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Contents
Dear Reader,

We are happy to be with you again in the latest Horizon Insight issue of 2019. We have three articles focusing on the security and defence developments in the EU and its implications to EU-U.S relations, emerging and disruptive technologies challenging Western security and Russian Maritime Practices. There is also a book review focusing on the regional security in the Middle East.

The first article is a policy brief on the state of the play in European Security and Defence. The author successfully summaries EU Defence Policy and Strategic Autonomy, outlines the latest developments in PESCO, EDF and CARD, underlines EU-NATO cooperation as well as transatlantic relations. He concludes the policy brief with tangible and solid U.S. Policy recommendations.

The second article scrutinise the developments on hypersonic missiles. This comparative analysis deals with the state-of-the-art missiles developing or developed by Russia and the U.S. What makes this article relevant is the fact that it manifests the repercussions of these emerging and disruptive technologies on the Western Security Community. It concludes with Russia’s superiority over hypersonic missiles so far and the need to a change in U.S. strategy to counterbalance this.

The third article is an overarching policy paper on contemporary Russian Maritime practices. It demonstrates how successfully Russia manipulates all the instruments and means for a comprehensive strategy. This empirical study manifest Russian practices not only with its neighbours stretching from the U.S. to Ukraine but also its endeavour in the Arctic Continental Shelf. The author concludes the article with substantive arguments in easy-to-follow bullets.

Last, but not least and as usual we have a book review. « Regional Security in the Middle East » by Pinar Bilgin, is an amalgamation of efforts to depict and understand the interactive dynamics of security in the Middle East. This book contributes to the literature on regional security in the Middle East by providing a critical interpretation to the prevalent discourse.

We wish you all the best for 2020.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG
A Europe that Protects?
U.S. Opportunities in EU Defense*

Seth Johnston**

* This article was first published on November 2019 on the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School at https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/europe-protects-us-opportunities-eu-defense.

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What’s New in European Defense?

Europe is pursuing significant new defense initiatives that span capability development, policy, and institutional cooperation. Many of these efforts occur under the auspices of the European Union and are part of the EU’s longstanding aim to grow itself as a security and foreign policy actor. But real security challenges in Europe—from Russian aggression to terrorism and regional instability—have contributed to the importance and potential of European efforts. The political dynamics of the transatlantic relationship may also favor Europe’s initiatives: although the Trump administration’s calls for greater European defense spending have rankled European leaders and U.S. officials have legitimate concerns about the details of EU initiatives, the larger issue of strengthening European defense is consistent with U.S. goals.

The EU’s security and defense efforts have implications for the transatlantic economy and defense industry, the NATO alliance, and U.S.-European relations generally. While the United States should work to ensure continued transatlantic defense policy coordination, secure and competitive markets for the defense industry, and preservation of the longstanding principle of ‘no duplication’ with NATO, it should also broadly support European efforts to invest more and more wisely on defense. Both the United States and Europe stand to benefit from greater European defense investment and capability.

The history of intra-European and transatlantic differences over European defense cooperation endures in the EU’s current efforts. But today’s environment favors change and represents a rare opportunity for bold action.

EU Defense Policy and “Strategic Autonomy”

The EU’s recent defense policy developments stem from its 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS), the most significant such document at the EU level since the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) (European External Action Service, 2016). Developed and published by the EU’s outgoing High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, the EUGS does much to articulate Europe’s roles and responsibilities in both a changed international security and defense environment as well as a European Union that has itself grown and changed in its membership and politics. The EUGS deserves credit for its recognition and assessment of these changes. Compared to the focus on institutional values and aspirations in the 2003 ESS, the 2016 EUGS dedicates more attention to specific challenges, risk, political and strategic limitations.

Yet the EUGS may still sound ambitious, particularly its proposal to seek “[a]n appropriate level of... strategic autonomy.” The meaning of this oft-cited phrase is contentious. Even among Europeans, considerable differences exist on the overall rationale and support for the concept as well as its geographic and functional level of...
ambition. Autonomy can be understood to mean non-dependence (e.g., self-sufficiency to conduct military operations); but it can also imply separation, and the concept is accordingly contested in countries with particularly strong views about relations with the United States (Howorth, 2019a). Most Europeans see autonomy as fully compatible with NATO, however (Franke & Varma, 2019). Although there is no consensus on a European level of ambition, a common preference is for an ability to undertake geographically limited and relatively low-level operations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and stability operations; while high-end warfighting, long-range expeditionary operations, and territorial defense remain the purview of NATO or sovereign states. But even this limited ambition for strategic autonomy may be a high bar for the EU. Europe’s record in the fielding of military equipment such as advanced aircraft, vehicles, or autonomous weapons systems. But these high-end procurement initiatives are the most likely to contribute to European capabilities. Others such as a new “Competence Centre for EU Training Missions” will not, despite participation from thirteen countries. A related problem is that many of the higher-end capability initiatives do not enjoy such broad multinational participation. The EuroArtillery project, for example, has only two participants: Italy and Slovakia.

The debate on openness of PESCO projects to third-country participation has largely become one of trade and industry self-interest, narrowly defined: Europeans seek preference for their defense industry and see U.S. criticism of PESCO as rooted in a desire to preserve access to the European market for American defense contractors. Americans counter that PESCO’s closure to non-EU countries would undermine integrated supply chains and existing transatlantic technology exchange while inadvertently discouraging European companies from participating in PESCO initiatives that could jeopardize their business outside the EU. Both sides claim to be more open to outside participation than the other.

EDF

The European Defense Fund (EDF) is an initiative of the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, to co-finance defense research and development with EU member states. Initial 2018 plans called for a proposed EDF budget of €13 billion ($15 billion) over a seven-year period beginning in 2021, with EDF assuming up to 20% of project costs. The EDF is the most innovative and perhaps most important new EU defense initiative because it will—for the first time—involve EU institutions directly in the European defense market. Although the financial scale is not large, EDF represents a potentially significant change in the way Europe invests in defense. By incentivizing member states to pool their resources on common defense investments, the EDF usefully aims to reduce fragmentation and increase the efficiency of European defense R&D.

New EU Defense Initiatives: PESCO, EDF, and CARD

While slogans and narratives are important for building and sustaining political support, specific and practical efforts to bolster European defense capability, investment, and coordination are the substance of such a policy. The most notable of the EU’s current initiatives in these regards are Permanent Structured Cooperation on defense (PESCO), the European Defense Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD).

A key issue for all of these initiatives is not simply that European defense investment and capabilities are small in aggregate, but also that they are fragmented and inefficient. European countries collectively spend more than $280 billion on defense annually, which, if Europe were a single country, would easily make it the second largest defense spender in the world after the United States. Europe’s 1.8 million military personnel actually outnumber America’s 1.3 million troops (The Military Balance, 2018). But it makes little sense to consider Europe this way. The European Commission reckons that lack of cooperation among EU member states costs between €25-100 billion ($28-111 billion) annually, i.e., between 9% and 36% of all European military spending. “Investment per soldier” among EU countries may be only one quarter of that in the United States (European Commission, 2019). Meanwhile fragmentation of research, development, procurement, operations and maintenance also take a significant toll. For example, Europe’s 20 different types of fighter aircraft and 17 main battle tank models compare to America’s four and one, respectively (European Commission, 2019). The multitude of different systems in Europe is not only inefficient but also complicates interoperability. PESCO, EDF, and CARD are all aimed, at least in part, at addressing this issue.

PESCO

Permanent Structured Cooperation on defense (PESCO) is an EU treaty-based framework for defense cooperation on capability development or operational projects. Launched in 2017, 25 EU member states have agreed to participate in at least one of 34 current projects ranging from common training to development of new capabilities, each led by different member states. The best known PESCO initiative addresses “military mobility,” harmonized procedures and physical infrastructure for the flow of friendly military equipment that aims to introduce something akin to a “military Schengen area.” This signature initiative boosts broad participation among states to address a significant need at relatively low cost, all while remaining complementary to NATO.

Outstanding questions about PESCO include the uneven practical utility of its other projects and their openness to participation by non-EU countries. Very few PESCO initiatives currently envision investments in hard capabilities or equipment such as advanced aircraft, vehicles, or autonomous weapons systems. But these high-end procurement initiatives are the most likely to contribute to European capabilities.

Moreover, the word “autonomy” does not translate well across the Atlantic, sounding to some Americans like “de-linking” or “decoupling,” an outcome U.S. policymakers consistently sought to prevent during previous attempts at common European defense identity. To avoid this semantic stumbling block, an increasingly prevalent formulation that resonates more positively in the United States is “strategic responsibility.” Yet Europeans may find this term pejorative and substantive differences between “strategic autonomy” and “strategic responsibility” are not altogether clear, not least because “autonomy” remains itself such a contested term. In any case, transatlantic tensions over European defense may be about style as well as substance. Reflexively negative reactions to terminology—especially those that recall decades-old narratives on European defense—could impede recognition of new opportunities or progress on more satisfactory alternatives.

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Even more than PESCO, however, the United States and other critics argue that the EDF’s rules effectively bar third countries—and potentially even the EU-based subsidiaries of companies headquartered in a third country—from participation in projects receiving EDF co-financing, and that such restrictions could also affect countries like non-EU NATO ally Norway and a post-Brexit United Kingdom. The United States has been especially strident that such rules could limit transatlantic defense cooperation and ultimately even reduce the range of choice and quality of gear available for Europeans to buy.14 NATO-EU cooperation on high-end warfare; yet very few PESCO projects and EDF as a potential funding source (see Figure 1) (European Defense Agency, n.d.). The 2018 CPD revision includes 11 new EU capability development priorities reflecting a stronger focus on high-end warfare; yet very few PESCO projects aim to develop high-end capabilities (European Defense Agency, 2019). Unlike the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) capability targets that are approved by national ministers, EU targets remain entirely voluntary. The EU and NATO have worked to align these processes in order to prevent competition and streamline administration. For example, NATO allies’ defense planning surveys can be released to the EU to serve as a common reporting mechanism, while the EU has invited NATO’s NDPP staff to observe CARD. As a non-binding instrument of information exchange and transparency within the EU, CARD has proved uncontroversial.

**NATO-EU Cooperation**

Increased cooperation between the EU and NATO is significant and historically unusual in European defense.15 Unlike the development of new EU policy or the creation of new institutions, this cooperation has more to do with the increasing significance of work in existing institutions. While NATO and the EU have had formal links since the early 2000s, notably including the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements for NATO to support EU-led operations, the 2016 Warsaw joint declaration served as a catalyst for closer collaboration (NATO, 2016). Within two years, EU and NATO leaders agreed to more than 70 specific collaborations on matters including hybrid threats, cyber defense, maritime security, training exercises, and operational coordination, among others.16 NATO-EU cooperation on military mobility is a signature issue. Other notable progress includes the implementation of a “Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence” and a coordinated response to high profile cyber threats like WannaCry, as well as active cooperation in the field between NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia (NATO, 2019a). The European Commission agreed to contribute €2 million to NATO’s Building Integrity Trust Fund, while NATO has worked with the European Defense Agency on the procurement of a European multinational fleet of multirole tanker–transport (MRTT) aircraft (NATO, 2009). As noted, NATO and EU officials continue to coordinate their respective defense planning processes.17 Beyond this list of deliverables is a qualitative sense among many at NATO and the EU that genuine cooperation and progress is not only possible but increasingly normal and good. As one Brussels official put it, the EU and NATO may have achieved more together in the past two years than during the past two decades (Mogherini, 2018). This development is all the more remarkable given the qualitative decline in many aspects of transatlantic relations over the same period. More work remains to be done and the gains are both relatively new and fragile. Unrelated tension between, say, NATO ally Turkey and non-NATO EU member Cyprus could again frustrate further NATO-EU collaboration.18 Brexit also remains a considerable source of uncertainty. But sustained organizational leadership at NATO and the EU, demonstrated results, and the eventual normalizing of more constructive ties all seem possible in a way few would have predicted just a few years ago.

**Figure 2. Photo of signing ceremony for joint EU-NATO declaration, Warsaw, 2016.**

Neither European defense cooperation nor transatlantic burden sharing are new subjects. Both have been prominent since at least the
that Europe is insufficiently capable in matters of defense, as both have acknowledged in the EU Global Strategy and NATO’s Wales Pledge on Defense Investment. Countries may not agree on prioritization, but few deny the range of threats facing the continent, including Russian aggression and the collapse of arms control agreements, terrorism and regional instability, and emerging problems associated with global shifts in the balance of power, cyber and hybrid threats, and even climate change.

Compounding these challenges is the uncertainty arising from changing domestic politics in allied countries, including deviations in U.S. foreign policy during the Trump administration and the disorder of the United Kingdom’s move to leave the European Union. Critical junctures such as these weaken the stability of pre-existing constraints, but may also free leaders to act in ways that make change more likely and momentous.

Implications & Recommendations for U.S. Policy

To make the most of this juncture in transatlantic defense relations and promote the shared U.S. and European interest for Europe to strengthen its security and defense, the United States should:

- Support any credible effort to strengthen European defense capabilities.
  1. Ideally all such efforts prioritize high-end systems, equipment, and readiness; reduce fragmentation and inefficiency; increase interoperability; sustain transatlantic defense industrial cooperation; preserve broader transatlantic strategic alignment; and avoid duplication or lack of compatibility with NATO.
  2. Expect some European proposals will not meet all of these criteria, however, necessitating hard choices and prioritization.
- Recognize the generational significance of Europe’s apparent defense ambition.
  1. Previous efforts to increase European defense cooperation and capabilities rarely faltered because NATO could not adapt or accommodate them, but rather because Europe’s follow-through fell short of its own ambitions.
  2. The recent high volume of EU defense activity and unusually close EU-NATO cooperation represents a rare potential opportunity for bold action.
- Disregard “autonomy.” Let interests and outcomes drive policy, not slogans.
  1. The United States and Europe have an overriding and shared interest in a Europe that is stronger and less dependent on the United States for its security and defense. Terminology and narratives are important but secondary.
  2. Be prepared to tolerate “strategic autonomy” or any other slogan that galvanizes European political will to follow-through on defense capability investments.
- Continue to work as constructively as possible with European countries and the EU to optimize PESCO, EDC and EDF.
  1. Encourage European projects that provide the most meaningful capabilities, defined by both NATO and the EU’s own Capability Development Plan, especially high-end systems, equipment, and readiness.
  2. Support the important work on military mobility in Europe.
  3. Appeal to European self-interest to have the greatest possible choice, quality, and access to technology from the participation of third-countries, especially non-EU NATO allies and trusted partners, in PESCO and EDF. Lead by example in welcoming European participation in U.S. defense markets.
  4. Resolve that low-capability projects pursued in isolated defense industrial markets would be the least desirable outcome and serve neither American nor European interests.
- Sustain and strengthen gains in NATO-EU cooperation.
  1. Ensure the NATO Defense Planning Process and EU CPD/CARD remain complementary and not competitive.
  2. Champion the results of high-profile cooperative initiatives like military mobility.
  3. Follow-through on the extensive agenda agreed since the 2016 joint NATO-EU declaration at Warsaw.
  4. Recognize that success in NATO-EU cooperation is as much about organizational culture and good leadership as creating or adapting institutions.
  5. Lead by example on interoperability by upholding and implementing NATO standards among U.S. forces.
Endnotes


3. In fact, the EU’s efforts stem in part from a shared recognition of its early post-Cold War difficulties, epitomized in the eventually false prediction of Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos regarding the Balkan civil wars of the 1990s, “This is the hour of Europe. ... If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.” Quoted in Jospin Glaudri, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 1.

4. For an up to date and comprehensive overview, see Sarah Raine and International Institute for Strategic Studies, Europe’s Strategic Future: From Crisis to Coherence? Adelphi (Series) 468-469 (London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019).

5. Most famously articulated by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in remarks to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 8 December, 1998: https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/981208.html; I am grateful to Stephanie Hofmann for pointing out that Albright may have been among the first Americans specifically to take issue with the term “autonomy” or “autonomous,” which also appeared in the 1998 Franco-British declaration at St. Malo. See also, for example, Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companions—or Competitor? (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002).


8. This is not an exhaustive list of EU security and defense initiatives. See Daniel Fiott, EUSS Yearbook of European Security, 2019 (Paris: European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019).

9. Denmark, Malta, and the United Kingdom are not participating in PESCO.


13. For a superb new and comprehensive analysis, see Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy, eds., The EU and NATO: The Essential Partners (Paris: European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019).

14. To be sure, some of these initiatives existed prior to the declaration and some initiatives have more substantive merit than others. But the narrative of such high levels of cooperation is notable in itself.

15. To be sure, NATO and EU membership does not overlap perfectly and states may coordinate outside these institutional mechanisms or frustrate inter-institutional cooperation. Stephanie C. Hofmann, “The politics of overlapping organizations: hostage-taking, forum-shopping and brokering,” Journal of European Public Policy 26:6 (2019), pp. 883-905.
16. See, for example, "Turkey condemns Greek Cyprus presence at NATO event," Hurriyet, 4 May 2019, http://www.hurriyetedailynews.com/turkey-condemns-greek-cyprus-presence-at-nato-event-143147


18. This pledge contains the well-known 2% of GDP defense spending benchmark and represents the first time that all NATO allies formally agreed to such a commitment at the level of heads of state and government. Wales Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 September 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

Bibliography


1. Background

In the past 50 years, except for the current one, every U.S. president offered and continued negotiations with Russia in order to regulate the destabilizing competition for superiority in nuclear weapons and to reduce the risk of collapse of itself and its allies in a nuclear war. In order to make the world a safer place, each US administration got involved in negotiations and concluded a series of agreements (Countryman, 2019). Contrary to this tradition, President Trump let the Mid-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987) end on 2 August 2019. The U.S. appears to be ready to allow the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to expire in 2021 in the same manner.

Trump administration’s rhetoric to sell this change of behavior is that it wants to include China also in talks in trilateral settings together with Russia (Countryman, 2019) on a new treaty to limit the nuclear weapons not covered by the New START. However, this is easier said than made. Negotiations in this direction will likely be lengthy, thorny, and above all complex to come to fruition. Realistically, there is no chance of concluding a new agreement along these lines before the expiry date of the New START.

2. Recent Developments

In March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a quick rundown on the developmental status of several “next generation” strategic weapon systems designed especially to evade U.S. missile defenses. As can be understood, Putin has given priority to the development of its strategic deterrence by building these new strategic missile systems.

According to open-sources, Russia has tested many hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), and hypersonic cruise missiles in the recent past,
and it is expected to field an operational capability in the near future. Some of these missile systems are about to become operational, whereas some others face important challenges (Stratfor, 2019). Below follows an overview of those Russian systems:

a. Avangard

Avangard is a strategic intercontinental ballistic missile which is composed of a high-performance ballistic missile and an HGV to maneuver and engage with ground targets at hypersonic speed. After entering the atmosphere, it can fly on an unpredictable trajectory and engage a target at a maximum speed of Mach 20. It constantly changes its course and altitude as it flies throughout the atmosphere, attempting to defeat any missile defense system (Erdogan, 2019a).

The HGV can reportedly be integrated as a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) with the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces’ RS-18B/UR-100UTKh (Erdogan, 2019a) (NATO Name: SS-19 Stiletto Mod 3). When Sarmat is ready for operations, it will be the carrier of the intercontinental ballistic missile.

Even though Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the missile system would be operational in December 2019, (TASS, 2019a) it could not surpass the development phase. The system was developed by the Research and Production Association of Machine Building, according to open sources, and has been in test since 2004 (TASS, 2019a). Avangard was successfully tested twice in 2016 (Congressional Research Service, 2019a) and once in December 2018. After test-launched in December 2018, Putin announced the success of the flight tests and further stated that “The Avangard has fully passed through its test program and will become operational on schedule. The weapon has fully confirmed its specifications” (Novichkov, 2019). But the previous test in October 2017 (Gady, 2019a) had yielded in failure. It is highly likely that there is no other test launches have been conducted other than the 2017 and 2018 tests. (Gady, 2019b).

Russia’s Defense Ministry underlined that a U.S. team had had an opportunity to inspect one of its new silo-launched Avangard hypersonic missiles (Trevithick, 2018a) under the terms of the New START (Trevithick, 2019). The Russian Ministry of Defense reported in a statement on 26 November 2019 “Under the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a U.S. inspection group was shown the Avangard missile system with the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle on the territory of Russia on November 24-26, 2019” (TASS, 2019b).

Incidentally or not, between 24-26 November 2019, Russia showed Avangard to U.S. inspectors as well. Whether or not to extend New START, Moscow and Washington are meeting and negotiating for the renewal of the agreement; if not, it will expire in February 2021.

b. Burevestnik

Putin outlined nuclear-powered cruise missile Burevestnik (Trevithick, 2018b) with unlimited range as one of six “next generation” strategic weapons Moscow was developing. Burevestnik is a supersonic cruise missile to escape any missile defense system. The missile’s range can be more than 10,000 kilometers and can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. Moscow drew attention to the unlimited range and its potential ability to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. The weapon can use a nuclear fuel source onboard to fly for a very long time. The speed of the missile is currently unknown; however, some researchers assume that it is in the range of Mach 8 to 9.

The missile is launched from a platform on the ground and flying at low altitude, following an unpredictable trajectory is headed towards its target, by escaping missile defenses. The missile has been tested four times, from November 2017 to February 2018, and the tests have given negative results. It was reported that the longest flight lasted just over two minutes, with a distance of about 22 miles between the missile crashed. The shortest one was four seconds, with a flight distance of five miles. It is important that in none of those four tests, the onboard nuclear generator was not activated. Following the explosion at a ground test on 08 August 2019 on the north coast of Russia, the Defense Ministry of Russia said at least two soldiers were killed and four wounded. It is probably one of the worst nuclear incidents, and it is highly likely that the explosion was a prototype of Burevestnik. If the missile has the capabilities that Putin has boasted about the limitless range, it will be the first transcontinental cruise missile in the world.

However, it was not indicated in March 2018 which missile or missiles would incorporate artificial intelligence. But there are two prominent candidates: the hypersonic vehicle “Avangard” and the cruise missile “Burevestnik”.

c. Kinzhal

Kinzhal is a hypersonic missile system capable of escaping any missile defense system. It is a nuclear-capable weapon that has an operating range of over 2,000 km (TASS, 2018a) and was testing phase since December 2017.

As an air-launched ballistic missile, Kinzhal essentially transports existing technologies. While many analysts have doubts about Kinzhal’s capabilities, the weapon appears to be a version of the Alexander-M short-range ballistic missile (Stratfor, 2019) flying at hypersonic speeds.

The missile can autonomously maneuver, hit targets at a distance of 2,000 km, and fly continuously at high speed to escape the air defense system. The missile is accelerated by the aircraft (MiG-31Ks or Tu-22M3 / Su-57) at its maximum speed then launched from the aircraft to activate its solid-propellant engine and reach a hypersonic speed of Mach 10 (TASS, 2018a).

The 2019 Aviadarts international competition for the 2019 International Army Games took place on 10 August 2019 at the Dubrovichi test range in the Ryzan region (South Front, 2019) of Russia. For the first time, Russian MiG-31K fighters armed with Kinzhal took part in an air exhibition. Specifically, Kinzhal hypersonic missile made its debut during the competition (Erdogan, 2019b).

Russia has successfully tested an air-to-ground hypersonic missile with the MiG-31 fighter several times and is currently building a Tu-22M3 bomber in order to expand its range, taking into account the carrier’s battle radius and missile range. The smaller size of the missile will be transported with the Su-57. (Erdogan, 2019b).

d. Tsirkon

Russia is reportedly developing 3M22 Tsirkon, and a ship-based hypersonic cruise missile launched, which is capable of traveling at speeds up to Mach 8. It is compatible with specific aircraft, submarines, and some of the surface warships, and its effective range is about 500 km (Episkopos, 2019). The development of Tsirkon has come to the fore since 2011, and Russia has conducted five tests of the hypersonic missile since 2015.
Tsirkon tests with the Tu-22M3 bomber were conducted in the summer of 2012, at the State Flight and Research Center in Akhtubinsk (Navy Recognition, 2016). Reports indicate that not all launches have been successful, but work on the missile has continued. U.S. intelligence reports show that Russia conducted its most successful Tsirkon test on 10 December 2018. According to a source, the missile production is expected to begin in 2021, (Macias, 2018) join the Kremlin’s arsenal as early as 2022, and that the missile will be operational in 2023 (TASS, 2019c).

Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed in his February 2019 address to the Federal Parliament that Tsirkon is capable of producing a speed of Mach 9, (TASS, 2019c) its range capacity can exceed 1,000 km., and it could hit both ground and sea targets. President Putin announced that the hypersonic missile was proceeding as planned.

Tsirkon has a unique feature and is a specific missile. Russian experts said Tsirkon was very hard to intercept for both the current air defense capabilities and currently designed perspective interceptors. According to the annual report of NPO Mashinstroeniya, (Navy Recognition, 2016) it will have both a radar target seeker and an optical-electronic complex in order to track and detect targets even at hypersonic speed as well.

e. Poseidon

Status-6 “Poseidon” torpedo is “robotic mini-submarine” with a diameter of 1 meter, and is an essentially underwater ICBM. It has a range of up to 6,200 miles and is capable of operation in depths up to 3,300 feet.

The Poseidon program was made public in September 2015 (Gady, 2019c) for the first time, when the Russian state television “accidentally” shows a picture of Poseidon. Accidentally or not it was broadcast on state television, people have wondered why Russia is producing a weapon that would end (Lockie, 2019) the world. In March 2018, Russia has begun to publicly announce for the first time not only its nuclear activities but also six next generation missiles with President Vladimir Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly.

The nuclear-powered submarine drone “Poseidon”, also known as an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). In particular, it is not clear whether Russia is capable of building a reliable miniaturized nuclear reactor for UUV (Gady, 2019c).

Poseidon can travel thousands of kilometers at speeds of up to 70 knots. Poseidon drone can allegedly be fitted with a thermonuclear warhead delivering around two megatons. (TASS, 2018b) The thermonuclear warhead of Poseidon is designed to destroy coastal sites such as ports, cities, and economic infrastructure (Mizokami, 2018).

Poseidon has been tested 11 times so far, in addition to that, the US intelligence assessment points out that the 11th and last known test of the Poseidon was conducted in November 2018 (Gady, 2019c).

Belgorod will be the first carrier of Poseidon nuclear-powered submarine drones, which will participate in sea trials in June 2020, and the act of acceptance must be signed in September 2020 (TASS, 2019d).

It is not clear whether the Poseidon will serve solely as a delivery platform for nuclear warheads or may also be deployed for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions (Gady, 2019e).

f. Sarmat

On 1 March 2018, President Vladimir Putin, in his speech to the Federal Parliament, stressed that the Russian Ministry of Defense had started an active phase in partnership with the space industry companies to test a new missile system with Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (TASS, 2018c). The known missile is called RS-28 Sarmat, although NATO calls it the SS-X-30 Satan 2.

The RS-28 Sarmat is the Russian silo-based missile with the heavy liquid-propellant ICBM, which was designed as part of (Missile Defense Project, 2017) Russian nuclear modernization and is capable of transporting nuclear charges. Sarmat has been developing since at least 2009 (Mosher, 2018) in order to replace the R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18 Satan ICBM). (Missile Defense Project, 2016).

Reportedly (TASS, 2019e) missile’s firing tests are on schedule and will complete its testing phase by the end of 2020. Sarmat prototype was ready in autumn 2015, while the timeframe of the pop-up testing schedule has been postponed many times because of the lack of silo-based launcher. (TASS, 2018c) The missile started the first stage test in 2016. The Russian Army conducted a launch test in which some technical shortcomings of silo-based launchers are revealed in December 2017. (Missile Defense Project, 2017) Putin declared that Sarmat had been successfully tested in December 2017 and that it could reach the United States via the North or South Pole thanks to its range of more than 11,000 kilometers (Rudischhauser, 2018). On 30 March 2018, Russia published video footage of a seemingly successful ejection test, which might have taken place at the end of March 2018. The third and last pop-up test of Sarmat was conducted in May 2018 (Gady, 2019d). Sarmat was originally scheduled to go into service in 2018, but this timeline has probably been delayed, and initial commissioning is now scheduled for the period 2020-2021 (Missile Defense Project, 2017).

If Russia succeed to finalize its testing phase, Sarmat’s serial production will be highly likely to start in 2021 (Gady, 2019). Russia’s plan is to replace gradually RS-36M2 Voyevoda with RS-28 Sarmat by the mid-2020s (Gady, 2019d).

President Putin underlined in his March 2018 address to the Federal Parliament that Russia had developed a brand-new generation of unstoppable nuclear weapons. He claimed that RS-28 Sarmat was “invincible” to any missile defense systems with “practically unlimited” range (Mosher, 2018). If RS-28 Sarmat ICBM achieves its specifications, as President Putin stated, “The weapon has fully confirmed its specifications”, (Novichkov, 2019) it will be the first intercontinental ballistic missile in the world of its kind.

The intercontinental missile, which would have a long-range and would be described as being able to transport between 10 and 24 warheads. The claim, along with multiple warheads, would allow it to penetrate any US missile defense system (Rudischhauser, 2018). Sarmat will clearly be the main counter-force weapon of Russia. However, the claim that it could transport 24 of the Avangard hypersonic gliders is clearly false; Sarmat only has about two and a half times the launch weight of the SS-19, which is around 4,300 kg. So that, Sarmat can carry three to five Avangard (Wortzel, 2019) gliders seems much more reliable.

Claims regarding the potential capabilities of Sarmat are numerous, and it seems quite ambitious. Therefore, it makes sense to assume that Russia would realize the schedule and obey the realization of the timeline. If not, it will be perfect on the paper. As the lifespan
of RS-36M2 Voyevoda is limited (until 2027), and an unlimited development schedule for Sarmat is unrealistic.

3. Where is the U.S. in this equation?

Following the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002, the heading of the armament race in terms of missiles between China, Russia, and the U.S. raises concerns. All three had earlier announced Research and Development (R&D) projects for developing new generation nuclear-capable weapons (Erdogan, 2019a). This is a result of crippled arms control regime and needs for newer systems with immediate response capability.

China and Russia, for deterrence purposes and to gain more foothold in the U.S. dominant market, constantly inform about advance recorded in terms of development. Against this backdrop, Russia has accelerated the program it launched in the 2000s to build strategic new “next generation” weapons.

China is another critical actor in this endeavor. Both China and Russia have made progress and are currently in the phase of testing “hypersonic weapons.” The respective programs are considered the greatest threat to U.S. space supremacy.

The U.S., although not having renounced space superiority, lags behind these two states. General John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command on 18 November 2017, at the Halifax International Security Forum stressed this fact saying: “I watch what our adversaries do. I see them moving quickly into the space domain, they are moving very fast, and I see our country not moving fast, and that causes me concern.” (Erwin, 2017).

At the current status, the U.S. is completely lacking in deterrence and its posture in this race is crucial. This needs to be rectified. Or better put, the US needs to accelerate at a faster pace, while Russia and China add hypersonic weapons to their arsenals with.

To prevent misunderstanding the development of new hypersonic systems progress in the U.S. too. But it does in a different manner. Below is a summary of developments in the U.S. that will give background to further enable making a comparison between Russian and the US programs.

a. Currents Programs in the U.S.

The U.S. has a different approach in this race from Russia and China. Since the early 2000s, (Congressional Research Service, 2019a) the U.S. has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as part of its Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) program. However, the U.S. has focused more on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles in recent years. The growing interest of Russia and China in these technologies and numerous successful flight tests on hypersonic glide vehicles of both countries has forced the U.S. to increase focus on hypersonic weapons. Although funding for these programs had been relatively limited in the past, the Pentagon and the Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2019a) have shown growing interest in continuing the development of hypersonic weapons.

Initially, CPGS weapons were not intended to replace nuclear weapons, but would support US conventional capabilities. Officials argued that long-range systems would provide a “niche” capability, with a small number of weapons (Congressional Research Service, 2019b) aimed at selected critical targets.

Along the same lines, currently, Department of Defense (DoD) efforts to develop hypersonic weapons under Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program aims to give the U.S. military the ability to shoot hardened or time-sensitive targets through conventional warheads, as well as with several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs (Congressional Research Service, 2019b).

The DoD recognizes the important role that hypersonic weapons have potential to play, especially in the face of advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies of Russia and China, and strategies for power projection, deterrence and reassurance (Wortzel, 2019). In this regard, DoD supports the development of Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), which has parts/programs tailored for use by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The CPGS program aims to enable U.S. defense forces to hit targets with conventional weapons anywhere in the world within an hour.

As regards the U.S. Army, the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) is designed as a long-range hovering vehicle capable of flying at hypersonic speed in the atmosphere. The AHW technology program is managed by the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) / Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) (Army Technology, 2019). This capability will enable the U.S. to attack time-sensitive high-value targets at a conflict. In November 2011, AHW was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, and successfully attained its target at 3,700 km distance from the launch site (Army Technology, 2019).

As regards the U.S. Air Force, there are two ongoing projects on hypersonic weapons in development by DARPA, namely the Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) and the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC). The TBG is an air-launched rocket with speed more than Mach 5 and has flight altitude of 200,000 ft. The HAWC, on the other hand, is designed to be launched from air. According to Jane’s Defense, HAWC has been designed as a hypersonic cruise missile as well. DARPA has been said to have scheduled to test both weapons on a B-52 bomber at the end of 2019 (Roque, 2019). So far, no information has been made public on the results of the tests.

As regards the U.S. Navy began developing an intermediate-range ballistic missile (SLRBM) launched by the submarine in 2003 as part of its CPGS program in order to fulfill its mission (Keck, 2017). However, the Congress cut its funding in 2008, and these efforts had terminated. (all CPGS funds were merged into a single DoD-wide account instead of individual programs). In 2012 the Navy began seeking industry proposals and strongly advocating CPGS technology launched by the submarine, and in 2014, (Howard, 2019) a booster explosion during an army AHW test prompted the Pentagon to get the Navy involved in the project and modify the boost-glide AHW for submarine missile tubes. Although the AHW was an HGV paired with a ballistic missile, it would be launched not only from SSBNs, but from SSGNs (Howard, 2019) and attack submarines. The Director of the Strategic Systems Program (SSP), Admiral Terry Benedict, announced on 30 October 2017, (Keck, 2017) a successful first test of the project - the CPS FE-1 (Conventional Prompt Strike Flight Experiment) - from an onshore facility in Hawaii.

The DoD stated that the Navy would (Congressional Research Service, 2019a) lead the development of a common glide vehicle for use in all services with a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in June 2018. The common glide vehicle is adapted from a prototype Army warhead, Alternative Reentry
the U.S. does not agree on the renewal of the security (Presstv, 2019) would be threatened if it could prevent a new arms race and that global Russian leader underlined that nothing Russian proposals to extend the agreement. On 19 December 2019, President Putin stressed that stockpiles, will expire in February 2021 if the sides do not agree to extend it. On the other hand, Moscow is developing missiles that "Regional Glide Phase Weapon System (RGWPS)", which started in September 2018 (Dahlgren, 2019). In this initiative, the Air Force, Navy and Army have put together their efforts on a common unpowered boost-glide vehicle design (Trevithick, 2018c) that can help give each of them an operational hypersonic weapon in the short term. As the above-mentioned common hypersonic glide, the Air Force, Army, and Navy are now working together to develop and deploy them by the early 2020s.

b. The New START
The New START Treaty, the latest of its kind to limit the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, will expire in February 2021 if the sides do not agree to extend it. On the other hand, Moscow is developing missiles that will not fall under the prescribed limits of the agreement.

On 19 December 2019, President Putin stressed that Washington had not yet responded to Russian proposals to extend the agreement. The Russian leader underlined that nothing could prevent a new arms race and that global security (PressTv, 2019) would be threatened if the U.S. does not agree on the renewal of the bilateral treaty.

General John Hyten, during his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2019, has expressed his worries about new Russian nuclear delivery systems, namely the Poseidon underwater drone, the Buran-Buravet nuclear-powered cruise missile, Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, and the Tsirkon (Zircon) hypersonic cruise missile. All those fall beyond the coverage of the New START (Congressional Research Service, 2020). He said that these weapons could ultimately pose a threat to the United States and that the U.S. and Russia could agree on an amended version of the New START that would cover this new Russian delivery systems (Erdogan, 2019b).

U.S. intelligence officials believe that Poseidon will be ready by 2027 at the earliest, and the latest tests of Buran-Buravet have failed so far. As such, these systems should have little effect on the U.S. short-term deterrence strategy and will not have a decisive role in decision making regarding the extension of the New START (Erdogan, 2019b). On the other hand, Russia will probably deploy Avangard and Kinzhal before the end of the New START, which will make it a pressing issue for the U.S. arms control negotiators (Vaddi, 2019).

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced "Russia is prepared to include its Avangard and Sarmat missile systems in New START when it is extended", and further said, "We have already presented Avangard to the Americans, and we will be ready to do the same with Sarmat at a certain stage" (TASS, 2019f). According to Lavrov, since these technologies are new, it is normal that the treaty did not cover them at the time of writing.

Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry Vladimir Leontiev said that the Russian missile systems, Sarmat and Avangard fit well with and could be included in the New START. In his opinion, if Sarmat materializes at least as a prototype, while the treaty is still effective, including possible prolongation, will not be a problem. He added "There are no big problems with Avangard, either, because it is an optional warhead for an ICBM of the corresponding type, to which the treaty applies, (TASS, 2019g) too."

In the finality that New START is not prolonged, emboldened by having no regulatory force, Russia might choose to reinforce its existing inventory of cruise and ballistic missiles. And, this has potential to cause Russia not to make any commitment within another binding mutual or trilateral setting. In other words, Trump's unrealistic policy of pushing both China and Russia to make commitment in a trilateral setting until the end of New START, if an agreement is not attained before the end of New START, has potential to put the two nuclear powers into another cycle of arms race which would further put a vast geography to include Euro-Atlantic zone within reach of harm. It seems that the extension of the New START with Russia is the best option for dealing with the most disturbing situations of Russian six “next generation” strategic weapons and try ways to pull China into the agreement afterwards.

4. Conclusion
While China is pursuing a long-term approach to develop strategic technologies and close the capability gap with west, Russia is taking the initiative to triumph over US technological superiority. Particularly recent Russian next-generation weapons focusing on hypersonic speed and extended range have the potential to threaten Europe and the U.S.

Russia has progressed substantially in developing long-range, nuclear-capable, air, land, and sea-launched hypersonic weapons. These hypersonic weapons have a broad range of applications in battlefield ranging from A2/AD in local conflicts to delivering strategic nuclear weapons. As such, they pose a substantial threat to NATO missile defense systems and overall security with their reported speed, range, and maneuverability.

From a realist perspective, the U.S. is expected to take necessary measures to counterbalance the threat posed to its security and accelerate R&D efforts to maintain technological edge in the development of hypersonic weapons to reciprocate Russian and Chinese efforts in the same direction. However, the proliferation of hypersonic weapon technology has the potential to increase instability throughout the world by encouraging both conventional and unconventional arms race.
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Current Russian Practices in Maritime Zones

Current Russian Practices in Maritime Zones

Official documents of the RF consolidate the primacy of international law (the UN Convention on International Maritime Law (UNCLOS, 1994 and conciliation protocols thereto, 1994-1997) in maritime policy of Russia. Among such documents the most significant are:

- The Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period until (2001)
- Decree by the President of the Russian Federation, 20 July 2017 “Approval of the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of naval operations for the period until 2030” (2017)
- The concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (2016)


Russia’s actions in the maritime spaces show that the most precise Russian maritime policy (interests, goals, and objectives) is described in the provisions of the Decree of the President of Russia 327 “on approval of the fundamentals of State policy of the Russian Federation in the sphere of military-maritime For the period until 2030.” The modern maritime policy of Russia is strategically focused not only on ensuring the implementation of sovereign rights of the RF in the waters belonging to it under maritime law, but also to ensure the Russian control over lines of transport on the world’s oceans and unimpeded access to oceanic resources (biological, energy, etc). Russia sees military force as the main instrument of maritime policy implementation.

TASS. (2019f). Russia ready to include Avangard, Sarmat systems in New START after its extension – Lavrov. TASS. Retrieved from https://tass.com/defense/1102179

TASS. (2019g). Foreign Ministry: Sarmat, Avangard systems may be included in New START treaty. TASS. Retrieved from https://tass.com/defense/1086515


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Tactically, Russian maritime policy is implemented in several ways:

- Legally (e.g. expansion of the RF continental shelf through the UN Commission decision)
- Militarily (e.g. aggression against Ukraine)
- Mixed - Through the use of economic, legal, and military levers of influence (including the latest technical inventions).

Russian maritime policy, like all of its foreign policies, can be characterized by flexibility in choosing the means of influence. A constant characteristic can be considered only the ultimate goal - to control or domination of the RF over certain areas of the oceans and to provide parity of maritime influence with the United States.

As a weaker state, RF can compete or confront other global actors only in asymmetric ways, resorting to local actions in the vacuum of the security environment. Accordingly, both for Russian foreign policy and maritime policy, Russia's most favorable environment is instability and conflict. Therefore, tactically, Moscow tries to destabilize the situation in the area of its interest (Baltic Sea), or save the conflict potential for the future with the possibility of intervention (Caspian Sea). The tactical feature of RF’s maritime policy is its focus on customary law, which allows us to count on the actual changes in the political situation in the historical perspective. For more thorough coverage of the features of Russian maritime policy, it is advisable to apply a regional approach.

**The Russian Federation’s Maritime Policy in the Arctic**

The principles of the RF’s Arctic policy determine that the Arctic is a strategic resource base, a strategically important territory for Russian foreign and security policy, and assumes that all activities in the Arctic are of maximum importance to the state’s interests in security and defense. The RF’s Arctic policy is determined by a large number of official documents, as listed above, and the following:

- Foundations OfThe Russian Federation’s State Policy In The Arctic (2001)
- Foundations of the Russian Federation’s State Policy In The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond (2008)
- The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020 (2013)

Russia’s maritime policy in the Arctic implements two priority goals: to consolidate Russian sovereignty over the North Sea Route (NSR) and to expand the area of sovereignty of the Russian Federation over the Arctic shelf. Today, Moscow has unilaterally established a legal regime of inland waters over the NSR. RF’s claims for exclusive rights to use the sea shelf are currently under scrutiny at the UN.

**The North Sea Route**

The Russian approach (Federal Law 155, Article 14, 1998) to the substantiation of the policy on the NSR and maritime policy generally relies on: 1) Russia’s claims of historic rights in a particular region; 2) The norms of international law, including UNCLOS (1982). In justifying its sovereignty over the NSR, Russia relies on two UNCLOS articles — 234 and 236 (Mikhina, 2015).

The Russian legal regime of the NSR established the status of inland waters for the entire North Sea Route.

*In 2012, the federal law of RF cancelled the notion of “Route of NSR” and introduced the concept “Sea Area of the NSR” (The Federal Law 132-FZ, Article 5.1., 2012) and in 2013 the ministry of the RF ordered (Rules of navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, 2013) that the waters of the NSR are to be considered the national line of transportation for the RF.*

The legal regime, which Moscow introduced for the waters of the NSR among other things, suggests that the shipowner, or the captain of the vessel, intending to transit the NSR must apply for transit from the administration of NSR for temporary permission at least 15 days in advance. In addition, all vessels approaching the borders of NSR must notify the administration of the NSR 72 hours in advance and provide a daily report on the movement and status of the vessel.

**Annex 1 (Border of the water area of the Northern Sea Route)**

*Source: The Northern Sea Route Administration*

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Among the legal bases of the special legal status for NSR, Russian lawyers define the following:

- The status quo of the Arctic region, which provides for an indisputable legal priority of the Arctic States and is enshrined not only by the normative legal acts of the Arctic States, but also by clearly pronounced or silent international recognition;
- There also exist “similar” practices in the maritime politics of other countries. Notably, it concerns the legal regime of inland waters. For example, Canada made claims to the Northwest Passage in 1986 (NWP). It stated that the transit of all foreign ships is allowed but subject to Canada’s legislation on regulation of the pollution of seas from ships. Foreign warships could enter Canadian inland waters and ports in accordance with the permit, which they should submit for to the Foreign Ministry of Canada at least 45 days in advance. Another example is the delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone and territorial waters by the Norwegian Government Decree (1935) and the positive conclusion of International Court of Justice concerning the Norwegian claims (1951).
An important precedent in Russia’s non-recognition of the international legal regime of the NSR's inland waters is the “Arctic Sunrise” case. The icebreaker of the international non-governmental organization Greenpeace was detained along with its crew by Russian border guards in August of 2013. Of significance was that the vessel “Arctic Sunrise” was in accordance with Russia’s rules for the water area of the NSR (three authorization requests were made and denied before the crew decided to continue its transit) (Berseneva, 2013). However, in the judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Press Release. The Arctic Sunrise”Case, 2013), the actions of the crew were considered legal and within the realm of UNCLOS. In May 2017, the Netherlands and Russia released a joint statement announcing the final resolution of the dispute regarding the detention of “Arctic Sunrise” on the International Tribunal’s judgment.

**The Arctic Continental Shelf**

In defending its positions and interests in the Arctic in general and on the shelf in particular, the RF utilizes symbolic, legal, and military means. One of the brightest symbolic gestures was Russia’s placement of its flag on a titanium plate on the submarine ridge of Lomonosov in the North Pole in 2007.

In the legal sphere, the RF is trying to assert its rights to the Arctic continental shelf through a mechanism of approval and the respective application of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In 2016, Moscow submitted an updated and supplemented application for expansion of the border of the Arctic continental shelf by 1.2 million sq. km.

For reference: Russia’s opponents to this application are other Arctic states; Denmark, Norway, Canada and the United States. Denmark also claims to expand its own territory of the Arctic shelf by 900 thousand sq. km. Norway filed a request in 2006 and was the first to receive a positive decision by the Commission. Denmark submitted its application for consideration to the Commission in December 2014, and Canada in May 2019. The claims of Russia, Denmark, and Canada all partly intersect.

The issue of establishing national claims or sovereignty over the territory of the Arctic continental shelf is based on economic interests. Present in the disputed territories is approximately 13% of world oil reserves, 30% of gas reserves, and significant deposits of other useful minerals to include rare earth materials. Any solution to be found will be based not only on scientific evidence, but also on a political basis.

Experts predict various scenarios in the event that Russia’s application will be rejected by the Commission (Moe, 2011; Zagorskiy, 2013; Konyshhev & Sergunin, 2014). The least probable scenario is the RF’s exit from UNCLOS and a unilateral declaration of Russian sovereignty on the expanded territory of the Arctic continental shelf. In this case, Russia will be in the U.S. position, outside of UNCLOS, and will rely on customary law and military force to substantiate its claims. It is believed that this is an extreme and unlikely step, since the positions of Moscow in this case would be weaker than the Commission’s decision. The second scenario involves reviewing their position and submitting a revamped, less ambitious, claim. This step will demonstrate respect for international law, but can provoke internal discussions within Russia. The third and most likely scenario, in the case of a negative decision, is to abandon the issue for a more favorable political circumstance and instead ensure Russia’s actual dominance over the region via military presence.

The important thing for Russia’s Arctic policy is that it is implemented by the RF as the sole presence in the region. Although other states declare their interest in the Arctic and protest against the spread of Russian sovereignty beyond the bounds of maritime law, there is no real competition for Russia’s presence there in the near term, although the first steps in this direction have been made by China. Therefore, the Arctic projects of the Russian Federation (NSR and continental shelf expansion) are a convenient opportunity for Moscow:

- To consolidate and secure the actual state of affairs until they become part of the legal order (customary law, tacit recognition).
- To strengthen the legal validity of the category of “historicity,” which is widely used by the Russian Federation to legitimize its interests and actions at sea in other regions.

Both of these Russian policies are relevant to the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation. On one hand, Russia justifies its aggression and the illegal annexation of Crimea to the “historical affiliation” of these territories to Russia and lays the principle of “historical inland waters” for the Azov Sea in the legal field of Ukrainian-Russian relations. On the other hand, it tries to consolidate the Crimean situation in the international political field as the situation has developed.

Part of the Arctic policy of Russia is its relations with Norway in the Barents Sea and with the U.S. in the Bering Sea and Strait. Both directions of Russia’s relations have some
was established by the agreement on the maritime border between the United States and the USSR of June 1, 1990. The agreement is ratified by the United States and not ratified by Russia. The agreement has been criticized by Russian officials and lawyers as having led to territorial and economic losses in the Russian Federation, in particular, with regard to the development of shelf and seabed resources (Tkachenko, 2017).

Annex 3

Despite the Russian Federation not ratifying the treaty, the parties adhere to the regime of maximum silence and the avoidance of provocations at the border. While the rhetoric of the United States and Russia is acute in relation to Ukraine, Syria, and Russia’s provocations in the Baltic region, in the Bering Strait during the past 10 years, the level of tension has remained steadily low; Russian military aircrafts and vessels are strictly adhering to territorial boundaries (Hawksley, 2015).

The United States relies on the principle of long-term common practice as evidence of the current international legal status of the border and the effectiveness of the treaty. This principle is part of international customary law and can legitimize a treaty whose entry into force has not been completed (Konyshnev & Sergunin, 2014). For its part, Moscow uses the 1990 agreement to substantiate its claim to expand the Russian territory into the Arctic shelf. This conundrum makes it impossible for Russia to renounce this agreement even if the Duma refuses to ratify it further (Laruelle, P.104., 2014.). Today, discussions and dialogue between Russia and the United States on Bering Strait issues are being conducted regularly, only not for territorial issues, but for fisheries.

For Reference: Russian claims to sovereignty over the areas from the Arctic sea to the North Pole were fixed in the Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of 1926 “On the declaration of the territory of the Union of SSR lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean.” This document defined the western boundary of the Russian Arctic possessions by a median of 168° 49’ 30” west longitude from Greenwich - just in the middle between the Diomede Islands in the Bering Strait, which was then confirmed by the US-Russia Convention. At that time, territorial waters were restricted only 3 miles of sea from the coastline (cannon shot), and so the Convention on the Purchase-Sale of Alaska did not define a boundary in the Bering Strait and Sea.

Russia-Norway: The Barents Sea, Seabard/Sealbard

In 2010, after 40 years of negotiations, Russia and Norway settled a bilateral dispute over the maritime boundary and signed an agreement on the so-called "Grey zone" (175,000 sq. km.) on the shelf of the Barents Sea.

For Reference: The factors that have resulted in a compromise between Russia and Norway (Konyshnev & Sergunin, 2014):

- Both countries have signed and ratified UNCLOS, which unified the national rules of delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ (as the Convention provides identical rules based on the median principle, rather than the sectoral principle of demarcation of Sea territories);
- Both countries took into account the decisions (a few in the 90’s and 00’s) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the principle of resolving sea disputes. The court determined that disputes should be resolved according to the principle of objective geographical factors, where there can be significant differences in the length of the coastline;
- Favorable political circumstances have emerged for Norway. This dispute was the last in the settlement of relations with Arctic neighbors, and in 2009 Oslo received a CLCS decision on the boundaries of its continental shelf and EEZ in the Arctic. It was important for Moscow to demonstrate goodwill and contractual capacity for a diplomatic fight with Canada and Denmark over the Arctic shelf;
- Both countries were interested in exploring the Barents Sea’s hydrocarbon
However, the signing of this agreement did not solve other problematic issues of bilateral Russian-Norwegian relations such as those regarding fisheries, energy production, and Russia's desire to strengthen its presence in Svalbard/Spitsbergen.

**Svalbard’s problem**

Background: Svalbard’s status is governed by the Treaty of Paris on the Svalbard Archipelago of 9 February 1920, which recognizes Norway's Sovereignty over the archipelago and obliges it to secure certain rights of other signatories to the treaty. The USSR formally recognized the sovereignty of Norway over the archipelago in 1924 through the exchange of notes. The USSR became a party to the Treaty of Paris in 1935. Today, about 40 countries have joined the Treaty.

The conflicts between Russia and Norway in the context of the legal regulation of activities in and around Svalbard have an economic and security dimension. In the economic sphere, Russia is questioning (Portsel, 2011; Oreshenkov, 2010):

1. There exists a 78% income tax rate that the archipelago's offshore energy companies have to pay to Norway. Russian companies believe that they enjoy the opportunities provided for by the 1920 Paris Treaty, namely the right to pay taxes less than 1% of the value of the product extracted.

2. Oslo decided in 1977 to establish a 200-mile fishing protection zone around the archipelago. Russia has not recognized Norway’s decision and considers these territories to be open to international economic activity, including fishing. Therefore, incidents have occurred between Russia and Norway, during which Russian fishermen have been arrested by Norwegian coast guards. In 2004, the Russian Northern Fleet began patrolling around Svalbard to protect Russian fishermen. Norway declared the practice unlawful and that it was a manifestation of Russia’s imperial ambitions and Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate to resolve the issues at hand.

A problematic issue for Norway in the field of security is Russia’s desire to expand its presence and operations in Svalbard. Oslo sees this as a threat due to its historical experience with the USSR's Svalbard policy (Portsel, 2011) and generally with Russia’s current aggressive policies. In response, Norway has intensified restrictive measures: blocking plans for the construction of facilities (such as fish processing plants), extending conservation areas within which Russian scientists and tourists are restricted, establishing rules for the registration of all scientific projects in a special database, etc. The Russian side, in response, restricted the access of Norwegian researchers to the Barents Sea’s bioresources within its EEZ. These issues are the subject of ongoing Russian-Norwegian negotiations.

For Ukraine, examples of Russia’s maritime policy in the Barents Sea, Svalbard, in the Bering Sea, and the Strait once again confirm that the most powerful argument for Russia to refrain from provocations and conflicts in bilateral relations at sea is the power of its adversaries. Both waters contain enough contentious issues to intensify the confrontation. If Moscow refrains from even hints of provocation in the Bering Sea and the Straits, then it will also have no intention of expanding its boundaries or influence in the Barents Sea and at Svalbard.

**The Baltic Sea**

Like the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea is a place of intense interstate relations with the participation of the Russian Federation and NATO nations. RF has no unresolved territorial issues in the Baltic Sea. Maritime borders with other countries are fixed and enshrined in interstate treaties. A factor that adds to the uncertainty of the overall situation is that Moscow has not yet ratified the Treaty between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Delimitation of the Maritime Zones in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Narva. The Russian Foreign Ministry argues that ratification is delayed because it is possible only in the absence of confrontation in relations between the two states (Lavrov, press-conference, 2017).

The Baltic Sea Region is the least conducive to establishing Russian maritime domination. There is no conflict potential in this geographical area that Russia could use to enhance its political weight and increase its military presence beyond Russian territory. At the same time, the high level of Russian military presence in the Baltic Sea area and the policy of systematic provocations by Moscow fulfill the following functions:

- Demonstrates the continued presence of the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea and its importance as a Baltic state;
- Provides ongoing intelligence to identify potential military threats to Russian infrastructure and military installations in the region;
- Provokes the North Atlantic Alliance to respond to the threat posed by Russia in this region, resulting in their underestimation of the level of threat in other areas.

German maritime policy in the Baltic Sea closely integrates the economic and military components. According to an analysis by the Center for Global Studies "Strategy XXI", the infrastructure of the Russian Nord Stream pipeline (1 and 2) can be used to gather intelligence and military information on NATO’s activities in the Baltic Sea (Honchar & Hayduk & Burhongisterk & Lakiychuk, 2018).

The Russian instrument of influence and destabilization in the sea waters is also the artificial disorientation (jamming and spoofing) of the GPS/GNSS satellite navigation systems. According to a study by the American non-governmental organization CAADS (March, 2019), since February 2016, there have been approximately 10,000 cases of Russian interference with the satellite navigation systems. Among the latest known cases of this kind are the Russian interference with GPS navigation during the NATO-led Trident Juncture exercise in October 2018, as officially announced by the governments of Norway, Finland and NATO officials (O’Dwyer, 2018), and failures in the GPS navigation system in the Sea of Azov at the same time as the Russian GLONASS system worked without fail (Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 7 March 2019).

**Caspian Sea**

Since the Caspian Sea has no natural access to other seas, for a long time there has been controversy over the legal regulation of its waters, specifically around the legal approach to the nature of this body of water - "sea or lake." The status of the Caspian Sea was undefined and first relied on agreements between the two countries, Iran and the USSR. After the collapse of the latter, the status relied upon bilateral and multilateral agreements of coastal countries that required codification up to the signing of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in 2018. The legal regime in the Caspian Sea is not governed by UNCLOS or other offshore instruments.

Russia’s interest was, and remains, in maintaining its maximum impact in the
Russia, namely:

- Provides for the right of free movement of the Caspian Navy outside the 25-mile zone to which coastal country sovereign extends (territorial waters + fishing zone) and blocks non-Caspian military presence in the Caspian Sea;
- Leaves the delineation of the sea floor uncertain. Such demarcation is envisaged to be in accordance with the agreements of the neighboring countries (Article 8). This approach was used in 1998-2003 to delimit the Caspian Sea between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan (Bratchikov, 2018). Thus, the potentially conflicting issue of the allocation of Caspian energy production rights between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan remains a favorable environment for the implementation of Russian policy;
- Contains a mechanism for blocking the construction of pipelines along the bottom of the Caspian Sea (Ibid). The text of the Convention does not require the consent of all coastal States to lay pipelines and requires the agreement of only the countries in whose sectors the pipe should pass. However, the possibility of blocking such projects is envisaged by the binding Convention (paragraph 14, Article 14) to the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea and its Protocols, in particular the Protocol on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, according to which each country in the Caspian Sea may express its disagreement about conducting activities in the Caspian Sea.

Examples of Russian maritime policy in the Baltic and Caspian Seas for Ukraine can be seen in terms of the implementation of RF’s goals in these two completely different environments. In both waters, the main tool for the strengthening of Russian political influence and presence is military force. In the stable Baltic Sea, with its low level of conflict, the Russian Navy has resorted to provocations and demonstrates its presence to create a conflict, while in the Caspian Sea with its number of uncoordinated issues between the littoral States, information about the provocative behaviour of the Russian Navy is not received, because such conflict can be quickly created there by the RF if necessary. This confirms the thesis that conflicting and unstable environments are the most favourable for the implementation of Russian policy. Respectively, the actions of the RF will always be directed either to constrain and conserve conflict potential in a certain region, or to destabilize the regional environment.

**Maritime policy of Russia in the Far East and territorial dispute between Russia and Japan**

In the Far East, the most problematic maritime issues for the Russian Federation are with Japan. The two States have a long history of maritime relations, the core problem of which was and remains the territorial identity of the islands of the Kuril Archipelago. In addition to this matter, other interesting examples of Russian maritime policy that can be seen in the Japanese and Okhotsk Seas are the issues of shelf and legal regimes; the use of water resources of the Okhotsk Sea and the desire of Russia to declare the Gulf of Peter the Great a territorial sea.

Russia claims to the waters of the Gulf of Peter the Great in the Sea of Japan as a proper territorial sea, the boundaries of which are defined by direct rising lines from the extreme points of the bay. Japan, France, UK, and the USA do not agree with this position. Moscow’s reasoning is built mainly on the fact that this bay is the “historical gulf” of the Russian Federation, respectively, its status is regulated by the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and the boundaries of Russian sovereignty are determined by UNCLOS article 7 and article 10 paragraph 6. For Reference: In 1957, the USSR announced the Gulf of Peter Great as its inland waters. U.S., Japan, France, and Britain refused to acknowledge this decision on the grounds that the width of the entrance to the Bay of 102 miles, which considerably exceeds the limit of 24 miles set by UNCLOS. Moscow, in response, stated that the Gulf of Peter the Great belongs to the category of “historical bays,” which was defined by Russia in 1901 in the rules of maritime fisheries in the territorial waters of the Amur Governor-General, as well as in the contracts with Japan on Fisheries 1907, 1928 and 1944 (Rezchikov & Trubina, 2018).

**Sea of Okhotsk**

In 2014, the UN Commission on the borders of the Continental Shelf adopted a positive decision on the Russian application for expansion of the borders of Russia’s continental shelf in the Okhotsk Sea. As a result of this decision, the central part of the Okhotsk Sea (52,000 sq. km.) was included in the RF Continental shelf (Reccomendations of the CLCS, 2014).

Comments from the Russian side, including from Russian officials, contain the statement that since the approval of the Russian application by the Commission, the Sea of Okhotsk has become a Russian Inland Sea (ZYkova, 2014).

Such statements, however, are untrue because of Russia’s existing limit of a 200-mile EEZ in the Okhotsk Sea. Russian sovereignty over the central part of the Okhotsk Sea shelf does not apply, to include the water and bioresources that are contained in therein (shrimp, shellfish, crabs, etc.) (Art. 78, UNCLOS). The legal regime of fisheries for both Russian vessels and those of other nations in the central zone is not altered by a decision of the Commission, but the aspects of cooperation between offshore energy and fishing companies that have economic interests in this part of the sea are subject to clarification (Kurmazov, 2015).

The coastal country of the Sea of Okhotsk is also Japan, and the experience of Russian-Japanese relations in the maritime sphere is especially important for Ukraine.

**The Kuril Islands**

Officially, Tokyo has a rather rigid position, requiring Russia to transfer to Japan part of the southern Kuril Islands; Iturup Island, Kunashir Island, Shikotan Island, and Habomai Island.
The unsettled territorial issues between Russia and Japan are an obstacle to the signing peace treaties between the two countries, but this situation does not prevent Japan and Russia from developing broad bilateral cooperation. In doing so, Russia has successfully used Tokyo's territorial aspirations as a factor in influencing Japan's position on various issues. Indeed, it is safe to assume that Tokyo's hopes for more productive island-negotiations influenced Japan's decision to refrain from protesting Russia's claims to expand the continental shelf in the Okhotsk Sea in 2013, as opposed to protesting Russia's bid in 2001 (Kislovskiy, 2016).

The main peculiarity of Japan and Russia's bilateral relations in terms of maritime policy in the area of the disputed islands is Japan’s actual compliance with the rules and regulations established under Russian sovereignty over the islands and the maritime space around them. In this area of the sea formed a special type of economic relations between the two countries, due to the acute dependence of the population of islands on both sides of the marine fisheries.

For Reference (Kurmazov, 2006): After WWII, Japanese fishermen who continued to fish near the USSR-controlled islands were often delayed by Soviet border guards (1534 Japanese fishing vessels were detained in 30 years, from 1945 to 1976, and only 939 returned). The magnitude of the problem for the Japanese population can be seen from the fact that in 1962, the Government of Japan established a fund to assist the fishermen's families who were detained by Soviet border guards. The All-Japan Fishermen's Association officially raised the issue of offshore fisheries in Tokyo by negotiating with Moscow in the early 1960s. The result was a 1963 agreement between the State Committee for Fisheries of the USSR Council of National Economy and the All-Japan Association of Fishery Producers for fishing for sea cabbage by Japanese fishermen in the area of Fr. Signal (Kaigar).

Arguments of the parties (Masiuk, 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The islands were occupied by the USSR between August 14, 1945, when the Japanese emperor announced the surrender of Japan, and September 2, 1945, when the Unconditional Capitulation Act was signed. During this time, Soviet troops continued the fighting and captured the islands.</td>
<td>The fighting ceased after the official surrender, which was recorded on September 2, 1945. Before this time, however, Japanese forces had stopped resisting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The affiliation of the islands of Japan is fixed by the treaties: the Shimodo Trade Treaty of 1855 (the border was drawn between the islands of Urup and Iturup and Sakhalin was unbounded) and the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 (Japan recognized Sakhalin as Russian in exchange for transferring all the Kuril Islands). As a result of the defeat of Russia in the war with Japan in 1904-1905, according to the Portsmouth Peace, Russia ceded Japan to all the Kurils and Southern Sakhalin.</td>
<td>The complete and unconditional surrender “nullified” the subjectivity of the state; accordingly, Japan cannot rely on international treaties that existed until 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet-Japanese Declaration of October 19, 1956 states the end of the war and the readiness of the USSR to hand over to the islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the conclusion of the peace treaty.</td>
<td>The declaration is not a contract but a protocol of intent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fishing for Japanese sailors in the waters controlled by the USSR was governed by interagency agreements. Noteworthy is the agreement signed in 1981 after being proposed by the USSR in 1977 regarding Japan’s 200-mile EEZ. The features of this agreement are (Kurmazov, 2006. pp. 349-350):

- The obligation of the Japanese side enshrined in Article 5 to comply with the laws and regulations of the USSR, as well as to pay for fishing rights;
- Asymmetric characteristics (from the Soviet side - the state department, from the Japanese - a public organization);
- Not ratified by the parliaments of the countries;
- Has the status of an international agreement through the exchange of notes of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR and Japan.

In 1998, another agreement was concluded between Russia and Japan, which this time was intergovernmental. It does not have an article similar to Article 5 of the 1983 Agreement, but there is an Article 3, part of which reads “The Parties, where appropriate, shall encourage the development of mutual cooperation between organizations and corporations of both countries in the field of fisheries within the scope of their respective relevant laws and regulations of the respective countries.”

Today, the Russian side adds to the list of arguments regarding Russian affiliation with the Southern Kuril Islands, the existence of two treaties - from 1983 and 1998 and the fact that...
For Ukraine, the historical experience behind Russia's maritime policy in its relations with Japan is valuable because of the parallels of the forced coordination of economic activity in the conflicted maritime area. Despite the different nature of the territorial conflict with the RF in Japan and Ukraine, the means and instruments of Russian maritime policy are similar in both cases and can be taken into account by Kyiv to secure its position in the future.

**The Azov and Black Seas**

The maritime areas of the Azov and Black seas do not differ in the severity of relations from the rest of the maritime areas where the RF is present. Cases of persecution and the detention of fishing vessels took place between the USSR and Turkey. After 1991, they continued between Ukraine and Turkey, Ukraine and the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Romania, etc. These incidents were resolved through the application of administrative measures; fines, etc., and counter-claims through legal, political, and diplomatic mechanisms. With the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the situation has changed dramatically as Russia, in the Black and Azov Seas, has begun to militarily reinforce the region with all of its experience in asserting dominance over other marine areas.

Today, in the Azov and Black Seas, the Russian Federation achieves its goals through a combination of military and economic means of influence. All coastal states are the object of Russian policy in the Azov-Black Sea area, but Moscow's focus is currently on Ukraine and Turkey. The purpose of the maritime policy of the RF in this maritime space is to completely absorb it into the sphere of Russian domination both economically and militarily.

**The Sea of Azov**

The actual control over the Sea of Azov, which Russia acquired as a result of the occupation of the Crimean peninsula, the construction of the Kerch Bridge, and the preserved contractual regime with Ukraine, provides for it virtually unlimited possibilities of presence in the Azov maritime area and the use of its biological resources. Today, Ukraine is limited in its ability to impede Russia's actions in the Azov Sea. Using its military advantage and effective control of the Kerch Strait, Russia has blocked the Azov Sea for Ukrainian warships and is restricting merchant shipping to the ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol. Russia's actions in the Sea of Azov indicate that Moscow is implementing a strategy of the gradual maritime economic isolation of Ukraine in the Azov-Black Sea basin.

In the conditions of restricting third-party countries' access to the Sea of Azov under the Agreement between Ukraine and the RF on cooperation in the use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait of December 24, 2003, and the military advantage on the part of Russia, the threats of isolation of the Azov coast of Ukraine increase significantly. To achieve the goal of isolating Ukraine's Azov coast, the RF applies both administrative and procedural methods such as controls, inspections, the creation of artificial pretexts for long delays of ships. It also asserts military methods such as the closure of certain sections of the Azov Sea under the pretext of naval exercises.

The Azov waters actually became the area of collision between the Russian Security Forces (FSB) and Ukrainian Naval Forces. The obstacles that Russia implements to subvert Ukrainian economic activity in the sea, namely fishing and commercial ports, aims to destroy the region's economy and cause further political destabilization.

It is not necessary to exclude the probability of Russia's manipulation of the existing agreements with Ukraine, both the agreement dated 2003 and annual protocols on fisheries in the Sea of Azov, to strengthen the Russian political position in its confrontation with Ukraine.

Today, Ukraine does not rely upon Russia's compliance with its agreements within the current legal framework and Ukraine is limited in its options to protect its interests and defend its rights in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.

Ensuring the rights of merchant vessels to a smooth passage of the Sea of Azov to ports in Berdyansk and Mariupol is effectively achieved only by using military means. The obstruction of Ukrainian Navy ships is attempted by the RF's FSB to commit illegal inspection stops.

**The Black Sea**

Russia views the Black Sea and the Black Sea region not only as a zone of influence, but as a necessary foothold for its presence in the Mediterranean region, the Middle East, North Africa, and also to strengthen its position there. Accordingly, Russia's Black Sea strategy combines two goals:

- To block Ukraine from the sea as part of a strategy to restore control of Ukraine,
- To acquire undisputed dominance in the Black Sea by limiting NATO countries' activity in the area and the unimpeded use of the Turkish straits.

Russian Black Sea domination, which also includes Russia's role in frozen conflicts in the region, will allow Moscow to: 1) influence the economic and political activities of the Black Sea states, 2) to control the trade and energy routes of the Black Sea from Europe to Asia. In this case, Russia will be able to maintain its monopolistic position of energy supplier to EU countries and may strengthen its political influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Russia's only competitor for influence in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus may be Turkey, whose naval power still prevails over Russia (Wezeman & Kuimova, 2018). Turkey also controls the passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

At the same time, Turkey is vulnerable to Russian influence. Its strategic transport and energy transit projects depend upon maintaining stability in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, where Russia's military and political presence is significant. Joint Russian-Turkish energy projects (Turk-Stream 1 and 2) may in the future become an instrument of Moscow's influence over Ankara.

Particular attention is paid to Ankara's concession to Russia in interpreting the provisions of the Montreux Convention, taking into account reports of passage of the Russian submarines “Veligky Novgorod,” “Kolpino,” “Krasnodar,” and “Stary Oskol,” which could be considered violations of Article 12 of the Montreux Convention (Zender, 2019).

Turkey today complies with the rules of the Montreux Convention and is interested in doing so in the future to preserve the convention and to protect the Turkish interests in the Black Sea. At the same time, Ankara's plans to build an alternative (parallel) Bosphorus-Istanbul Canal deserve special attention and study. It is not inconceivable that the existence of this channel may provoke discussions on the extension of the rules of the Montreux Convention.
Convention to it, as a whole and its separate provisions. It is not excluded that in the future, Ankara may decide to build an additional canal parallel to Dardanelles, which will create a fundamentally new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region and put on the agenda the need to review the legal use of straits.

We can assume that Russia considers the prospect of building alternative connecting channels between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea as an opportunity to create a new legal regime for the passage of vessels in and out of the Black Sea. This could also be used to limit the possibility of warships from non-Black Sea states from entering the sea. Additional grounds for the Russian military presence in the area of the Black Sea Straits and their control may appear after the completion of the Turkish Stream, as Moscow traditionally uses such infrastructure as a pretext for military or intelligence activities (Burhomistrenko & Haiduk & Honchar & Lakiychuk, 2018).

The Black Sea region has today become an area of power dominance. In the secondary role of international law, only high-security states (military power, security alliances) are able to protect their own interests as a guarantee of security. This state of affairs is entirely in the interests of Russia. And since Moscow in this case is a provocateur of chaos in the region, the situation and the return to a relationship based on international law should not be expected in the near to medium term. To change the political situation, any general regional formats of cooperation in the economic, humanitarian, or environmental protection arenas have no future because they will not be based on common interests.

Today, the main threat to Ukraine in the Black Sea is Russia’s aggressive intentions and behavior through the further destabilization of the southern regions of Ukraine. The initial stages of this can be the establishment of Russian control over shipping to the Black Sea ports of Ukraine: Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson and the mouth of the Danube.

Control over the Crimea and the installation of intelligence equipment on the drilling and extraction platforms of the Ukrainian state company “Chornomornaftogaz” give the RF Black Sea Fleet the possibility of conducting radio and electronic intelligence operations (Ibid.). The constant military presence of Russian warships near these facilities is a demonstration of the RF’s claims to “rights” in this part of the Black Sea waters.

Conclusions

- The modern maritime policy of the RF is strategically focused not only on the protection of sovereign rights of the RF in the waters belonging to it according to maritime law, but also on ensuring Russian control over transportation lanes in the world’s oceans. Furthermore, RF seeks unhindered access to the resources of these global commons (biological, energy, etc.). The ultimate objective of RF’s maritime policy is to provide parity of maritime influence with the USA.

- Russia’s maritime policy is implemented through a combination of military force, political and legal instruments, economic impact, and new means of technical influence. With the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the value of military force for the RF as a tool for achieving maritime policy objectives has prevailed over other means.

- Security, instability, and conflict are the most favourable environments for the implementation of RF’s maritime policy objectives. Therefore, Moscow is tactically trying to destabilize the situation in the areas of its interest (Baltic Sea), or to preserve the conflict potential for the future with the possibility of intervene (Caspian Sea).

- RF’s maritime policy relies on the existing normative foundation of the law of the sea. In those cases when RF cannot reach its desired goals through military means, the RF relies upon the decisions of these competent international bodies. In cases of Russia’s violation of international and maritime law, it captures the status quo by power and counts on the legitimation of its actions in the future through the principles of political expediency, customary law, and “Historicity.”

- Striving for parity with global actors in the maritime sphere, the Russian Federation, as a weaker state, rests on the law of the sea and declares compliance with its norms. At the same time RF prefers the application or demonstration of military force in relations with other countries.

- In the Arctic region, RF prioritizes two goals: to consolidate Russian sovereignty over the North Sea and to expand the area of the sovereignty of RF over the Arctic shelf. The important thing for Russia’s Arctic policy is that it is implemented by the RF as the sole presence in the region. Russia’s accelerated militarization of the Arctic creates convenient conditions for Moscow to:

  - To consolidate and secure the actual state of affairs until they become part of the legal order (customary law, tacit recognition).

  - To strengthen the legal validity of the category of “historicity,” which is widely used by the Russian Federation to legitimize its interests and actions at sea.

- In the Bering Strait and Bering Sea, despite the lack of ratification of the treaty that delimitates it, Russia observes a policy of silence and the avoidance of provocations on the border with the USA.

- In its relations with Norway in the Barents Sea, despite the resolution of maritime border issues and the disputed “grey zone,” the RF continues to not recognize the Norwegian legal status of sea areas around Svalbard with respect to fisheries regulation and energy production. For Norway, the primary issue is Russia’s desire to strengthen its own presence near Svalbard/Spitsbergen.

- While the region of the Baltic Sea is the least favorable for the establishment of Russian maritime domination, the high level of Russian military presence in the Baltic Sea and the policy of systematic provocations by Moscow serve the following purposes:

  - Demonstrates the continued presence of the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea and its importance as a Baltic state;

  - Provides ongoing intelligence to identify potential military threats to Russian infrastructure and military installations in the region. It also serves to identify “weak areas” in Baltic states;

  - Provokes the North Atlantic Alliance to respond to the threat posed by Russia in this region, resulting in their underestimating of the level of threat in other areas.

- The main tool used by Russia to pursue its interests in the Caspian Sea is naval power. Additional influence, however, is leveraged by the RF through the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. On one hand, it provides the conditions for the completion of the delimitation of the maritime boundary of
Caspian states. On the other hand, the creation of such a legal maritime regime is quite satisfying to Russia because it does not limit its military presence and provides an opportunity to hinder the implementation of economic projects that it deems disadvantageous.

- In its relations with Japan, the RF now adds to the list of arguments regarding Russian affiliation with the Southern Kuril Islands that Japan’s fisheries in these waters fall under Russian laws and international treaties with the Russian Federation. For Ukraine, the historical experience of Russia’s maritime policy in its relations with Japan is valuable because of the parallels of forced coordination of economic activity in the conflicted maritime area. Despite the different nature of the territorial conflict with the RF in Japan and Ukraine, the means and instruments of Russian maritime policy are similar in both cases and may be taken into account by Kyiv to secure its position in the future.

- Today, in the Azov and Black Seas, the RF achieves its goals through a combination of military and economic means of influence. The subjects of Russian policy in the Azov and Black Seas are all coastal states. The purpose of the maritime policy of the Russian Federation in this maritime space is to completely absorb it into the sphere of Russian domination both economically and militarily.

- Having made a decision on the violation of the norms of international and maritime law in the Azov and Black Sea region, the RF remains within the legal framework where it does not contradict its goals and can help to consolidate the “actual state of affairs.” The most commonly used legal arguments of the RF’s actions in the Black and Azov Seas are the “historical affiliation” of these territories to Russia and the principle of “historical inland waters” for the Azov Sea in the legal arena of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

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“Regional Security in the Middle East” by Pinar Bilgin is an amalgamation of efforts to depict and understand the interactive dynamics of security and security agenda in / for the Middle East. Even though Regions and Powers by Buzan and Waewer succeeds in giving an insight about internal and external mechanisms shaping the security dynamics on any region this books impugns validity of many ideas or thoughts taken for granted by double reading. Those ideas or thoughts belong mostly to the neo-realist school of thought.

At the very heart of the study there lies the intent to disassemble the two core terms “security” and “region”. As such, it sets out with reconceptualizing security from a critical perspective through two main directions, namely: broadening and deepening the concept through refusing the primacy of the sovereign state, and rejecting “theorizing” as being a neutral tool. The author believes theorizing privileges certain practices while marginalizing some others, creating fertile grounds for the privileged to take root. Lamenting the scarcity of publications reflecting security considerations within the region, she takes on the task to lay out security perspectives from outside and within the region in a critical and comparative way following a chronological logic. While doing this she takes on a normative tone suggesting change.

Bilgin does not try to refute the utility of current security agenda building upon military solutions to the problems within the region. But she tries to broaden the panorama or enlarge the view for the decision makers / students so that they can base their decisions / inferences upon better analysis of whole catalogue of fields pertaining to security. In other words she calls for a comprehensive approach that pays attention to local security concerns also.

The author delineates three specific aims for the book:

a. To present state of art on the prevailing security literature and practices in the Middle East to show the untapped potential,

b. To show the mutually constitutive relationship between inventing regions and following a security agenda for the invented region,

c. To show how one can envision a different regional security in the Middle East when compared to the imposed version.

Further disassembling security, the author contends even though not uniform, most Cold

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Zender, A. (2019). Can Russian submarines pass through the Turkish Straits according to the Montreux Convention? Beyond the Horizon, Commentary.


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War security studies reflected a privileged focus on the primacy of the state, on its military dimension and preservation of the status quo. Two main colors of those studies were the dominance of realist approach and the context of “Cold War” they were created within. As several currents of objectivism appeared in the general spectrum the mainstream thinking survived the demise of Cold War.

Products of security thinking going against mainstream thought though started to appear starting from 1960s. Three prominent strands were alternative security thinking, peace research and third world security.

Students of Alternative Security thinking were for common security rejecting zero-sum calculations. In the case of a nuclear war there would be no winner. Based on this argument the security had to be attained not against but with the adversary.

According to Peace Research students the absence of war should not be conflated to peace. For attainment of peace conditions for social justice should be fulfilled and structural causes of instability should be tackled as proposed by Johan Galtung. “Stable peace” concept by Kenneth Boulding would effectively argue that a peace attained through threat and use of war was not to last.

One last strand, students of Third World were for the idea that prevalent East-West stability and search for equilibrium did not mean much to those countries. For them as opposed to dominant Western rhetoric, a change in status quo was a good thing. The reasons of insecurity were rather internal than external. In this logic, state and institution building critical for raising human capital and increase trade creates more conducive trend to change status quo in their favor.

In this sense, end of the Cold War marked a pursuit to adjust on the side of the mainstream thought. An important book as such was Buzan et al’s “People, States & Fear” published in 1991. The authors would posit in the book that:

a. The concept of security should be broadened to the fields of economy, politics, society and environment alongside existing military which had up to that point received disproportionate attention.

b. The focus for study should be directed to both above to international and below to individual levels

In 1991, Ken Booth would suggest a similar broadening to include “all those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.” As many subjects could register within the same category to include illiteracy and human rights abuses, the final objective could be said to tackle those non-military issues before their solution requires military methods.

Bilgin criticizes Buzan’s arguments because of his over-reliance on neo-realist state-centric approach saying: “the state is generally privileged as the actor historically endowed with security tasks and most adequately structured for the purpose.” Her main argument is that reliance on state for non-military threats to security will not produce intended results. Despite the well position of the state for most security matters, some others will require agency of non-state actors. She further elaborates on Buzan’s claim that security studies are dominated by states responding the reason is not the absence of other referents and agents to challenge the state but the security analysts thoughts as such.

On her pursuit to disassemble the second term “region”, Bilgin contends that they have been defined and redefined as a result of political activity. The term Middle East was coined by British India Office towards the end of 19th century to organize the defense of India for the lands standing in the middle of England and India. It was further redefined by British and later US strategists describing their spatial understanding for the most optimum space to implement specific security policies. During Cold War, the term was redefined in line with containment policy against Soviets. Even after the developments following the end of Cold War the term survived with many differences on understanding. This clearly shows that space and politics has a relationship. It should be noted that not all societies have been able to impose their maps onto others. Rate of success is dependent on the relative power of the inventors.

In line with this argument, there has existed multiple views on the regional security advocated by different actors four of which come to fore in the subject region. The first one is the well-known “Middle East” perspective advocated by the West to further its own security concerns and interests. Bilgin argues that “the region is not a ‘real historical entity’ and there are relatively few common characteristics that could be used to view this group of states together as a region.” During the Cold War, this geography was tried to be kept under control and stability in order not to provoke a counter action from the Eastern Bloc or Russia. In the post-Cold War period, any compromise in the stability of this region has been perceived as a threat for Europe or the West in wider connotation. As a good example of this understanding, following is an excerpt from the NATO Prague Summit (2002) Declaration: “The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security. It is based on the recognition that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean [...]” (NATO 2011)

A second perspective developed against this Western understanding was Arab Regional System. In their work published in 1979 Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Matar would argue that the term Middle East was a political invention that did not correspond to the nature of the area but aimed at tearing up Arab homeland by including non-Arabs. They argued the term served better to describe interactions between Arab leaders and their interactions with outer world. Yet it is noteworthy that this was another political act to facilitate ascendance of Nasser to the leadership of Arab nations. This Arab nationalism itself was invented at the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century to motivate Arabs revolt against first Ottoman then colonial powers. As more nations gained their independence this Arab security rhetoric lost effect in face of new state-centric understanding. Also the Gulf states broke ranks to join US approach. After the death of Nasser statist security concerns took precedent. Yet, states within the region to include those of the Gulf continued to justify their acts with reference to Arab National security.

A third perspective, Euro-Med Region was a result of European efforts of distancing itself from US policy towards the region dovetailing decline in Pan-Arabism. Although not delivering much during Cold War, in the 1980s European politicians came to the understanding that stability in the Middle East was an integral part of their own security. This Euro-Med Region did not include Gulf countries and other non-littoral states to include Yemen, Iran etc. The main weakness of this representation is that the conception encompasses non-military issues not from the perspective of the regional states but from that of Europe. The ultimate goal is that those issues do not become ones of Europe. The remedy to that end was encouragement of economic liberalisation and sustainable economic growth which would entail political participation and democratization.
The last perspective to be mentioned is Muslim Middle East coined after Islamic Awakening in 90s. Islamist discourse had actually been mobilized first by Saudis to counter Nasserism. The Islamic revolution in 1979 further heated anti-status quoist rhetoric. In the 90s it was picked up by Hezbollah and FIS where the latter reverted to violent tactics when obliterated by the military from the political scene. Currently it is the hardest to be tracked due to the reason that it is utilized by non-state actors on their claim for legitimacy. Running the gamut from Hezbollah to Saudi Arabia, Islam has become a discourse to garner legitimacy although their message has anti-Islamic content.

It is possible to claim that 1990s US backed Middle East perspective gained acceptance until invasion of Iraq in 2003. Then there was an unwillingness to accept this based on the fears that Israel with its economical might and strong Western support would dominate a united Middle East. Since than the perspectives get support from different state or non-state actors at different times.

The author concludes the book expressing her belief in potential to create a security community in the region based on application of Adler and Barnett’s approach. Accordingly, states willing to address security problems by pooling their resources could create such community. But the first requisite would be to view insecurity rather that themselves as threat. However, she equally admits that a bleak outlook is awaiting the region. So she suggest instead of drawing optimistic pictures the students of critical should draw a realist picture.

Bilgin’s book contributes to the literature on regional security in the middle East by providing a critical interpretation to the prevalent discourses. She aptly classifies and enumerates critical arguments about the subject and tries to show fault lines between the neo-realist and critical approaches.