 17+1 configuration is an intergovernmental forum established by China as a mechanism to engage with 17 countries in Europe 13 of whom are EU members, on promoting investment and business relations.
- 6 To date, Chinese support has been received by France, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Serbia Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Latin America and the Caribbean.
- 7 Jack Ma, Alibaba Foundations, donate to seven more Asian countries to fight COVID-19. Arab News. March 30, 2020. <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1649226/world>.
- 8 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-poll/chinas-growth-set-to-slow-to-63-per-cent-in-2019-more-stimulus-seen-reuters-poll-idUSKCN1PB0AZ>.
- 9 China's OBOR project has been billed as the world's largest overseas undertaking by a single country since the Second World War.
- 10 Bretton woods institutions include the World Bank and International Monetary Fund established at a meeting of 43 countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA in July 1944 to help rebuild the postwar economy and to promote international economic cooperation in the rebuilding of western Europe after the Second World War. <https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/01/art-320747/>
- 11 Founding members of the AIIB apart from China include: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Myanmar, the Philippines, Pakistan, Australia, Britain, France, Germany and Spain. On July 13, 2019, the AIIB announced meeting an important milestone that of hitting the 100-member mark. <https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2019/AIIB-reaches-100-member-milestone.html>.
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Who will Govern the Cyberspace? A Debate on Multi-stakeholderism vs. Multilateralism

Bora Aslan*

Abstract

Today, cyberspace is governed in an environment where decisions are taken by multiple actors, including governments, businesses, civil society, and individuals or briefly “stakeholders.” This bottom-up policymaking aims to place all stakeholders on an equal level for a decentralized governance; however, it fails to stop US government and American companies from becoming more equal than others, a problem that bothers roughly more than half of the world governments. These governments, led by Russia and China, demand to reshape the governance of internet on a multilateral base under the UN umbrella to obtain an authoritative role and sovereignty zones in the so-called borderless and open-to-all internet. Before the militarization or de facto fragmentation of cyberspace will make it even harder, the US has to decide to lead multinational efforts to regulate cyberspace with other states and should find ways to preserve the freedom of internet in this new system.

Keywords: cyberspace, cyber security, governance of internet, multilateral governance, multistakeholder governance.

Introduction

The invention of internet revolutionized our world view in many ways. Using notions drawn from the history of economics, some economists name it as the “Third Industrial Revolution.” For security studies, this space has already become the “Fifth Domain” in addition to those of land, sea, air and space. Some people even dare to claim that cyberspace is going to be a “Parallel Universe” in the “not so far” future. Almost every company, institution and government has been forced to reshape themselves to meet the physical and virtual requirements of internet. This new connector of activities made a significant progress in the last decade of the 20th century and with the new millennium these technologies started to affect all walks of life. The internet became more and more integrated into peoples’ lives

every single day, and not only individuals but also societies became more interconnected. Digital networks have gradually been the backbone of economies, governments, militaries, academia, and societies. The virtual space where this network operates and the infrastructure where the connection between computer systems occurs is called “cyber space” (Goodman, 2018). The impacts of the use of this space have also been catalyst for the globalization through its ability to enable people to communicate without any borders, in other words; interconnection of cultures and ideologies on an unimaginable speed and intensity.

The use of internet has become so widespread that it is likened to the biggest country in Mihr’s words; “If cyberspace were a country, it would be the largest and most populated in the world, albeit one without any constitutions

* Bora Aslan is a PhD candidate at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia.

or government.” (Mihr, 2014) The last part of Mihr’s sentence refers to the lack of a common regulation, regime, or set of rules in the cyberspace which is in perfect fit with the very nature of the largely non-organized way of the development of the internet. Here comes the question of many: “Is there any problem with structure?”

Multi-Stakeholder Governance Model

The answer to the above question depends on how we look at it. From a technical perspective, the cyberspace is governed almost flawless. It is not easy to see complaints about the ill-governance of internet. If we see through the lenses of Joseph Nye, we will not see an organized chaos but a grand order which he calls a “regime complex.” In the traditional understanding, a “regime” is either an institution or a set of institutionalized practices that function in accordance with a set of norms or rules. The current use of the word in international relations refers to the international agencies that lie out of the control of the governments. In this meaning, there is obviously not a single regime governing cyberspace, but it hosts a big deal of large/small, formal/informal regimes seen in the chart below that is created by Jo-

seph S. Nye in 2014.

Nye’s chart is a good starting point to understand the current framework of internet governance and the regime complex. In an effort to explain the chart better, Judy Towers lists the organizations on this chart in four groups (Towers, 2014). First one being “Authoritative Organizations” (located at the center) which have the authority to create the standards and policies and make changes to implement those to function the internet better. The most important one is “ICANN” that I will discuss in detail later in this article. The second group is “Coalition Organizations” as Government Groupings who have joined together upon the same goals for internet governance. “Forum organizations,” the third group, are shaped by the conferences that are attended by government, regulatory, and coalition organizations, including entities in advisory roles from the technical and academic communities. The last group, “the Advisory Role organizations” - not included in this chart - suggested by Towers aims to aid or impact governments and other institutions on issues related to internet. Nye’s “Regime Complex” explains this multifaceted structure of internet governance below;




Figure 1: The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities

“a set of loosely coupled norms and institutions ranking somewhere between an integrated institution that imposes regulation through hierarchical rules, and highly fragmented practices with no identifiable core and non-existent linkages.” (Nye, 2014)

At this point, it would be best to start explaining the “multi-stakeholder governance” approach which fits pretty well in this definition of regime complex(es.) The multi-stakeholder governance is an environment where decisions are taken by governments, businesses, civil society, and individuals in coordination, placing all of these bodies on an equal level for a decentralized governance model and based on bottom-up policymaking. It needs to be said that frameworks for this kind of a transnational governance already exist in sectors like financial regulation, environmental policy, and global health all of which cannot be managed on a national basis. In cyberspace, this governance method also aims to mimic the “borderless and open-to-all” nature of internet (Raymond, 2018). Authority over distinct functions are distributed among various actors and there is a general lack of an authoritative role for states. Multi-stakeholder governance stresses the assumed effort to bring all stakeholders to the table and it has evolved alongside the internet and as the hallmark of its governance as the “internet model.”

One of the authoritative institutions on cyber governance, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has always been a hotly debated institution of this governance model, and it is the best example to clarify the multiple participant governance as a “heterogeneous polyarchy.” Robert Dahl describes it as a “system of governance in which power is invested in numerous actors, a theory based on the assumption of popular sovereignty and political equality (C. Kurre,

2017). ICANN was formed in 1998 as a not-for-profit, public-benefit organization to operate the internet’s “Domain Name System,” and allocate (or coordinate the allocation) and assign the Internet’s Protocol addresses, which means in general that ICANN is responsible for coordinating the procedures of cyber world and ensuring the network’s stable and secure operation (Dissertation, 2012). Currently, this private sector organization, based in California, manages and oversees the most critical foundations of the internet with legal status under US law. This issue makes national governments more interested in ICANN policy decisions since internet policy intersects with national laws in various cases as intellectual property, privacy, law enforcement, and cybersecurity. ICANN, as the prototype of the multi-stakeholder governance, is also criticized for its features like insufficient government participation, too much American government oversight, lacking legitimacy, and its contractual relationship with the US government.

As it is seen in the ICANN discussion, not all see the cyberspace through the lenses of Nye. The qualities of the overall governance of cyber space seem a functioning chaos where all sorts of actors are trying to define the rules or turn their own particular interests into codes of action so that they can enlarge their space for action to obtain more resources. The term “functioning chaos” (Zeng, 2017) is used to point to the decentralized architecture and distribution of power to the periphery and individual users, namely multi-stakeholder governance. The concerns of the opponents of the multi-stakeholder governance will be discussed later on. What they suggest instead of the current system is called “multilateral governance model.”

Multilateral Governance Model

Multilateralism is an institutional form found-

ed to coordinate the relations among three or more states in accordance with pre-determined and generalized principles of conduct. The use of the term after the second World War focused mainly on opposing unilateral acts or bilateral arrangements made to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak. Multilateralism initially aimed to decrease international conflict by the use of global governance of the “many” as defined by Miles Kahler (Brotman, 2015). At the time when it was presented, states in the whole world were gathering around different tables, as the sole legal actors, on the basis of the Westphalian Order. What the proponents of multilateralism demand today is the same thing; making states the only actors and build a governance for greater multilateral and top-down administration of the internet in the name of social order, national sovereignty, and tighter control of information flows. The keyword here is “sovereignty.” Sovereign nations are demanding control over “networks and data” of internet in the global context. They are asking for the establishment of a “multinational, democratic, and transparent” governance of cyberspace through an agency founded under the umbrella of the United Nations, leaving transnational corporations, NGOs, scientists, or law experts, only in a consultative role. (Demchak & Dombrowski, 2011)

To put the sides of the debate more concretely, I named the multi-stakeholder camp as the “status quoists” and the multilateralism camp as the “revisionists.” In this debate, United States, Europe, and other Western countries (including Japan and South Korea) are on the status quo side and Third World countries (or Group of 77) led clearly by China and Russia on the other side. Latter allies are found among relatively less powerful countries in terms of internet development and they constitute the majority in terms of numbers of countries.

On the other camp, even though Europeans insist more on the states’ role as the defender of the interests of citizens, the US has the support of the group that resists the purely inter-governmental governance approach. In this context, status quoists need to preserve the current situation of decentralized/distributed, global/transnational internet governance and management of the worldwide internet architecture the way it rests in the hands of a worldwide cluster of industry, academic, and non-governmental actors. Revisionists are trying to change the governance into a more centralized form which is supposed to function on national sovereignty based intergovernmental platforms. Revisionists are not only trying to improve the management, but “internet” itself since the change they offer is a move to end the very nature of the internet as an open-to-all, borderless, worldwide medium. Their ostensible demand is giving national governments a larger role in managing the global internet. This will unite all the governance of the internet under one specific agency or preferably turn International Telecommunication Union (ITU) into the basic organization for the construction of the new global Internet governance system. ITU is a specialized agency of United Nations responsible for coordinating the shared global use of the radio spectrum, satellite orbits, and worldwide technical standards while improving the telecommunication infrastructure in the developing world. The only actors on this union are the states.

Academic Debate over Cyber Governance

The origins of this engaging and controversial debate go back to the revisionist demands that came first in the form of security concerns. A letter sent by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to the UN Secretary-general in 1998 may be the first visible move. It was noted in this letter that the creation of information

weapons could cause serious security threats, and Russia wants to develop international law regimes to prevent the misuse of information technologies and ensure global stability and security (Glen, 2014). Ivanov compared the destructive effects of the information weapons to that of the weapons of mass destruction. A draft resolution on “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” was also attached to the letter. US position after the letter was trying to dismiss this Russian aspiration to establish information security as an essential aspect of international peace. US was successful at this effort thanks to the support of other developed countries, but Russian security concerns have turned out to be right by their own cyberattacks against Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine. However, revisionist worries about the need for international cyber regime were also justified by US governments’ misuse of the current cyber governance.

First prominent misuse “.iq Domain Name” occurred in 2002. A grand jury of the US indicted a private company “Infocom” on charges that they exported computer equipment to Libya and Syria. ICANN had granted this company the responsibility to register web addresses for Iraq, and it was ensuring that internet traffic is properly routed under Iraq’s domain name .iq. The jury put the “.iq” domain on ice and ended the existence of all servers in cyberspace (Raymond, 2018). In 2005, an official report produced by the United Nations working group on internet governance pointed out that Domain Names System root zone files and systems were under “unilateral control by the United States Government.”

The second prominent and more (in)famous event was the PRISM Scandal where the National Security Agency of the US was caught red handed in 2015 cyber spying throughout

the world. A former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee Edward Snowden had revealed NSA’s network monitoring action on the grounds of national security through the PRISM program. These two events proved that US could maintain sovereignty control over the of ICANN’s regulatory authority and make other sovereign nations’ network facilities legitimate targets by its ruling over internet giants like Google, Facebook, Microsoft etc. This means double standards when it comes to the concept of Internet sovereignty.

Theoretical Aspects of the Debate on Cyber Governance

Anarchy and Sovereignty

In this aspect of the debate, I suggest that the revisionists resort to the realist arguments or discourse; status quo, on the other side, resorts to liberalism. Both sides try to define the framework of the debate using the way they read the world. Realists view the cyberspace as an anarchic system, apparently with no governing body or police force, and the internet perfectly fits their security model. They declare the cyberspace as the new international battlefield where every state stands alone or with its allies, and no one can be fully trusted. Every actor should build up its cyber strength, knowing that every breakthrough by another state poses a vital threat to security (Musiani, 2014). But seeing that not only governments but also non-state actors and even individuals are capable of orchestrating an attack on cyberspace, they admit that “government alone cannot secure cyberspace,” and propose alternative governance in China’s Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2nd World Internet Conference;

“...to respect each country’s right to choose its own internet development path, its own internet management model, its own public policies on the Internet,

and to participate on an equal basis in the governance of international cyberspace – avoiding cyber-hegemony and avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other countries.”

Jinping expresses the core demand of the revisionist camp to reduce the threats imposed by this anarchic environment, a Cyber Westphalia where the nations’ governments have a cyber-sovereignty. He can see that this space is not getting along well with the borders of states. He is asking for the Westphalian order in realist definition, and this is where the theoretical debate starts, defining this new space in old terms: “Territoriality, Autonomy, Control and Mutual Recognition” (Jayawardane et al., 2015). He requests territoriality to describe the edges of his jurisdiction over cyberspace without risking external conflict. This territory is supposed to be giving him the capability to alter the cyberspace experienced by its own citizens, and also the autonomy to impose its will in this territory with respect to its own citizens. We see states such as France and Australia creating rules of oversight for their own citizens and procedures with the power of law to be implemented on national telecommunications firms. This approach turns the national telecommunications regulators and firms to the skirmishers in the frontline of their borders in cyberspace (Cattaruzza, Danet, Tailat, & Laudrain, 2016). “Control” in cyberspace means the monopoly of a state on the use of “force.” Cyberspace, in its current form, profoundly challenges traditional notions of the monopoly of force as it requires a state to stop or punish harm to its society that comes through cyber mechanisms. Mutual recognition means that states recognize the autonomy, territoriality, and monopoly of force of other states in cyberspace (Jayawardane & Larik, 2015).

Liberals attack these realist efforts for us-

ing 18th-century technology to deal with the 21st-century problems. They name these definitions useless as cyberspace is destroying the link between geographic location and the power of local governments to assert control over its citizens or the ability of a physical location to give notice of which set of rules apply. Likewise, the legitimacy of the efforts of a local sovereign to enforce the laws applicable to this “global phenomena” is questionable. Pushing hard to this end will result in the contradiction with the concept of unrestricted inter-connectivity, and the need for the involvement of multi-stakeholders will finally outweigh all other benefits expected from multilateral governance. Liberalists also argue that the struggle of each country to set up a separate cyberspace of its own, will result in the fragmentation of the internet and destroy the spirit of the internet.

Realists have a quick answer to these concerns: Transition to Cyber Westphalia is already happening, so we need to regulate it. China and several other states are trying to assert their technological sovereignty by designing a protected public internet with limited connection to the outer cyberspace (Zeng, 2017). Germany started to see its monopoly of control, autonomy, and territoriality on relying German-only technologies. Russia is defining a “.ru” internal cyberspace that is only open to Russian citizens and can be filtered, or functions through the permission or blockings of the state (Drezner, 2004). In general, the return of states and the new notion of cyber sovereignty is an inevitable trend for realists.

Dictators Dilemma

What stops nations, and why do they not declare their sovereignty over the internet? “Dictators Dilemma” (Slack & Slack, 2016) explains this with the difficulties of finding the right balance between economic development and

political freedom, especially in authoritarian states. Power holders with a weak society face the core issue of taking the risk of jeopardizing economic development by isolating its network and cutting the country from outside influence. Sustaining economic growth is vital for any political power

In the speech of French President Nicholas Sarkozy at 2012 G8 meeting we meet another aspect of leaders' relative incompetence in cyberspace while he was pointing to the executives of Google, Facebook, Amazon, etc. and saying:

“The universe you represent is not a parallel universe. Nobody should forget that governments are the only legitimate representatives of the will of the people in our democracies. To forget this is to risk democratic chaos and anarchy.”

Legitimacy

On the surface, Sarkozy was complaining about the lack of democratic legitimacy in cyberspace but indeed, this complaint is about the redistribution of power. From the legitimacy perspective, when we take democracy as a result of an electoral process (Poelert, 2017), we do not see an election system for the new governors of the cyberspace. Financially and technologically powerful states find ways to make their voices heard, but many states remain largely outside the existing dialogue about international efforts to regulate cyberspace. And the representation of the new demographics is another problem when the 700 million internet users in China are taken into consideration. In the multi-stakeholder system, the private sector obviously benefits from cyberspace more than public thanks to their expertise regarding the internet, and it raises more questions on the legitimacy of the current system dominated by the (mostly US-based)

private sector. Also, at the institutional level, revisionists expect the international organizations of internet governance to inevitably go through a legitimacy crisis, which will result in difficulties in maintaining the status quo. Liberals draw attention to the danger of such a system where the regimes and organizations governed only by governmental stakeholders will lose legitimacy and effectiveness, in the long run, thanks to the lack of participation of the major actors of the cyberspace: companies, organizations and powerful netizens (Katrandjiev, 1997).

Security

Realists indicate to different security aspects of an ungoverned (governed by multi-stakeholder approach) internet. For authoritarian states, it is mostly about securing the regime, and it is a domestic insecurity issue related to state-society relations. Internet, in this current borderless form, is seen as a tool for an “invasion” of Western liberal ideas like the democracy that brings into question the legitimacy of the authoritarian governments (Kello, 2013). Social and political movements, cyberattacks, hacktivism, cybercrime, cyber spying, and misuse of personal data are challenging the governments continually on social, economic, and cultural domains (Goodman, 2018). The solution is united governance of cyberspace under an intergovernmental institution. Liberalists do not see the introduction of western values to different societies as a threat, but for other lawless cyber activities, they admit the difficulties of launching an international organization composed of states and non-state actors dedicated to the preservation of cybersecurity but still keeping their support for a system based on the current one since it gives the opportunity to the private sector to reveal its capabilities, offer methods to identify its cyber activity and share defensive technologies they developed.

This is the key to lessen the uncertainty for liberals.

Hegemony and Power

Both sides see the US as reproducing its domination over the world in the digital age as a hegemon over cyberspace for its technological superiority, its role as the creator of the internet, and for being home to the central governing bodies and private giants of the internet. Following this kind of reading, realists expect a “balancing.” In cyberspace governance case, it does not come in the form of balancing against the powerful; we see EU siding by the US. Instead, it looks like more a balance of threat since states balance against the one they see as a threatening actor. In the status quo side, allies to the US who share fundamental values and have interest in aligning with the dominant power in cyberspace benefit from joint efforts. However, their alliance is not forever. After Snowden leaks, the strike down of the Safe Harbor Agreement which was allowing the US companies to transfer personal data from EU citizens highlighted a change of stance by European States and institutions concerning their interests in cyberspace. Through the hegemonic reading we can still say that the rest of the western world see band-wagoning, namely aligning with the dominant power in cyberspace, as the best way to benefit from it. For scholars from realist camp, both situations entail a risk of “balkanization” in the meaning of uncontrolled state fragmentation in an infinity of smaller territories (Cattaruzza, Danet, Taillat, & Cyr, 2016). This fragmentation is expected to threaten the security and integrity of the internet itself, not only against individual freedom. They see inclusive multilateral governance as a solution which could lead to the realization of an international treaty on cyberspace sovereignty (Poelert, 2017). For them, the only way to build trust on the international

stage is to allow each state to formulate its own strategies to rule its own “cyber-territory” to enhance collective security over the internet.

A multilateral international institution, in the form of membership, can give small powers a voice and influence by binding powerful nations and corporations, and discouraging unilateralism. Small powers might apply “Lilliputian strategy” by banding together to collectively bind a larger power otherwise they could not stop. Giving small powers means to achieve control through collective action can also tame powerful states. Through multilateralism, one great power can also influence another great power who seeks control through bilateral ties. This kind of an effort will be made costly since it may require bargaining and cooperation with the other great power. Powerful states might enjoy the benefits of writing the rules and designing privileges for themselves such as veto vote and special status (Singh, 1999)

Global Commons

Seeing a hegemon in the cyberspace and taking internet as created and presented to the whole world by this hegemon, liberals’ internet, and cyberspace as a public good that has currently two characteristics: Non-excludable and non-rivalrous. US created the technology and the network logic of internet and administers it without excluding any country from use and the way this network operates does not let the use of a country to reduce availability to other countries. This is obviously the definition of a public good and in this sense internet and cyberspace is a public good. To get more does not mean that others get less, and so far as US, a hegemon of this field, does not try to exclude any actors from joining this space, and it is devoted to keeping the internet open, free, and without division by sovereignty (C. M. Kurre, 2017). In this sense, liberals do not see any benefit in the

existence of “national segments” for the good of humanity. But for others, US is no longer defending the idea of a global public domain and exploiting her hegemonic power on this space in many more cases than I have mentioned in this article. Revisionist camp treat the notions of common good and public domain with suspicion as ideas created by the global hegemons to strengthen their technological, political, and cultural superiority (Mihr, 2014). For revisionists, US acts on PRISM and iq.domain issues prove that when the US gathers countries’ online data or interferes with other countries’ cyber policies, it sees cyberspace as a public domain. When it wants to increase online supervision or enhance public-private cooperation domestically, then it either thinks that cyberspace is a sovereign sphere, and the US has the right for jurisdiction over privately-owned Internet infrastructures (Xinmin, 2015).

Anonymity

Liberalists draw attention to the “failed states” in a cybered world which could not build effective authority and capability in cyberspace or achieve only partial sovereignty over borders in cyberspace but lack enforcement tools. They might find ways to succeed in projecting offensive cyber power and begin spending resources to develop cyber weapons to have an asymmetrical advantage against their adversaries. This is the diplomatic nightmare of multilateral efforts because it gives a state the ability to attack another without a single trace of the attack’s origin. In this case, states fearing imminent, unknown attacks will lose their trust to the international institutions; they will draw back and start to build up their own strength. Since for many states, a conventional arms race with the big powers does not make any sense, a cyber weapons arms race becomes a more likely scenario.

Conclusion

Cyberspace is an environment that contains tremendously conflicting interests of states like cybersecurity, promotion of democracy and internet freedom, intelligence, cyber warfare, and a lot more. Governance of the internet is heavily related to all these interests, and even if the term “governance” sounds singular, everyone accepts that it should be done by a combination of plural actors. The question is about who these actors will be in the future. We can expect the current status will be obliged to adapt to the changing roles of the actors. Thanks to the improvements in the technology, sooner or later, states will have the ability to create their territories on cyberspace and declare their sovereignty in the newly designed cyber borders. Keeping away from the international regime/institution/norms/rules will only lessen the role of the US as the architect and chief arbiter of the existing liberal international system. Eventually, the US will face this crucial decision. Before the militarization of cyberspace weapons or de facto fragmentation of cyberspace will make it even harder, the US has to decide to lead multinational efforts to regulate cyberspace with other states and should find ways to preserve the freedom of internet in this new system.

Author’s Note: In this article, I named the revisionist ideas as realist and status quoist approach as liberalist. However, I need to say and admit that it is impossible to classify the ideas of both sides in such a clear-cut way. Moreover, there are western realists who do not share the multilateralist ideas of the revisionist camp. Still, through my readings, I noticed that the arguments of this camp coincide with realist thinking in general, and some western realists keep silent when it comes to cyber governance. I also observed that, if international relations is a pendulum swinging between realism and liberalism, it is at the liberalism side on the issue of governance of cyberspace.

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Book Review: Rethinking Security Governance *The problem of unintended consequences* *

Onur Sultan**

The term security governance has become a buzzword in the realm of security studies especially after 9/11 attacks. Yet, there are few empirical works on the unintended consequences of security governance and no work on conceptualizing and theorizing the concept. Friesendorf and Daase takes up this heavy work by editing this volume to include nine chapters contributed by scholars of security, an introductory and a concluding chapter penned by themselves.

The editors set the basics of security governance and what should be understood from unintended consequences in the introduction. Accordingly, as opposed to traditional state's maintenance of security through its military and other security forces under its hierarchical order, security governance is an initiative undertaken by states, non-state actors and private actors horizontally and in a decentralized way with the ultimate goal of attaining a more secure world globally.


Historically speaking, the prevalent mode of security policy until the end of the Cold War was more geared towards provision of territorial integrity and deterrence against threats. However,

the implosion of Soviets triggered new threats to security like internal ethnic conflicts, state failures, terrorism, human trafficking, migration, organized crime and likes. Those new types of threats added the referent of objects and required global security governance by governments, with governments and without governments.

Naturally best situated for such coordination, UN and NATO showed the first examples of such intense formal and informal coordination to bring together expertise from various actors of different echelons.

It is possible to claim that there is a general positive perception attached to global governance due to transnational nature of the current problems. Yet, the term unintended consequence has a rather negative connotation despite the probability of having a positive outcome.

An evaluation of those unintended consequences call for closer look into several dimensions. To start with unintended consequence means a difference between what was intended and the result. The problems related to this difference is multifold. First is the multiplicity of the actors. There are so many actors that who intended what may be meaningless in the end in most cases. Even though having an articulated endstate,



* Daase, Christopher, & Friesendorf, Cornelius (2010). Rethinking Security The problem of unintended consequences. New York: Routledge.

** Onur Sultan is a research fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG.

various actors may contribute at specific time and location to lose the grand picture. Second, what is the yardstick to measure or understand intentions? Researchers do not possess a magical tool to look into the heads of the stakeholders. Even so, in many cases those stakeholders may not have a clear mind about their own intentions either. The editors suggest taking official statements and statements of the stateholders as the main reference of intents.

There are also reasons to alleviate the responsibility to failures. First such actions are taken in environments bearing great uncertainties and risks. Second the multiplicity of actors and their heterogeneity to include multinationality and multi-culture result in less effectiveness. When those features of the recipients of such actions included, the rate for risk increases.

After those basics by the editors, the bulk of the volume follows to include contributed chapters which can be grouped under two categories. The first category examines the consequences of assistance efforts in terms of security and reforms in authoritarian, war-torn or weak states under chapters 1-4. In the first chapter, World Bank's involvement in higher education reform in Egypt is examined. As the programme started to get funding, its control was taken over by the ruling party. The reform alliance consisted of domestic policymakers who joined the state structure. The ruling NDP manipulated programme to define stakeholders not to challenge the authoritarian rule. In sum, the efforts to democratize Egypt actually served to strengthen the authoritarian rule. In the second chapter complex peace support operations of NATO and EU in Bosnia and Kosovo are studied. The insecurity and low domestic capacity resulted in use of police and military forces in law enforcement and support which are exclusive to each of the forces. The effort resulted in militarization of the police and policization of military forces which goes against

security sector reform principles. The third chapter is devoted to state-building efforts with four different variants, namely liberalization-first, security-first, institutionalization-first and civil society-first, with each having different unintended consequences as a frequent feature. The author succeeds in convincing the reader in this by showing the complex structure regarding state building. By nature, the action requires taking over institutions by foreigners at several levels to include headquarters and operational level. Those trustees have to communicate with both international, national, interorganizational and intraorganizational levels to effectively coordinate. However, it is not easy to make every stakeholder share the same vision and intentions and also communicate this to host nation. In most cases there are negative effects and retrogression of the relations despite good intentions.

The fourth chapter is a perfect example to heed the warnings in the previous chapter. According to the author Bush administration after invading Iraq and Afghanistan did not engage in building sustainable and democratically elected state institutions. But it tried to give piecemeal assistance to help establish security forces. The result was insurgencies and in many cases blowbacks meaning the elements trained by US forces turned against US forces and coalition both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The second category to include chapters 5-9 has been devoted to the consequences of sanctions and other privatized solutions to regulate local actors. The fifth chapter expounds the comprehensive sanctions against Yugoslavia to result in Milosevic's harder grip on state, the victory of the cunning and the criminal and total loss on the side of normal folks. In this regard, the criminals are competent enough in most cases to find new remedies to the new precautions. But it is the regular people paying for those remedies. The sixth chapter examines measures

against financing terrorism to have both positive and negative consequences, the former to offset the latter. The seventh chapter focuses on privatized migration control to result in less migrants but greater human rights violations with the negative aspect garnering acceptance as collateral damage. The eighth chapter discusses the targeted sanctions on the example of Iraq to have negative effects on the Iraqi society and to cause loss of faith among UN officials and other actors in the legitimacy and utility of UN. The ninth chapter deals with the issue of privatization of force to yield positive results in the short term while shaking the foundation of private enterprise and the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

The editors start with an agnostic tone about the nature of the unintended consequences of security governance. After all nine chapters with negative effects and with only two positive effects alongside, they change into a more normative tone to suggest ways on how to minimize negative outcomes. As such and in line with the aim of the book, the first solution found is to raise awareness. Second is to deliberate the long-term impacts. The heat of the problem should not blind the stake holders on the long-term losses despite short term gains. Third is to have an open mind and a well understanding on the recipient side. Prejudices or a posteriori premises may obstruct understanding. Fourth is to hold the stake holders accountable for their failures. Five is to enhance cooperation and coordination between stakeholders. This may be horizontal and vertical meaning coordination between operational and strategic levels of one organization and between relevant personnel of the organizations involved. The last is to create scenarios before an action to anticipate and find cures to unintended consequences.

The editors also recommend using the methodology of process tracing to understand

causal mechanisms of unintended consequences. Through this method causal mechanisms to intervene between security governance and unintended mechanisms are suggested to be defined. Counter factual analysis has been suggested as another methodology to the same effect.

In general terms, the editors have selected an important subject that requires even more attention. The contribution of the scholars is also praiseworthy in that each of them gives understanding on a different aspect of those unintended consequences.

Yet, there is a problem in the view of the editors towards the actors. To be more precise, organizations like UN or NATO are all for states to further extend their influence or project power. In many cases they are utilized as sources of legitimacy putting a multilateral mask while following a national agenda. The great powers based on their contribution to the budget easily man and steer such organizations. So, in many cases it may not be possible to find out who really intended to do what by initiating and help executing an action despite loud announcements on the aims and objectives.



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