Influencing and Promoting Global Peace and Security

Irregular Immigration Flow from Middle East to Europe

Russian A2AD Strategy and Its Implications for NATO

Fighting Terrorism Through an Effective Bureaucracy

2017 Piracy Assessment and Avoidance Methods from Piracy Attack

Burden Sharing at NATO and the Battle of 2 Percent
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Beyond the Horizon is determined to be a unique think tank with a focus on realistic policies and in-depth analyses to offer comprehensive solutions on topics related to international politics and security, peace and conflict studies.

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Dear Reader,

Amid all the chaos, uncertainty and growing instability, the need for more security and stability reached to unprecedented levels. The resurgence of great power conflict, the rise of illiberalism, protracted wars and violent conflicts in recent years have caused immense human suffering as well as huge social and economic cost. Alarmingly, these emerging challenges have become more complex and prolonged, involving more non-state groups in addition to regional and international actors. This has given impetus to focus on preventing wars and violent conflicts more effectively. The old days where States were the sole actors to address global issues are long gone. While it could still be argued that states hold the primary responsibility on the international stage, it is becoming ever clearer that non-state actors, civil society, private sector, regional and international organizations have a bigger role to play.

In this regard, we took Margaret Mead's famous quote “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it's the only thing that ever has” to heart and established Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies Group. As a very young but rapidly yet soundly growing organization, we are dedicated to influence and promote global peace and security. Our aim is to help reverse today's malicious trends and build a secure and stable setting at all levels -human, society, state, and international-. Our primary goals are to empower decision and policy makers; advocate paths to build a better world; and prevent, mitigate or end crisis and conflict.

As an independent voice, Beyond the Horizon is determined to be a unique think tank with a special focus on realistic policies and in-depth analyses to offer comprehensive solutions and inclusive approaches to decision and policy-makers, academics, planners, practitioners in international security and external affairs circles.

To enhance our response to the global challenges, we also keep a watchful eye on the globe (Horizon Weekly) and countries in crisis (Crisis Watch) to bring the issues related to our focus areas and deadly conflicts to the attention of not only security professionals but also to the general public.

To that end, Horizon Insights aims to make sense of international security environment by presenting articles and book reviews on important current trends, actors, places and issues to decision-makers, security professionals and interested public. As in previous edition, the list of topics is comprehensive and in line with the mega trends in international affairs and security. I wish you an interesting and thought-provoking read.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon
1. Introduction:

Irregular immigration has become one of the toughest challenges in recent years the world is facing, along with terrorism. Since the latter has been exploiting the former heavily, these two challenges have become so intertwined that now it is quite hard to separate them from each other. In addition, as the current rate of immigration has reached to enormous levels, countries have become incapable of handling the issue individually due to their limited capacities.

During the last 7 years, the world has witnessed a continuously growing immigration trend originating primarily from the conflict zones in the Middle East and North/Central Africa. Despite the long distances, developed regions and countries; mainly EU, US, Australia and Canada, have become the main destinations in search of a safe haven for those escaping from conflict zones.

The main aim of this paper is to provide a different aspect on today’s immigration phenomenon and bring forward potential solution proposals in handling and countering this big challenge for Europe.

In the first part I will try to give an insight on the irregular immigration problem in general, then I will focus on the current situation, challenges of immigration from the Middle East and the operational seaborne efforts particularly at the Aegean Sea but also Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. After shedding insights on the economic dimension of the smuggling immigrants, I will try to put forth possible course of actions to counter the related problematic issues. Moreover, I will examine the different aspects, side effects and probable outcomes of EU-Turkey Readmission Statement. Finally, I will conclude with policy suggestions with wider implications.

2. Immigration and Challenges in General:

Immigration has always been a phenomenon driven substantially by the inequalities among nations and by the political, demographic and economic imbalances between the developed and the underdeveloped parts of the world. However, regional conflicts and civil wars the world has been witnessing in recent years, primarily in the Middle East and North/Central Africa, have reshaped both the scale and the consequences of immigration.

Main motivation of immigration has sharply turned into a desperate search of a safe and secure place for those who faced violence in conflict and war zones. Numbers have climbed up to tremendous levels especially for the neighbouring countries to crisis areas such as Syria/Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan etc. Some side effects of immigration have also become more visible such as illicit human trafficking, drug trafficking, organ trafficking, etc. linked to traditional criminal activities. Most remarkably, however, terrorist infiltration into immigrant flows has become the most critical issue from the security perspective. Social, economic and political side effects in the destination countries have also been issues of concern and debate as the numbers have accumulated in the recent years. Focus areas for this immigration phenomenon have greatly been the regions/countries bridging the developed world to the crisis spots. Over the past years, due to the consistent conflicts and tensions in Central-Northern Africa and the Middle East, countries in the south of Europe have had to bear the most of the burden in managing the immigration influx to Europe. In fact, immigration has been elevated to become a major challenge for the European security.1

This fall can in part be attributed to the collaboration and coordination among

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One example of these efforts can be the EU-Turkey Agreement which has resulted in dramatic decreases in the number of arrivals in Greece. In reality, active NATO operation in the Aegean Sea has had a considerable impact on the crossings over the sea. Coordination of efforts among countries along the immigration routes must have discouraged potential immigrants from crossing the sea to reach Greece where there is also very limited land passage between the two countries.

Up until now, Turkey herself has been harbouring around 3.5 million Syrian refugees in addition to another 400 thousand coming from other countries. The level of difficulty for Turkey to absorb 3 million refugees in her own 80-million population would be lesser than the countries, with a smaller population such as Greece, which are potentially exposed to huge number of immigration flows. In this sense, Greece, which has approximately 11 million population, one million of which are already foreigners, may have dramatical changes in her demographic structure if she welcomes 3 million refugees in her soil. It goes without saying demographic changes in that scale strecches the resources and brings about complications in cultural, economic, educational and political spheres in destination countries.

The biggest challenge for the countries hosting enormous number of immigrants as safe havens is security issues related to potential terrorist activities. The sensitive situation of asylum seekers/immigrants, who are trying to use one of the fundamental human rights, has great vulnerability to be exploitied by terrorist organizations. It is a proven modus operandi for terrorist groups or organizations to embed their members in irregular/undocumented immigrants to reach Europian soil for terrorist attacks.

The fight against terrorism has been a top 5 European Commission, 6 April 2018, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/turkey_syrian_crisis_en.pdf
priority for EU and especially for the Europol for the last decade and, in this fight irregular immigration will be monitored continuously. It looks like this priority will keep still its place at the top of the list for a while.\(^6\)

It is huge challenge for the countries that have inappropriate infrastructure and capabilities to handle immigration issues and host asylum seekers and immigrants. These countries are also potentially in danger to confront economic and social problems related to migrants.

As one of the serious global issues of the last decades, the immigration issue and the burden incurred requires collective and comprehensive response from the International Society and. In the context of EU, it can be offered that developed countries in the union should financially support those countries with stretched resources and infrastructure who are hosting mass of immigrants.

3. Operational Efforts and Obstacles at Aegean Sea to Cope with Irregular Immigration:

The efforts at the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean to deter and hinder irregular immigration flows at sea by the support of patrolling warships and coast guards in the frame of maritime operations introduce new measures and create new problem areas to the overall problem.

Maritime operations, especially beyond the Territorial Waters (TTW) of origin or passage countries, are namely conducted within the concept of Search and Rescue (SAR) operations but, in reality, they aim to monitor and control the probable immigration routes. In this manner first version of the bilateral agreements between EU/Greece-Turkey and EU/Greece-Libya emphasize on the necessity and importance of taking appropriate measures against irregular immigration flows at the land or territorial waters of Turkey and Libya.\(^7\)

On the other hand, the existence of below-mentioned dispute areas between Greece and Turkey affects the level of cooperation and effective execution of the NATO operations at the Aegean Sea. We can shortly summarize prominent problem areas between two countries as follows:

- Demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean Islands: Turkey denies any activity of Greek military or Greek Coast Guard units based or stationed on the East Aegean Islands such as Leros, Lesvos, Rodos etc. and manoeuvres in those island’s TTWs due to the demilitarized status of these islands. This problem has been affecting many other NATO operations as well since 1954.\(^8\) Turkey’s stance over the status of these islands also impedes the cooperation between NATO, European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) (previously known FRONTEX) and Turkish Coast Guard.

- The legal status of certain geographical features (Islands, Islets, rocks) at the Aegean Sea: There is a long-term continuing problem over the legal status of several islands, islets etc. between these two countries. And this issue always has a great potential to create an unexpected crisis between the neighbours in parallel with the political developments. It is a possibility, not to be easily ignored, that growing tension between these two countries may not remain limited between them and may end up as a crisis including EBCG and EU as well.\(^9\)


9 NATO, 1957, “Demilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands”, accessed Sep 22, 2017: http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/1/2/128823/SGM-0217-57_ENG_PDP.pdf, “Demilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands: The North Atlantic Council has studied the NATO Common Infrastructure projects on the Island of Leros, with a view to meeting NATO military requirements insofar as possible while at the same time avoiding any conflict with provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty. The Council has decided that the NATO installations currently authorized may be completed and used only under the conditions set out below: a. No naval, air or military units may be based or stationed on the Island in peacetime, nor may the base be used for maneuvers. b. The installations must be maintained by civilian personnel exclusively. c. None of the construction on Leros must be patently military..
the launching of NATO Operation at the Aegean Sea, stands as a clear example of the sensitivity of the issue above.\(^\text{10}\)

- The dispute over airspace at the Aegean Sea: Greece claims 10 NM airspace over 6 NM TTW and refuses the flight of Turkish Military Air Vehicles between 6 - 10NM Airspace without flight clearance. This long-standing problem also stands as an obstacle for any kind of effective cooperation in the Aegean Sea.

- Search and Rescue (SAR) Region: Greece and Turkey have different declarations over the SAR Regions which overlaps each other in the Aegean Sea. In case of any incident at sea in the overlapping areas, both parties try to respond to the event by their means and carry out SAR operations.

Based on the abovementioned explanation over the Aegean Sea, we can clearly state that the main problem is related to the determination of maritime borders between Turkey and Greece. These mentioned dispute areas generate communication barriers and weaken the coordination between two countries\(^\text{11}\) during the struggle with irregular immigration flow in the East Aegean Sea. Therefore, third parties such as EU (Germany takes the most active role) and NATO are forced to act as a mediator between Greece and Turkey.

In this context, EU and NATO firstly brought forward the proposal to act and operate with NATO and/or EU assets against irregular immigration flow in TTWs of the counterparts, Greece and Turkey. Due to the existence of abovementioned chronic problems between Turkey and Greece, this proposal was strongly refused by both countries assuming and worrying about a possible misuse or misinterpretation of NATO Operational Assets in the East Aegean shores. In the meantime, on the other side of Mediterranean Sea, Libya accepted the proposal letting Italy operate in Libyan TTW to intercept irregular immigration before their reach to open seas.\(^\text{12}\)

As a prescription to a similar problem, in October 1997, U.S. and Haiti signed a bilateral letter of agreement concerning cooperation to suppress illicit maritime drug traffic allowing US law enforcement agencies to enter Haitian territorial waters and airspace.\(^\text{13}\)

As a result of a similar agreement with the Bahamas, US air and sea assets can operate, detect and intercept immigrants\(^\text{14}\) and another type of irregular activities in the third countries TTW to avoid long and expensive processes of returning immigrants to their origin countries.

The Maritime Operations conducted beyond the third countries’ TTWs to prevent irregular immigration flows to EU can be stated as Sisyphean labour. Countries suffering from immigration should focus on effective options to keep potential immigrants in their origin or transit lands. Experiences have already shown that sea-based efforts against the irregular immigration have mostly been successful only if the operation is conducted in origin or transit countries’ TTWs in close cooperation with counterparts.

\(^\text{12}\) The second category of the outstanding Aegean issues is demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean Islands under relevant international instruments, including the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 and the Paris Treaty of 1947.


Additionally, it should be expressed that sharing timely information with origin or transit countries like Libya and Turkey is of great importance and a main prerequisite for the success of counter immigration operations. There was an expectation of an increase in the number of immigrants from Turkey to Greece in 2013 due to the developments in conflict zones and origin countries. However, after the first-ever assignment of a Turkish Coast Guard Representative to the Embassy of Turkey in Greece in 2014, the level of cooperation between two countries’ Coast Guards enhanced. The fruits of this initiative and the excelled level of operation-oriented information sharing between Turkish Coast Guard (TCG) and Hellenic Coast Guards (HCG) were seen in the upcoming period and led to much better results particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in the year 2015. Based on the intelligence provided from successful HCG, TCG conducted operations (OPERATION SAFE-MED) at the south coast of Turkey (focus on sea areas south of Mersin City), Turkey-based irregular immigration flow has almost been eradicated from the East Mediterranean.

4. The Importance of Dealing With Irregular Immigration at Land Before Reaching Seaborne Transfer Assets

Supporting the transit countries such as Libya and Turkey financially has emerged as the most effective course of action to deal with immigration flows. In this example, both countries received financial support from EU in exchange for using their law enforcement efforts to impede irregular passage towards Europe in their own territories, setting up refugee camps for immigrants and ratifying readmission agreement.

In this context, while Greece received €1 billion, on the other side, Turkey and Libya were allocated €3 billion euros and 300 million euros respectively in tackling the immigration challenges. The EU has also allocated more than €1.2 billion to Lebanon since the start of the Syria crisis to relieve the impact of the Syrian crisis as Lebanon hosts more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees.

The majority of the immigrants naturally do not have resources and capabilities to find means for their voyages towards destination countries. For their whole journey they depend on smugglers and facilitators, who are well-organized and have networks in origin, transit and destination countries. In this respect, collapsing smugglers, facilitators and such criminal organizations are one of the primary objectives of EU countries.

Leading EU countries have initiated and increased mutual cooperation and coordination both with their own law enforcement/secret service agencies and with the ones of the third countries including joint operations in this manner. Countries have adapted enormously increased penalties in their criminal law system 19 Turkish Coast Guard Command, 2015, “Current Operations”, accessed Sep 30, 2017: http://www.sahilgunvenlik.gov.tr/baskanliklar/genel_sekreterlik/ingilizce/current_operation.asp “On August 2014, Turkish Coast Guard Command has initiated an operation called “OPERATION SAFE-MED” to fight against irregular migration in the East Mediterranean with its own surface and air assets. (Writer Note: Even Though TCG has started operation on AUG 2014, its current name “OPERATION SAFE-MED” was given on FEB 2015 right after successful operations against relatively big ships)

20 Aljazeera, 2017, “EU leaders ink deal to stem refugee flow from Libya”, accessed Oct. 02, 2017: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/eu-leaders-ink-deal-stem-refugee-flow-libya-170203151643286.html “At a summit in Malta, the bloc’s leaders on Friday decided to give 200m euro ($215m) to Libya’s fragile government to step up efforts to stop migrant boats in the country’s territorial waters.”


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Against smugglers and facilitators as well. Nonetheless, there are still serious obstacles to reach real culprits by law enforcement agencies, because of the precautions taken by facilitators such as not steering the immigrant boats by themselves but instead training and letting immigrants to sail the boats at sea.

Land-based increased preventive measures at the borders and the coastlines appear to be the most effective measures against irregular immigration by hindering and discouraging possible attempts to reach sea-based assets as boats.

5. Economic Realities Of Smuggling People At Sea And Efforts To Minimize The Irregular Transportation Capabilities

Another measure to diminish the sea-based flows is to take the transfer of indispensable materials for navigation under control such as lifejackets and inflatable boats to the origin or transit countries. In this sense, EU has limited sales of inflatable boats and related materials to Libya and also requested China to stop the shipments to the designated countries as of May 2017. It is still not naturally expected that the producers of such a large home-grown industry entirely will give up shipping rubber boats to Turkey or Morocco.

Until EU-Turkey agreement came into effect, irregular immigration organizers (or separated criminal groups who get profits on this new business model), had even dared to pick up the abandoned boats at the nearby offshores of Greek Islands after their previous usages by migrants. In this manner, they expected to decrease marginal resource costs or getting profit by selling them on the market again. The rubber boats were available at the market with the prices between $300-500, and the number of new immigrant arrivals after a dangerous journey from Turkish coasts to the Greek islands by these boats had been roughly 2,000 before the EU-Turkey statement on 18 March 2016. In 2015, each day more than 50 immigrant boats were transferring immigrants to the Greek Islands, and at the end of the year the overall number of immigrants reached to the islands was around 885,000. Boat transfers and boat market created a new profitable sector with a financial turnover of around 10 million US Dollars.


Organizers used to buy scrap ships from the ship dismantling facilities or second-hand ships which were about to reach their end of life cycle with very low prices. By using these kinds of ships, they can transfer a much higher number of immigrants at the same time and earn around 10,000 Euros per person, which is five times more than they can gain, 2000 to 3000 euros, by using rubber boats. While transfer capacity of rubber boats is around 20-60 people, this number goes up to 1000 at the ships. The ships can also deliver immigrants after longer voyages at sea directly to central EU countries such as Italy. And travelling by ships is an essential advantage for the immigrants by preventing them from a tiring process where they have first to cross Greece and then take a more extended and risky trip through non-EU member countries on foot to reach their aimed destinations.

It is an unfortunate reality that transferring people needing protection and looking for safe havens and ready to pay as much as they can have created a very profitable market. And, usage of ships provides an opportunity

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to organizers/smugglers to earn around 7-10 million Euros for each single trip. Although nearly all ships are confiscated at the end of their voyages, it is not a big deal for organizers since they get 10 times more in return. It is a great deal for the organizers as they receive half or two-thirds of a certain amount as an upfront payment and the rest is collected right after successive arrival. Regardless of the success of the sea passage, in any case, organizers assure their earnings.

6. Main Sea Routes For Middle East Based Immigration

Smugglers/organizers by changing routes and transporting systems continue earning huge amount of money in this illegal sector and, their elastic behaviours and creative approaches generate new courses of actions to keep the continuous flow of migrants through the sea in response to taken measures by law enforcement agencies. Within this knowledge, a quick insight is provided below on these alternative routes and ways to reach EU for Middle Eastern Immigrants with the destination to countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus or Italy.

a. Turkey-Cyprus Route:

Cyprus Island, which has no land connection with other EU countries, can be assessed as an unfavourable destination or a transit country for immigrants. But on the other hand, Turkey’s refusal to recognize Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) as the unique representative of the people at the island and, the problematic political status between counterparts may have a potential to turn Cyprus especially Southern Part a preferable new destination for asylum seekers in EU. We need to emphasize that Turkey-EU Admission Statement, which is based on the flows from Turkey to Greek islands or mainland, is not an applicable cure in this situation.

b. Lebanon-EU (Italy/Greece) Route:

Lebanon is hosting at least 1.5 million Syrian refugees as a country with the highest number of refugees per square km and per capita in the world appear as a possible preferable transit country for new immigrant routing to EU. Existence of UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) land and sea-based units which operate within the mandate of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006 facilitates the control of the irregular immigration flows originated from Lebanon. Patrolling UNIFIL Maritime Forces in the area can be assessed as a main reason for immigrant smugglers to accept this route as a desirable one. Equally important to diminish the possibility of irregular immigration out of this area is the financial support of EU to Lebanon that has an effective role in keeping refugees in the country.

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c. Southern Coasts of Turkey-Italy Route:

It has been the main route for the immigrant smugglers in terms of ensuring passage around 1,000 people at each cruise directly to Italian coasts with earning massive amounts of profit. This route has been hampered after the initiation of effective information sharing between Greek and Turkish authorities and Turkey’s increased follow up measures. Nevertheless, this route keeps its attractiveness and importance for immigrant smugglers as it is naturally out of EU/Greece-Turkey Migration Admission agreement scope that includes flows from Turkey to Greek islands. In practical manner, the trafficking or smuggling of immigrants through this route is not only used by directly embarking people ships at the coasts but also by transferring them with relatively small boats to big ships waiting at sea.

d. Aegean Coasts of Turkey/Canakkale( Turkish Straits) -Italy Route:

Without crossing to Greek islands and destined to Italian coasts instead, migrants may be transported using small boats to relatively big ships off the Turkish Aegean Coasts. In the same manner, they are boarded at the southbound vessels before entering to Canakkale Strait (Turkish Straits) at the Marmara Sea or after exiting the strait into the Aegean Sea. This is not often applied modus operandi but still in use.

e. Turkey-Bulgaria/Romania Black Sea Route:

Increase in the number of intercepted immigrant boats by Romanian Coastguard has incited the fear that smugglers are trying to activate a new dangerous transit passage to Europe. While these numbers remain irrelevant compared to the hundreds of thousands who have made the perilous crossing between Turkey and Greece, it could still be a significant precursor.29 1936 Montreux Convention provides an exclusive statue to the Black Sea by restricting the deployment of Navy Units of non-coastal countries. Montreux Convention allows non-

Black Sea Countries total tonnage up to a maximum of 45,000 tons with a duration of 21 days at the Black Sea. Thus the Terms of Convention prevent EU ships from operating for long periods of time here, the only possible solution to fight against immigration flows at the Black Sea relies on the coastal nations naval/coast guard capabilities and cooperative initiatives as BLACKSEAFOR.

7. Aspects Over Eu-Turkey Readmission Statement

As stated in many papers EU-Turkey Readmission Statement signed on 18 March 2016 was not the first one to deal with immigration flows towards EU; on the contrary EU and Turkey had already ratified Readmission Agreement more than three years ago on 16 December 2013. In practice, there are some crucial requirements for effective implementation of the agreements, for example, submission of concrete evidence showing to Turkish Authorities that immigrants started their journey out from Turkey as an initial step. Since most of the immigrants do not have any documents as a proof of their identities and not all immigrants have been registered in Turkey, the readmission issue heavily depends on the Turkish authorities’ subjective decisions. Therefore, this is a serious problem for this agreement to work as expected.

It should be accepted that financial commitment of EU is a strong incentive for Turkey to increase necessary measures against illegal passage. Despite this factor, the statistics reveal that the readmission process does not work very well to alleviate the situation. Since March 2016, out of 27,711 arrivals to Greece, 1,504 irregular immigrants were accepted back to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement and the Greece-Turkey bilateral protocol.30

Along with unstable political situation in Turkey and the usage of the foreign affairs issues as a tool for domestic policy by the current administration to increase/hold steady their


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public support endanger the future of EU-Turkey Migration Agreement. Moreover, the repeated rhetoric of high-level political figures such as Turkish President, Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs (Directorate General of Migration is sub-organization of Internal Affairs Ministry)\(^{31}\), who are in charge of execution of the agreement properly, is very accurate indicator for the future of ill-fated EU-Turkey Agreement.

The EU has supported Syrian refugees in Turkey with €3 billion for 2016 and 2017 through its facilities for refugees in Turkey and an additional €3 billion is also in the agenda for 2018. The allocated money will be used for the needs of refugees and to host communities with a focus on humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support. In the initial year of the agreement, €2.2 billion was allocated from the resources of the facility for refugees in Turkey and 39 projects worth €1.5 billion have been signed\(^{32}\).

Turkey is holding snap Presidential and Parliamentary elections on June 24, 2018.

- Turkey's current economic indicators are not pleasant.

- The prolonged State of Emergency declared on 20 July 2016 after 15 July 2016 Failed/so-called Coup Attempt, the parliament has been constantly bypassed. Instead, Government introduces new laws itself by using the power of Presidential Decree Laws. Lastly the State of Emergency was extended on 18 April 2018 for another 3 months which will take Turkey to crucial election under period under State of Emergency that restricts free media, free speech and basic rights.

- Turkey has serious problems with not only all neighbours but also EU, NATO allied countries and Gulf countries as well.

- Insecure environment leads Turkey more unstable future.

- Turkish public is much more divided than ever due to populist domestic policies, and Turkey is turning fast into a land of fear for opponents while losing the peace and serenity in the country.

- Nowadays the political and military rapprochement of Turkey with Russia and Iran is another controversial issue for NATO, EU and western countries.

- Last but not least, Turkey is rising in the listings of countries due to the Violation of fundamental human rights.

8. Conclusion And Proposals:

a. Regarding Sea-Based Operational Efforts and Challenges to cope with Irregular Immigration

- The coordinated mutual operations of Turkish Coast Guard and EBCG or any other EU members' law enforcement agents along the Turkish West coastline will certainly contribute to the efforts to prevent immigrants set to sail out from Turkish coasts. Greece and Turkey signed/agreed on a bilateral protocol to establish a joint disaster response force. Since immigration is a very dramatic disaster for humanity while thousands of immigrants lose their lives during their travels at sea, it is a prerequisite for EU to step forward and in this sense, EU should seek for the opportunity to set up a similar joint immigration response force with Turkey.

- Apart from the effective Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) contribution role and deterrence over organizers and smugglers, NATO assets should carry out more active duties to facilitate, monitor and control the operational efforts of both sides, Turkey and Greece, at the Aegean Sea. Thus, they can dissuade them of violating human rights and international agreement, which may


Nick Gutteridge, 2017, “‘We’ll blow your minds’ Turkey threatens to allow through 15,000 migrants a MONTH to EU”, accessed Oct. 26, 2017:http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/780509/Migrant-crisis-Turkey-threatens-scrapp-EU-deal-refugees-Erdogan-Brussels-Netherlands

cost immigrants' lives such as execution of push-back policy of Greece or negligence of necessary measures at sea by Turkey.

- Although Turkey currently has a national contact point in EBCG HQ, a mutual exchange of personnel between Turkey and EBCG can boost the overall efficiency. The deployment of EBCD personnel in the Turkish Coast Guard Operation Center or Search and Rescue Coordination Center will enhance the level of cooperation and success of operations at the Aegean Sea.

- EU is better to seek for alternative solutions or determine courses of actions to undermine possible migration flows from Turkey via Black Sea routes by considering restrictions on force deployment in the area emerging from 1936 Montreux Convention.

- Due to the fact that Turkey does not recognise Cyprus (GCA) officially, it seems to be not possible in the short term to apply Turkey-Greece/EU Agreement between these counterparts. This current situation may create a new favourable immigrant smuggling route in spite of the fact that Cyprus is not a top selection for immigrants as a transit route to central EU countries. This potential is to be monitored and taken into account seriously by EU officials and work on to strengthen the measures against possible new Turkey-Cyprus route.

- Setting up not only information sharing but maritime picture sharing systems particular to immigration movements on land/air/sea can create a common situational awareness for EU and Turkey, which finally would allow both parties to show a reaction in due time.

- EU needs far more close cooperation/common operation with the origin, transit and EU members’ law enforcement agents to eliminate transnationally organized crime groups that pose the greatest threat to the national and economic security of the EU.

- The immigration is not the only problem of origin/transit/destination countries but the whole world in terms human rights. UNSC is to take the initiative to prevent thousands of deaths of immigrants at sea (Years-Death Numbers: 2014-3,162; 2015-3,461; 2016-4,039 and 2017-2,775 (till 15 Oct)). UNSC can initiate UNIFIL-type operations in the TTW or/and out the TTW’s of Libya where most tragic casualties have taken place. By this way, all countries can share the burden of immigration problem as well.

- Collapsing immigrant smugglers and facilitators network is a top priority task for EU countries. Leading EU countries should initiate/increase cooperation and coordination both among their own law enforcement/secret serves agencies and with third countries including joint operations in this manner. Countries should enact enormously increased penalties against smugglers and facilitators as well.

b. Regarding EU-TURKEY Readmission Statement

- EU needs to take necessary measures in a proactive manner to prevent immigrant flows and ensure all parties act in accordance with the readmission agreement and generate contingency plans taking into close consideration of the possible worst-case scenarios such as “Turkey’s breaking long-existing ties with EU, USA, NATO and reorienting towards RF and Iran”.

- Assignment of Turkish officials to hot migration spots on Greek Islands may provide them to monitor the first registration process of immigrants and to control their declarations over the start points of their journeys. This methodology will help to solve the main challenge, proving that Turkey was the point of departure, in the practice of readmission agreement so far. Likewise, it would be beneficial for EU to deploy his officials to monitor the execution of registration process in Turkey as well.

- In addition to Syrian immigrants, another hot issue, that may be a potential topic for another research, is that Turkish citizens become immigrants due to suppressing, harsh politics and ruling towards the opponents by the regime with the high approval of President. The main principle “separation of powers” in democracies is subject to a great danger due to never-ending State of Emergency state and ruling by Decrees in Turkey, which may bring more pressure, more stress and more drama to the country and more potential refugees to the
Western Democracies. EU officials should not underestimate the current route of the regime in Turkey and prepare contingency plans to additional massive immigration flows originated from Turkey.
Humans have witnessed many wars throughout the history. The weapons, equipment, tactics, doctrines and strategies used in these wars have been in a constant evolution. This evolution of warfare has depended on technological level, changes in the societies, global security environment, governance of the states, innovation and creative thinking. Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) is one of the most popular military strategies in recent years. US has expressed concern for the Chinese military initiatives in the Pacific region. Russia adopts the same approach against American Style warfare and has already created A2AD bubble zones in the NATO’s eastern and southern flanks, which would have severe implications that NATO is to take into considerations.

1. Introduction:
After a short glance at the evolution of warfare in chronological order in the first part, the definition, background and the main characteristics of A2AD is presented in the second part, third part summarises the Russian military activities and A2AD strategy, and finally the last part exhibits the implications of Russian A2AD strategy for NATO.

2. Evolution of Warfare:
There are many studies to categorise evolution of warfare. Some of them categorise it in terms of ages, some of them waves and some of them generations. In this study, evolution of warfare is summarized in chronological order.

Warfare has been in an evolution fueled by; changes in technology, global security environment, competition between offence and defence, governance of states and so on so forth. Until the introduction of gunpowder to the battlefield, wars were generally fought between city-states and swords, shields, spears, bows, arrows etc. were the most prominent weapons used by soldiers. Ships were used mainly for the transportation. While the phalanx system was used by some nations, Roman legions were created and effective against it. Cavalry was used to overcome the deadlocks. In this era, battles lasted for very short time periods.

With the invention of the gunpowder, the face of the war changed dramatically. Most of the basic elements of the warfare such as tactics and weapons became obsolete. Cannons and muskets became indispensable. Castles were not as impregnable anymore and the conquest of Istanbul by Ottoman Empire was an apparent evidence of the revolutionary effect. Efforts for defense triggered new types of precautions such as construction of new types of the castles, fortification of walls, deployment of archers and cannons on the bastions etc. The offense side concurrently developed engineering and mining. With the 14th century, Chinese and Spanish started to deploy cannons to ships and seas became another important domain in the battlefield. In the 15th and 16th century, the battles lengthened. The sieges were lasting for a long time; for example, Spanish, French, Ottoman, Austrian and Russian armies were in the war in 2 of the 3 year-periods. The proliferation of the rifles with the extended ranges and the new tactics and orders of battle became prevalent in the 18th century. Clausewitz defined the war with physics rules such as momentum, mass, acceleration etc. with his book ‘On War’. The generals indoctrinated with his ideas during 20th century used these principles in the World War I. The unprecedented firepower forced the infantry to dig into the trenches, and World War I became known as ‘Trench Wars’.

World War II witnessed to many revolutionary events with lessons learnt from the first. Tanks and warplanes became a game changer in the battlefield. ‘Blitzkrieg’ doctrine was used by Germans to overcome the trenches and advance deep into enemy rear. The parachute troops were very effective to surround adversary and radio was very useful to develop the command and control and allowed small troops to conduct operations in extended distances. Atomic Bomb was, of course, the most important determinant factor to end

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the war. It caused great losses for Japan and made the surrender. 1 With the introduction of the Atomic Bomb, a new doctrine as ‘Nuclear Doctrine’ has evolved.

After World War II, a two polar World emerged, and colonies declared independence wars employing doctrines like Mao’s ‘Protracted War’ and guerrilla strategies in their struggles. For the first time, an international organisation-UN became a side of the war in the Korean War. On the other hand, with use of atomic bomb, a nuclear race has begun, and several nations have acquired this capability. Those nations adopted “Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)” doctrine for deterrence. Arab-Israel wars revealed the importance of strategic surprise, air defence systems, use of mechanised and armoured troops, improved logistics etc. While the 1973 Yom Kippur War testified the effects of technological advances in weapons technology, USSR’s Afghanistan War revealed the fact that Soviets had closed the quality gap with the US regarding military technologies. The Air-Land Battle concept was developed by the US to overcome operational problems faced by NATO on the European Central Front against USSR in the cold war.

Air-land Battle concept which was based on the integration of abilities of two services enabled armies to fight deep with the development of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and long-range fighting and shooting capabilities. The extended battlefield regarding time and geography enabled attacking to the second-echelon forces and preventing the reinforcement of Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) troops and gain initiative. The doctrine paved the way for developments of new tactics and weapons, and a similar NATO operational concept known as Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) as well. These developments, in turn, allowed changes in the way of deterrence and planning fighting. The world witnessed the first Gulf War, in which US-led coalition used this doctrine. In the beginning, air campaign was executed to silence Iraq’s air defence systems and then land offenses launched with the close support of air forces. New technologies and tactics, which were developed during the cold war, were employed for the first time.

With the end of the cold war, NATO assumed an international role for the crisis areas around the world. It carried out campaigns in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. UN sent troops to Somalia in 1992. These operations revealed that tolerance for losses was a key factor to new way of fighting. After 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, US and her allies -and later NATO- launched a war against terrorism in Afghanistan in 2001. In 2003, US initiated second Gulf War in Iraq claiming that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. We have been witnessing ever-mounting Russian aggression since 2008. Russia carried out a campaign against Georgia in 2008. It also initiated so-called hybrid warfare against Ukraine and destabilised it. In 2014, it occupied and annexed Crimea with conflict still ongoing in the east of Ukraine supported by Russia. Finally, Russia launched a campaign in Syria alleging that Syrian government called her to help Syrian government to fight against terrorism.

When we analyse the recent wars, we recognise many important and common aspects in most of these wars:

- The actors of wars have changed and non-state actors (e.g. terrorist organizations, international organizations, NGOs, foreign fighters, proxy rebel factions etc.) have become key players in war.

- Strategic communication (Stratcom) namely, winning hearts and minds of people to get...

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5 In his article in 2007, Frank Hoffman opined that “Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battle space to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimension of conflict.”
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their support, has become indispensable to be successful.

- Cyber warfare has evolved as a new domain of battlefield and it has been applied concurrently or separately against adversaries.

- Beginning and end of wars has become increasingly vague.

- Hybrid warfare has emerged as a new strategy and way of waging war.

- Proxy war has been applied as an indirect way of carrying out campaigns by using proxies rather than routine forces.

- The battlefield has been used as a laboratory and most recent technologies and war fighting concepts have been tested.

3. Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD):

Adversaries always tried to prevent their opponents from approaching and attacking their territories or deter them to do such acts to protect their people and interests throughout the history. They have built castles, trenches, walls (e.g. Great Wall of China), defence lines (e.g. Maginot Line) and now A2AD capabilities to undermine the freedom of movement and operational access of foes. After the cold war, US became the most powerful nation with immense military power. US carried out operations in Iraq twice (In 1991 and 2003) and exhibited her way of warfighting. This kind of superiority and warfighting naturally triggered some initiatives to develop counter capabilities and strategies. Having witnessed the US’s way of fighting and experienced events like the 1995-1996 Taiwan Crisis and the 2001 Hainan Island Crisis, China started to develop an A2AD strategy. However, the most dangerous and aggressive one for security environment in NATO’s eastern and southern flanks is, of course, Russia. Russia has begun to develop A2AD capabilities to create a buffer zone to compensate her losses after the Cold War. So; what is A2AD? What does this strategy envision? And what those A2AD capabilities are?

US’s ‘Joint Operational Access Concept’ defines these two terms Anti-Access and Area Denial as the following; ‘anti-access refers to those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. Anti-access actions tend to target forces approaching by air and sea predominantly, but also can target the cyber, space, and other forces that support them. Area-denial refers to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area. Area-denial capabilities target forces in all domains, including land forces. The distinction between anti-access and area-denial is relative rather than strict, and many capabilities can be employed for both purposes. For example, the same submarine that performs an area-denial mission in coastal waters can be an anti-access capability when employed on distant patrol’.6 As seen in abovementioned definitions, while anti-access capabilities aim to prevent or deter any adversary to enter an operational area, area denial capabilities are to hamper or degrade freedom of manoeuvre within an operational area. Generally anti-access capabilities have longer ranges than area denial capabilities. Since anti-access capabilities can be used for both anti-access and area denial purposes, they encompass area denial capabilities as well. This strategy in one hand aims to dissuade or prevent any adversary to project power and perform actions near the borders, on the other hand, -thanks to A2AD capabilities’ offensive nature- it has a high potential to be used for offensive purposes. A2AD capabilities/means include many domains varying from political to military. As comprehensive approach suggested; it requires taking all kinds of capabilities into account. Some examples of existing and emerging A2AD capabilities may be listed as7;

- Multi-layered integrated air defense systems (IADS), consisting of modern fighter/attack aircraft, and fixed and mobile surface-to-air missiles, coastal defense systems,

- Cruise and ballistic missiles that can be launched from multiple air, naval, and land-based platforms against land-based and maritime targets,

- Long range artillery and multi launch rocket systems (MLRS),
- Diesel and nuclear submarines armed with supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles and advanced torpedoes;
- Ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force,
- Advanced sea mines
- Kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite weapons and supporting space launch and space surveillance infrastructure,
- Sophisticated cyber warfare capabilities,
- Electronic warfare capabilities,
- Various range ISR systems,
- Comprehensive reconnaissance-strike battle networks covering the air, surface and undersea domains; and
- Hardened and buried closed fiber-optic command and control (C2) networks tying together various systems of the battle network,
- Special Forces etc.

With these capabilities; any operation can be carried out by any state’s air forces and integrated air defences to have or keep air superiority or parity over its sovereign areas or its forces. Operations with Special Forces, artillery and multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS) and missiles against forward-based forces and deploying forces can be executed in any entry points to the area of operations. Additional to land-based capabilities; maritime capabilities such as anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles and submarines armed with torpedoes or anti-ship cruise missiles, sophisticated mines, coastal submarines, and small attack craft could be employed as well.

4. Russian Military Activities and A2AD Strategy:

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been adapting itself to the New World Order while facing difficulties. It has not been easy for a superpower of Cold War era to get accustomed to second rate status. Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and independence of old Soviet nations caused great problems for the new Russian Federation (RF). Loosing these countries and then the enlargement of NATO and European Union towards the east has made the security environment much more concerning for RF and contributed to a Russian perception of an increasing threat to its interests.

The European Council on Foreign Relations October 2015 policy brief exhibits Russia’s ‘then and now’ view of NATO’s enlargement. Figure 1 illustrates comparatively the border between NATO/EU and the USSR during the Cold War era and afterwards. During the Cold War, the borders between NATO/EU and Eastern Bloc countries were incomparably shorter than those, which exist today between NATO/EU and Russia. Since geography is a very critical factor for defence policy and thinking, so this fact goes for Russia as well. During the Cold War, USSR had a ‘strategic buffer zone’ between NATO and the homeland (Russia) through Warsaw Pact states. This buffer zone provided Russia to maintain a defence in depth and to have the opportunity to keep freedom of movement (FoM) within its territory to respond to attacks. The current situation, shown in the right side of Figure 1, exhibits the loss of so-called ‘Zone of Privileged Interest’, the strategic buffer zone, thereby losing the ability and opportunity abovementioned.

When Russia felt that it had been losing its influence over its alleged privileged zone, it started to compensate these losses by a new strategy with the help of its economic growth, political stability and momentum of the Russian leadership under Putin. After Cold War; Russia has published its top strategic documents such as ‘National Security Strategy (1997, 2000, 2009 and 2015), Foreign Policy Concept (1993, 2000, 2008 and 2013) and Military Doctrine (1993, 2000, 2010 and 2014)’ four times to renew its approach and perspective and adapt itself to the dynamic and complex security environment. The National Security Strategy, the overarching document outlining Russian vision in security domain, reinforces the idea that Russia aims a ‘multipolar’ or ‘polycentric world’ and it wants to secure a place in the new global security environment as a leading world

power. Russia’s handling of the Syria crisis exhibits its willingness to use military power to achieve its desired status and to pursue its strategic interests.

Russia defines NATO’s expansion and transformation as a threat for the first time; ‘The build-up of the military potential of NATO and vesting it with global functions implemented in violation of norms of international law, boosting military activity of the bloc’s countries, further expansion of NATO, the approach of its military infrastructure to Russian borders create a threat to the national security’.

Russia finds NATO’s increased military activity, the approach of its military infrastructure to Russia’s borders, the creation of a NATO missile defence system, and efforts to develop a global role for the Alliance as unacceptable and against to its national interests. It considers developing cooperation with NATO would only be based on ‘equal relations’, and taking into account Russia’s ‘legal interests’, notably ‘when conducting military-political planning’ and NATO’s readiness to ‘respect the provisions of international law’.

Russia emphasises the importance of military domain regarding strategic deterrence and the prevention of military conflicts by maintenance of a sufficient level of nuclear potential and military forces at their assigned readiness for combat employment. After the war in Georgia; Russia realized its deficiencies and launched a military reform in late 2008. The reform was planned in three phases; first, enhancement of professionalism by increasing educational level and decreasing the number of conscripts; second, improvement of combat-readiness by reorganising command structure and increasing exercises; and third, modernisation of arms and equipment.

- The first part of the reform is completed resulting in a more streamlined command-and-control chain and a pyramid personnel structure with few higher educated senior level officers at the top.

- The second phase has been successful in increasing troop readiness and improving organisation and logistics. Russia reorganised the entire structure of its armed forces by

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dissolving its divisions and introducing new brigades with high-level readiness. The number of military districts was reduced, and they were converted into joint forces commands, thereby allowing them to all land, air, and naval forces in their zone. The number of manoeuvres and exercises/snap exercises were increased so as to enhance the combat-readiness. The goal is to deploy all airborne units and to make all Russian new brigades ready to deploy within 24 hours of alert.

- The aim for initial stages of the third phase was not to modernise weapons and equipment, but rather to ensure effective use of existing weapons and equipment. The introduction of new weapons and equipment has just begun only recently. However, the straining of NATO/EU-Russian relations after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military activities in eastern part of Ukraine, and severe economic conditions due to the collapsing oil prices, have caused several delays for Russian modernisation programmes. It looks like that this phase will continue throughout coming decades due to these postponements.\(^\text{12}\)

Despite abovementioned postponements, Russia has improved the quality, quantity and capability of its armed forces to close the gap with NATO. It has developed advanced capabilities in terms of space, cyberspace, and across the electromagnetic spectrum. Russia deployed these new capabilities in a fashion that restricts, or imposes consequence, friction and cost on NATO FoM and operations. Advanced A2AD capabilities exhibit many challenges to the Alliance while providing Russia increasingly assured FoM and operation.

Russia’s recently deployed advanced A2AD capabilities such as; long range precision air defence systems, fighters and bombers, littoral anti-ship capabilities and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare), mid-range mobile missile systems, new classes of quieter submarines equipped with long range land attack missiles, counter-space, cyberspace, & EW weapons; and WMD assets in Kaliningrad in Black Sea and partly in Syria have changed the military environment. With additional deployments -thanks to modernization expected by 2020s- battlefield will be more complicated than ever. These A2AD capabilities allow Russia to have a new strategic buffer zone between NATO and Russia, but this time within Alliance’ own territory. They provide the ability to target a large part of the Europe to influence, deter and deny NATO’s potential operations in the High North, Baltic, Black Sea and East Mediterranean regions. The figure\(^\text{13}\) below depicts only a part of the Russian A2AD capabilities.

5. The Implications of Russian A2AD Strategy for NATO and Potential Measures

Russia uses A2AD strategy as part of a comprehensive approach for deterrence, and it would employ it to neutralise NATO’s military advantage during time of peace, crisis and war:

a. In the peacetime; Russia’s A2AD capabilities, given their coverage of NATO’s territory, becomes a potential threat and limit Alliance’s freedom of movement even within own territory.

b. During a crisis; Russia could attempt to deter Alliance military activities through show off its A2AD capability, with concurrent snap exercises and military preparations. Moreover, it would probably use its cyber/electronic warfare capabilities to reduce NATO’s situational awareness and strategic anticipation, through blinding Alliance’s ISR, radars and communications. More importantly, prolonged A2AD bubbles created by Russia outside of its territory -such as Syria-, would enable Russia to have a constant justification to project its forces and blur the distinction between force movements for exercises or a real preparation to escalate tension leading to hot conflict. This also enables Russia to seize the initiative to determine the course of an emerging crisis. Crisis such as Syria provides Russia with the opportunity to test its newly developed long-range weapon systems and associated technics, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) in order to advance its warfighting capabilities versus NATO.

c. In a conflict, Russia would try to isolate the theatre of operations from NATO’s forces while dislocating threatened nation’s defence forces

\(^{12}\) Ibid, P.4-5.

\(^{13}\) Rem Korteweg and Sophia Besch, No denial: How NATO can deter a creeping Russian threat, 09 February 2016, http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/no-denial-how-nato-can-deter-creeping-russian-threat
and those already forward deployed. Given the NATO’s system of responsive reinforcement, it would be clear that the Russian A2AD strategy is specifically developed to prevent establishment of initial NATO forces on the theatre and to threaten follow-on forces. Even if NATO forces could be deployed to the theatre of operations, they will face these advanced systems within area of operations. With its advanced A2AD capabilities; Russia could attempt to;  

- Threaten all NATO bases/troops/assets close to the Russia,
- Deny NATO force deployment to the area of operations,
- Disrupt NATO Navy surface and submarine operations and threaten them out to an extent where they may not operate effectively to target Russian forces by deployment of sophisticated sensors and weapons in littoral waters and narrow,


- Challenge NATO air operations with its air force and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems,
- Impede NATO to use space effectively for ISR, command and control (C2), communications and for the purpose of targeting,
- Infiltrate to the NATO members close to Russia with its special forces or paramilitary units to foment hostilities against ruling authorities and other subversive purposes,
- Carry out electronic and cyberattacks against NATO battle networks to impair effective logistics, C2, fires, ISR, combat service support (CSS) and etc.

Russian A2AD strategy would cause dramatic changes in Freedom of Action (FoA). As abovementioned; in the event of conflict, Russia would attempt to restrict NATO’s FoM to deploy its initial, enhanced response and following forces to the theatre of operations and have a relative advantage to shape the battlefield.

Figure 2: A partial depiction of Russian A2AD capabilities along the NATO’s eastern and southern borders.  
(Source: IHS Jane’s; IISS Military Balance 2015.)
Possible effects of A2AD on FoM are:

- Situational awareness and strategic anticipation is sine qua non and should be enhanced by advanced joint ISR systems to a rapid political and military decision making.

- In order to negate the A2AD systems and to provide required FoM for NATO forces to deploy, there would be a need for entry operations against A2AD systems at the outset.

- The level of threat emanating from A2AD challenge would affect the type of deployment. While Russia would attempt to prevent any NATO deployment, NATO’s main effort would be to concentrate its forces to the battlefield. In this regard; developing alternative deployment methods and protection of the Lines of Communications (LoCs) would be very critical.

- In order to reduce the need for responsive reinforcement and have more force and capability close to Russia, an appropriate balance of forward presence and responsive reinforcement should be considered. While forward presence is an essential issue, the assured reinforcement would be crucial as well.

- A more geographically comprehensive approach for military plans would be required to overcome complex and sophisticated A2AD challenges. Moreover, these plans should be exercised to develop required level cooperation and collaboration within the allies and forces (Land, maritime, air and space, special forces). Especially, deployment and manoeuvre of forces in an A2AD environment should be the top two items that must be included in NATO exercises. These exercises would be very crucial to detect shortfalls and provide valuable feedback to create high-level competencies.

- NATO and member nations should develop new capabilities to demonstrate its ability and decisiveness to deter, deny, degrade and defeat A2AD threat whenever required. After the Cold War, NATO Nations cut the defence expenditures and gave priorities to the conventional capabilities, which may prove ineffective against such an advanced threat. NATO and member nations should take A2AD challenges into account thoroughly and reformulate their defence budgets prioritising the acquisition of weapon systems to confront dangerously evolving Russian A2AD zones in NATO’s area of interest.

- Current assurance measures may need to be modified accordingly.

- Overall effects of A2AD challenges on the battlefield functions should be examined in consideration with operational functions. Although these functions (manoeuvre, fire support, air defence, survivability, intelligence, combat service support (CSS), engineering and command, control, communication, computer and cyberwar (C5)) are mostly for army land operations, they are also very important for the other domains.

Indeed, means such as A2AD will enable further actions for Russia. According to Gerasimov ‘Each war does present itself as a unique case, demanding the comprehension of its particular logic, its uniqueness. It is why the character of a war that Russia or its allies might be drawn into is very hard to predict. Nonetheless, we must’. In regard to NATO, under the negligible risk of response, i.e. staying under the threshold of Article 5, Russia achieves its objectives in Near Abroad, zone of privileged interests, Middle East and wherever they deem necessary. From NATO side, Corrosion in Cohesion of Alliance, confusion in seeking countermeasures were the results of the recent new generation warfare activities which may potentially undermine NATO’s collective security without a single shot\(^15\).

What has NATO done so far to counter this unique challenge? General Philip M. Breedlove, then-SACEUR, suggested that NATO had to step back and ‘take a look at our capability in a military sense to address an A2AD challenge [...] This is about investment. This is about training.’ Indeed, A2AD crosses the span of a solely military response and questions the ability of both political masters and military to effectively cooperate in order to overturn this challenge.

NATO’s philosophy to counter this threat swiftly unearthed but slowly evolved. To summarise; NATO must reinforce and protect those allies...

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that are most vulnerable to A2AD capabilities. This is particularly valid for member states along the Alliance’s eastern flank, which may likewise require NATO’s lasting access to their region. This ‘enhanced forward presence’ should fill in as a tripwire, making any regional seizure a cause of potential escalation. Without question, the authorization of NATO’s eastern flank in its present state and nature, can’t constitute an adequate military power to contradict Russia’s military in an enduring and heightening conflict. But, what it can achieve is solidify NATO’s commitment to Article 5 and therefore deter Russia from any undertakings or escalating the conflict.

In that respect, the first case that rings the bell is the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. In response to the Ukraine crisis, NATO invoked the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) which enhanced the NATO Response Force (NRF) Concept with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and secured the audit of Graduate Response Plans (GRPs) hoping to assure Allied Nations. With the execution of these plans, enemy A2AD naturally focus on the forces deploying into the theatre. Hence, NATO should be able to counter A2AD, creating a preferable air, ground, or maritime situation that permits beginning the Inside-Out Approach. If this cannot be provided outside of an A2AD zone, the necessary capabilities need to be already in place (pre-deployed) to create favourable circumstances.16

NATO’s active response to the Russian A2AD challenge poses highly relevant political implications – not solely, on the future NATO-Russia relations, but also on the internal political situation in several NATO countries. Clearly, a sudden increment in countermeasures may cause a conflict risk – probably decrease the public support. NATO’s capacity improvement, not only in the Baltics, but also outside the area itself, should in this manner be suitably coordinated and addressed and communicated broadly to the public.17

So far NATO has been developing plans and developing its Technic, Tactic and Procedures according to the new reality. Exercises with appropriate training objectives are being implemented. In order to address the problem appropriately, this phenomenon is being discussed academically as well.

What could be the possible consequences and mitigations? These elements represent a specific test for military and political initiative taking part in unconventional warfare. Effective unconventional warfare commands a long-term approach, starting at Phase Zero before conflict breaks out. Phase Zero commitments are successful because they look to utilise non-military instruments to shape the operational environment, keeping the conflict from happening. However, they deliver few rewards that are clear to a sceptical public; tools of soft power, for instance, diplomacy, economic aid, and propaganda require patience perseverance and don’t create explicit, prompt pointers of triumph.18

From the strategic perspective; A2AD deserves to be studied not only through a military lens but also in the broader context. A2AD encompasses a significant part of the military strategy of Russia and using the term ‘A2AD as a stand-alone acronym’ would simply undermine the philosophy behind 19. Therefore, A2AD phenomenon must be considered in the context of new generation warfare of Russia. It is a fair assessment to say that there are many tasks or things to be addressed well before tackling before A2AD and Russia’s advantage is more in Phase Zero activities. Although a Military Cooperation like NATO may have more resources than the opponent, they may not be enough to address the Russian new generation warfare. As Aleksandr Svechin wrote, ‘It is extraordinarily hard to predict the conditions of war. For each war it is necessary to work out a particular line for its strategic conduct. Each war is a unique case, demanding the


establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some template. Therefore, NATO needs to adapt itself not only at operational and tactical aspects but also towards new generation warfare concept of Russia.

From the operational perspective; Russia operates advanced air defence not only within its territory but from sites in Syria and occupied Crimea, as well as cooperatively through the Joint Air Defense Network in Belarus and Armenia. Russia can implement these systems to hamper the ability of the US to defend its NATO allies by disrupting the ability of US air forces to access conflict zones during a crisis.20

Significant to NATO’s ability to come to the aid of an alliance member, is an arrangement of aerial and seaports of debarkation and embarkations (APODs/SPODs), vital to the rapid deployment of troops and equipment. Disabling these nodes would complicate NATO’s ability to effectively respond to the crisis, and as such, they would carry priority for air and missile defense coverage21.

While A2AD challenges in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean do not raise the same level of concerns (primarily due to the availability of various allied reinforcement and supply ‘routes’) as the Kaliningrad-Baltic environment, their presence could pose a significant difficulty to the modality of continuous NATO missions at a later date22.

From the tactical perspective; RF, considering the military superiority of NATO, has been developing asymmetric means of A2AD. The most essential of these comprise of S-300/S-400 and Bastion systems. The deployment of such measures in various regions (the Baltic Sea region, the Crimea, the Arctic, Syria) in a continuous manner is a piece of Russian strategy to avoid NATO forces operations in the NATO border states and in the areas assessed by Moscow as their strategic ones.

NATO nations should develop a common strategy and invest in resources and weapons systems that could break A2AD systems i.e. standoff weapons. The air forces of NATO members acquiring a large number of small and rather cheap unmanned ships, which could pretend combat aircraft (miniature air-launched decoy, MALD) to misguide and neutralise anti-missile systems, may be an exciting solution. In this scope, NATO needs to consider developing capabilities in fighting against A2AD in its defense planning (NDPP – NATO Defense Planning Process)23.

6. Conclusions

In a nutshell; NATO should analyse the challenges emanating from Russian A2AD strategy to prepare itself by developing offset strategies. Effective deterrence would be very crucial to prevent Russian aggressiveness. In order to achieve and keep an effective deterrence posture; NATO should have required sophisticated capabilities, strategy and doctrine to demonstrate its ability and resolve. This requirement should inform capability development and defence planning. On the other hand; a comprehensive approach against Russian A2AD strategy is a must. All instruments of the power (e.g. political, diplomatic, economic, informational, military) should be applied coherently. Military power should be exercised jointly by including air (with space), ground and maritime forces in all domains of the operations during the peace, crisis and war.

Introduction

Why do some countries experience more terrorism than others? The role of bureaucratic capacity is intensely investigated by existing research to address this puzzle, and the previous studies show that having a strong bureaucracy is useful for states to be protected from political violence.¹ There has not yet been a consensus in measuring bureaucratic capacity within this literature. Additionally, the impact of bureaucratic capacity on terrorism has not been examined for distinct types of terror attacks. In this paper, I present a relationship between bureaucratic capacity and different types of terrorist activities, namely domestic and transnational terrorism, by offering empirical evidences which use a more comprehensive measurement of bureaucratic capacity. I use four indicators to measure bureaucratic capacity: rule of law, military influence on politics, corruption, and bureaucratic quality as predictor variables. I will first review the existing arguments regarding the role of different indicators of bureaucratic capacity on terrorism, which resulted in five testable hypotheses. Then, I will discuss my research design to test these hypotheses. Next, I will present the evidences of bureaucratic capacity on terrorism and discuss the results. Finally, the paper will conclude with suggested directions for future research to explore the effects of bureaucratic capacity on terrorism.

The Relationship Between Bureaucratic Capacity and Terrorism

Before discussing the role of bureaucratic capacity on violent activities of terrorism, I first want to explain the concept of bureaucratic capacity. Bureaucratic capacity is the extent to which states can collect and manage information from the population, which then enables them to exert their authority via nonmilitarized means.² States with high levels of bureaucratized capacity have competent and technocratic bureaucratic structures with a merit-based promotion system, and they can exert a significant degree of institutional authority over the country’s territory.³ The existing arguments, with respect to the role of bureaucratic capacity on insurgency/terrorism, suggest that bureaucratic capacity, unlike military capacity, allows states to exert their authority via nonviolent means.⁴ Some previous research studies stress that having a high military capacity might not be effective in winning the wars against insurgent/terrorist groups because conventional armies, with mechanized structures (e.g. artillery, tanks, helicopters, and other sophisticated weapons), may be an obstacle for them when attempting to partner with local populations to fight insurgent/terrorist groups. Not being able to interact with the local populace may reduce the ability of conventional armies to gather intelligence from these locals regarding insurgent/terrorist groups, which could eventually undermine the capacity of the armies to eliminate these violent dissident groups.⁵ Furthermore, conventional armies are too powerful compared to terrorist groups, and terrorism as a “weapon of the weak”⁶ is used by violent dissident groups when they face disproportionately powerful government forces due to not having an incentive to target noncombatants by using terrorist violence, instead of confronting state military.⁷

Having high bureaucratic capacity does however, enables states to be informed about goings-on at the local level, which can help states gather intelligence about the whereabouts of terrorists as well as hamper the ability of the terrorist group to conduct terror attacks. In other words, the higher bureaucratic

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² Hendrix 2010; Hendrix and Young 2014

³ DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Blankenship 2016; Hendrix and Young 2014; Taydas, Peksen and James 2010

⁴ Hendrix 2016; Hendrix and Young 2014

⁵ Hendrix and Young 2014

⁶ Lyall and Wilson 2009

⁷ Hendrix and Young 2014

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Fighting Terrorism Through an Effective Bureaucracy

capacity of the state, the better they will be at identifying and tracking terrorists in addition to being more likely to interdict terror attacks. Furthermore, bureaucratically capable states are also more likely to provide social service provisions to their citizens in a timely manner, and states providing more social services can reduce terrorism. Providing social services may lead to an increase in support for the state: citizens of a state tend to disapprove of terrorist actions against a state when that state provides public services in a timely fashion. Thus, an effective bureaucracy is an important power source for the state since it enables governments to implement and enforce enacted policy, deliver public goods to redress popular grievances, and selectively crack down on violent dissidents, which may eventually reduce the likelihood of experiencing terrorist violence. Therefore, I argue that states with higher bureaucratic capacity will experience less numbers of violent terrorist activities. I also argue that the individual indicators of bureaucratic capacity have a significant impact on explaining terrorist violence.

I will discuss the four dimensions of bureaucratic capacity: corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and military influence on politics. First, corruption is the abuse of public office for private gains and damages the government’s ability to provide public services in a nondiscriminatory fashion. When the public services become available to those who pay bribes, the state will lose its legitimacy in the eye of certain disadvantaged groups and this may lead to economic dissatisfaction among those disadvantaged groups. Simpson argues that the loss of legitimacy caused by corruption may encourage use of terrorist violence by the dissidents because the inability of the state institutions to address the grievances can be conducive to the emergence of political violence. Therefore, I argue that states with higher corruption rates will experience more terrorist violence. Second, the high levels of rule of law should include two primary components: a fair, objective, and efficient judicial system and a legitimate legal system with respected laws and nonarbitrary decisions. A fair and objective judicial system must have an independent judiciary with unbiased prosecutors, lawyers and judges and must have stable law enforcement personnel. In this sense, as the state has a greater rule of law, it tends to provide a peaceful way for people holding grievances to express these within the judicial system, instead of leading them to use violence to redress their grievances. Thus, I argue that states with greater rule of law are less likely to experience terrorist violence. Third, bureaucratic quality has also been shown as a significant factor that reduces terrorist violence. Hendrix and Young found that states with higher bureaucratic quality experience a lesser number of terror attacks. States with high bureaucratic quality tend to provide public goods to their citizens in a timely fashion, which might increase the cost of using terrorist violence because the citizens enjoying the benefits of the government’s performance in delivering public goods might be less likely to support a terrorist campaign against that government. Hence, I argue that as the state has a higher bureaucratic quality, it is less likely to experience terrorist violence. Finally, military influence on politics could disrupt the decision-making process since military and civilian administrations have differing opinions about resolving the grievances of people in the society. The involvement of military in politics, even at a peripheral level, is a diminution of democratic accountability. In some countries, the threat of military take-over can force an elected government to change policy or cause its replacement by another government more amenable to the military’s wishes. Such a problematic system of governance is likely to create an armed opposition. Given these arguments, I contend that states having undue military influence on politics might be more likely to experience terrorist violence than states without undue military influence on

8 Hendrix and Young 2014, p.336
9 Taydas, Peksen and James 2010; Hendrix and Young 2010
10 Burgoon 2006
11 Goodwin 2001
12 Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000; Taydas et al. 2010
13 Taydas et al. 2010
14 Ibid. p.200
15 Simpson 2014
16 Tilly 1978
17 Choi 2010
18 Choi 2010, p.944; Raz 1977, p.198-201
19 Choi 2010
20 Hendrix and Young 2014
political affairs. Thus, I finalize this discussion with the following hypotheses:

H1: States with greater rule of law will experience less terrorist violence
H2: States with higher corruption rates will experience more terrorist violence
H3: States with higher bureaucratic quality will experience less terrorist violence
H4: States with higher military influence on political affairs will experience more terrorist violence
H5: States with higher bureaucratic capacity overall will experience less terrorist violence

Research Design

I will test my hypotheses with time series cross-sectional data, commonly preferred in political science fields for hypothesis testing. My unit of analysis is state-year. I will look at yearly variation in the number of terror attacks in a given state, given the change in the levels of bureaucratic capacity for the state. There are 147 countries in my data set. The time period covered in my statistical analysis is from 1984 to 2007. My data structure will appear as one observation per the number of terror attacks, the level of bureaucratic capacity and control variables for a given state in a given year.

Dependent variable

Since I investigate the variation in experiencing terror attacks given the level of bureaucratic capacity, my dependent variable is the number of terror attacks in a given state and year. I distinguish the effect of bureaucratic capacity on terrorism based on the type of terrorism. In other words, the bureaucratic capacity of the state might have different effects on violent terrorist activities committed by dissenters of the home country versus terrorism committed by violent actors from a different country. Therefore, I looked at both domestic and transnational terrorism experienced by a given state in a given year. For measuring terrorism, there are a few different options. One is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), commonly used in the literature, which reports all terror attacks in countries but does not distinguish the type of terrorist activities as domestic or transnational terrorism. Therefore, I used Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev’s data since they classify terror attacks from the GTD into domestic and transnational terrorism. By using their data, I was able to determine domestic and transnational terror incidents for countries in my database. According to Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev, a terrorist incident is domestic if the perpetrators and the target are from, and in, the same country. For their definition of transnational terrorism, a terrorist incident is transnational if 1) the nationality of the perpetrators is different from the victim(s) 2) the nationality of the victim differs from the target country 3) the attack targets foreign diplomats, international organizations, international peacekeepers, 4) the terrorist attack starts in one country but ends in another country 5) terrorists go across an international border to perpetuate the attack. Because my dependent variable is a count variable, I use negative binomial regression as an estimation technique. Most state-year observations report zero domestic or transnational terror attacks in the data, which indicates that the dependent variable presents in skewed form, which is another justification for using negative binomial regression technique.

Independent variables

My independent variable is bureaucratic capacity, and I measured this concept with four indicators. Most studies have used the “bureaucratic quality” measure to operationalize this concept. Cole’s study represents an exception because he used three indicators to measure bureaucratic capacity: corruption, military influence on politics and bureaucratic quality. In addition to these three indicators of bureaucratic capacity, I also added rule of law as a fourth indicator, which makes the measurement of the concept of bureaucratic capacity more comprehensive than the previous measurement. Rule of law is also an important dimension of bureaucratic capacity because implementing counterterrorism

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22 LaFree and Dugan 2007
23 Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011)
24 Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011)
25 Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev (2011)
26 Cole (2015)
policies without committing to rule of law could lead to a disproportionate use of state power in fighting terrorism, which may then lead to civilian victimization within counterterrorism operations and the loss of public support for the government.

In measuring these four indicators, I used the International Country Risk Guide Database. Rule of law variable is a measure with a 7-point scale ranging from 0 to 6, with the higher scores in the scale indicating a greater degree of rule of law for a given state. Like the rule of law variable, military’s role in politics and corruption variables are also created based on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 to 6. However, the higher scores in the military influence on politics and corruption variable suggest a lower degree of military role in politics and a lesser degree of corruption. Finally, the bureaucratic quality variable is a measure with 5-point scale, ranging from 0 to 5, with the higher scores indicating higher levels of bureaucratic quality. While these four variables are created with ordinal scales, I should note that they have continuous values.

Control variables

I checked for certain factors that might potentially confound the relationship between bureaucratic capacity and terrorism. Whether the state is in a state of ongoing civil war is controlled because terrorism is commonly used within the context of civil war. 27 I use the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset 28 to measure whether a given country is in a civil war in a given year. A dichotomous civil war variable is coded 1 if the state is in civil war, and 0 is otherwise. I controlled for regime type because a great deal of research shows a positive or negative link between democracy and terrorism, and I, therefore, controlled for this factor. I used Polity IV data 29 to determine regime type. Polity IV data creates a scale ranging from -10 to 10, and countries scoring 10 are the most democratic countries, and those scoring -10 are the most autocratic countries. I also controlled for state repression since repression is one of the strongest indicators of terrorism. 30 I used the Political Terror Scale 31 to measure state repression. The repression variable is a measure with a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 to 5 with the higher scores indicating higher levels of state repression. Past terror attacks are also controlled because there may be a temporal dependency between current and past terror attacks. I used the Global Terror Database to measure this variable. The past terror attack variable captures the average annual number of past terror attacks for a given state. Post-cold war era is controlled because terrorism is increasingly becoming a transnational security challenge especially after the cold war era ended. Finally, I control for GDP per capita and population since these variables are usually controlled in the previous studies, which made my results consistent with the literature. In the next section, I will present the results of my empirical analyses on the relationship between bureaucratic capacity and terrorism.

Results

After building my data set to test the hypothesis on the relationship between bureaucratic capacity and terrorism, I analyze the data by using STATA 13 software to present the results of my empirical analysis. Tables 1 and 2 below present the findings of negative binomial regression on the effect of the four indicators of bureaucratic capacity on domestic and transnational terrorism. In the tables, I report the coefficients and standard errors, shown in parenthesis below the coefficients. I interpreted the results based on the coefficients. The coefficients with a positive sign indicate a positive relationship between a given independent or control variable and the dependent variable, and those with a negative sign indicates the opposite. The stars on the coefficients represent the significance level. One star suggests that the variable is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence level in predicting the dependent variable (p value is less than 0.1); two stars indicate that the variable is statistically significant at 95 percent confidence level (p value is less than 0.05); and three stars represent 99 percent significance level (p value is less than 0.01 level) in predicting the dependent variable. The coefficients without a star(s) show that a given variable has no considerable influence on the dependent variable.

27 Findley and Young 2012
28 Gleditsch et al. (2002)
29 Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers(2015)
30 e.g. Quinn and Mason(2015); Polo and Gleditsch(2016);Piiazza(2017)
31 Wood and Gibney(2010)
According to the findings in Table 1, the sign of the coefficient of the rule of law variable is statistically significant with one star, suggesting that rule of law significantly explains domestic terrorism at a 90 percent confidence level, and negative sign of the coefficient suggests that states with greater rule of law experience a lesser number of domestic terror attacks. The coefficient for the military influence on politics is strongly significant (99 percent confidence level), suggesting that it is a good predictor of domestic terrorism. The negative sign of the coefficient of this variable indicates that higher scores of the military influence on politics variable (meaning less military influence on political affairs) is associated with a lesser number of domestic terrorism acts. The results of rule of law and military influence on politics support the hypothesis that a higher bureaucratic capacity is associated with less terrorist violence because they suggest that a greater rule of law and a lesser military influence on political affairs are associated with a lesser number of domestic terror attacks. While the findings on rule of law and military influence on politics support the theoretical argument, I could not find significant support for the hypothesis given the results for corruption and bureaucratic quality.

The coefficients of the corruption variable and bureaucratic quality are not statistically significant. Therefore, these variables appear to not explain domestic terrorism. Regarding the findings for the control variables, all control variables are statistically significant, suggesting that they significantly explain domestic terrorism. Discussing the results of the individual control variables, the states in an ongoing civil war experience a higher number of domestic terror attacks. More populous countries and those with higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with more domestic terrorist violence. Concerning the finding for the regime type variable, the coefficients on all models suggest that more democracy predicts more domestic terrorist violence. For the repression variable, the coefficients show that more repressive states experience more domestic terrorist violence. In terms of the role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>-0.147*</td>
<td>-0.237***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0830)</td>
<td>(0.0630)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military influence on politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0727)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>0.535**</td>
<td>0.708***</td>
<td>0.566**</td>
<td>0.603**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.396***</td>
<td>0.389***</td>
<td>0.364***</td>
<td>0.385***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0625)</td>
<td>(0.0589)</td>
<td>(0.0617)</td>
<td>(0.0667)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.428***</td>
<td>0.464***</td>
<td>0.310***</td>
<td>0.384***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>0.0646***</td>
<td>0.0802***</td>
<td>0.0680***</td>
<td>0.0669***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0161)</td>
<td>(0.0170)</td>
<td>(0.0173)</td>
<td>(0.0170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.669***</td>
<td>0.588***</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
<td>0.713***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past terror attacks</td>
<td>0.0183***</td>
<td>0.0160***</td>
<td>0.0179***</td>
<td>0.0180***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00597)</td>
<td>(0.00484)</td>
<td>(0.00555)</td>
<td>(0.00569)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-cold war era</td>
<td>-0.419**</td>
<td>-0.434***</td>
<td>-0.539***</td>
<td>-0.539***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.702***</td>
<td>-7.469***</td>
<td>-7.225***</td>
<td>-7.636***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.239)</td>
<td>(1.200)</td>
<td>(1.226)</td>
<td>(1.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>2,102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
of past experience on terror, states with higher numbers of past terror attacks also experience more domestic terrorism. Finally, the number of domestic terror attacks is lower in the post-cold war era than during the cold war era.

After discussing the results in Table 1, I will now interpret the results regarding the effect of bureaucratic capacity on transnational terrorism, which are included in Table 2. According to the results of the four indicators of bureaucratic capacity, rule of law and bureaucratic quality have no major influence on transnational terrorism. On the other hand, the military influence on politics variable is still statistically significant at 99 percent confidence level, and the coefficient has a negative sign, which suggests that less military influence on political affairs predicts a lesser number of transnational terror attacks. Unlike the expectation of the theoretical hypothesis, the coefficient of the corruption variable demonstrates that more corrupt countries experience more transnational terror attacks.

The sign of the coefficient is positive, suggesting a positive relationship between corruption and transnational terrorism but note that the higher scores on corruption indicate a lower degree of corruption. The findings on all control variables are as statistically significant as they are in Table 1, and the signs of their coefficients are in the same direction as they are in Table 1. Thus, the control variables predict both domestic and transnational terrorism in the same way.

I have interpreted the effect of the individual indicators of bureaucratic capacity on terrorism. As the last part of this section, I will discuss the effect of overall bureaucratic capacity on domestic and transnational terrorism with the findings included in Table 3. To do that, I have created an index of bureaucratic capacity that includes all four indicators. This is an additive index that combines the scores of rule of law, military influence on politics, corruption and bureaucratic quality. As the scores of the index increases, the rule of law will be greater, the military influence on politics and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>-0.087***</td>
<td>-0.165***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0701***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0699)</td>
<td>(0.0515)</td>
<td>(0.0696)</td>
<td>(0.0826)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military influence on politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.128*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0696)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>0.519**</td>
<td>0.582***</td>
<td>0.469**</td>
<td>0.539**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.274***</td>
<td>0.267***</td>
<td>0.249***</td>
<td>0.269***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0591)</td>
<td>(0.0535)</td>
<td>(0.0609)</td>
<td>(0.0596)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.369***</td>
<td>0.438***</td>
<td>0.265***</td>
<td>0.365***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.0921)</td>
<td>(0.0892)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>0.0695***</td>
<td>0.0755***</td>
<td>0.0673***</td>
<td>0.0696***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0122)</td>
<td>(0.0130)</td>
<td>(0.0130)</td>
<td>(0.0126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.475***</td>
<td>0.426***</td>
<td>0.594***</td>
<td>0.500***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.0950)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past terror attacks</td>
<td>0.00920***</td>
<td>0.00864***</td>
<td>0.00935***</td>
<td>0.00930***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00318)</td>
<td>(0.00286)</td>
<td>(0.00298)</td>
<td>(0.00301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-cold war</td>
<td>-0.311**</td>
<td>-0.313***</td>
<td>-0.380***</td>
<td>-0.376***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.793***</td>
<td>-6.941***</td>
<td>-6.658***</td>
<td>-6.908***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.033)</td>
<td>(0.958)</td>
<td>(1.050)</td>
<td>(1.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>2,102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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corruption will decrease, and bureaucratic quality will increase. The findings on the effect of bureaucratic capacity index on domestic and transnational terrorism are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the index show that as the overall bureaucratic capacity of the state increases, the number of domestic terror experienced decreases. This suggests that if a given state has greater rule of law, less undue military influence, engage less in corruption, and provides more public good and has more competent bureaucracy, it is feasible to expect that that state is more likely to experience less domestic terror. While the finding on overall bureaucratic capacity confirms the hypothesis regarding a reduction in domestic terror, the results also say that there is no significant relationship between the overall bureaucratic capacity and transnational terrorism.

### Table 3 Negative Binomial Regression of the Overall Bureaucratic Capacity on Domestic and Transnational Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Domestic 1</th>
<th>Transnational 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic capacity index</td>
<td>-0.0657*** (0.0240)</td>
<td>-0.0333 (0.0238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>0.651** (0.263)</td>
<td>0.556** (0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.403*** (0.0591)</td>
<td>0.271*** (0.0577)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.493*** (0.123)</td>
<td>0.403*** (0.0992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>0.0683*** (0.0173)</td>
<td>0.0703*** (0.0126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.611*** (0.121)</td>
<td>0.455*** (0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past terror attacks</td>
<td>0.0176*** (0.00564)</td>
<td>0.00914*** (0.00304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-cold war</td>
<td>-0.464*** (0.176)</td>
<td>-0.342*** (0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.881*** (1.209)</td>
<td>-6.889*** (0.990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>2,102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

### Conclusion

To conclude, the results of my quantitative analysis suggest that as the state has greater bureaucratic capacity, it is likely for the state to experience domestic terrorism in a lesser extent. Bureaucratic capacity, however, seems to not significantly affect transnational terrorism. More specifically, the results show that rule of law and military influence on politics are an important indicator of bureaucratic capacity that have significant impact on domestic terrorism. Military influence on politics, however, also has a significant impact on transnational terrorism. The potential reason for the different results on the effect of bureaucratic capacity on different types of terrorist violence might be the fact that a state is limited to project its capacity within its border.32 States may not be able to prevent terrorist attacks arising from an external environment or actors by relying on their internal capacity.

Given the robust impact of this variable in the analyses, the future research on terrorism should further explore the role of military influence of political affairs on political violence. The recent literature on civil war includes some studies on the effect that civil-military relations has on intrastate conflict but more research on the impact of undue military influence or civilian supremacy on military could improve our understanding of the dynamics of intrastate conflict including terrorist campaigns. Unlike the previous research, I did not find evidence for the significant relationship between bureaucratic quality and terrorism. The findings on the bureaucratic quality for both domestic and transnational terrorism are not significant in my analysis. One unexpected finding in the analyses is regarding corruption. The analysis performed for transnational terrorism shows that states with less corruption experience more transnational terrorist attacks. Since transnational terrorism has seen a recent rise in Western countries that have relatively more clean records on corruption, this finding may not be necessarily surprising. However, I don’t have a strong theoretical explanation for this unexpected finding. The future research can focus exclusively on the effect of corruption on transnational terrorism. While some research addressing the link between corruption and terrorism has been done, the impact of corruption might differ by types of terrorism.

32 Salehyan 2007
References


1. Introduction:

Maritime transport is crucial to the world’s economy as over 90% of the world’s trade is carried by sea, and it is the most cost-effective way to move goods and raw materials around the world for the time being. The massive commercial maritime traffic makes more sensitive anchorage grounds, ports and maritime routes especially through narrow waters and congested chokepoints. Thereby, it increases the importance of maritime security which is the subject of serious concern to states, international organizations and other stakeholders in the maritime domain. On the other hand, the maritime threat environment is dynamic, and the risks do not remain constant. Operating in the oceans requires thorough planning and application of all available information. So, the security of maritime trade needs considerable attention.

Regrettably, some specific waterways have in recent times emerged as some of the world’s most dangerous routes for vessels and their crew members regarding pirate attacks. Piracy is one of the contemporary challenges of the maritime industry. This phenomenon has a global impact on maritime trade and security, especially during the last decades, when the activities of pirates increased exponentially in Southeast Asian and West African (Gulf of Guinea) in addition to East African (Somalia) coasts. However, there was a relative fall in 2017 compared to the previous years and the number of incidents in 2017 continue to be among the lowest in the past 5 years.

In this context; in this article, I will try to explain the measures taken, the methods applied and a short analysis of incidents in 2017 compared to the incidents in last 5 years according to the 4 main regions (East Africa, Southeast Asia, West Africa and South America) as a person who has an experience of participating in counter-piracy operations as an intelligence analyst within CMF (Combined Maritime Forces) in Bahrain for 4 months in 2010.

2. The Assessment of Piracy Incidents in 2017:

According to the 2017 Annual IMB (International Maritime Bureau) Piracy Report;

- During the last 5 years (2013-2017), there was a steady decrease in the number of events, from 264 to 180.
- 74% of total incidents were in Africa and Southeast Asia.
- Only 6 ships were pirated out of 180 incidents.
- 63% of the actual attacks were on anchored ships, and 76% of the attempted attacks were on underway ships.
- Locations, where arms (guns, knives and other weapons) were used most, were Indonesia, Philippines, Nigeria, and Venezuela.
- While the total number of crews killed in piracy attacks in the last 5 years was 9, 3 (2 in Philippines and 1 in Yemen) of them was realized in 2017.
- The pirates mostly targeted tankers carrying chemical products, bulk carriers, and containers and tankers carrying crude oil.
- According to flag states; Singapore, Marshall Islands, Panama, and Liberia were targeted by pirates because Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands are the world’s three largest registries of deadweight tonnage (DWT).
- In this regard, the managing countries of Singapore, Germany, and Greece, which are the primary seafaring nations, were also susceptible to pirates.

Graphs and figures show that:
- Numerousness of criminals in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Philippines,
- In addition to numerousness of criminals, the lack of state capacity and the presence of terrorist groups along the Nigeria coasts lies on
Figure-1 Assessment of Piracy Incidents in 2017 (ICC IMB, 2018)

Figure-2 Assessment of Piracy Incidents as of ships & countries between 2013-2017
the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean,
- Likewise, smuggling, drug trafficking, and violent robbery incidents along the coasts of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela in South America,
- In addition to all these reasons mentioned above, the intrastate and interstate conflicts in Somalia in east Africa, piracy represents a serious and sustained threat to maritime security.

When we consider pirate attempts and attacks on commercial ships in 2017, 7 countries were in the spotlight out of 180 reported incidents.

- Indonesia, with 43 incidents, is in the first place as the country where most of the cases happened, although there is a significant decrease and only one ship was pirated. Positive actions of the Indonesian Authorities resulted in fewer incidents, but it is also believed that many attempts/attacks may have gone unreported. In this area, pirates are generally armed with guns/knives and normally attack vessels at anchor or in narrow water during the night.

- Indonesia is followed by Nigeria with 33 incidents. Unfortunately, we can’t say there is a decrease for Nigeria and pirates in this area are often well armed and more violent. They may also kidnap and injure the crews. All waters in/off Nigeria are risky, and even up to 170 nautical miles from the coast, attacks have been reported.

- Pirates/militants were active in the Philippines which had 22 incidents, a significant increase compared to the previous years. But, the good development in the Philippines has been that the kidnappings by militants have stopped recently because of the ongoing efforts of the Philippines military.

- 12 incidents in Venezuela and 11 incidents in Bangladesh occurred. There was a sharp increase in Venezuela. Puerto Cruz and Puerto Jose are more risky areas in Venezuela. In Bangladesh, the ships preparing to anchor were targeted. Additionally, attacks in Bangladesh have increased from 3 to 11 compared to the attacks in 2016. However, there is a significant decrease from 21 to 11 compared to attacks in 2014 due to the efforts of Bangladeshi authorities.

In addition to the 5 previously mentioned countries, Somalia and Malaysia attracted attention with 3 and 2 pirated ships, respectively. Although there were only 9 total incidents in Somalia, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, 3 of them resulted in a successful attack by pirates. This shows that the pirates in Somalia still possess the capability and capacity to carry...
out attacks and also indicates that they have gained experience with choosing targets.

3. Piracy in East Africa (Somalia, Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean):

Since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, the country has been controlled by rebel and clan-based groups and has little or no infrastructure. It has resulted in a fail-state and is one of the poorest and most violent countries in the world. There is no functioning government, no police or military infrastructure anywhere in the country. At the same time, Somalia is a country which has the longest coast in Africa.

On the second phase of the Somali Civil War in 2000, foreign fishermen exploited illegally rich fishing grounds because of the absence of an effective national coast guard on the Somalia coasts. They reduce the local fishing stocks which were the single source of income in Somalia. Local communities tried to respond by forming armed groups to deter invaders. These developments in Somalia have given rise to significant pirate activities, especially in the Gulf of Aden. The pirates have used the same tactics: skiffs to attack ships and utilization of small arms, RPGs, and rigid boarding ladders. The pirates approach the ships by skiffs powered by extra motors which make them faster than most of the commercial ships. The skiffs are small, and they can operate hundreds of nautical miles off the coast by using large mother ships from which they launch their attacks.

Pirates then take control of the ship and force the crew to move the vessel to anchor off the coast of Somalia. Then, they open the negotiation for payment of the ransom to release the crew and the ship. The pirates can also use the pirated ship as a mother ship.

Somali pirates have attacked hundreds of vessels in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean region, though most attacks do not result in a successful hijacking. Somali pirates earned hundreds of millions of dollars from hijackings during their peak years of activity between 2008 and 2012. Hijackings then tailed off almost completely after commercial ships began routinely conducting Best Management Practice, although the presence of the international anti-piracy fleet also had a deterrent role.

The Sri Lankan flagged Bunkering Tanker MT Aris 13 was the first commercial vessel since 2012 to be pirated in the vicinity of Somalia on March 14, 2017. After MT Aris 13, 2 more ships were pirated off the coast of Somalia within 2 weeks, on March 23 and April 1, respectively. The question is whether 3 pirated ships in 2017 represents a new spectre of piracy on the horizon. It can be considered as an indication of a large-scale return to piracy off the Somali coast, but it is not possible to say there will be more frequent attacks in the future.

In 2017, almost all attempts in the Somalia region were conducted by firing upon the ships, and 3 of the attacks resulted in hijacking; so, there were 3 successful attacks in the Somalia region. Almost all the attacks and attempts were conducted while the ships were underway. There were no crew members killed in the Somalia region, but most of the incidents resulted in the crews being taken as a hostage.

a. Counter-Piracy Measures in Somalia:

(1) Operations:

There were 3 different Combined Task Forces (CTFs) that have conducted counter-piracy operations in the area. These CTFs have been performed by NATO, EU and CMF (Combined Maritime Forces), however; NATO formally ended its Operation Ocean Shield (CTF 508) in the waters off the coast of Somalia on December 15, 2016. Participating naval forces rely on long-range military reconnaissance aircraft to locate a pirate skiff that is just a tiny dot within hundreds of thousands of square miles of open Ocean. Once discovered, the aircraft relays the position of the skiff to the nearest warship which then proceeds at maximum speed to the suspected pirate’s location. The most cost-effective solution would be to stop the pirates at the coast, keeping them on the coast/territorial waters as to not to let them get lost in the expanse of the open ocean.

The international naval forces also patrol these waters to understand the usual patterns of ships, which will allow them to identify and
deter any suspected piracy event more easily. So, all entities involved carry out operations by coordinating with one another.

(a) Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) by NATO (NATO OOS, 2016):

OOS (by CTF 508) was NATO's counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. NATO helped to deter and disrupt pirate attacks while protecting vessels and increasing the general security in the region from 2008 until 2016. NATO's role was to provide naval escorts and deterrence while increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in the area to optimize efforts and tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics. Until the end of 2016, NATO conducted counter-piracy activities in full complement of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

NATO vessels conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions to verify shipping activity off the coast of the Horn of Africa, including the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean up to the Strait of Hormuz, sorting legitimate maritime traffic from suspected pirate vessels.

(b) Operation Atalanta (CTF 465) by EU (EUNAVFOR, 2018):

The EU launched the European Union Naval Force Atalanta (EU NAVFOR) in December 2008 within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and by relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International Law.

EU NAVFOR has an Area of Operations covering the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and a vast portion of the Indian Ocean, including Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoros. The Area of Operations also includes the Somalia coastal territory, main territory, and internal waters. Within the Area of Operations, close cooperation with the WFP (World Food Program) and the AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) ensures that no vessel transporting humanitarian aid (or logistics for the African Union mission) shall travel unprotected along the Somalia coastline.

(c) CTF 151 by CMF (CTF-151, 2018):

CTF 151, established in January 2009, has been endorsed under UNSCR 2316 with specific piracy mission-based mandate. Lately it has been empowered to conduct wider maritime security operations in support of CMF which is a multinational naval partnership with 32 member nations with its headquarters located in Bahrain.

CMF comprises three Combined Task Forces (CTFs) which are focused on Counter-Terrorism (CTF-150); Counter Piracy (CTF-151); and Arabian Gulf Security and Cooperation (CTF-152).
Regarding UNSCR, and in cooperation with CMF coastal states, CTF 151’s mission is to disrupt piracy at sea and to engage with regional and other partners in order to build capacity and improve relevant capabilities to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation. CTF 151’s area of operation extends from the Suez Canal in the North West to 15 degrees South.

(d) Independent Deployments:
Additionally, other non-NATO and non-EU countries have, at one time or another, contributed to counter-piracy operations. China, India, Iran, and Russia have all sent ships to the region, sometimes in conjunction with the existing CTFs and sometimes operating independently.

(2) Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) (MSTC, 2018):
The Gulf of Aden is one of the most vulnerable and High-Risk Area for pirate activities: the IRTC is a corridor in which the merchant vessels pass through the Gulf of Aden according to a “Group Transit Schema” coordinated by MSCHOA (Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa).

The presence of Naval/Military forces from 3 task forces along with independent deployments in the Gulf of Aden, concentrated on the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), has significantly reduced the incidence of piracy attack in this area.

Naval/Military forces coordinately operate the ‘Group Transit Scheme’ within the IRTC which is coordinated by MSCHOA. This system’s vessels pass together at a speed for maximum protection during their transit through the IRTC. Some countries offer independent convoy escorts through the IRTC where merchant vessels are escorted by a warship.

(3) Key Leaders Engagement:
To meet the demands of the region, civil and military actors need to work together. Reaching the population and acquiring their support is often vital to mission success. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) is an important element of Command and Control, and the commander of Task Forces still uses this method to achieve
their missions. The Task Forces commanders have been meeting with important local officials, especially during their port visits.

b. The Reasons & Trend of Piracy in Somalia:
The piracy incidents showed a decline after the naval engagements by NATO, EU and CMF assets but the recent attacks indicate that these measures were not a permanent solution to the piracy problem. Because the causes of piracy lie behind land-based problems, lack of legal consequence, chronic unemployment, social acceptance, and opportunity all play a role in supporting this criminal enterprise. For example, illegal fishing off Somalia coasts by other nations leads to the poverty and unemployment rates in Somalia, which are among the root causes of the piracy. But, as a matter of course, naval engagements focus on only pirates, not land-based problems.

In addition to naval engagements, sustainable and long-term solutions by the international community are also vital. Improving the abilities of governance/local forces and supporting the capabilities of onshore community/infrastructures contribute to building long-term solutions which will address not only piracy but also other forms of maritime crime. This is because piracy and other maritime crimes at the Somalia coasts rely heavily on onshore support for infrastructure which provides food, water, fuel and the leafy narcotic khat to the pirates/criminals who guard the pirated ships throughout the ransom negotiation process. The MT Aris 13 which was pirated in 2017 is one of the best examples of why local forces and infrastructure are so important since it was released after only four days and allegedly without ransom payment due to the pressure of Puntland Maritime Police Force. Making an investment in the governance/local forces and onshore community instead of paying millions of dollars as ransom will help to find a permanent solution for the Somalia coasts.

c. Who are the pirates in the Somalia region?
During the counter-piracy operations in which I participated in 2010, we found very interesting results after interviewing a group of pirates:
- The pirates were staying at sea to hijack a ship for weeks without enough food and water, but their income was in a range between Dollar 30,000 and 75,000, which was just to survive on condition that ransom was paid,

- After receiving the ransom, the money they got was deducted because of the food and khat which is a narcotic plant they consumed,

- They said they never mistreated the crew members of the hijacked ships since there were a deduction and a dismissal as a result of mistreatment towards crew members,

- Some of them claimed a big part of the ransom was going a long way in any country such as Kenya and/or Tanzania for the pirate gang leaders,

- Some pirates also claimed that some percentage of the ransom was being transferred to terrorist groups in the region such as Al-Shabab and terrorist groups tied to Al-Qaeda,

- Most of them said they were doing piracy because they were unemployed and they had a family. These pirates were working as a fisherman before becoming a pirate, but there was not enough fish anymore,

- After spending many days at sea without hijacking a ship, they wanted to be captured by a NATO or EU military ship because these military ships were bringing them on board and giving them humanitarian aid such as food, water, and warm clothes before leaving them on the Somalia coast and destroying their vessels. They also said they were especially afraid of the Russian and Indian Navies because they were brutal and merciless, claiming many of their friends were killed by them.

As a result of interviews; the general view was;

- They obviously needed employment to survive. Fishing, the most important income source of region people, should be maintained by preventing illegal fishing with big trawlers by other countries’ fishermen,

- There were leaders and planners behind the pirates who got a large amount of money,

- The most dangerous part of piracy was the potential to be tied to certain terrorist organizations and the possibility of piracy to transition into violence and killing,

- It was also barbarous to mistreat and/or to kill the surrendered pirates as that is taking advantage of the lack of legal consequence in the region.
4. **Piracy in Southeast Asia:**

Despite the fact that the Somalia region comes first to the mind when the world thinks of piracy, the Southeast Asia region is also among the most perilous seas for criminals and pirates. The straits and the countless islands in the region are particularly the most dangerous waters.

After World War II, Indonesia has become home to the pirate gang leaders. These criminal organizations have offered fishers and seafarers a second profession. By mid-1990s, Southeast Asian pirates have begun to use rifles and machine guns which have given them a reputation for violence. Between 1995 and 2015, the amount of people who were killed during piracy incidents was more than twice the amount of people killed in Africa. However, by the support of local authorities there was a sharp decrease in the incidents when we check the numbers in 2015 and 2016 (ICC IMB, 2018);

- In Indonesia, from 108 to 49,
- In Malacca Straits, from 5 to 0,
- In Malaysia, from 13 to 7,
- In Singapore Straits, from 9 to 2.

In 2017, the region countries, except the Philippines, were able to manage to keep the level of piracy incidents low. Although there is a significant decrease in 2016 and maintaining the same level in 2017,

- Indonesia, with 43 incidents, is in the first place as the country where most of the cases happened,
- There was a significant increase in the Philippines compared to the previous years, from 10 to 22,
- 2 ships were pirated in Malaysia in addition to 1 ship in Indonesia.

Stretching from the westernmost corner of Malaysia to the tip of Indonesia's Bintan Island, the Malacca and Singapore straits serve as global shipping superhighways because of a growing Chinese economy, increasing global maritime trade and becoming a corridor of world oil transit routes. Each year, more than 120,000 ships traverse these waterways, accounting for a third of the world’s marine commerce. Between 70% and 80% of all the oil imported by China and Japan transits the straits. This situation increases the importance of the maritime security and counter-piracy initiatives in Southeast Asia.

As a result, in 2017 most of the attacks in Southeast Asia were due to boarding with 1 in Indonesia and 2 in Malaysia due to hijacking.

![Piracy Incidents in Southeast/East Asia between 2013 and 2017](image)

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Table-1 Piracy Incidents in Southeast/East Asia between 2013 and 2017 (ICC IMB, 2018)
yielding 3 successful attacks in Southeast Asia. Cilacap, Dumi/Lubuk Gaung, Galang, Muara Berau/Samarinda, Off Pulau Bintan in Indonesia and Batangas, Manila in the Philippines are among those with three or more reported incidents. Almost all of the attacks/attempt in Southeast Asia were conducted while the ships were anchored. There were 2 crews killed in the Philippines and almost all attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia; there were crews taken hostage.

a. Counter-Piracy Measures in Southeast Asia:

(1) Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy (ReCAAP):

ReCAAP is the first regional government to agree to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. Launched in 2006, it facilitates communication and information exchanges between member countries. Singapore, Japan, Laos, and Cambodia were the first four states to adhere to ReCAAP (ReCAAP ISC., 2018) formally. Brunei, Cambodia, China, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and Singapore are among 20 countries that have become contracting parties to ReCAAP despite their geographic proximity to these attacks.

(2) Malacca Strait Patrol:

Another regional effort to suppress piracy especially in the Malacca Strait is MALSINDO (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia) which was introduced in July 2004. Later, Thailand joined MALSINDO in 2008. MALSINDO is comprised of navies from three coastal states in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Conducting coordinated patrol within their respective territorial seas around the Strait of Malacca is its main task. One of the weaknesses of this patrol is that it does not allow the cross-border pursuit of other states territorial sea as it is viewed as interference in other states’ sovereignty. In 2005, significant reductions in the piratical attack around the Malacca Strait were reported.

The reductions of the number of piratical attacks were also influenced by the launching of aerial patrol over the Malacca Straits, known as the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) plan. Thailand also joined EiS in 2009. This plan allows the patrolling aircraft to go over the other states’ territorial sea (up to three nautical miles). This measure was enforced as to strengthen the water patrol which has been limited to twelve nautical miles of the respective states.

In 2006, the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) was formed which consisted of both MALSINDO and EiS.

(3) ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Measures:

Piracy has also been a concern for ASEAN. Measures to combat piratical attacks have been introduced by some member states of ASEAN.

However, maritime security issues including piracy do not affect the entire membership of ASEAN, so there is no anti-piracy measure at this time, involving all members of ASEAN.

Nonetheless, ASEAN has been committed to discussing issues related to Maritime Security in their meetings. As a result, there are three prominent forums which aim to address Maritime Security: ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting (ARF-ISM) on Maritime Security, and the Maritime Security Expert Working Group (MSEWG). In addition to these three forums, ASEAN has also produced initiatives to address maritime security threats including piracy.

(4) Military Exercises in the Region:

The main goal of these exercises is not directly counter-piracy, but it undoubtedly helps to strengthen regional cooperation and collaboration, increasing the ability to participate nations to work together on (complex multilateral) counter-piracy operations.

(a) Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) Exercise:

Since 2002, in order to focus on shared maritime security challenges of the region and promote multilateral cooperation and information
sharing among navies and coast guards across South and Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercises have been conducted annually. In 2017, in addition to the US Navy, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia participated in these exercises.

(b) Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Exercises:

For 22 years, CARAT has been a bilateral exercise series among the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and the armed forces of nine partner nations in South and Southeast Asia, including Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. CARAT is an adaptable, flexible exercise; its scenarios are tailored with inputs from the United States and partner nations to meet shared maritime security priorities, such as counter-piracy, counter-smuggling, maritime interception operations, and port security.

(c) Cobra Gold Exercise:

Cobra Gold is a Thailand/United States co-sponsored, combined task force and joint theatre security cooperation exercise conducted annually in the Kingdom of Thailand. Cobra Gold will strengthen regional cooperation and collaboration, increasing the ability to participate nations to work together on complex multilateral operations such as counter-piracy and the delivery of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The capabilities of participating nations to plan and conduct joint operations will be enhanced, relationships across the region will be promoted, and interoperability across a wide range of security activities will be improved.

5. Piracy in West Africa (Gulf of Guinea):

The Gulf of Guinea is a hub for global energy supplies with significant quantities of all petroleum products consumed in Europe, North America, and Asia transiting this waterway. The Gulf is also rich in hydrocarbons, fish, and other resources and is host to numerous natural harbors, largely devoid of chokepoints and extreme weather conditions.

On the one hand these attributes provide immense potential for maritime commerce, resource extraction, shipping, and development, but on the other hand, this economic development made the gulf more sensitive in terms of maritime security. The Gulf of Guinea, which has been Africa’s main maritime piracy hotspot since 2011, has become one of the world’s most piracy-affected areas.

As countries in the 5,000-nautical mile (nm) coastline of the Gulf of Guinea increasingly rely on the seas for economic prosperity, the evolving violent attacks on shipping with transnational dimensions call for multilateral remedies.

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Table-2 Piracy Incidents in Gulf of Guinea between 2013 and 2017 (ICC IMB, 2018)
The worrying rise in insecurity follows a period where Nigeria was believed to be emerging from maritime risk due to a gradual decline from 31 to 14 in vessel attacks in the area from 2013 to 2015. It was determined that the declines in 2014 and 2015 were the result of the increased naval activities by the Nigerian Navy and the coast guard. Nigeria, as the regional economic power, has developed some initiatives against maritime criminals and pirates in the region.

Despite these initiatives, there was also a significant rise from 14 to 36 incidents from 2015 to 2016, keeping a similar level in 2017 with 33 incidents. In parallel, the Gulf of Guinea recorded a high level of piracy incidents in 2016 and kept a similar level in 2017 as well.

As a result, in 2017, most of the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea were a result of boarding with some due to being fired upon and attempted, but not successful, hijacking. So, there was no successful attack in the Gulf of Guinea. Lagos in Nigeria is among those with three or more reported incidents with almost all the attacks/attempts conducted while the ships were underway. There was no killed crew, but in almost all of the attacks, there were kidnapped crews in Nigeria.

Additionally, piracy incidents in this area also tend to be more dangerous because they are often well armed and more violent. Additionally, they may kidnap and/or injure the crews. All waters in/off Nigeria are risky; even up to 170 nautical miles from the coast, attacks have been reported in 2017.

a. Counter-Piracy Measures in the Gulf of Guinea:

(1) Obangame Express Exercise:

Obangame Express, conducted by U.S. Naval Forces Africa, is an at-sea maritime exercise designed to improve cooperation among participating nations to increase maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. It focuses on maritime interdiction operation, as well as visit, board, search, and seizure techniques.

The exercise takes place in the Gulf of Guinea with the participation of 20 African partners: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Cabo Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bassau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Morrocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo.

(2) Regional Initiatives:

Three regional maritime strategies had been adopted by the Economic Community of Central African States (on 29 October 2009); the Gulf of Guinea Commission (on 10 August 2013); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (on 29 March 2014). The three organizations agreed on a memorandum of understanding in June 2013, through which they set up a maritime security interregional coordination center in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

This center has to cooperate with the regional maritime security coordination centers established in Pointe Noire, Congo for Central Africa; and Abidjan for West Africa.

(3) Efforts by Nigerian Armed Forces:

Nigerian Armed Forces declared war on general insecurity with counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Guinea among first priorities. The Nigerian Navy has also increased patrols along the coastline and gives authority for the use of firepower on pirates who are in the act of attacking or attempting to hijack ships.

Nigeria has deployed warships and troops in a massive operation to end pirates' attacks on local and international merchant ships in the Gulf of Guinea. The operation sought to contain a high spate of attacks by thieves on critical oil and gas installations and other misconduct prevalent in the nation’s territorial waters.

(4) The International Response:

The international community and maritime industry have been supporting regional efforts to fight piracy, but most endeavors have been limited to support from the US, European Union, and the International Maritime Organisation. Among the Asian nations, Japan and China have provided some limited support, but as
regional observers point out, material resources regarding naval assets and hard-surveillance capabilities have been sorely lacking. The main reason for the international community’s reluctance to get involved in fighting pirates on Africa’s western coast is the absence of pirate attacks on the high seas. Almost all of the reported incidents take place within the maritime territorial limits of the coastal states, where domestic laws apply and only national law-enforcement institutions are authorized to act.

Additionally, it complicates matters in the region since countries like Nigeria and Cameroon have refused to allow merchant ships to bring armed guards into their territorial waters, one of the most effective Best Management Practices.6.

Piracy in South America:

Piracy continues to affect vessels operating in South American waters, and much of it is likely to have gone unreported. Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela are among the South American countries that stand out regarding piracy in recent years.

In particular, Venezuela has very rich resources concerning fishing such as tuna, sardines, shark, crab, and octopus. Just like in the Somalia coast, industrial trawlers have hunted in the Venezuelan coast to catch tons of fish creating an unemployment problem leading some of the fishermen to convert into pirates. As a result, there was a sharp increase in piracy attacks in Venezuela in 2017. The increase of piracy attacks in Venezuela began in 2016 when the fishermen were murdered by pirates. Piracy incidence, which was 1 in 2015, has risen to 5 in 2016, and 12 in 2017. It is also thought that many incidents have not been reported. It is worrisome that the incidents may increase day by day. Additionally, Venezuela and the island of Trinidad are separated by only 10 miles of water which is one of the most lawless markets on Earth nowadays. Unfortunately, it is also alleged that the Venezuelan Coast Guard and National Guard are involved in this lawless market.

Colombia also has a situation similar to Venezuela regarding smuggling and drug trafficking adding to the already existing problems of piracy. The Colombian Navy launched patrol by warships to serve in the vicinity of the country’s Pacific waters to defend its sovereignty as well as to provide further support for operations aimed at preventing piracy and drug trafficking. These should help improve the operational capacity of the Navy to assist but only if the vessels are vigilant and report incidents in a timely fashion.

Like Colombia, Peru has significantly developed its control, surveillance and monitoring capabilities in the maritime environment. In this regard, the Peruvian Navy increased surveillance and control of maritime activities to establish maritime security, and they were able to reduce 11 incidents in 2016 to 2 in 2017.

| Piracy Incidents in South America between 2013 and 2017 |
|-----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|                 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| Brazil          | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
| Colombia        | 7    | 2    | 5    | 4    | 6    |
| Dominican Rep.  | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Ecuador         | 3    | -    | -    | -    | 2    |
| Guyana          | 2    | 1    | -    | 2    | 1    |
| Haiti           | -    | -    | 2    | 4    | 1    |
| Mexico          | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
| Peru            | 4    | -    | -    | 11   | 2    |
| Venezuela       | -    | 1    | 1    | 5    | 12   |

Table-3 Piracy Incidents in South America between 2013 and 2017 (ICC IMB, 2018)
Two incidents have been reported in Ecuador in 2017, the first reports since 2013, although it is likely that many opportunist incidents might go unreported. Particularly in Guayaquil, piracy attacks stopped, but ships were advised to be vigilant.

In addition to piracy in Ecuador, there are high levels of domestic maritime crime, namely the smuggling of narcotics, associated violence towards local fisherman by criminal gangs, and Ecuadorian–Peruvian fishing disputes.

As a result, in 2017, all attacks in South America were a result of boarding, not hijacking. So, there was no successful attack in South America. The ports, Cartagena in Colombia, Puerto Jose and Puerto La Cruz, are among those with three or more reported incidents. Almost all of the attacks in South America were conducted while the ships were anchored. There was no killed crew, but there were hostages, assaults, and injured crews in Peru and Venezuela.

Piracy incidents that take place across South America are largely opportunistic and do not mirror the pirate action groups that operate off the Gulf of Guinea, Southeast Asia, and offshore Somalia. However, it is present within most regional states and can be violent in its nature.

On the other hand, it is really difficult to describe the incidents in South America as either piracy or armed robbery. Unlike the Somalia region, armed robbery, smuggling, and drug trafficking are also very common in these regions.

7. General Precautions Against Piracy:

a. Best Management Practice (BMP):

BMP is a guidance for merchant vessels to reduce the chances of being successfully attacked by piracy and/or small, high-speed boats using small arms; rocket-propelled grenades and explosives. BMP offers advice and guidance on avoiding piracy and is targeted at seafarers who intend to travel through the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, and the Indian Ocean. Measures include: Maintaining a proactive 24-hour lookout, reporting suspicious activities to authorities, removing access ladders, protecting the lowest points of access, the use of deck lighting, netting, razor wire, electrical fencing, fire hoses and surveillance and detection equipment, engaging in evasive maneuvering and speed during an attack, and joining group transits.

The BMP primarily focuses on preparations that might be within the capability of the ship’s crew or with some external assistance, since pirates cannot hijack a ship if they are unable to board it. The BMP is based on the experience of piracy attacks, and it always requires amendment over time if the pirates change their methods.

The following practices are the most basic and effective ones (BMP4, 2011):

1. Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance: A proper lookout is the single most effective method of ship protection where early warning of a suspicious approach or attack is assured, and where defenses can be readily deployed.

2. Enhanced Bridge Protection: The bridge is regularly the focus for any pirate attack. In the opening part of the attack, pirates direct weapons fire at the bridge to try to force the ship to stop.

3. Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces: It is strongly recommended that significant effort is expended prior to entry to the High-Risk Area to deny the pirates access to the accommodation and the bridge.

4. Physical Barriers: Physical barriers should be used to make piracy as difficult as possible to get onboard the vessels by increasing the height and difficulty of any climb for an attacking pirate.

5. Razor Wire: Razor wire creates an effective barrier on board where the pirates may climb and attempt to board and take control of the ship.

6. Water Spray and Foam Monitors: The use of water spray and/or foam monitors has been found to be effective in deterring or delaying pirates trying to board a vessel.
(7) Alarms: Sounding the ship’s alarms/whistle serves to inform the vessel’s crew that a piracy attack has commenced and importantly, demonstrates to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.

(8) Maneuvering Practice: Practicing maneuvering the vessel prior to entry into the High-Risk Area will be very beneficial since waiting until the ship is attacked will be too late.

(9) Closed Circuit Television (CCTV): The use of CCTV coverage allows for a degree of monitoring of the progress of the attack as it is difficult and dangerous to observe while under attack.

(10) Upper Deck Lighting: Ships proceed with just their navigation lights illuminated. Once pirates have been identified or an attack commences, illuminating weather deck lighting and search lights demonstrate to the pirates that they have been observed.

(11) Deny Use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment: Pirates board vessels with little in the way of apparatus other than personal weaponry. It is important to try to contradict pirates the use of ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to hack into the vessel.

(12) Protection of Equipment Stored on the Upper Deck: Any gas bottles or flammable materials are stored before transiting since small arms, and other weaponry are often directed on the bridge, accommodation section, and poop deck.

(13) Citadels: These places provide maximum physical protection to the crew. A Citadel is designed and built to resist a determined pirate trying to gain entry for a fixed period. In case of any crew member being left outside before the citadel is secured, the whole concept of the Citadel approach appears to be lost. If naval/military forces are sure all crew members are secure in the citadel in a pirated ship, then they can apply boarding operation to get control of the ship back. However, the use of citadel can not guarantee a naval/military response.


(15) Armed Private Maritime Security Contractors: If armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are to be used they must be as an extra layer of protection and not as an

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Table-4 Accession Status of International Conventions in Southeast Asia (IMO, 2018)
alternative to BMP. If armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are present on board a merchant vessel, this fact should be included in reports to UKMTO (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations) and MSCHOA. On the other hand, some countries do not allow armed private maritime security contractors in their territorial waters.


SUA Convention is one of the legal instruments used to combat against illegal acts conducted at sea including piracy. This convention does not precisely aim to address piracy. However, piratical acts are subject to SUA Convention. This convention was initiated after the hijacking of an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro in 1988 which was allegedly motivated by political ends. Unfortunately, article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was not able to punish the committers as the act did not meet the requirement ‘committed for the private end’. Thus, states find it important to create a legally binding instrument which could arrest criminal acts at sea committed for political and other ends. This convention filled the gap in UNCLOS that confines illegal acts of piracy which requires the two ships involvement as well as it should occur on high seas or other areas beyond the national jurisdiction. According to article 3 SUA Convention, it is against the convention if any person unlawfully and intentionally:

- To seize or exercise control over that ship by force, threat, or intimidation,
- Perform an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to imperil the safe navigation of the ship,
- Destroy or cause damage to a ship or its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship,
- Places or causes to be placed on a ship a device which causes damage to the ship or its cargo,
- Destroys maritime navigational facilities,
- Communicates false information,
- Injures or kills any person in connection with the commission points in the articles above.

SUA Convention also aims to punish its offenders:

- Article 10 (1) expounded that a state is responsible for prosecuting or extraditing the offenders committing one or more of the crimes stated in article 3 of this convention.

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Table-5 Accession Status of International Conventions in Africa (IMO, 2018)
- Article 11(1) elaborated that offenses in article 3 are extraditable based on the extradition treaty between states. In those scenarios where states do not have treaties of extradition, this convention through article 11 (2) allows states to use the SUA Convention as the legal basis of extradition. Regarding prosecution, the convention reveals in article 6 (1) that state party has the right to establish jurisdiction if the offense meets one of these aspects:
- If the offense is against or on board a ship flying the flag of a state,
- If the attack is committed in the territorial sea as well as the territory of the state,
- If the perpetrator is a citizen of the state.

When we check the accession status of International Conventions; Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in Southeast Asia, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Somalia in Africa, Colombia, Haiti, and Venezuela in South America are not a party none of 1988 and 2005 SUA Protocol/Convention.
However, Indonesia, Malaysia, Somalia, and Venezuela are among the countries where piracy activities are most experienced.

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Table-6 Accession Status of International Conventions in South America (IMO, 2018)
8. Conclusions:

In order to have a permanent solution to the piracy problem, in addition to counter-piracy military operations, the international community should also focus on land-based problems such as lack of legal consequence and chronic unemployment in the region. For instance, illegal fishing in Somalia waters with big trawlers by other nations should be prevented to avoid creating an unemployment area. Additionally, strong governance/infrastructure and right to education are also some of the sustainable and long-term solutions.

All the ships planning to pass through high-risk areas should be encouraged to follow the guidance of Best Management Practice and all the countries, especially those suffering from piracy, should be encouraged to be a party to the Convention SUA. Another point of consideration is that ReCAAP should be signed by those regional states in Southeast Asia that have not yet done so.

Moreover, the leaders and planners behind the pirates should be found and neutralized. The most dangerous part of piracy is the potential to be connected with some terrorist organizations and the possibility of piracy to escalate into violence and killing. It is also barbarous to mistreat and/or to kill the surrendered pirates as this would be taking advantage of the lack of legal consequence in the region.

Even though the number of incidents in South East Asia (Indonesia and Philippines) and West Africa (Nigeria) is more than in East Africa (Somalia), Somalia continues maintaining its importance since Somalia pirates still have the capability and capacity to perform attacks.

It has not been ruled out that the merchant ships should vigilantly pass through the coast of South East Asia and West Africa.

Over 90% of the world's trade is carried by sea, and an important amount of this trade uses the route of Bab El Mendeb, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. When we take into consideration 3 hijacked ships in the region of East Africa (Somalia, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden), the counter-piracy operations should continue deterring and disrupting pirate attacks, while protecting vessels and increasing the general security. Additionally, the ships, which pass through the Gulf of Aden should inform MSCHOA to use IRTC earlier than its transit. The commander of the task forces should maintain and increase the activities of Key Leader Engagement in the region. Similar corridors in hot-spots in West Africa and Southeast Asia might be established, and the navies of the region countries may support the ships while passing through these corridors.

It is likely that piracy in Southeast Asia and West Africa (Gulf of Guinea) will continue for years to come and will also remain a security concern for the shipping industry and governments. To combat piracy in these regions, steps in the right direction must be taken, and it requires more cooperation, coordination, and collaboration between countries. The regional countries should launch more joint investigations on piracy crimes in their region and should step in the right direction such as implementing intelligence sharing mechanisms and establishing communication channels.

For South America, it is largely opportunistic and does not mirror the pirate action groups that operate off the Gulf of Guinea, Southeast Asia, and off-shore Somalia. However, it is present in most regional states and can be violent. It is almost certain that many greater piracy incidents take place across the South America region than is reported but it should not be ignored that most of the incidents might be robbery rather than piracy.
References


Burden sharing has been one of the most hotly contested issues in NATO especially since the end of Cold War. Trump’s bitter statements about utility of the Alliance in the wake of his election and following urge by U.S. policy-makers to make Europe pay more for its own defence has added more fuel on fire. An important reason for rekindling this old debate is the great change in the security landscape NATO has to operate. NATO perceives multiple risks and threats of both conventional and non-conventional nature along its southern and eastern flanks, which will incur more costs on the Alliance. U.S. pushes Europe to stick to its pledge to spend 2% on defence 20% of which has to be allocated to major equipment acquisition. Germany on the other hand advocates creation of a sophisticated plan for implementation of such guidelines prioritising its national interests. The question we need to answer within this intense debate is, how does the Alliance financially adapt itself to the crises escalating in and around Euro-Atlantic region and how do EU and non-EU Allies share the burden? To answer these questions, we analysed defence spending behaviour of the Allies in the last four decades, each separated by milestones creating significant change in the Alliance modus operandi. In this regard, we arranged data in a dichotomous way, focusing on two main subsets, EU and non-EU Allies. We mapped which group contributed in what percentage in the Alliance budget to inform public debate about who shoulders the burden at what percentage and test the validity of the arguments. Then we matched the results of our expenditure analyses, narratives and global security landscape to find a middle ground. Our findings clearly illustrate a declining defence expenditure trend among NATO members for the last four decades only to be reversed with Ukraine Crisis. This has been true for EU Allies despite multiple crises preceding the latter. Non-EU NATO members (mainly U.S.) on the other hand have been more responsive to the risks and threats emanating around Euro-Atlantic region with regards to defence expenditure.

1. Introduction

The most recent rekindling of 2% percent debate was when the NATO Allies committed to devote 2% of their respective Gross Domestic Products (GDP) to defence spending during the Defence Ministerial in June 2006 (Press Briefing by NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai after the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Defence Ministers, 2006). At the Wales Summit in September 2014, the Allies further agreed to halt diminishing defence expenditures, a trend in full swing since the end of Cold War. According to the Summit Declaration, Allies conforming to the rule of spending a minimum of 2% of their respective GDPs on defence and/or 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development were to continue to do so. For the others not meeting any criteria, the declaration prescribed the way ahead as halting any decline in defence expenditure and aiming “to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO capability targets and filling NATO’s capability shortfalls”. (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014).

The revival of 2% debate was primarily provoked by the deterioration in the general security situation around the globe. After the collapse of USSR, Allies had made remarkable cuts in their defence budgets since there was no credible conventional threat any more to challenge Europe. However, the outlook started to change starting from 9/11 attacks which provided a significant increase in U.S. Defence Expenditures, not influencing the trend for the rest of NATO members. For the latter, even Russian intervention in Georgia...
didn’t create necessary stimulus. The alarm bells rang for Europe only after Russian annexation of Crimea and extension of such move into two other Ukrainian regions in 2014. The level of alarm increased further with the emergence of Salafi jihadist terror in the Middle East and North Africa. In the current situation, NATO has to take measures against Russian provocative action along its Eastern borders and against the destabilizing effects emanating from Syrian civil war and proliferation of Salafi jihadist terrorist organizations along its Southern borders. Those measures or the posture NATO has to take in face of multiplicity of such threats certainly has its costs.

During his presidential election campaign, Trump severely criticized NATO, and even went so far as describing the organisation as “obsolete” (McCurry, 2016). The epicentre of the debate was Europe’s unwillingness to spend more for its own defence and its failing efforts to meet NATO’s 2% guideline (Funding NATO, 2017).

Despite such harsh criticism, Trump administration did not abstain from taking concrete steps to counter Moscow in defence of Allies (De Luce, Gramer, & Tamkin, 2018). For example, U.S. increased its posture in Europe by deploying rotational forces, to include an armoured brigade combat team and a combat aviation brigade. Additionally, U.S. provided battalion task force for NATO’s enhanced forward presence in Poland, pre-positioned equipment for additional Armoured Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), doubled maritime deployments to the Black Sea, executed bomber assurance and deterrence missions in Europe and, for the first time deployed fifth-generation fighters to Europe (House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Security Challenges in Europe, 2018). In the fiscal year 2018, U.S. Department of Defence requested nearly $ 4.8 bn for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), some $ 1.4 bn increase compared to that of 2017 (Pellerin, 2017). Furthermore, Secretary of Defence, Jim Mattis, during a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in February 2017 stated: “the Alliance remains a fundamental bedrock for the United States.” Yet, U.S. continues and will continue to put constant pressure on Allies over this 2% guideline (Joint Press Statements, 2017).

Many experts and scholars has spilled ink and shared their assessments on the issue, in many cases taking sides. With the study at hand, our aim is to find answers to the question of how NATO financially adapts itself to the crises escalating in and around Euro-Atlantic region and how EU and non-EU Allies share the burden. We intend to inform public debate about the real substance of the current debate by delving deep into official figures given by NATO and SIPRI. We present a balanced view of the Ally defence spending, avoiding the extremes of dismissing European reluctance as avoidance from paying the costs of its own security or justifying U.S. insistence. We do argue that both the United States and Europe are less capable militarily in Europe (Techau, 2015) to counter contemporary threats and thus Europe’s defence is in jeopardy. Both sides are right in their arguments and the technical differences are to be discussed and solved on the table. In the final part, we dare to draw few conclusions and make policy recommendations.

2. Methodology

In our research we examined defence expenditure data of the Allies in four different periods, all of which constitute a historical milestone with implications on defence spending trends. Those periods are:

- 1980-1991, last decade of the Cold War,
- 1992-2001, from the immediate afterward of the Cold War till 9/11 terror attacks,
- 2000-2009, from the start of global war on terror until global financial crisis,
- 2010-2017, the last and the most recent epoch of the Alliance. As might have been realized, second and third periods are overlapping in that both periods have the years 2000 and 2001. The reason for that is to better monitor the devastating effects of 9/11 attacks on defence and security domain with further implications on defence expenditures.

In our effort to find explanations for general defence spending trends, we predicated
our study upon global trends and omitted divergences in micro-trends such as the rivalry between Turkey and Greece not to bias our general findings.

Before further diving into the details, several clarifications should be made;

- France didn’t share her equipment expenditure data with NATO authorities until 1995. Thus, her GDP is not taken into account while calculating EU equipment expenditure ratios for the missing years.

- German defence expenditure for Berlin and occupation costs were not taken into consideration.

- The “GDPS” and the “defence expenditures” of new NATO Members have been added according to respective membership years. This have a slight effect in years between 2004 and 2009, the years of enlargement of NATO to Eastern Europe.

- Based on the fact that Iceland does not possess standing armed forces, its defence expenditure data – if there is any – was neglected in NATO documents.

- The reader should be cognizant of the differing nature of the data that NATO and the World Bank provides. Despite being retrieved from the same sources, we came across inconsistencies within the reports. To be more precise, the five-yearly reports published pursuant to NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) reflect differences on yearly basis. So, based on the selection of the report year, slight differences may appear on different studies.

- For reasons of clarity, we used the NATO accredited term “defence expenditure” rather than “military expenditure”. “Equipment expenditure” includes major equipment expenditure and Research & Development devoted to major equipment as defined by NATO. Some charts illustrate defence expenditure as quantity (in U.S. dollars), while some others as ratio. For the latter, we simply mean the ratio of the defence expenditure to the GDP of a given year. Equipment expenditures were only given as ratios, namely as the percentage of total defence expenditure.

- The open source data provided by NATO (Information on Defence Expenditures, 2018) and World Bank/SIPRI (Military Expenditure (% of GDP), 2018) databases have been used in the charts. NATO uses 2010 constant $ figures for defence expenditure data in its most recent papers. However, The World Bank, gives 2015 constant $ figures in its database. We used official NATO reports with 2010 constant $ figures where possible. For the rest, the World Bank data has been used.

- Reports released by NATO generally, if not always, reflect geographical perspective and divide data into two main categories; North Atlantic and Europe. This trend has been replaced by a division of U.S. and other Allies recently. Below is the latest chart from the Secretary General’s 2017 Annual Report, constituting another example.

- In order to tailor our findings according to our main audience, namely EU, we rearranged data and divided it into two new subsets: EU Allies and non – EU Allies, a departure from the current American-centric illustration.

![Chart 1: Alliance GDP and Defence Expenditure Shares in 2017 (The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2017, 2018).](image-url)
3. Defence Expenditure of Allies in Four Periods


The last decade of Cold War witnessed a constant rise in defence expenditure of NATO members, though not proportional with respective growth in their GDPs. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while increasing her defence expenditure caused a similar increase in the West with remarkable deterioration in relations with USSR.

This had further implications on figures. Although holding about 60% of total GDP of NATO-member states, the non – EU Allies’ defence expenditure made up roughly 70% of the total. (see Tables 1 and 2)

Except for 1991, as a whole group, EU Allies kept their defence expenditure ratios above 3% minimum except for 1990 [2.93%] and 1991 [2.74%], the year USSR dissolved. This became true although at declining percentages (see Chart 3, green line). Individually, except for Luxembourg, all Allies kept their defence spending above 2% individually throughout the period (in those days the NATO guideline was 3%). Non – EU Allies though, exposed to various risks and threats kept their defence expenditures well above 5% (Chart 3, blue line). Of course, figures belonging to U.S., a giant Ally, dominate the entire chart.

From the perspective of equipment expenditure, except for U.S., UK and to a certain extent the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Greece and Turkey, Allies couldn’t exceed 20% guideline (see Chart 3, blue bars for non-EU, green bars for EU Allies). As a whole, non – EU Allies conformed to 20% guideline (thanks to the U.S.) while EU Allies fell as low as 15% especially in 1991. As we will witness in the following period, the collapse of the USSR directly affected the defence expenditures and sharp declines were observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Expenditure Share of NATO Allies</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
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<td>Non - EU</td>
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Table 1: Total Defence Expenditure Share of NATO Allies (1980 - 1991), Source: (SIPRI Mil.Exp. Database).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP Share of NATO Allies</th>
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<td>EU</td>
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Table 2: Total Equipment Expenditure Share of NATO Allies (1980 - 1991), Sources: (Information on Defence Expenditures, 2018), (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).


In the period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11 attacks, NATO members’ GDPs rose, while their defence budgets fell at a constant rate till Kosovo War. NATO member states and especially EU Allies benefited much from the cuts in defence spending, which has been often dubbed as peace dividend (Gupta, Clements, Bhattacharya, & Chakravarti, 2002). This was an outcome of absence of any credible conventional threat anymore to challenge themselves or NATO.

However, the deterioration of the security situation in Western Balkans caused a bounce back for European defence expenditure. The bloodshed in Bosnia and NATO’s direct involvement in the Kosovo War caused a steady growth in Allies' defence budgets (see Chart 4). As GDP share of the non – EU Allies rose, so did their defence expenditures. (See Tables 3 and 4)

When it comes to the defence expenditure/GDP ratio, the figures for both EU and non – EU Allies show dramatic falls when compared to the previous period, though at different rates.

The ratios for non-EU Allies follow a constant fall from 4.9% (1992) to 2.86% (2001). EU Allies, on the other hand, follow a rather cautious behaviour about their spending, arguably due to aforementioned conflicts between ex-Yugoslavian states. Their respective ratios follow a steady fall from 2.61% (1992) to 1.89% (2001) (see Chart 5, blue line for non-EU, green line for EU Allies). As a group, EU Allies fall below 2% threshold after 1997.

Similar to the previous period, equipment expenditure percentages of the EU Allies were consistently below 20% threshold (see Chart 5, green bars) while non – EU Allies never fell below that threshold (see Chart 5, blue bars).

States like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland that attained membership in this period had little effect on the overall defence expenditure of the Alliance. But the political impact of their membership was huge, and their NATO membership paved the way for their EU membership in the coming years.

c. War on Terror (2001 – 2009)

Both EU and NATO had their largest enlargement wave during this period. The expansion was towards eastern strategic direction, namely Eastern Europe and Balkans or former Russian “sphere of influence”.

This period also witnessed the “operationalization of NATO”. In line with U.S.-led war on terror, NATO engaged in the fight in Afghanistan while continuing its existence in the Western Balkans. Although NATO handed over much of its responsibilities to EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, burden on the NATO nations remained almost unchanged.

GDP share for the period remained almost constant for both groups. From defence expenditure perspective however, non-EU Allies' share constantly increased from 66% in 2000 to 75% in 2009, whereas those of EU Allies decreased from 34% in 2000 to 25% in 2009. (see Tables 5 and 6)

The reasons for such inverse movement between the two groups can be attributed to 9/11 attacks and following actions by U.S. and the Coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq. The two campaigns had enormous effect on defence expenditures of the U.S. between 2001-2009. U.S. defence expenditure increased by 50% in less than a decade when compared to the other sector expenditures, increasing on average about 13.5%. Over the same period, defence expenditure of non-EU members on average increased from 2.38% of their respective GDPs to 2.58% while that of EU members decreased from 1.81% to 1.64%. For the latter, slight increase in defence expenditure ratio in 2009 was caused by the decline in GDPs due to 2008 global economic crisis.

Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 wasn’t perceived as a threat enough to increase defence budget neither by EU nor by non-EU members. Unlike EU Allies, non-EU Allies satisfied the 20% equipment expenditure guideline as a whole. (see Chart 7, blue and green bars)

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<th>Defence Expenditure Share of NATO Allies</th>
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Table 5: Total Defence Expenditure Share of NATO Allies (2000-2009), Source: (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).

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Table 6: Total Equipment Expenditure Share of NATO Allies (2000-2009), Sources: (Information on Defence Expenditures, 2018), (SIPRI Military Exp. Database).

Chart 7: Defence Expenditure as % of GDP in Comparison with Equipment Expenditure as % of DE between 2000 – 2009 Sources: (Information on Defence Expenditures, 2018), (SIPRI).
d. MENA Challenges and Cold War 2.0 (2010-2017)

Latest decade witnessed a rupture in international order. Euro-Atlantic region faced multiple threats of both conventional and non-conventional nature emanating from eastern and southern flanks. Events triggered by Arab Spring had disastrous effects for populations in the region and its effects spilled over Europe as well. Russia, having learned valuable lessons from Russian – Georgian War, responded to Western enlargement to Ukraine by illegal annexation of Crimea and occupation of Donbass region. In line with its Middle East strategy, Russia intervened in the fight in the Levant when it saw that its footprint was diminishing as the Ba’ath regimes fell one by one.

In the south, U.S., NATO and EU responded to the developments first with Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya then with Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Syria and Iraq against Daesh.

In the east, NATO both adapted to the new challenges and (re)assured its eastern Allies with a couple of measures most notably with Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). For some, Cold War 2.0 has commenced (Wintour, Harding, & Borger, 2016). New engagements have relatively decreased the importance of ongoing operations. For example, in 2012 there were more than 130,000 troops deployed in ISAF theatre (International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures, 2012). The biggest operation in NATO history shrank into a train, advise and assist mission (Resolute Support Mission, RSM) with merely 13,000 troops (Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures, 2015) in non-combat roles in less than 3 years. Relatively stable situation in the Western Balkans provided economy of power for NATO, however it couldn’t disengage from the region since Western Balkans has a potential to be a front in the struggles both against Daesh and Russia. Successor states of Yugoslavia, including Serbia are either too weak or too reluctant to resist Russian influence and/or extremism. These tremendous changes in the security landscape caused great turbulence in the defence expenditure of the Alliance.

Reverting back to the statistics, when compared to the previous period, GDP share

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Table 7: Total Defence Expenditure Share of NATO Allies (2010 - 2017), Source: (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).

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Table 8: Total Equipment Expenditure Share of NATO Allies (2010 - 2017), Sources: (Information on Defence Expenditures, 2018), (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).
between EU and non-EU members remained unchanged. However, starting from 2015, EU defence expenditure share increased due to the Russian aggression. (see Tables 7 and 8) Downwards trend in defence expenditures veered in an opposite direction when Russia intervened in Ukraine (Chart 8, blue and green bars). This shift in trend can also be observed in defence and equipment expenditure ratios of both EU and non-EU nations (Chart 9).

Although nations raised their defence spending, except U.S., UK and Greece (from 2015 on Estonia and Poland) they still fell short of 2% requirement. Estonia and Poland met 2% requirement starting from 2015, a direct consequence of unrest in Ukraine in 2014. It is arguable that Russia’s irredentist policies put an end to long lasting stagflation in defence sector in some allies.

For EU, Ukraine Crisis put an end to the decrease in defence expenditures in 2015 and further reversed it to reach 2.8% although rate of GDP increase was only 1.7% compared to previous year. It can be deduced that EU members couldn’t get over the deleterious effects of 2008 Global Crisis as non-EU members.

As for the equipment expenditure ratios, as a whole, non-EU NATO members either met or approached to 20% threshold in this period. However, EU members have only been close to touch the line in 2017 with 19.13% on average (see chart 9 blue and green bars respectively).

Russian intervention in Ukraine caused a change in threat perception especially in Eastern Flank of NATO. While half of those members’ (bordering Russia) defence expenditure was below 1% of their GDP in 2014 and for the rest below 2%, nearly half of the group’s defence expenditure met the 2% target in 2017 (Chart 10).

**Chart 8: NATO Defence Expenditure in Comparison with GDP between 2010-2017**

**Sources:** (Information on Defence Expenditures, 2018), (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).
When we look at the overall defence expenditure ratios of last four decades, a constant fall especially after the Cold War is observed (Chart 11). However, non-EU NATO members, especially U.S. seem much more responsive to the risks and threats emanating around Euro-Atlantic region. Decline in EU member NATO nations’ defence expenditure ratios would only be stopped by the Ukraine Crisis.

What would happen if 2% and 20% targets could have been reached?

NATO Guideline for members since 2006 has been spending 2% of their GDPs in defence and 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment. The latter refers to major equipment procurement as money spent on missile systems, missiles (conventional weapons), nuclear weapons, aircraft, artillery,
combat vehicles, engineering equipment, weapons and small arms, transport vehicles, ships and harbour craft and electronic and communications equipment. Even though 2% is not a perfect tool to measure contribution to collective defence, it is useful for members to set a target to reach. The difference between targeted and actual defence expenditure was $ 89 bn in 2010 and the annual gap reached to the level of $ 121 bn in 2016. If all NATO Members would have satisfied 2% threshold, they would have spent $ 769 bn more on defence between 2010-2016. $ 219 bn of this amount was supposed to be on equipment expenditure. If this additional amount had been spent on equipment, it could mean a more self-sufficient Europe in defence, more contribution to NATO missions, less need of support from U.S. in deterrence and defence of European defence and more arms import from U.S.

Arms import by EU Allies between 2010-2016 was $ 22 bn and the $ 11 bn of that came from U.S. This became true even though 5 of the 8 largest arms importers are EU member states. Possible increase in defence equipment expenditure of NATO Members would possibly increase arms export of U.S., even though the amount would still be nearly negligible when compared to the total of American arms sales figures.

4. Positions of U.S. and Germany in 2% Debate (General Policy Statements)

Both inspired by Roosevelt, Obama was speaking softly while Trump is carrying a big stick. Regardless of the changing tides of daily politics in the U.S. and idiosyncratic statements of late president Trump, National Security Strategy explicitly indicates that U.S. is ready for (un)conditional support to its NATO Allies (National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017). The strategy reads: “The United States remains firmly committed to its European allies and partners as well as Article V of the Washington Treaty.” The U.S. sees NATO as a cornerstone in its multilateral approach to global security and a precious tool to maintain superiority over its competitors. So far unfaltering U.S. contribution to NATO efforts and budget is a testimony for that.

Yet, American policymakers don’t shy away from reminding their Allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defence and pay their fair share to protect mutual interests, values and Western way of life. They repeat: ‘The United States fulfils our defense responsibilities and expects others to do the same.’ (National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017).
Rose Gottemoeller, a U.S. diplomat and first ever female Deputy Secretary General in the history of NATO continuously stresses the need for complementarity between NATO and EU efforts (NATO Deputy Secretary General Discusses Transatlantic Partnership at Brussels Forum, 2018). Similar concerns were raised by U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchinson about possible protectionist behaviour of European Allies in defence sector (Erlanger, 2018).

As one of the major players in this debate, German Minister of Defence Ursula Von der Leyen found U.S. calls on boosting up defence expenditures as ‘a fair demand’ (US Request for NATO Spending Boost ‘a Fair Demand,’ German Defense Minister Says, 2017). However, Germany has two caveats. First, Germany continually emphasizes the importance of the EU as a partner for NATO. Second, it questions the added value of the defence expenditures.

Germany recognises its duty and responsibility to contribute to collective defence through strengthening the cohesion and capacity of NATO and the EU. To that end, Germany gives priority to strengthening NATO’s European pillar, by interlinking and integrating European armed forces and coherent interaction between NATO and the EU.

According to the German Security Policy, The German Government is determined to spend 2% of its GDP on defence and invest 20% of this amount in major equipment over the long term and subject to available resources in order to meet the target set by NATO. However, it also works towards shifting the focus in NATO more towards the relationship between expenditure and performance. Germany questions how nationally invested funds contribute to strengthening NATO capabilities. In this respect, Germany uses Framework Nations Concept to strengthen NATO’s European pillar (White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 2016).

In line with the security policy, European Defence Report, published prior to Munich Security Conference 2018 argues that countries that spend most on defence are not necessarily those that make the most significant contributions to European or Allied security. Some may spend more than 2% of their GDP on defence but make only minor contributions to the Alliance as a whole and seldom show up for NATO or EU missions. Other countries fall short of the 2% goal while providing crucial capabilities to joint missions or by regularly committing troops to common operations (European Defence Report, 2017).

The issue was further expanded upon within Munich Security Report 2018 (Munich Security Report 2018, To the Brink- and Back?, 2018). The report included a hypothetic scenario illustrating that if all EU-28 states and Norway spent 2% on defence, it would generate an additional $114 bn resource per year. Within that amount, $22 bn would go to the equipment costs if 20% guideline were to be met. However, the report argues that this additional resources would make no meaningful change in short and medium terms if the resources were to be spent within existing mechanisms and structures (Munich Security Report 2018, To the Brink- and Back?, 2018).

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

Defence expenditures of NATO members started to decrease in the last year of the Cold War. This decline became more evident and constant after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Recent developments showed more clearly that defence expenditure is responsive to crises / threats and proximity to them. Understandably, NATO members located in the western neighbourhood of Russia are far more responsive to the threat than others while radical terrorism in the Middle East contributed to reversing the downward trend in defence spending. Still, defence expenditure of most NATO member states, most of whom are EU members is currently far from 2% guideline which was agreed by the Allies as early as 2006.

As of 2017, except Estonia, Greece, Poland and Romania no EU member NATO nation came even close to the 2% guideline in defence spending. This is of particular concern for U.S. because it is the one who closes the gap. As NATO Secretary General put it on several occasions, after Brexit, 80% of NATO defence
spending will be coming from non-EU Allies (Doorstep by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Start of the European Union Foreign Affairs Council in Defence Format, 2017). Despite frustration among Its ranks, the U.S. remains committed to the Alliance and offers its unconditional support to the Allies.

Germany’s choices on defence spending are of particular importance since It is the locomotive of EU and a decisive player in continental Europe. Having recognized the necessity of increasing the defence expenditure, Germany questions the efficiency of existing guidelines and tries to find wiser ways to spend the expected defence budget.

NATO, by far the most reliable politico-military organisation, has proved its utility in defending Europe in the most cost-effective way against any threat since its establishment. Europe doesn’t have any alternative for NATO in the foreseeable future. This makes NATO as the most useful tool for Europe to cope with the existing risks and threats.

Even though reduced defence expenditures were justified upon collapse of the USSR, the global security landscape has changed immensely since then, stipulating the otherwise. Latest figures published by NATO show an upwards trend in almost all metrics. Despite lack of clarity and inherent weaknesses in measurement, 2%-20% guidelines can be seen as an avenue to develop missing defence capabilities. Checks and balances within NATO decision-making mechanisms minimize the risks of unexpected consequences for each player. Besides, top NATO officials play a crucial role in finding common ground between different parties and keeping Allies focused on fair burden sharing. While doing so, they continuously express the need for complementarity between NATO and EU efforts on European Defence.

Considering all reasons mentioned above, EU Allies are not ready to conform to the guidelines with no plan about where this will take them. U.S. on the other hand wants to see more European willingness to take on more burden for their own defence. All parties have valid arguments from their perspectives. What is essential for the time being is to sit around a table and find common ground. At the end of the day, all members tend to adjust their operational contributions based upon the operation’s significance with regard to their national interests (McQuilton, 2015). Among those interests, Alliance solidarity and cohesion which provides deterrence might be the most valuable one.
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Burden Sharing at NATO and the Battle of 2 Percent


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