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Influencing and Promoting Global Peace and Security



# Horizon Insights

Quarterly Journal by Beyond the Horizon ISSG – Volume 2 Issue 1

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**Hybrid Warfare and Strategic Theory**

**Third-party Intervention to Civil Wars**

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**Migration and Human Security**

**Book Review: How NATO adapts?**

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Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies Group (ISSG) is a non-partisan, independent, and non-profit think tank organisation. The mission of Beyond the Horizon is to influence and promote global peace and security by empowering decision and policy makers and advocating paths to build a better world and prevent, mitigate or end crisis and conflict.

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Horizon Insights 2019-1 (2019 January - March)

DOI : 10.31175/hi.2019.01

ISSN: 2593-3582 (printed)

ISSN: 2593-3590 (online)

Please cite as: Surname, Name (Writer) (2019), "Article name", Horizon Insights – 2019/1, Brussels.

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# Foreword

Dear Reader,

In 2018, Horizon Insights became the venue for articles tackling a wide range of security challenges threatening Europe and the globe. Those challenges included:

- Daesh and evolving security landscape in the aftermath of its total loss of territory,
- Russian aggression in Ukraine and an assessment in light of newer concepts of war to include hybrid and political,
- The civil war in Yemen, the perspectives on the worst humanitarian crisis and the risks emanating from the instability in the country,
- Irregular migration flows,
- Energy politics in the Caspian,
- EU - NATO cooperation ,
- The principle of self-determination,
- Burden sharing in NATO and the battle of 2%,
- Russian A2AD strategy and its implications for NATO and the western security community.

In this first issue of 2019, we tried to look into hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory, make sense of migration-security nexus, and see what different IR schools of thought have to say about third party interventions to civil wars, an issue that has gained extreme importance since conception of “responsibility to protect” and gaining even more importance crisis after crisis such as Libya, Syria and Yemen.

This same year is also the 70th anniversary of NATO. Many Allies will mark the 10th, 15th and 20th anniversaries of their joining the Alliance. To add more flavour to discussions revolving around the subject based on this important milestone, we reviewed a book written by an academician and soldier, Seth A. Johnson on “How NATO adapts.”

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG



## Hybrid Warfare and Strategic Theory\*

Murat Caliskan\*\*

*Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defence community in the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic documents of NATO, EU and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy papers and books; however, this paper is unique in the sense that it approaches hybrid warfare from the perspective of strategic theory, which assumes that all wars throughout history have shared certain common characteristics. Analysing the hybrid warfare concept through the lens of strategic theory, this paper argues that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept. Strategic theory instead, which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare, provides a better viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. It concludes that efforts should be directed towards exploring warfare under the light of eternal principles instead of proving the emergence of new types of warfare.*

**Key words:** Strategy, Strategic theory, grand strategy, military strategy, hybrid warfare, military concept, military doctrine, buzzwords.

### 1. Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of new terms and concepts within the defence community regarding the search for an understanding of contemporary warfare. Analysts, scholars raced to assign labels such as “fourth-generation warfare”, “compound wars”, “asymmetric conflict”, “revolution in military affairs (RMA)” etc. Some terms are adopted in the core documents of leading Western countries and international organizations, only to fade from use after a few years, even before they could understand the lessons learned. For this reason, such terms are often seen as buzzwords. “Hybrid warfare”, the latest term of this kind to gain a place in the official documents of the EU and NATO, carries the risk of becoming another buzzword as critiques of the concept have

begun to increase. It is understandable, even commendable, that analysts endeavour to grasp and conceptualize contemporary warfare. The concepts shape our defence understanding, and thus our armed forces, doctrines and the way that armed forces fight. However, the opportunity cost of misconception is too high, as it creates confusion rather than clarity and obscures the strategic thought. The defence community clearly needs a litmus test for the validity of the terms that it has adopted.

Strategic theory, which assumes that all wars throughout history have shared certain common characteristics, could provide a valid viewpoint, if not a litmus test. This is because most of the concepts, doctrines or terms are rediscoveries of what has already been observed in the past. For instance,

\* “This is an Author’s Original Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Defense & Security Analysis, 2019, available online 17th January 2019 at <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1565364>

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the “comprehensive approach”, which was initially developed by the UK Ministry of Defence at the beginning of the 2000s and later recognized by all NATO members, is not different in its essence form “the grand strategy”, which has been well known for more than a century. Interestingly, hybrid warfare, the next term to be adopted by NATO, which shares many common aspects with the grand strategy as well, has been compared increasingly with the comprehensive approach. A closer look on recently invented terms reveals that they tend to see the current problems as unique but fail to see historical continuities. They usually concentrate on some dimensions of strategy and suggest that the success can be gained through these particular dimensions. Strategic theory instead provides a holistic thinking that the defence community needs. As Milevski indicated, these attempts to categorize war usually discount the role of strategy which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare and it is only through strategy that the character of warfare takes shape.<sup>1</sup>

This paper aims to analyse the “hybrid warfare” concept through the lens of strategic theory. The hybrid warfare already has inspired many articles, policy papers and books; however, this study is unique in the sense that it approaches hybrid warfare from the perspective of strategic theory. The first part of the paper will discover the strategic theory and present a model. It is a challenge to summarize such a comprehensive theory in one part as it has a literature of more than a century. I would like to note that although this part reflects my own understanding from strategic theory, I benefited so much from Gray’s thoughts as it is the most comprehensive one, in quest to theorize strategy with its all dimensions. The second part will present the hybrid warfare concept to describe its evolution, its definitions by various stakeholders and common critiques on the concept. Finally, the third part will analyse the hybrid concept through the

lens of strategic theory, particularly through discussing the controversial themes about the concept and later providing a general assessment.

## **2. Strategy and Strategic Theory**

Strategic theory, which assumes that all wars in history share certain common characteristics, provides a holistic viewpoint to examine warfare. It is useful in understanding the validity and soundness of emerging concepts, albeit it is too comprehensive to grasp at first glance. To Osinga, strategic theory comprises thoughts about making effective strategy.<sup>2</sup> It is a system of interlocking concepts and principles pertained to strategy, which postulates that there exists a system of common attributes to all wars and that war belongs to a larger body of human relations and actions known as politics.<sup>3</sup> It provides guidance on how to manage the complexities of using force to achieve policy ends.<sup>4</sup> It is mind opening and it facilitates clarity of understanding as it is not linked to a particular historical context, which allows the strategist to extricate himself from situational bias.<sup>5</sup> In one respect, all explanations relevant to strategy that shall be presented in the rest of this part constitute the strategic theory.

Before moving to the content, it is good to say that the strategy, hence the strategic theory, is an attempt to explain what has already been practiced throughout the history. It is a depiction of the universal and eternal features of strategy-making. Strategy, as a term we would understand today, was first utilized in 1770s<sup>6</sup>, however, as Gray noted, the basic logic of strategy is to be found in all places and periods of human history, regardless of which term was used by distinct societies or cultures. Strategy is unavoidable because human, the common denominator between the past and the future, always needs security and it is in his/her nature to behave politically and strategically against potential dangers.<sup>7</sup>

Strategy is one word that is so widely used but hardly understood. It also became popular



in many fields outside politics, such as economics and management. For Strachan, the term has acquired such universality that it has robbed it of meaning.<sup>8</sup> Despite their vital importance to the security of any nation, policy and strategy are not well understood, hence widely confused by many officials even in key positions of the governments.<sup>9</sup> Clausewitz provides a brilliant and very concise definition, -but narrow at the same time, “strategy is the use of the engagements for the purpose of the war.”<sup>10</sup> Building on this definition, Colin S. Gray defines strategy as “the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics”.<sup>11</sup> For Wylie, strategy is “a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end: a purpose together with system of measures for its accomplishment.”<sup>12</sup> Beatrice Heuser makes a similar definition with an emphasis on comprehensiveness and enemy’s will. “Strategy is a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills.”<sup>13</sup> More definitions can be presented here as there are many, however, to keep it short, strategy can be summarized as the use of ways and means to achieve the desired ends, the link between policy and military. What is common in all definitions is its function of instrumentality.

Strategy is usually expressed by the magic formula of the retired U.S. Army Colonel Arthur Lykke. It consists of three simple phrases; policy ends, strategic ways, and military means (EWM) where policy end denotes the goals we aspire to get, strategic ways correspond to the alternative courses of action to follow, and military means are the resources that we could employ. Recently a fourth word, the assumption, was added to this construction. Since the strategy is a future-centric discipline and there are always unknowns about the future, planners have to make a presumption to enable their further planning. It is inevitable that the trinity (ends,ways,means) must be built upon some educated guess.

Built on the Clausewitzian definition of strategy,

Lykke’s architecture is a powerful construct to explain the essence of strategy in a concise manner. However, it is rather a mechanistic explanation which is far from explaining the real nature of strategy where complexity, dynamism, uncertainty and chaos reigned.<sup>14</sup> It is not that we shouldn’t use the construct, but we should know that there is much more to strategy than this formula.

There has been a shift in the meaning of strategy since its first conceptualization by the pioneers of strategic thought. Clausewitz and Jomini adopted a narrower definition of strategy, which was limited to the use of military. Contemporary interpretation is inclined to comprise other instruments of national power than military. Strategy with its broader meaning is called as “grand strategy”. It is more convenient to examine the strategy in the context of “levels of war” for a deeper understanding of its instrumental function and its evolution to grand strategy.

## 2.1. Levels of War and Strategy

There are four levels of war adopted by most of the armies, namely policy, strategy, operations and tactics. Traditionally, the construct has been discerned as three levels, but it became four levels with operational level’s introduction in 1980s. In theory; politics produces policy. Strategy connects policy with military assets. It determines military forces and their tasks that can achieve the desired aims of policy. Operational and tactical levels execute concrete tasks decided by the strategy. (Figure 1)

The levels are different in nature and they answer different questions. Policy answers to the question of “why and what”, while strategy seeks an answer for “how”; and tactics do it. Since there is no natural harmony between levels,<sup>15</sup> it is quite difficult to provide coherence, and this is what strategy does. Strategy fills the gap between political goals and military capabilities through the command performance. It requires all levels of command to function properly.




Figure 1- Levels of War and Strategy

The main challenge in strategy is to convert military power into political effect. It is very difficult because it requires an exceptional talent to determine which military action provides what policy wants. Gray uses bridge metaphor to explain the instrumentality function of the strategy. The bridge must operate in both ways; therefore, strategist needs not just to translate policy intentions to operations but also to adjust policy in the light of operations.<sup>16</sup> This is done through negotiation. The strategies are developed in an ongoing process of negotiation among potent stakeholders, by a civilian-military partnership. Usually it is a committee process, but it is always driven by the character of key unique people's performance and strategic inspiration is usually a product of a single person, not a committee. However, this person, no matter how genius he is, needs a staff and confident subordinate commanders to translate his ideas to actionable plans.<sup>17</sup>

It is important to discern that the strategy is not the use of forces itself. All forces of all kinds behave tactically-or operationally but produce strategic effect, whether it is special forces performing behind the lines of enemy or

a Corps conducting a joint conventional attack against main body of enemy forces. In Gray's words, strategy can only be practiced tactically. All strategy has to be done by tactics, and all tactical effort has some strategic effect.<sup>18</sup> Strategy is all about the consequences of tactical behaviours.

Despite their differences, all levels constitute a unity. If one level is absent, or not functioning well, this means all project is in jeopardy. When political guidance is weak or missing, the strategists cannot know the end-state to which they should lead their tactical enablers. If strategy is weak or absent despite the existence of a good political guidance, tactical forces might fight a wrong war however they are excellent in their fighting capabilities as there is no bridge converting political goals to actions. If there is no competent tactical ability, political and strategic endeavour becomes worthless.

Strategy summarized here represents the narrower understanding, which takes the military resources as main instruments to achieve policy goals and focuses on battlefield. Next section explains the shift in the meaning of strategy and its broader interpretation.

## 2.2. The Shift in the Meaning Strategy and Grand Strategy

As Hew Strachan indicated, there has been a shift in the meaning of the term "strategy" since it was first conceptualized by classical theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini. By 1900, strategy had been used to explain something done by generals to conduct the operations in a particular theatre.<sup>19</sup> It usually referred to a relationship below politics, between strategy and tactics. But after two World Wars, where all national resources were used, and the Cold War, during which the deterrence without actual fighting became the essence of strategy, the function of strategy shifted to higher levels. Operational level, with its introduction in 1980s, took the place of what classical theorists called strategy,



whereas strategy in practice became much more concerned with the connection between strategy and policy. In fact, strategy is started to be used as a synonym for policy.<sup>20</sup>

Especially after First World War, more scholars such as Corbett, J.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart, Edward Mead Earle, André Beaufre discussed on the broader meaning of the strategy. It was Fuller who introduced the term “grand strategy” in 1923. Edward Mead Earle, remarked in his famous book, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (1943) that “Strategy has of necessity required increasing consideration of non-military factors, economic, psychological, moral, political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times.”<sup>21</sup> Earle, writing in the middle of Second World War, emphasizes the importance of non-military factors and defines strategy as an inherent element of statecraft at all times, which implies that the strategy inevitably must be rendered as the grand strategy. Colin S. Gray, contemporary strategy theorist, mentions the same thought in different words.

*All strategy is grand strategy. Military*

*strategies must be nested in a more inclusive framework, if only in order to lighten the burden of support for policy they are required to bear. A security community cannot design and execute a strictly military strategy. No matter the character of a conflict, be it a total war for survival or a contest for limited stakes, even if military activity by far is the most prominent of official behaviours, there must still be political-diplomatic, social-cultural, and economic, inter alia, aspects to the war (...)Whether or not a state or other security community designs a grand strategy explicitly, all of its assets will be in play in a conflict. The only difference between having and not having an explicit grand strategy, lies in the degree of cohesion among official behaviours and, naturally as a consequence of poor cohesion, in the likelihood of success.*<sup>22</sup>

As Gray eloquently stated, whether it is a limited conflict or a major war, all conflicts inherently include dimensions other than military. In a limited warfare, a smaller number of dimensions can be in play whereas in a major war, almost all national powers are mobilized. There might be cases that military




Figure 2- Grand Strategy

plays no part. Instead of direct use of force, sometimes, only the threat of force can provide the desired effects. But whether it is the leading component or not, military is indispensable in designing and executing grand strategy. Figure-2 is a simple depiction of how grand strategy works.

Lonsdale & Kane grouped instruments of grand strategy in four categories: military, diplomacy, intelligence and economy.<sup>23</sup> I prefer the “intelligence” to be included under the broader term of “psychological” aspect, which includes propaganda and information warfare as well. Although these categories are the most relevant aspects to the national security, there can be more instruments based on the context and the characteristics of the state in question. For instance, if a state has a separate technology ministry, there is no doubt

it is involved in developing grand strategy. Depending on the context, it would even be possible to add an agricultural aspect. Dotted boxes in Figure-2 refers to this fact.

### 2.3. Key Features of Strategy

This part so far explained what strategy and grand strategy is, how strategy function within the levels of war, how it is done and who does it. The remaining section will discuss some key aspects required in strategy-making. The following eight factors are eternal dimensions of the strategy, valid for all wars, whereas their relative weights depends on the context of specific war. Each factor plays its part, in every conflict. (Figure 3)



Figure 3- Grand Strategy and Key Features

### 2.3.1. Adversary

Strategy is carried out by properly aligning ends, ways, and means, but always against an intelligent enemy. As Carl von Clausewitz stated, “war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale.”<sup>24</sup> Without an enemy there can be no duel, so without an enemy there can be no strategy. While it is central to the strategy, the role of the enemy is often overlooked by the strategists. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars showed once again that the enemy has a vote. The US expectation of being greeted as the liberators in Iraq, or George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement after the invasion are some recent examples of how the enemy is often neglected. Tactical actions are meaningful or can produce strategic effects only when impairing the opponent’s strategy making process.

### 2.3.2. Complexity

The concept of chaos, disorder and confusion is dominant in strategic theory.<sup>25</sup> A country at war is an incredibly complex system of systems,<sup>26</sup> given that it requires the participation of thousands, or millions of people, organized by different parties. Beatrice Heuser suggests that one of the key features of war is that it is a function of interconnected variables, which makes it quite complicated.<sup>27</sup>

One of the best explanations on variables of war belongs to Clausewitz, who was the first to understand war as a nonlinear system. Clausewitz postulates that any war has three sets of variables, namely primordial violence and hostility, the play of chance and probability, and reason.<sup>28</sup> What makes war so complex is that it is suspended between these tendencies pulling different directions, “like an object suspended between three magnets.” As Van Riper noted, this analogy is a description of a nonlinear system, whose parts have freedom of movement and it is impossible to balance their tendencies.<sup>29</sup>

Friction is another reason why war and

strategy are so complex. Clausewitz states that accumulation of all difficulties in the war causes a friction which impedes strategic performance. This makes the apparently easy so difficult. According to Clausewitz, the source of friction is “the climate of war” which is composed of “danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance.”<sup>30</sup> The future is not foreseeable due to friction and the intelligent enemy. All of these factors contribute to the complexity of strategy.

### 2.3.3. Human and Culture

Human is the best evidence of eternal fundamentals of war. Despite the continuous progress in technology and social life, human with its inherent characteristics stays at the center of war. Increasing connectivity allows us to do all sorts of things, from commerce to education, differently. But as a human, actions we do are all the same. We still buy and sell, teach and learn or get angry when we are ill-treated.<sup>31</sup> The strategy is devised, executed, and maintained by people. As Gray indicated, in most cases, historians mention “France decided...” or “2nd Brigade invaded...”, however, it is humans but not governments or military units performing in reality. The fact that the main role of humans will not change in the future makes humans an important aspect of war.

Since the human is indispensable for strategy, so the culture in which human was born is. Culture has an impact on strategy as the strategists are encultured by their own nations’ beliefs, habits or customs. Its impact could be both on the strategic and tactical levels. For instance, the leaders at the strategic level can make imprudent and biased decisions just because of their culture. Soldiers at the tactical level could become fierce warriors with the emotions that their culture imposed on them. As Bernard Brodie noted: “Good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department. Napoleon despised the



Russians as somewhat subhuman, as did Hitler after him, and in each case, fate exacted a terrible penalty for that judgment.”<sup>32</sup>

#### **2.3.4. Technology**

Almost in all historical cases, it is not the weapons themselves that provide strategic advantage. It is the ability of using technology in conjunction with other dimensions of war to achieve the desired policy end state. It requires the combination of significant other resources. Consider that there are oil rich countries today that have state of the art military technologies, but it is hard to see their effect on the battlefield. Germany's use of tanks in masse in Second World War was an organizational innovation rather than technological.

David Betz gives us a good criterion to understand the point where the influence of technology changes the nature of war. “War will remain as it ever was until the humanity comes to the point of ‘The Singularity’, at which human intelligence is surpassed by machine intelligence.”<sup>33</sup> As long as wars are conducted by people, technology stays as a key feature, but does not become a final arbiter.

#### **2.3.5. Geography**

Geography has always influence, and will always be, on planning, executing and maintaining strategies. That's why the ideas of two geopolitical theorists, Mackinder and Spykman, are still relevant today.<sup>34</sup> For instance, it has always been vital for Russia to have access to warm water, to the Mediterranean Sea. This means that Russia has always had a conflicting interest with the country between Russia and Mediterranean Sea, no matter which country it is. It was Ottoman Empire in the past, today it is Turkey. Russia would never prefer a strong country in that region as long as it exists as a robust power. This is all about location. Geography is the destiny.

In some cases, geography becomes very important just because of its constraining

features, such as rugged terrain, extreme distance or bad weather conditions as it was experienced in Both Napoleon and Hitler's campaigns against Russia. It is true that advances in technology decreased the relative effect of geography in terms of its limitations, but never to the degree to ignore it totally.

#### **2.3.6. Logistics**

As it is stated in US Joint Logistics Publication 4.0<sup>35</sup>, “The relative combat power that military forces can generate against an adversary is constrained by a nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to required points of application.” It is so basic but a vital fact that armies cannot fight no matter how capable they are unless they can move to operation area and they are continued to be supplied. General Omar Bradley indicated this simple fact with a bit of exaggeration when he said, “amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics”<sup>36</sup> Logistics is one of the eternal dimensions of the strategy that needs to be considered. It is essential to strategy at all levels and for every type of warfare. Great developments in technology, whether in transportation or in IT, have not yet reached to the point that we can assume the logistic challenges are no longer is a main concern.

#### **2.3.7. Doctrine**

Military doctrine is a product of intellectual activity to determine how military force should be applied<sup>37</sup> and what methods to use to carry out a military objective.<sup>38</sup> It includes a set of prescriptions about how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to recognized threats and opportunities, and the modes of cooperation between different types of forces.<sup>39</sup> It is the best military practice of the day and it is usually derived from the past experience.

So, why is it so important to include doctrine as a key feature of strategy? Because employed correctly, it is one of the key enablers of

strategy, by greatly enhancing fighting power. In Gray's words, "it is an important transmission belt connecting strategic theory with tactical performance."<sup>40</sup> In a sense, it is the concretization of the strategy, based on the circumstances of the day. However, it could become very dangerous if it is applied dogmatically, which would mean that you use your combat arm in a completely wrong manner. Therefore, doctrine should be revised periodically.

### **2.3.8. Strategy is a Whole**

None of the aspects of strategic theory can be omitted in the conduct of war or strategy. War and strategy are interactively complex systems, a nonlinear phenomenon, where all parts in flux and play their role. Technology has a huge impact on war, but human, ethics, geography and logistics etc. do as well. It is so complex in its working parts that it is not possible to approach war through one or two perspectives. Clausewitz stated, "in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together."<sup>41</sup> Therefore, as Paul Van Riper indicated, it is useless to insist on approaching war with linear methods as Americans do.<sup>42</sup>

All the dimensions of strategy explained here are valid for all wars. However, every war is a different combination of them which were articulated by the strategists and commanders based on the conditions of the day. The war is "a function of interconnected variables"<sup>43</sup> whose weights differs by the context and circumstances. The purpose or the intensity of the war could vary from one war to the next, or even multiple times within the same war. Therefore, dimensions of war are dynamic, both influence the outcome of war and are influenced by one another. Strategy must be considered as a whole and in any given moment, an effective strategy requires careful analysis on weighing up the options where many variables must be considered to decide whether tactical deeds can be converted into

political capital, in a continuously fluid and context-dependent environment.

## **3. Hybrid Warfare Concept**

Hybrid Warfare has gradually gained traction in defence community since its first use in 2005. Even before Russia's annexation of Crimea, it was widely referred as a model for contemporary warfare in defence communities. But after 2014, it gained a new momentum to the degree that it was frequently cited as a new kind of warfare. The term frequently circulated in distinct fora ranging from newspapers to official strategic documents. In the rest of the paper, I will use the term "Hoffman's hybrid concept" to refer the military-dominant notion that permeated before 2014. Therefore, it is more helpful to discuss hybrid warfare in two phases, before and after Russia's annexation of Crimea.

### **3.1. Hybrid Warfare as a Military Concept**

It was Frank Hoffman who developed the hybrid warfare concept in a series of articles and books. He refined the "hybrid warfare concept" as part of a research program, through examining a number of past theories, mainly 4th Generation Warfare, Compound War and Unrestricted Warfare. Then he explained the concept in detail in his seminal paper, "Conflict in 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars", in 2007.

He projected that future wars will be a convergence of distinct challengers into multi-modal wars which blends the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical fervour of irregular warfare, both in terms of organizations and the means. In the context of the research program, he studied on a number of historical examples, but he couldn't find the multi-dimensionality, operational integration or the exploitation of information domain to the degree that they expected from hybrid wars. It was Hezbollah, who fought against Israel in 2006, that he found as the clearest example of a modern hybrid challenger.<sup>44</sup>

He defined hybrid threats as "incorporate



a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” For Hoffman, hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors, by separate units, or even by the same unit, but operationally and tactically directed within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects both in the physical and psychological dimension of conflict.

To Hoffman, what makes hybrid wars different from previous wars is its blurring even at lower levels. He acknowledges that many wars in the past had regular and irregular components, but they were rather combined at the strategic level and were conducted in different theatres or in distinct formations. Hybrid wars in contrast, blended those forces into the same force in the same battlespace even at operational and tactical levels.<sup>45</sup> If one is to summarize the study of Hoffman at one word, it would be “blurring”.

Despite some early critiques, hybrid warfare, popularized by Hoffman, has become as common as to appear like new orthodoxy in military thought.<sup>46</sup> As Hoffman noted himself, hybrid threats found traction in official documents of various US defence circles and many high-level officials cited it in their speeches as a sound concept.<sup>47</sup>

### **3.2. Hybrid Warfare After Russia’s War in Ukraine**

It wouldn’t be wrong to say that the use of the term got out of control after Russia’s war in Crimea and Ukraine. As Galeotti suggested, Western authorities perceived that a “new kind of war” is being employed by Russia<sup>48</sup> and they almost unanimously referred to Russia’s war as a model for hybrid warfare. Its use in distinct fora gained a huge momentum. It permeated the doctrines and military concepts of NATO, EU and their member countries.<sup>49</sup> NATO and the EU officially agreed to collaborate against hybrid threats. However, few analysts used the

actual concept of Hoffman, they rather loosely referred to the hybridity, but usually implying very different meanings.

NATO’s adoption had a huge effect on the popularity of the term because of its critical role as an international security actor and its influence on many of western nations. NATO agreed on a strategy about countering hybrid warfare at the end of 2015<sup>50</sup> as a continuation of its decision at Wales Summit in 2014. At Warsaw Summit in 2016, the Alliance announced its determination to address the challenges posed by hybrid threats.<sup>51</sup> It established a Hybrid Analysis Branch at NATO HQ in Brussels.

The EU, on the other hand, just a few months later after NATO announced its strategy, developed a “joint framework” focusing on the EU’s response to hybrid threats. Based on this framework, it established a Hybrid Fusion Cell within Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and created two Strategic Communication Task Forces against misinformation. Additionally, “European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats” was established in Finland in 2017. EU Global Strategy projected a close cooperation with NATO on countering hybrid threats. A recent report on NATO-EU Cooperation, prepared based on interviews with NATO-EU officials, identifies hybrid threats as one of the major challenges in common between two organizations.<sup>52</sup>

NATO’s definition of hybrid threats seems similar to the definition permeating academic circles. NATO members agreed in 2015 that “Hybrid warfare and its supporting tactics can include broad, complex, adaptive, opportunistic and often integrated combinations of conventional and unconventional methods. These activities could be overt or covert, involving military, paramilitary, organized criminal networks and civilian actors across all elements of power.”<sup>53</sup> The EU has broadly defined hybrid threats as a “mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and nonconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic,



technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare”.<sup>54</sup> Although both definitions are similar to Hoffman’s definition, there is an increasing emphasis on the broader aspects of strategy other than military, such as diplomacy, economics, technology, etc. This is more obvious in Military Balance-2015’s description of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare; “the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure.”<sup>55</sup>

One can figure out that with Russia’s War in Ukraine, the definition of the concept became more inclusive and tends to focus more on non-military factors while Hofmann’s definition was military-dominant.

### 3.3. Critiques of Hybrid Warfare

On the one hand, NATO, EU, or Western nations have officially adopted the hybrid warfare concept in their core documents. Many politicians, analysts, military practitioners or journalists continue to use the term widely. On the other hand, there is an increasing number of critiques about the validity and the use of the concept. Critiques can be grouped into five themes. 1- Hybrid Warfare is about Tactics, 2- Hybrid Warfare is not New, 3- It is An Ambiguous Definition and A Weak Concept, 4- Hybrid Warfare Creates an Unnecessary Category, 5- Hybrid Warfare is Under the Threshold of Article 5. Next chapter will analyse hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory, first by focusing on the main critics mentioned above, then making a general assessment.

## 4. An Assessment of Hybrid Warfare Through the Lens of Strategic Theory

### 4.1. Hybrid Warfare is about Tactics

Hoffman claims that new type of warfare he introduces is consistent with Clausewitz’s strategic theory but makes no further explanations about “how”.<sup>56</sup> Implicit in his studies that Hoffman attempts to conceptualize the contemporary warfare. However, by boiling-down the war to the convergence of distinct modalities of war, organizations, and actors, this concept just focuses on operational and tactical levels.

“Hybrid” as an adjective which precedes “warfare” requires more than Hoffman’s concept because warfare includes much more than the blurring of the modes, forces, or actors. Figure 4 shows where hybrid warfare falls in the realm of strategic theory. The idea that new approaches such as “hybrid warfare” can lead to repeatable military victories is an astrategic approach that overemphasizes operational capabilities and doctrine at the expense of strategy.<sup>57</sup> Focusing too much on tactics, hybrid warfare becomes counter-productive to strategy by ruling out key features. Hoffman himself confessed that his theory fails to capture non-violent actions, such as economic, financial, subversive acts or information operations.<sup>58</sup> The concept in its original form as Hoffman postulated could be the topic of a military doctrine at best. In fact, the name that Cox et al. proposed, “convergent trends in tactics” would perfectly fit to Hoffman’s concept.<sup>59</sup>

It is only after Russia’s annexation of Crimea that non-military factors more frequently began to be incorporated to the definition. However, these factors were comprised in an arbitrary rather than in a systemic way. The term has usually been associated with propaganda, information warfare, or cyber-attacks, which constitute only some aspects of warfare, thereby lacking a holistic view.




Figure 4- Hoffman's Hybrid Warfare in the Realm of Strategy

It is interesting and ironic that the defence community rediscovers “grand strategy” with each new term coined. As Galeotti noted, Military Balance-2015’s description of hybrid warfare is not different from the corollary of the Clausewitzian doctrine.<sup>60</sup> NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated in 2015 that Russia’s hybrid warfare can be seen as a “dark reflection” of comprehensive approach, which is not different from grand strategy in essence. One cannot keep himself from asking, “why then we keep coining new labels just to rediscover grand strategy in the end?”

#### 4.2. Hybrid Warfare is not New

Not only the use of a new term such as “hybrid” suggests that it is a new kind of warfare, but also many analysts, journalists, and Hoffman

himself claimed that a new way of warfare had emerged. In fact, hybridization is an inherent nature of all wars because sole conventional or irregular war can only be expected to exist on paper.<sup>61</sup> As Echevarria noted, from a historical standpoint, hybrid war has been the norm, but conventional war has been the illusion.<sup>62</sup> For instance, Second World War, known as a prominent example of the conventional war, included many irregular aspects from the use of propaganda to the subversion.<sup>63</sup> If the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 and Russia’s wars in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 are regarded as hybrid wars, then a great number of wars in the past are nothing than hybrid war.<sup>64</sup> However, with the lack of historical experience, many experts believe that so-called hybrid wars are a new kind of warfare.



Going back to Hoffman's concept, one can see the evolution in the thought of Hoffman regarding the novelty of the concept. While he argued that the convergence of different modes of war at lower levels is new,<sup>65</sup> two years later, he stated, "The combination of irregular and conventional force capabilities, either operationally or tactically integrated, is quite challenging, but historically it is not necessarily a unique phenomenon."<sup>66</sup> This was an important divergence from his previous thought.

It doesn't seem logical to assume that the Vietnam War does not present an example of hybrid warfare, just by supposing that it is not blurred enough at operational or tactical levels while Boer War does.<sup>67</sup> One should understand that while strategic thought has fundamentals that don't change, warfare is context-dependent and at the tactical level can take infinite forms on the continuum of hybridity.

#### 4.3. An Ambiguous Definition and A Weak Concept

Hybrid warfare is too inclusive to be analytically useful.<sup>68</sup> It includes almost every type of warfare in its definition. Any violence can be labelled "hybrid" as long as it doesn't have the characteristics of a single form of warfare. This broadness allows both Russia's war in Ukraine and ISIL's war in Syria to be referred as a model for hybrid warfare. Causing a good deal of qualifications to be associated with hybrid threats, this broadness creates a perfect enemy with magical powers and strategic prowess<sup>69</sup> as it had been in the case of West's perception of enemy image of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It evolved to such an inclusive term that even the public statements made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov can be labelled as hybrid warfare when he criticized the German police for the lack of transparency with regards to the alleged rape of a 13-year old Russian girl in Berlin.<sup>70</sup>

Hoffman's concept is also criticized as too narrow. Glenn suggests that the concept has a

narrow view and he proposes "comprehensive approach" as a better construct to address the breadth of the challenges.<sup>71</sup> Probably, because of this shortcoming, later definitions of the concept by NATO, the EU, and others included broader aspects of warfare. However, this has been done by arbitrary additions to the original form, which creates confusion and ambiguity. For this reason, it has frequently been referred for non-military factors whereas the original form had military basis. The concept evolved to a term that generally refers to any malicious influence short of war.<sup>72</sup> Had the defence community looked through the lens of strategic theory from the beginning, probably it wouldn't have needed a new term to explain contemporary warfare.

#### 4.4. Hybrid Warfare Creates an Unnecessary Category

Hoffman is right when he criticizes the West's binary view of war as traditional and irregular for being oversimplified and when he claims that war is a continuum. Wars could take any form in the continuum that is framed by irregular warfare at the one end and the conventional warfare on the other. However, he made the exact same mistake when he restricted the warfare somewhere in the middle of the continuum, for a foreseeable future, to the mixture of multi-modes. Instead, we need to understand that every war is unique and any alternative within the continuum is possible at any time. This point of view not only excludes broader elements of strategic theory, but also urges people to expect future conflicts to be hybrid in character. As Strachan warned, it has the fatal risk of becoming another category.<sup>73</sup> If we stick to a standard description (like hybrid warfare), we might have difficulty in understanding the potential for change as each war is waged.

From the point of strategic theory, categories are too exclusive to capture the complexity and richness of strategic historical experience. For example, Russia, as a regular actor, employs irregular means and methods as many state



actors did in history. Should we name its war as irregular? Actors do not necessarily need to employ the means and methods described in one category. In some cases, it may require switching the kind of warfare even within the same war, as it occurred in US-Iraq War. Categorization privileges specialization at the expense of adaptability.<sup>74</sup> Gray maintained in his insightful monograph on categorization;

*the well-intentioned quest after a better grasp on the ever-changing characteristics of conflict misled our strategic theoretical entomologists. What they claim to have done is to discover new species of strategic or strategically relevant behaviour, when what they have done is to erect conceptual constructions that, in their empirically better evidenced aspects, really are only subspecies, or variants of the one species that is war.*<sup>75</sup>

This is a very good explanation for what has been experienced with hybrid warfare concept. Both Hoffman's concept or its later construct explains only some part while claiming to describe the whole. Categorization could be helpful to some extent in understanding different characteristics in war and warfare, however, by familiarizing too much, often time they cause to decontextualize and to lose holistic view.<sup>76</sup>

#### 4.5. Hybrid Warfare is Under the Threshold of Article 5

There is a perception that hybrid warfare is conducted under the threshold of international law, such as Article 51 of UN Charter and Article 5 of NATO, even though the concept does not postulate such a specific understanding. This perception stems from the defence community's preference to label Russia's all covert actions as hybrid warfare, not necessarily from the concept itself. The practice of operating under the threshold of law is not new or something pertaining to hybrid warfare, it had been undertaken frequently during the Cold War, much before hybrid warfare concept emerged.

The real problem lies in our perspective that sees current events through the lens of the so-called hybrid warfare concept. If the defence community can succeed to give up the habit of labelling every malicious event short of war as a hybrid threat, it would be easier to see what really happens. For instance, Echevarria proposes a classic coercive-deterrence construct as a way to approach so-called "grey-zone wars" or "hybrid wars" such as Russia's in Ukraine or China's in South China Sea. For Echevarria, these types of wars which takes place under Article-5 threshold, can be reduced to the core dynamic of coercive-deterrence strategies, which is usually conducted before almost every war.<sup>77</sup>

Additionally, it is a mistake to see NATO's Article 5 as a rigid, unchangeable border. One should not forget that if aggressive actions of Russia and China reach the point that NATO members and their allies cannot tolerate any more, it is only a matter of days to amend the interpretation of Article-5. For example, subversive means that Russia has been using within neighbours could be interpreted as an armed attack if those means cause violence within the state.

#### 4.6. A General Assessment

In his seminal paper about hybrid wars, Hoffman wrote the following assessment on Fourth Generation Warfare;

*Whether this really is something entirely new, "visible and distinctly different from the forms of war that preceded it," has emerged as challengeable. What has occurred is simply part of war's evolution, a shift in degree rather than kind, and a return to older and horrific cases. 4GW advocates do not deny the existence of irregular warfare techniques and the return to medieval warfare. But they do tend to overlook Clausewitz, who noted that war is "more than a chameleon," with continuous adaptation in character in every age. Very little in what is described as fundamentally different in the 4GW literature is all that inconsistent with a Clausewitzian*



*understanding of war as a contest of human wills.*<sup>78</sup>

It is ironic that I use his own words to criticize Hoffman's concept. This assessment by Hofmann applies to his hybrid warfare concept. What is described as fundamentally different in hybrid warfare, whether the convergence of the modes of warfare or "further complexity," are all consistent with strategic theory. What has occurred is simply part of war's evolution, as Hoffman eloquently summarized, there is a change in degree, but not in kind. In Gray's words, "war is essentially more of the same."<sup>79</sup>

Echevarria compares "hybrid warfare" with "blitzkrieg" of the 1940s, a label that was never an official term in German military doctrine, but polished by media and commentators.<sup>80</sup> In fact, a closer look on the transformation of Russia's military since 2008 shows that Russia does not place the hybrid warfare at the centre of its military policy.<sup>81</sup> What makes Germans successful in the beginning of 1940s and Russians in 2014-2015 was not the labels attached to their operations, it was skilful direction of statecraft, leveraging the principles of war; knowing the enemy and itself very well. Russia has been using the best means at his toolbox to achieve its policy goals, whether it is hard power as it was in the east, of Ukraine or soft power against Western populations.

It is crucial to understand that war is context-dependent. It is a function of interconnected variables where all variables are in flux. There are myriad possibilities that enemy, friendly forces or the environment can take different forms. Before, during, and at the end of each war, governments must develop and adjust their strategy accordingly. They must be ready to apply a different combination of tools from their capability toolbox, as it occurred in three consecutive wars of Russia, in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria. Specific conditions require distinct countermeasures, which could range from subversive means, socio-economic measures to the direct use of military forces. Russia had a swift and surprising success

in Crimea thanks to some enablers, such as the presence of Russian base and forces, the presence of pro-Russian civil population, and a weak government control of Ukraine. In Eastern Ukraine, used proxy forces-pro-Russian rebels without any evidence of direct linkage, though it had to step in at some stage with its sophisticated fire power. In Syria, it supported the regime forces mainly by assisting in air power, air defence systems and military consultation. Under the broader goal of being a great power again, Russia has different aims in three consequent wars, hence three different strategies. As Galeotti points out, Russia wanted to annex Crimea and to create a new order, whereas its aim was to create controlled chaos and to force Kiev to acknowledge Moscow's regional hegemony in Eastern Ukraine.<sup>82</sup> In Syria, if we take the words of Alexander Dugin, the Russian philosopher and nationalist who has influence on the Kremlin, Russia's ultimate aim is to show the world that "a Middle East without Western presence is possible".<sup>83</sup> Russia has chosen three different sets of ways and means in its three-consequent warfare. They were not all necessarily hybrid wars by definition. What Russia is doing is to pursue its policy goals by the best combination of the instruments of grand strategy.

Instead of putting the warfare into the categories, the best way is to understand the lines of evolution in different perspectives such as technology, economy, sociology etc. and their impact on warfare. Understanding the nature of war, we need to focus on the change in degree rather than the kinds of warfare. For instance, if we take Russia as the case, we should determine the areas where Russia shows progress. Galeotti lists three areas where the Russians are distinctive in degree; 1) Giving primacy to non-kinetic operations, especially information warfare 2) Increasing connections with non-state actors 3) Single command structure coheres and coordinates political and military operations.<sup>84</sup> This is a good summary of where we need to focus our efforts on.



## 5. Conclusion

Strategic theory is a depiction of the eternal principles of strategy, which has a literature centuries long. There are indeed very few things that haven't been discussed in the history of strategic theory. Looking through strategic theory, we can keep ourselves from rediscovering old ideas. It provides us with an unbiased approach to modern warfare.

This paper has demonstrated that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept and strategic theory provides a robust viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. In fact, there is only one war with some more or less active warfare. What is required is to have a holistic vision of the strategic context and the adaptability to meet unique challenges of the day through the use of all instruments of grand strategy. Given that every challenge is unique in many important details, whether it is regular, irregular, or hybrid, they must be approached as political challenges in the first instance, then as grand strategic challenges. If it is decided that the challenge requires a military reaction, then grand strategy must employ the military instrument tailored against that specific challenge. One should note that it may not require a purely military option. As we have been experienced in Russia's hybrid warfare, the categorization encourages tactical thinking focused upon enemy's fighting methods, rather than upon strategic effectiveness in the conflict as a whole.<sup>85</sup> As Renz pointed out, we oversimplify Russian Foreign Policy by narrowing down our vision to hybrid theory.<sup>86</sup> The hybrid concept becomes counter-productive to strategy.

I would like to conclude with the words of former Danish Chief of Defence, General Knud Bartels, who presided over the NATO Military Committee between 2012-2015. He experienced Crimea crisis first-hand as the Chairman in 2014. His words are a good summary of this paper's the main theme.

*Hybrid warfare is a fancy term to name what we have always known as "war". Life is very*

*complicated and many of our nations love simple clear-cut definitions when they face complicated issues. War is war that you can conduct in many different ways. It doesn't always need to be main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, mechanized infantry, frigates, destroyer, aircraft carriers etc. It can also be subversive operations. But war has no purpose other than to achieve a political goal. Hybrid warfare is just a way of fighting a war which has a political purpose... It doesn't change the fact that as military personnel, in our commands, we make an assessment, we try to understand our adversary, we try to find what are his strong sides, what are his weak sides, and we try of course to focus on the weak sides and to shield off his strong sides. Military strategy is how you are going to fight the war, operations is how you want to fight the battle and tactics is how you fight in the battle. When I define how I want to fight war that's where, as a military commander, I will make a decision whether I want to use hybrid warfare or not. It's very relevant to study hybrid warfare now, but to elevate it as a new type of warfare, that's wrong.<sup>87</sup>*



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83. Taylan Bilgic, 'Russia Keen to See Turkey and U.S. Fight, Nationalist Guru Says', *Bloomberg*, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-04/russia-keen-to-see-turkey-and-u-s-fight-nationalist-guru-says>.
84. Galeotti, 'Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear?', 291.
85. Gray, *Categorical Confusion?*, 34.
86. Renz, "Russia and 'hybrid Warfare'", 294.
87. General Knud Bartels, interviewed by the author in July 2017.


# Third-party Intervention to Civil Wars: Realist, Liberalist and English School Theoretical Perspectives

Cem Boke\*

## 1. Introduction

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 48 of the 49 active conflicts in 2017 were fought within the boundaries of a state between government and opposing groups. 19 of these conflicts were internationalised (40%) with intervention from other states in the form of troops to at least one of the sides. (Kendra &

Siri Aas, 2018). The number of internationalised conflict would be higher if foreign intervention is construed in broader context to include economic, logistical, and diplomatic assistance or sanctions applied to influence the outcome of the conflict in addition to exertion of military power.




As internationalised civil wars constitute significant aspect of international politics, potential drivers of third party interventions into intra-state conflicts and more specifically civil wars have been widely researched within International Relations (IR) theories. Realism, liberalism, and English School theories provide different frameworks with varying power to explore and explain why third parties intervene into intra-state conflicts and more specifically

civil wars. Is it exclusively national interests, values, or both that drive the intervention decision? How can we explain major power's selective interventions and use of different tools from the intervention spectrum ranging from diplomatic pressure to boots on the ground fighting in support of regime or rebel groups to influence the outcome of a civil war? This study looks into different perspectives provided by three distinct IR theories regarding third-party interventions to civil wars.

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(Boke, 2017)

## 2. Realism and Intervention

Realist tradition describes international relations as conflict between states in which the interest of each state excludes the interests of any other. Under realist perspective states are free to pursue their goals without any kind of moral or legal restrictions (Bull, 2012:23-24).

As a classical realist, Morgenthau attributes the objective laws of politics to human nature. He claims that the statesman makes his decision regarding foreign policy issues on the basis of rational choice theory which minimizes risks and maximizes the benefits. The decisions are made based on the assessment of how that policy might affect the power of the nation. So the statesman is believed to think and act in terms of interest defined as power (Morgenthau, 1985). Maximizing the state interest in an anarchic and threatening international environment is seen as the only option to ensure survival of the state.

Structural realists on the other hand believe that prevailing anarchy within the international system urges states to maximize their relative power to ensure survival and security. Structural realism has two main strands: defensive and offensive realism seeing states as security and power maximizers respectively. Defensive realists such as Waltz argue that states are satisfied when they obtain enough power to ensure their security and survival whereas offensive realists such as Mearsheimer posits

states are willing to acquire as much power as possible and they make use of any opportunity to alter the existing distribution of power in their favour. Pursuit of power, traditionally defined narrowly in military strategic terms, and the promotion of the national interest are the core tenets of realism for survival of the state. Realists are sceptical about the international institutions and oppose the idea of entrusting their security to any external institution (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014).

With an offensive realist perspective, states aim to downgrade the rival countries` power to mitigate the potential threat posed against them. They make a direct connection between power and security by arguing that in order to ensure security, state has to maximize its relative power and achieve superiority in relation to its opponents. In contrast defensive realists believe that states increase their power to ensure balance of power against rival states so that the opponent cannot risk attacking (Slaughter, 2011; Miller, 2010). Consequently, foreign interventions serve both offensive and defensive realist interests by shaping the successor administration and ensuring granted alliance or by counterweighing rival major powers` interests.

As Mearsheimer puts it, realists believe that great powers seek to increase their economic and military power and keep other states under control to prevent them from shifting the



balance of power in their favour. Even though Mearsheimer advocate that states are willing to gain as much power as possible and use wars to gain power over a rival state and enhance their security, he also underlines that ideology or economic considerations are crucial along with security as the driving force behind the decision of war (Mearsheimer, 2007).

J.Samuel Barkin also underlines four common aspects of contemporary definitions of realism: the state is the central actor in international politics; states are interested in their own survival to last in an anarchical world; in order to pursue the state's interests the statesman behaves rationally; states focus more on material capabilities such as military power rather than other forms of power (i.e. economic, organizational, or moral power) (Barkin, 2003). Grieco also states that the anarchical international environment penalizes states when they fail to protect their vital interests (Grieco, 1998).

Realists attribute the selectivity in humanitarian intervention to states' foreign policy agenda aiming to advance national interests through enhancing power that override moral considerations. They also argue that the decision for humanitarian intervention is formed by the cost-benefit analysis and geopolitical interests (Jude, 2012). Bull's mention of Grotius' distinction between 'justifiable' war and 'persuasive' war in that context points to the realist conception of using humanitarian intervention as a pretext to pursue their interest (Bull, 2012:43).

Realists in general agree that national interests are the main driver of intervention so interventions take place only when national interests are at stake. However, realist scholars disagree on what defines national interests, whether material or ideational interests. Morgenthau's classical realism defines interest and power primarily in material and particularly military terms. As an instrument to achieve any interest, power becomes interest (Williams, 2004). Morgenthau describes the intervention as "an instrument of foreign policy as are diplomatic pressure, negotiations and war" and attributes the decision of intervention to national interest at stake and sufficient power available to succeed (Morgenthau, 1967). So

in classical realism, pursuit of power is framed as the national interest. The national interest ensures the continuity and consistency in foreign policy (Molloy, 2004).

Some scholars also support the idea that third-party intervention is more likely to be related to interveners' strategic interests (Regan, 1998; Findley & Teo, 2006; Woodward, 2007). According to the realist point of view, regional or global powers tend to exploit the opportunity and available conditions for foreign intervention to pursue the expansion of influence on civil war states where regional balance of power is at risk and the conflict is detrimental to regional and international peace.

Biased interventions, which aim to alter the likely outcome of the conflict in favour of one side (Carment & Rowlands, 2003) can also be explained by a realist point of view. A potential intervening power will shape its decision for intervention based on its interests and desired end state for the intrastate conflict regarding who will run the country after the conflict. In that context, foreign powers attempt to change the leader or the type of government, economic system of the country, or certain policies of the government (Gent, 2005).

The major powers prefer to grant UNSC authorization before intervention to justify the legitimacy of the intervention; however, UNSC authorization is not an absolute prerequisite for intervention. Specifically when highly strategic interests are at stake and UNSC permanent members have contradicting stances against intervention; major powers may opt to violate or disregard the existing norms with a realist perspective (Allison, 2009). This fact is seen by realists as a reinforcement to their position to explain the motives of the intervention.

In that context realist tradition questions the existence of moral norms that cut across the boundaries of states and regions and humanitarian justifications for intervention (Bellamy, 2003a).

Realists claim that states struggle for power and interests so by and large material interests rather than norms determine the decision for intervention. Under conditions of prevailing international anarchy, states strive for either



maximizing power and security or minimizing threats to security for the ultimate aim of survival. From realist point of view, military intervention is an instrument so states intervene only if these interests are at stake (Binder, 2009).

Realists argue that humanitarian intervention is not purely motivated by humanitarian ideals, rather as Morgenthau suggests it aims to maintain or increase the power and contain or reduce the power of other nations' (Szende, 2012). Realists conceive humanitarian intervention as a means of powerful states using military force to promote their own interests (Bellamy, 2003a).

In sum, realists conceive international relations as a zero-sum game among states competing for power to ensure national survival and secure or promote their national interest in relation to others. In that respect intrastate conflicts are exploited and internationalized by nations to pursue national interests by shaping the post-conflict environment through intervention. In an attempt to explain why states intervene into intrastate conflict, the realist paradigm associates regional and global powers' decisions for intervention/non-intervention into intrastate conflicts and for choosing a side to support with exclusively national and strategic interests at stake.

### **3. Liberalism and Intervention**

The liberalist theory, in contrast to realist view of international politics, opposes the idea of constant conflict and zero-sum game struggle among states, and instead claims that transnational social bonds that link the individual human beings provide a window of opportunity to cooperate. Liberalist theory also supposes that moral imperatives limit the state actions in contrast to the realist conception (Bull, 2012:24-25). Liberalism suggests that interdependency, interaction, and cooperation among states enable and sustain peace and security.

Liberals mainly concentrate on how lasting peace and cooperation in international relations can be ensured. They believe material power is not the sole determinant of international relations and emphasise the role

of international institutions in promoting and enforcing peaceful relations among nations by mitigating the implications of existing anarchy. International organizations act as higher authority since the states accept willingly to limit their own power, autonomy, and, to some extent, freedom through a set of rules put in place by international organizations of which they become members (Terriff, Croft, James, & M.Morgan, 1999:46). The empowerment of international organizations ensures the implementation of political, economic, and liberal norms at national and international levels.

Liberals in general agree that states with democracy and free market economy have political environments more conducive to peace. In liberal theory this has been explained by the democratic peace phenomenon which describes the lack of war between liberal states as a result of existing liberal democracies (Slaughter, 2011). Expanding the zone of democratically governed nations in that perspective through intervention and regime change is considered a justifiable action to serve the purpose of establishing more secure and predictable international society.

On the other hand, liberals differ over the role of international institutions and the application of military intervention. Some support the idea that respecting states' sovereignty can be overlooked in case of non-liberal states' violations of their citizens' basic human rights (Miller, 2010). Contemporary liberal theory on military intervention identifies two groups of liberal scholars: cosmopolitan interventionists and liberal internationalists. Cosmopolitan interventionists claim that intervention is a moral obligation in case of systematic human rights violations by a tyrannical regime oppressing its own population. Liberal internationalists, on the other hand, justify foreign intervention as a last resort to end protracted civil wars and indiscriminate killing of civilians. They generally insist that military intervention should be multilateral and authorized by the UNSC to be legitimate (Doyle & Recchia, 2011). Many liberals support foreign intervention whenever domestic turmoil threatens international peace and security or the domestic violence results in human rights violations, such as ethnic

cleansing and genocide (Hoffmann, 1995).

The basic foundational principle of international relations since 1648 has been the sovereign state. The contemporary consensus requires UNSC authorisation for humanitarian intervention. The definition of humanitarian intervention is “the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from wide-spread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights” (Goodman, 2006).

However the failures of the UNSC to act in Rwanda and Kosovo, in 1994 and 1999 respectively, had a major impact on normative debate about intervention for humanitarian purposes. In that respect International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)’s report on “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) promoted the idea that sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their own citizens from massacre, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and starvation. If states are unwilling or unable to fulfil their responsibility or the state itself is the one perpetuating these atrocities against their own population then the larger international community should exercise R2P (ICISS, 2001). That normative shift brings about flexibility for military intervention outside the scope of UNSC approval and in practice translates into a ‘responsibility to intervene’ for the international community to end the violence of intrastate conflict (Woodward, 2007). So R2P is perceived as justification for intervention outside of the UN framework in case UNSC permanent members exercise veto power to block resolution for intervention. The idea is to have an alternate tool in case the UNSC fails to act in case of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

R2P conceives human rights violations as a threat to international peace and security as declared in the UN Charter Chapter VII. Intervention in another state for the purpose of protecting individuals against gross violations of human rights is seen as legitimate and necessary (Bin Talal & Schwarz, 2013). R2P underlines that the state sovereignty cannot be viewed in absolutist terms as an obstacle to international action if states fail to protect their

population (Cottee, 2008).

Liberal internationalists claim that new international norms prioritize individual rights and security. So the human security argument provides a framework to achieve international consensus for legitimate intervention (Chandler, 2004). Human security, the aim of humanitarian intervention, recognizes that democratic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development, and social equity are as important to global peace as are arms control and disarmament (S. Kim, 2003).

Liberalism is committed to the principle that humanitarian need constitutes the only legitimate basis for intervention and asserts that purely self-interested intervention would undermine the basis for the system of international cooperation and cause instability (Szende, 2012).

Past research also shows that humanitarianism influences intervention decisions. When a civil war involves humanitarian disasters, major powers are less likely to care about their own interests, and normative criteria can affect intervention decisions (S. K. Kim, 2012), with a liberalist point of view. The 1991-92 Somalia crisis was believed to pose little threat to US political or economic interests and did not constitute a threat to regional or international stability; however, liberals claims of a dire humanitarian emergency situation in Somalia, with 300,000 Somali dead and almost 4.5 million on the brink of starvation, played an important role in US intervention in Somalia (Western, 2002; Jakobsen, 1996). Military intervention in Kosovo by NATO, conducted without a UNSC approval, has also been acknowledged as a response to massive human rights violations. The ability of international institutions to promote cooperation and manage conflict reinforces the liberalist point of view to promote peace in the world (Robinson, 2010). UNSC’s failure to authorize intervention for Kosovo manifests the dilemma the liberalist face.

Liberal cosmopolitanism, prioritizes the alleviation of human suffering over state sovereignty and support the idea that international society has moral obligation to intervene for humanitarian purposes (Spalding, 2013).



Liberal internationalism's stance against intervention requires an international order where global institutions rule the world. From the liberal point of view Dunne briefly explains Michael Doyle's dual-track approach. First liberal community forge alliances with other like-minded states and follow an international policy aiming balance of power to contain authoritarian states. Secondly liberal community maintains an expansionist policy to extend the liberal sphere by economic, diplomatic instruments or through 'intervention' (Dunne, 2014). That provides another perspective to comprehend the underlying motives of the foreign interventions.

Liberal international relations theory provides a different perspective with regards to the motivation of state intervention into intrastate conflicts. That perspective opposes the realist assumption that national interests are the main driver of intervention decision. With a liberalist point of view, if an intrastate conflict brings about genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or humanitarian disaster, global powers should intervene to maintain rule-based international order regardless of the existence of national or strategic interests.

#### **4. English School and Intervention**

The English School is seen as a middle way between realist and liberal theories with its key concept of 'international society' (Brown, 2001). The concept of international society is portrayed as 'the via media between an anarchic international system, where politically diverse states compete for power and security, and a world society that gives legal and political expression to a universal moral community of humankind. English School tradition focuses on the shared norms, rules and institutions that maintain the sense of society and order between politically diverse states' (Ralph, 2013).

Bull reinforces English School's position between the realist and the liberalist tradition. He argues that English School opposes the basic realist argument that states are in constant struggle for interests, and rather advocates that they are bound by the moral

values, rules, laws, and institutions of the society formed by mutual interaction (Bull, 2012:25). Bull's conception of international society has three substantial basis: a sense of common interests, rules to sustain these goals, and institutions that make these rules effective (Bull, 2012:63).

International society is about the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states, by shared norms, rules and institutions (Buzan, 2004). According to Hedley Bull's definition for international society 'an international society exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules and in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions' (Bull, 2012:13).

Within the English School, there is a divide between scholars known as pluralists and solidarists. The divide within the theory is largely in the way the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is interpreted. Pluralists insist that international society must stick to the established norms and non-intervention to maintain order in the anarchical society while solidarists advocate humanitarian intervention to maintain the international order and rule guided international society (Bull, 2012:16). Jason Ralph explains the source of the tension referring to the controversy between the rule of law, human rights and democracy promotion. While the rule of international law promotes the sovereign equality of states, this concept brings about tolerating undemocratic regimes to abuse their own people (Ralph, 2013).

Whereas pluralist perspective forbids humanitarian intervention on the grounds that it breaches the norm of sovereignty of states within the international society, solidarist view favours humanitarian intervention by international society to collectively enforce the international law in case of violation of shared norms, values, moral considerations (Spalding, 2013).

The pluralists argue that states are enthusiastic to cooperate unless norms of sovereignty and



non-intervention are breached. English School supposes that agreed rules and norms mitigate the risk induced by anarchical structure of international society and contribute maintaining international order. States, international organizations, non-governmental organizations are seen as the entities that contribute the formation and management of shared ideas, values, norms and institutions (Jude, 2012).

Pluralists also argue that strong states responding to humanitarian crises selectively, are often motivated more by self-interest than humanitarian concern and humanitarian intervention is illegitimate since it breaches the fundamental norm of sovereignty. On the other hand solidarists claim that international society should not allow human rights abusers to exploit sovereignty while committing crime against their own population. They argue that the protection of human rights has precedence over the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention. They consider humanitarian intervention in case of supreme humanitarian emergency both as a moral responsibility and legal right to act (Bellamy, 2003a)

Widely referred concept of R2P is of concern as much for the English School as it is for liberalists. Its maturity is questioned especially after NATO's Libya operation. Alex Bellamy examines whether the fact that mandate framed by UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya is implemented to pursue regime change undermined the chance of R2P applicability to prevent substantial human rights violations and mass atrocities committed during the course of 8 year conflict in Syria. He claims that UNSC's inability to reach consensus on intervention in Syria crisis stemmed more from considerations regarding the situation in Syria itself rather than from opposition to NATO led intervention in Libya under R2P context (Bellamy, 2014).

Brazil's objection to implementation of R2P within the framework of UNSC mandate for Libya as a tool to pursue regime change led to Brazil proposal defined as "responsibility while protecting" (RwP). RwP proposes a set of criteria for legitimate military intervention, a monitoring mechanism to assess and control the implementation of UNSC mandates. RwP

indeed is an initiative to curb any attempt to exploit R2P by prioritizing national agendas over the protection of civilians (Welsh, Quinton-Brown & MacDiarmid, 2013). In that context RwP should be considered as the footsteps of a new norm or transformed form of R2P to prevent and respond to mass atrocities.

English School's main concern as an international relations theory is the relationship between order, justice and norm construction within international society. The central debate revolves around whether reciprocal recognition of state sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention are non-negotiable or protecting basic human rights in case of 'supreme humanitarian emergency' thorough intervention takes precedence as a responsibility for international society. Pluralists claim that international society is based on mutual recognition that allows states to pursue their diverse identity and interests within the framework of functional and procedural institutions (Bellamy, 2003b). Pluralists conceive humanitarian intervention as illegitimate action that hampers the basis of international society by breaching sovereignty right and non-intervention norm.

Dunne emphasises Hedley Bull's broader conception of international society that includes interaction among multiple actors. The international society is seen as the result of the interaction among NGOs, transnational and subnational groups, individuals, institutions and wider community of human kind along with states in historical perspective (Dunne, 2007). For English school scholars, diplomats and leaders are also considered as real agents in international society. Therefore understanding of how diplomats and leaders view the world thorough examining the language they use and the justification they employ for their decisions is a main area of study in English school (Dunne, 2007).

The main trust of the English School has been to understand the nature and the function of international societies, and to trace their history and development (Buzan, 2004). So English School focuses on defining characteristics which forms the boundaries of different

historical and normative orders (Dunne, 2007).

English School perspective, as a via media between realism and liberalism, considers international society, formed on the basis of common identity, moral values and interests has the responsibility to intervene intrastate conflicts to uphold human rights, international law and collective international norms.

## **5. Conclusion**

Each IR theory works as a lens to see, understand and make sense of cases in the real world with certain strength, weaknesses and explanatory power.

While realism conceives power, influence, and

national/strategic interests as the main drivers of any third-party intervention decisions, liberalism advocates global powers intervene regardless of the existence of national or strategic interests if genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or humanitarian disaster takes place. As a via media between realism and liberalism, English School reinforce the notion of international society which has the responsibility to intervene intrastate conflicts to uphold human rights, international law and collective international norms. From English School perspective the main drivers of intervention by International Society are shared common identity based on universal moral values and sense of common interests.

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# Migration and Human Security: Different Perspectives About Central American Migrants Caravans

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*At the beginning of the twenty first century Human Security (HS) is a challenge for nations. Taking the perspective from HS, integrity and individual safety for individuals which is the main focus for states as the United States and Mexico. They are confronting Central American caravans, who want to enter into their countries. The challenge is to consider the protection of Central Americans' human security and at the same time to defend their borders. This essay analyzes how the United States and Mexico's public security policies deal with these caravans which are considered a menace and a priority in an internal manner. It will be analyzed whether both countries consider human security as a way to treat them or whether they are violating this right.*

## 1. Introduction:

This essay has the purpose of exposing how the security conditions from Central Americans on their way to the United States were treated when they got through the Mexican territory.

The methodology for knowing how human security for migrants were guaranteed in the Mexican territory traveling from Central America to the United States, is to interview them when they were transitioning through the state of Puebla. Seventeen interviews were made with those who wanted to talk about their experiences during their way from their countries until that moment. These interviews were kept long and deep in order to create confidence and willingness, so they could tell their stories.

In the interviews their names were changed. It is just mentioned if they were female or male and their country. These interviews allowed; to learn and compare the different reasons they had for being in the caravan, identify the menaces they faced during their travel and determine what they expected in arriving to the Mexican American border.

Human Security theory is used in this essay for understanding the security problem which was confronted by the Mexican and American governments in receiving these migrants by

taking measures to protect their borders.

Human Security (HS) is considered to be the protection and safety of people from menaces which could arise from diseases to wars or any kind of treat, making them to migrate from one place to another. Also, HS is the assumption that individuals have the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" because they represent the state's basic unit for acting (Hampson et al., 2002).

Human Security is considered basic for the National Security of any nation, because if people are the basic unit for protecting states from any menace then to treat persons is to treat the state. If HS is based upon Human Rights (HR) which is the condition to feel protected and safe then HS, is the product for respecting HR for any person in any condition (Ramcharan, 2002).

The dilemma is about how to protect people's HS and at the same time the integrity of the state in not letting them to get in illegally. States consider migration as a treat and at the same time they are forced to guarantee HS for people. In this dilemma the Mexican government and the American government try to protect themselves from illegal migration but are also forced to guarantee the safety for people. In this

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study, the interviews show how migrants' right for HS were treated during their journey through Mexico and identify the menaces they received from authorities and criminal organizations.

US President Trump stated that "States" have the right to choose the kind of people they want to have in their country, those who are going to prosper and flourish, that's why he considered illegal migrants as a menace and not as a blessing for covering those jobs which were obtained.

## **2. Donald Trump's migration security**

President Donald Trump mentioned during his campaign that migration system in the government was broken and has to be fixed and promised to do that if he would be the president. He pointed out: "We agree on the importance of ending the illegal flow of drugs, cash, guns, and people across our border, and to put the cartels out of business." (Dove, 2016 / Baker y Cochrane, 2019)

His platform for reaching the presidency was to fix this problem which was not forgotten by him during his first two years as president. For him the priority was to protect his country from illegal migrants, drugs, illicit traffic of guns and other activities and merchandises coming from south, for that reason to protect the southern border with Mexico was going to be a priority in his presidency. He considered that many presidents in the past did not want to arrange this problem and just wanted to patch it with public policies as "dreamers", "visas for work", "border patrol" and other minor actions. (Nixon & Santos 2017)

From his point of view illegal migration was a menace for the country because migrants stole jobs from people. Also, he considered there has not been a leadership in Washington who wanted to fix it and he was going to. At the same time, he mentioned the system was broken because everybody (institutions, enterprises and many others) was taking advantage of this issue. (Dove, 2016)

"President Trump has talked frequently about "bad hombres" streaming in from Mexico. But it is the flow of money going from north to south — a product of Americans' voracious appetite

for illicit drugs — that officials say is an equal part of the problem." (Nixon & Santos 2017)

Trump saw a broken system on the migration issue, and he started to menace the Mexican government by saying he would build a wall on the border between the two countries and would be paid by Mexico. He considered this action as a way to protect and defend his country from all kind of illegal flows. He wanted to guarantee his citizens that he would be dealing with this issue during his presidency.

"We will build a great wall along the southern border. [...] And Mexico will pay for the wall." (Dove, 2016)

Besides this declaration he was invited by Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto, during his candidacy, with the objective to shorten the distance by his posture on migration and commerce. There was a fear about these issues if he could get to the presidency.

Peña Nieto's invitation was criticized, and it did not help to improve the relations because once in power Donald Trump continued to menace the Mexican government in many occasions and reiterating the building of the wall on the border and closing the NAFTA agreement. (Anderson, 2017 / British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2016)

Donald Trump's speech denouncing migrants as a menace for the country's security was based on the idea that they enter as illegals and stole American jobs helped him to secure the presidency. But this discourse was for a certain electoral person who accepted and considered migrants as a menace to their security so they trusted during his campaign. (British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2016)

"Then there is the issue of security. Countless innocent American lives have been stolen because our politicians have failed in their duty to secure our borders and enforce our laws like they have to be enforced." (Dove, 2016)

The first action from Donald Trump as president was to detain migrants and to ordain detentions just if people could look like illegal migrants. It was not a measure obeyed by many states.



After that, he started to separate families; children were taken away from their parents, there were arrests and deportations in different states which the president announced as “zero tolerance”. Although many politicians and experts on the issue stated this was a human violation right, but the practice continued. (British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2018 / Olmo, 2018 / Lissardy, 2018 / Bachega, 2018)

Almost 2,000 minors were separated from their families in 2018 according to American authorities. The UN commissioner for Human Rights declared it was a cruel policy and would be consequences for the Trump administration. There was a visit from congressmen to Texas to a detention center where migrants and their children were taken. (Dart, 2018 / Shugerman, 2018) The conditions migrants were kept in, terrified congressmen. Congressmen considered the situation as inhuman treatment. Migrants call the center “la perrera” which means kennel. This measure was criticized by many people besides the congressmen and it is claimed that this action was not fixing the problem as promised by the president. (British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2018 / Olmo, 2018 / Lissardy, 2018 / Bachega, 2018)

“The installation of Texas is known as Úrsula, although immigrants call it “La Perrera”, in reference to the cages installed there and which, in addition to adult immigrants, are now used to house children separated from their parents after attempting to cross illegally border.” (British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2018 / El Universal, 2018 / The Guardian, 2018)

Instead of making a progress with the migration policy and fixing the “system” the president announced there would be a shut down in the government due to the negative attitude by Congress for not financing the building of the wall between Mexico and the United States. Congress argued the project was not going to solve the migration issue, instead it would make Mexican government get mad with this action and could affect other areas of cooperation and relation they had.

Donald Trump announced a shut down due to the humanitarian crisis that is allegedly going on at the border with Mexico, and with that, about eight million dollars will be used to build the wall and hold back undocumented immigrants and illicit drugs. (Esquivel, 2019 / Portella, 2019 / Ocaño, 2019) The president Donald Trump declared a shut down to finance his promised wall on the border with Mexico without the approval of Congress, a step that Democrats denounce as a violation of the Constitution. (Ocaño, 2019)

In seeing that these actions were not helping him gain voters in different states which had illegal migrants -as many started to protect them by refusing to arrest and deport them- President Trump tried other actions which was to cut budget for those states stating that they should obey federal laws and his orders. But courts in states started to say this action was illegal and could not proceed because states had a certain amount of independence from federal government .

Democrats have regained control of the House of Representatives, a momentous win in the midterm elections that will enable the party to block much of Donald Trump’s agenda and bombard the president with investigations. (The Guardian, 2018)

Democrats opposed Donald Trump’s migration policies as they believed these actions were, just not right, violating human rights and not fixing the problem. So, Democrats would not approve budget for the wall on the border.

### **3. The caravan from Central America**

Facing this political environment, the Central American migrants started to organize themselves for traveling to the United States in a huge group crossing the Mexican territory. One of the reasons for the caravan approach according to the interviews made with migrants in Puebla city was the violence and insecurity this travel would present for a single person; in which he/she could face Central American gangs, Mexican drug cartels and even authorities who takes advantage of



their undocumented status. They considered traveling in a caravan to be more secure in facing all possible threats on their way to the United States. ( British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2018 / WOLA, 2018)

“For two weeks, throngs of people have trudged north, crossing first from Honduras into Guatemala and then on to Mexico, bound for the United States border. They have spent nights in sprawling makeshift camps or in churches and schools, washing their clothes in rivers and relying on donations from locals.” (Correal, A. & Specia, M., 2018)

While Central Americans have long fled their homelands for the US and have sometimes joined forces along the way, the organized nature of this caravan is relatively new. (British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2018)

Migrants are often kidnapped by traffickers and drug gangs which force them to work for them. A large group such as this one is harder to target and therefore offers more protection. (British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2018)

In fact, when the caravan was in the state of Veracruz, the association “Pueblo sin Fronteras” and the organization of “Caravana de migrantes” warned the immigrants about the risk of the zone. They told them that “It was vital in this stretch of the crossing, to remain united, as they were reminded that Veracruz is known worldwide for being a drug trafficking land, organized crime and clandestine graves, which is why you had to be very alert”. (Zavaleta, 2018)

Another explanation for why and how they organized in a caravan to cross the Mexican territory was the call from persons who belonged to a nonprofit organization: “Pueblo sin Fronteras”, who considered the best way to let know governments from Central America, Mexico and the United States that frontiers should be pull down and take consideration of human rights as poverty, menace to their integrity, hunger and other problems caused by them. So, the best way to solve this problem from their point of view was to let them to cross

borders without restrictions for getting what they cannot in their countries. The Government Secretary from Mexico, Olga Sánchez Cordero, identified the international association Pueblo sin Fronteras as the one who organized the migrants’ caravans from Central America for crossing the Mexican territory to reach the US border. (Esquivel, 2019)

In an interview with the coordinator Garibo, she affirmed: Central American caravan had the right to be created by her organization, with free will in wishing to live in a secure place and to get develop. From her point of view, they should not be seen from president Trump’s point of view as a menace. (Garibo, 2018)

This call was made by cell phones (wats ups and facebook) in Honduras and was spread to Guatemala when migrants arrived, they considered it was an opportunity for improving their social and economic live without risking their lives traveling alone as other have already did it. (Ahmed, Rogers, Ernst,2018/Sieff,Partlow 2018)

The caravan left San Pedro Sula, Honduras, on Oct. 12, assembled through a grass-roots social media campaign that began in early October. The campaign drew the attention of a Honduran news outlet, which focused on the organizers’ criticism of the Honduran president, and then spread to other outlets. (Correal, A. & Specia, M., 2018 /Carrasco, 2018)

In the end, migrants organized themselves and started to travel from CA to Mexico. On the 12th of October 2018 the caravan arrived at the Mexican border with Guatemala. They were stopped by Mexican authorities; the border was reinforced by Mexican police officers. The commissioner from the National Institute of Migration (INM) declared: “those who have visa will be accepted the rest would be detained in the INM facilities to start procedures in accordance to every person for asylum”. (Henriquez, 2018)

To prevent the arrival of the caravan, president Trump pushed Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Mexico to stop the immigrants. But it was not so easy because of the number of people who came. (Ahmed, A. & Dickerson, C. 2018)



On the 19th of October people from the caravan got desperate and started to fight against the Mexican police officers who resisted without harming them just using shields. They were yelling: “we are not leaving until we cross”. Young people in trying to cross the bridge jumped to the river, they were starving, desperate and heated. (British Broadcasting Corporation News Mundo [BBC News Mundo], 2018 / Camhaji, 2018)

Migrants were able to cross the bridge next day and entered into the Mexican territory by pushing the gates and forcing the authorities to retreat from that point. Once they entered, they split in many groups because they marched at different rhythms. On the 26th of October the president Peña Nieto launched a program for Central Americans to stay in Mexico which was called: “you are at your home” offering a “temporary identification” for making legal procedures, but he mentioned they should stay in Chiapas and Oaxaca, two states at the south east of the country and far away from the border with the United States. (Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 2018/ Reséndiz, 2018/ Nieto, 2018)

This measure was as a response to the pressures from Donald Trump’s demand to stop the caravan before arriving to the south border of his country. But the Mexican president wanted to present this measure as part of his strategy to stop Central Americans which were just looking for a better life and should not be taken as criminals.

Peña Nieto said: “Dear migrants: Mexico wants to protect and support you. The only way we can do is if you legalize your staying in the country and obey our laws. I invite you to approach as soon as possible to the migration authorities which are for helping you.” (Excelsior, 2018 / Tourliere, 2018)

We can see a double action by the Mexican government: first the pressure from the United States for not letting them to cross the border; and seeing they could not avoid the crossing of migrants into the Mexican territory because it could have been a blood bath and the international pressure could have criticized that action based on human rights violation.

This public policy form Mexican government had a double purpose: one was to show the American government that Mexican government was making all it is possible to stop the caravan from getting to the border. Second, was to take care of the migrants by demonstrating Mexican government policy was in accordance with human rights.

But the caravan continued to travel by the country, suffering from hunger, heat, accidents and many other threats. In their way to the Mexican American border passing through many Mexican cities, migrants got to Puebla city where they were interviewed for this research.

#### 4. Testimonies by migrants

Migrants arrived at the state of Puebla and they reached the father Gerardo’s shelter church for staying before continuing their way to the border. That shelter was used to receive migrants more than a decade ago, so it was not strange that they get there.

The interviews could be made there because it was a quiet and secure place and migrants could be trusted to tell the truth about their travel until reaching that state. Also, they could be trusted because it was a church and because they were catholic believing god protected them from anything.

In that way they felt relaxed for talking without any menace from any authority. Another reason was that they were talking with students who were helping them to rest and feel comfortable while they were interviewed.

From the seventeen interviews thirteen were men and four women, twelve were from Honduras and five from Guatemala there were Salvadorians, but they did not want to talk. For getting to an interview with them the approach was made when they were eating or resting in the shelter, once they were confident enough to talk about their experiences, they were asked if they would accept to be interviewed, some rejected others accepted.

Poverty and insecurity was stated as the main reason for leaving their countries during the seventeen interviews. They declared insecurity



in the travel was due to accidents in the Mexican territory, all of them wanted to get to the United States and stay there, just a few of them wanted to remain in Mexico if they could not cross the border but not to return to their countries.

Insecurity in Honduras and El Salvador had been mentioned by many authors as a problem in the region because there is a heritage from the guerrilla warfare during the eighties and also due to the existence of two gangs (Mara Salvatrucha and Neighborhood 18) which started to exist in the 80's and became a menace for people.

So, insecurity in these countries grew all this time and people could not continue to survive this environment at the beginning of this century because these gangs have not been fought with efficiency by governments. The experiences from migrants in the caravan were that they had to pay for having their businesses, to be careful about displacing from their homes to any place in the city because they could be robbed, kidnaped, killed or even being violated.

One of the interviewee said: "I had to pay for my business every week so I could work but they (gangs) started to menace my family and my costumers and then I realized I could not afford any longer, that's why I choose to travel in the caravan." (Karina, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

Another mentioned: "I preferred to travel with the caravan because alone I could have been kidnaped, killed or even capture by authorities in my way into Mexican territory." (Jorge, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

Just four of the them related the fact that gangs in CA and Mexico could agree to kidnap people when they coordinated with one another, they do not know how they do that and what for but they kidnaped women, men and young people. So, traveling in the caravan was a way to avoid this menace in their crossing by Mexico.

The cartels in Mexico and the gangs in CA have been in touch in the last years for several reasons: for trafficking drugs from South America to the United States, for sending central Americans to Mexico because they

need "mules" to cross drugs to the American border and also because they need labor and prostitutes in the Mexican organizations.

As we can see the fears of migrants about these menaces was not invented or was just an idea, it was real, and they lived with it in their country.

So, the caravan was a way to protect themselves from these menaces because they have already known about kidnappings in the past or deaths when they resisted collaborating with one cartel than other. Women were the major attraction for them, and they were avoiding being killed, rape or kidnaped.

When they referred to this menace in the interviews they said: "they (criminal organizations) are outside waiting....and in any moment they can appear in any place during the travel."(Miguel, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

Poverty and underdevelopment in their country was another major factor which made them to travel with the caravan. Always in the interviews, their poor condition was mentioned as one reason to leave their country and even was as strong as violence.

One of the interviewees pointed out: "I prefer to travel with the caravan than to see my family dying of hunger, the only thing I want is to have a job that's why I want to get to the United States."(Carmen, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

Many of them related they did not have a chance in their country because they couldn't find a job that was enough for living, prices were very high and at the same time many families were more than three persons. For them the only desire was to have a job and to get out from poverty and hunger

If we see the economy from these countries, it has not been well in the last decade. There are many reasons for that: corruption, no public programs for development, violence and dependence from remittances. So, migrants were the result of these problems and also the result for not paying attention to them by international community.

So, poverty was another major reason for them to leave their country, their family and all possibility to go back in the long future. Migration as many authors say is the displacement of people from one place to another and also to cut ties with their roots in many senses as costumes, roots and family ties.

Central Americans were doing the same as Europeans in the eighteenth and nineteenth century when they arrived at the United States. There are many differences between them and the central Americans, but one thing can be said to be the same: hunger and poverty. Many Americans stated that their family did not have anything in arriving to the country and they had to improve their lives.

Migrants stated that there have been a lot of accidents in highways trucks and shelters during their travels across Mexico because people did not take precautions. One of the interviewee said: "there was a boy standing up on a wagon and fall sleep and then fall down from the wagon and a truck run over him killing him at once." (Arturo, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018) Another mentioned: "a boy turn out his head from a car and then another smashed his head killing him." (Silvia, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018) For others the more horrible was that the little children have seen a lot of accidents and deaths during their journey.

We can say these accidents were the cost of migration like when they get sick, injured or even die. So, authority was not preventing them from having accidents crossing Mexico even the surveillance from them, because as many of them refer there were many young people deciding and improving actions without precautions.

Until their journey to Puebla City they pointed out they were tired and did not want to continue without resting well. One cause for accidents was many decided to travel at the pace of the younger and stronger. "I'm hungry and I have not sleep well during all these days I thing I will be able to do it here (in Puebla) before continuing my journey to the United States." (Amanda, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

Finally, the last question was, what they

expected from their travel across Mexico and facing all these dangers and menaces. Fourteen from the seventeen pointed out they wanted to get to the border with the United States and do everything in their own hands for crossing the border. They constantly declared they were not criminals or even a menace to Americans they were just looking for jobs and get out from poverty.

All the t stated that they wanted to arrive to the border between Mexico and the United States but did not have an idea what they could found as a risk to cross it. They knew about the attitude from president Donald Trump not just for building a wall between his country and Mexico but also his xenophobia to migrants from CA and Mexico because he considered they steal American jobs, were criminals and stayed in the country in an illegal way making roots for next generations.

"I do not know what to do if I do not cross the border; I do not know anybody here in Mexico." (Juan, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

"I have to cross the border at any cost if not it did not worth anything to make the trip." (Ignacio, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

"My relatives told me I had to hire a coyote to cross the border and on the other side they will pick me up." (Gabriel, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

As we can see from migrants' declarations in the caravan there was not other choice for them than to cross the border ignoring the menaces and the possible aggression from authorities on both sides of the border, because the American government was getting ready for protecting their side of the border and Mexico was going to show its help.

Also, they feared not just to have more accidents but to be attacked by authorities or criminal organizations. Just three interviewers mentioned they knew from others who tried to cross the border that they could face criminal organizations or authorities who could take advantage from their condition.

One of the examples from cartel's menace was



the example with the migrants killed in San Fernando where police officers detained them and gave them to the Z cartel for killing. So, as criminal organizations were in touch with Mexican authorities they were afraid to confront this scenario as a big menace for their integrity and obstacle to cross the border.

Four of the interviewees said that they were avoiding to cross certain states in the Mexican territory as Veracruz, Tamaulipas or Michoacán because they knew cartels control those parts of the country and they could be kidnapped for being mules to carry drugs or killed as San Fernando massacre.

“Walking in this way we avoid to get into some states in the country, we know there is a strong presence from cartels in those regions.”(Mauricio, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

“We are protected in this way (referring to travel in the caravan) from authority and drug cartels which are outside and are seeing us all the time since we leave our country.”(Alberto, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

“Girls are looked after when traveling in the caravan, many have to take pills for not getting pregnant during their travel, that’s the risk for them all the time during this travel.”(Amanda, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

We can affirm they just had an idea of what could come from the rest of the travel and believed they were ready to confront these risks for getting to the border. Avoiding certain states, going with the caravan and girls taking pills in order not to get pregnant, were the actions they consider enough to confront these probably risks in their travel.

At the same time, their fear was less than their desire to get out from their countries and get into the United States. They decided to do whatever was necessary for crossing the border because as one declared: “we do not have anything else to lose.”(Rosa, personal interview, Nov 05, 2018)

## **5. Human Security**

For understanding this challenge to the United

States and Mexico which have to protect migrants from any kind of violence and insecurity in their territory and mostly from any human violation, human security theory can be used to understand how and why migrants are important for both governments.

Bertrand Ramcharan points out that human rights define human security: “To be secure is to be safe, protected. Security is a secure condition or feeling. It is respectfully submitted that international human rights norms define the meaning of human security.” (Ramcharan, 2002)

The importance of human security for people all over the world is that human rights is a “fundamental liberal assumption that individuals have a basic right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and that the international community has an obligation to protect and promote these rights” (Hampson, Daudelin, Hay, Reid y Martin, 2002)

Shahrbanoou mention that before the 1994 Human Development Report, where the term freedom from want and freedom from fear was considered, there was Roosevelt’s plea for the respect to the four freedoms: fear, want, speech and worship in 1941 in his speech to the State of the Union Address. (Martin y Owen, 2015) So as we can see human security is not a new concept or idea in international politics to consider peoples’ security.

At the same time for Shahrbanoou the human security approach includes: human development, human rights and security. (Figure 1)

This framework gives us an idea on how these three concepts are connected and related to one another at the same time. If there is the violation of one of them the others are affected, so security is part not just of human rights but also development.

Taking all these considerations for human security, we can make the assumption that for both governments’ (Mexican and American) responsibility about this issue should have been to secure the integrity of migrants and to develop measures for that.




Figure 1 :Human Security Triangle (Martin y Owen, 2015)

If we take the declarations from migrants interviews the Mexican government was not guarantying their integrity during their travel to the northern border because they were not allowed to cross the southern border by authorities and when they could, their safety from accidents and other kind of violence they had was due to their decisions, but also because the government was not making anything to prevent them.

If we take migrants' declarations, accusing the Mexican authorities who took advantages from them and their knowledge about the presence of criminal organizations in Mexican territory that could menace their safety and integrity during their way to the border, we can say human security was not guaranteed by the Mexican government.

The first reaction from the Mexican government was to prevent migrants from crossing the southern border because there was a pressure from the American government who considered

them as a menace. When they could cross the border the Mexican government changed its policy from preventing to offer and guarantee their presence in the territory not just by local authorities but also by launching a program if they decided to stay.

We can say the launching of this program had a double purpose: in one way was to avoid they could get to the northern border, because the Mexican president Peña Nieto clearly pointed out they should stay in Guerrero and Chiapas two states in the southern part of the republic. In that way they were not going to reach the northern border.

From other perspective this was an opportunity for improving their lives because they could stay in Mexico if they preferred to do so, in the interviews declared: "I want to go out from poverty and to have a better live for my family" and that was an opportunity.

In that way we can affirm the Mexican government was taking actions and taking care of their human security with this program because it was preventing them from continuing their journey to the northern border and to face violence and other kind of menaces in their way.

Human rights and human security are frameworks related and interconnected. For example, if there is not economic development in a country people could not have access to food, education and so on. (UNDP, 1994)

In the case of Central American migrants, they referred in the interviews that they were traveling to the United States looking for an opportunity for development which they could not have in their countries because there was not stability, economic development and a proper situation for them to have a better live. Also, there was violence and they were afraid to be killed, kidnaped or robbed, the government was not providing the necessary to have a secure live in their countries.

So, in this way we can see the relationship proposed by Shahrbanou; migrants were in an underdeveloped economic condition in their countries and in an insecure atmosphere because of the gangs' violence. Migration was the only way to escape from these two threats and there was no point of return besides their journey had been tired, dangerous and insecure since the beginning. But when they were migrating to the US their security was menaced by gang's organizations and even Mexican authorities.

Also the issue was who should guarantee their rights during their journey from C.A. to the US in crossing the Mexican territory, (Central American) governments or the Mexican government? If we consider the fact that states are responsible for their security as a responsibility for their wellbeing because they have the right to be secure then all governments should take care of their security. (Tadjbakhsh, 2007)

The C.A. countries did not do anything for them at any time even there was not an official declaration to express sadness or worry for them. From the Mexican government has been explained what it did but also the question and

the criticism from society was: they should not be there and also why the Mexican government was taking care of them as if they were its citizens. So, from this point of view, migrants were demanding security during their travel to a government who was not obliged to do that, it was just because they were crossing its territory and that was the duty acquired but not as part of a relationship between citizens and state.

In that order of ideas, the C.A. governments were passing their duty for guarantying human security to migrants to the Mexican government because they were crossing the borders. But at the same time there could be another way to take care of their human security by consular presence with bilateral agreements but they did not want or were interested to do so.

So, human security was not guaranteed by migrants' governments. It was assumed by Mexican government but in another way, it was just reacting to an emergency for which it was not prepared at all. And the American government was not even thinking about their security, just seeing them as a menace as they were approaching to the border.

Taking all this as a referent for migrants' security during their travel to the US border they were expendable not just for CA governments but also Mexican and Americans, - the initial one assuming a duty for which was not prepared and wanted to have, and the latter rejecting their arrival to the border. So migrants were adrift in their travel and not protected in their vital individual security.

## **6. Conclusion**

The migrants caravans are the new form of migration in the Latin America territory and probably in the world, if we take the case from Syria or other countries where migrants are running away from violence, we could say Central Americans were joining with a purpose, and not were directly affected by a war or conflict as Syrians.

So, the caravans could be considered as the new form of migration because they are pushing governments to consider their wellbeing and security during their travel to get to the US border as seen in this research. Also,

these countries are not in a conflict but there is a permanent insecure atmosphere which did not allow them to live in peace and have a life, secure and with possibilities to improve.

And as Shahrbanou mentions there is an interconnection between human development, human rights and security as shown before that applies to the C.A. caravan's case. They are traveling because they feel insecure in their countries, so they cannot develop economically but when they migrate (crossing the Mexican territory) they are insecure because of the menaces in the region.

At the same time this new form of migration is the result from the experience of persons who tried to cross the Mexican territory before and failed because of the insecurity due to the presence of cartels, the authorities actions in not respecting their human security and in not been able to cross the US border when they got there because of the American border patrol and the criminal organizations spread all over the border expecting to take advantage from them.

Caravans are also the result from the past. When conflict and wars were present in C.A. in the 80's, the international community considered it was due to the influence from the communist ideology and did not want to realize it was the result from a long period of dictatorship which was taking away. Poverty, hunger and insecurity were the result also from the deportation from the US of hundreds of Central Americans who became criminals or already were (Maras).

So, from this point of view we are witnessing the result from several decades of abandonment from the international and national community unworried about these circumstances which were accumulating during all this period of time and exploded in the caravans to get to the US.

The challenge for governments in this part of the continent and area of the world is: how to mitigate and resolve something that has not been attended for a long period of time. What is the result going to be if there is no policy to resolve and handle this migration issue? considering migrants expressed in the interviews: "we are not criminals".

Donald Trump could not fix the system as he promised during his campaign and when he tried to fix it, he angered many American states and local authorities with his migration policy and that's not the way to resolve the problem in keeping away migrants and get rid of them.

For him the problem is just to deport and not let migrants and all kind of "bad things" to cross the border as drugs, weapons and so on. To build a wall and offend another government saying it will pay for, it is not fixing the problem, but making it worse.

Finally, Trump is not worried about human security for migrants. To deport migrants is not a human security action and to build a wall, between his country and Mexico, is not either. At the same time, this foreign policy became an internal policy issue when states were pressured to detain and deport persons who look like illegal migrants and that action is much more xenophobic, than national policy.

Central American governments continue to not do anything about this issue and even they do not want to act for preventing illegal migration, they are ignoring the problem and do not want to assume their responsibility. For them the idea of human security is something far away from their current policy.

There was no official declaration from CA governments about this humanitarian crisis that confronted the Mexican government for their population. And it was not expected to have one as the humiliation could be worst. So C.A. governments will keep quiet which can be interpreted that they prefer people to leave than stay.

Lastly we could see the Mexican government was the only one who had to confront this challenge because migrants were in the country (illegally) and had to do two things: one was to preserve their security meanwhile they were crossing the territory and second was to demonstrate that it was not violating their human rights at all. Launching a program for them so they could stay if they wanted can be taken as a major action for preserving their security and demonstrating there was not a xenophobic feeling toward them.



But the human security for migrants was not granted at all, as was mentioned by migrants when they were interviewed. They felt they were under the threat of criminals in their country and while traveling across the Mexican territory and even they did not know what to expect in arriving to the border. They just knew they wanted to cross, but the American government was prepared to allow them to do that.

If caravans are going to be the new way for migration in the region, it is the governments that could face challenges on human security and they have to be prepared. If they do not coordinate themselves this kind of migration issue could affect not just migrants' integrity, but also the security of all people in the region, If they opt to travel with surveillance from criminal organizations or some kind of agreement with them for their security, then migration will affect the whole region from C.A. countries to the US border.

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## Book Review: How NATO Adapts - Strategy and the Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950\*

Samet Coban\*\*

Dr. Seth Johnston's "How NATO Adapts" is first and foremost a book about NATO's history. It explains changes in NATO's strategy and organisation – terms identified as external and internal units of analysis in institutional adaptation, respectively – throughout its history by using a framework of critical junctures<sup>1</sup> and shows how NATO adapts to the changes in the international system and maintains its institutional identity.


Cover image of the book is an indicator of the pace of NATO's adaptability and change. It was designed in 2017 and consists of (then) 28 flags of NATO members – which is 29 now, after less than two years – with the accession of Montenegro and (future) Republic of North Macedonia is expected to become 30th member of the Alliance<sup>2</sup>.

The book contributes to the literature by emphasising NATO's character as an international institution rather than an alliance among sovereign states. The author underlines that international organisations, like states, are critical players in international relations. The key finding of the book is that NATO's bureaucratic actors played important and often overlooked roles in its adaptations. The author also argues

that the functions of NATO's formal institutions – which have achieved a higher degree of formal institutionalisation than any other alliance in history – have played a significant and largely underappreciated role in how NATO works and adapts. Institutional adaptation mechanisms include convening, agenda-setting, delegating, information-sharing, delaying, moderating and co-opting, as identified by the author.

The author selects three case studies of critical junctures in NATO history, as well as an assessment of the argument's applicability to contemporary challenges. The first case is about redefining the role of Germany in post-WWII order. The second case deals with the political environment in the early 1960s when France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure, and American nuclear deterrence was questioned in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The third case is about the collapse of the Cold

War Order, where NATO's existence was being questioned since its main adversary ceased to exist. A fourth chapter tries to demonstrate the applicability of the author's overall argument to NATO's new expeditionary endeavours such as Kosovo and Afghanistan. Institutional alternatives to NATO (European Defence



\* Dr. Seth A. Johnston, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2017, ISBN 9781421421988 (pbk.: alk. paper)

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Community - EDC, United Nations - UN, the European Union - EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - OSCE) were observed in the aftermath of critical junctures, as Johnston pointed out, but NATO has managed to adapt itself and endured.

Author's military and academic background helped him to capture both the military and political dimensions of the developments in NATO's history. The author's concise style in summarising relevant historical events is exceptionally good. The language used in the book is clear and easy to follow which makes it valuable not only for academia but also for multinational defence and security practitioners.

Its bibliography consisting of official NATO documents and relevant international legal materials is particularly rich. Author's ability to reach first hand NATO sources and officials added value to the study.

The book truly deserves to be a reference document for those who wish to begin their career at NATO or defence and security practitioners who are assigned to NATO posts. Last but not least, developments after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and how NATO tries to adapt to the changed security environment would be the new chapter of the next revised edition of the book.

1. A situation in which the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands, and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous (Cappocia & Kelemen, 2007).
2. On 6 February 2019 (future) Republic of North Macedonia and permanent representatives of 29 NATO members signed the Accession Protocol. Once the Accession Protocol will be ratified by each member state according to its national procedures, the country will become a member of NATO.



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