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Horizon Insights

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A Comparative Study of Russian Political Warfare against the West and the Western (NATO & EU) Counteractions

Why the EU and NATO have failed to manage the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

What Comes After ISIS: A Sociological Analysis of Radicalisation into Violent Extremism

Weak states and Post-ISIS Challenges
Post-Daesh Challenges for Europe

How can't ISIS re-emerge?

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Russian Political Warfare and Post-ISIL Challenges



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Acknowledgements

This publication consists of analyses of contemporary Russian grand strategy and respective actions against West which are in general outlined under the context of Russian Political Warfare, and post-ISIL challenges and its implications for the West, particularly Europe.

The first article “A Comparative Study of Russian Political Warfare against the West and the Western (NATO & EU) Counteractions” firstly defines political warfare and its new forms such as hybrid methods and blurring war, then develops a new conceptual framework which provides an interdisciplinary approach to understand the specifics of political warfare against the West, and explores how and why the West has failed in countering and undermining political warfare employed by especially one-man ruled states. Finally, it proposes ways and means in order to explain how to counter political warfare in the future.

The second article “Why the EU and NATO have failed to manage the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?” mainly focuses on the Russia-Ukraine crisis which has disclosed the Russian political wills with the undertaken actions. It analyses the drivers and the reasons of NATO and the EU’s poor reaction against Russia. Then it emphasizes why and how the roles of NATO and the European Security Strategy should be reconsidered in the light of energy security policy of the EU, and why NATO and the EU needs to improve their responsiveness rather than readiness.

The third article “What Comes After ISIS: A Sociological Analysis of Radicalisation into Violent Extremism” intends to fill this gap through providing a comprehensive sociological model which would be suitable for explaining the process of radicalization both for individuals who reside in source countries (Middle East) and for those who reside in Western countries. To sum up, this paper elucidates the nature of the sociological process by which an individual adopts radical views, joins an extremist organization, and engage in violence; and extends policy recommendations towards the effective sociological measures that should be taken to undermine the process that might culminate in violent extremism.

The fourth article “How can’t ISIS re-emerge? Weak states and Post-ISIS Challenges” aims to provide recommendations for policymakers to help them address the root causes for the original birth of ISIS in order to preclude its re-emergence after its collapse. In this sense, the article argues that weak states could be convenient places for ISIS for these purposes because the weak capacity of these states in maintaining law and order and managing border security might appeal to terror groups to re-invigorate its fighting and mobilization capacity.

The last article “Post-Daesh Challenges for Europe” aims to find answers to the question: what exactly awaits Europe in the post-Daesh world? This question is essential in that countering and defeating a threat requires first understanding its true nature and anticipating its next moves based on this insight. This study aims at serving to fulfill these two tasks: understanding and anticipating. Operationalizing NATO's multiple futures methodology, the article looks into four probable scenarios based upon the trends so far. At the end of each future, policy recommendations, an attempt to change futures through stopping or reversing those trends are made. Attracting attention to the root causes that gave rise to Daesh, the article argues that the EU and member states should contribute to efforts of state-building and to ameliorate social cohesion in Iraq. Internally, they should invest more on education to eliminate polarization and increase resilience against radicalisation.



A Comparative Study of “Russian Political Warfare against the West and the Western (NATO & EU) Counteractions”

1. Introduction

Since eruption of the Ukraine crisis, the world has witnessed a well-developed Russian political warfare strategy and the hybrid model, utilized by Kremlin, which have had destabilizing consequences and as well as wide-ranging implications for international security, in particular for Europe. While the concept seems like a novelty, in fact, Putin has built up current Russian political warfare strategy against the West on a valuable historical background and experiences dates back to the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union (Dickey, 2015).

On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the West mostly focus on public diplomacy and strategic communication to influence the foreign audience rather than political warfare (Boot and Doran, 2013). From my perspective, this shift creates a gap in all aspects of political warfare and makes the West vulnerable to political warfare waged by particularly one-man ruled states and non-state enemies.

Therefore, it is high time to analyse the reasons behind the West, notably NATO's and the EU's, poor reaction against new forms of political warfare as well as to find ways to improve their response capacity and capabilities through a variety of mechanisms. In this paper, the first in a series of three articles, I will define political warfare and its new forms such as hybrid methods and blurring war, which is to be basis for the rest of the study. Then, I will develop a new conceptual framework which provides an interdisciplinary approach to understand the specifics of political warfare against the West, and to explore how and why the West has failed in countering and undermining political warfare employed by especially

one-man ruled states. Finally, I will propose ways and means that I will go in detail in my further studies in order to explain how to counter political warfare in the future.

2. Literature Review

a. Political Warfare Defined

As most scholars refer to the often-quoted passage of Clausewitz, I also prefer to start with the very famous statement of him. “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means ...” (Clausewitz, trans. by Rapoport, 1982). Some scholars such as Kennan (1948) who have Clausewitzian perspective, define the political warfare as “the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace” (Dickey, 2015). Seabury and Codevilla (1989) extend these arguments by adding “propaganda, agents of influence, sabotage, coups de main, economic sanctions, and support for foreign groups” to political warfare means. To Gray (2009), “Peace and war are different phases of statecraft—distinctive, but essentially united and permanently connected.”

Thus, we could come to realize that political warfare is political because it is a strategy that intentionally avoids an open war, but at the same time, it is warfare because it is covertly violent and adversarial. With its nature, political warfare has a distinct character from other forms of warfare, as it uses less-bloody means. Despite the fact that one of the core principles of political warfare is to avoid conventional war, it is still a form of war between diplomacy and conventional war.

It must be noted that the use of force or credible threat of violence is a necessary step for pursuing




political warfare. With regard to this argument, Seabury and Codevilla (1989) highlight that “political warfare may serve as a surrogate for actual war, but it does not work without actual force backing it up.” This is because, as Art (2009) claims, “military power undergirds the other instruments of statecraft.” In this respect, we could argue that activities conducted during political warfare campaign could easily continue in support of conventional war especially in shaping the conflict environment.

A different approach is evident in some other scholars such as Hoffman (2014) who argues in a Clausewitzian sense, all kinds of war could be seen as political warfare. They claim that political warfare is not new, especially by quoting to Sun Tzu’s Art of War in 512 BC and Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War in 433 BC (Smith, 1989). But Codevilla (2009), a political warfare theorist, emphasizes that the transition from political warfare to peace or war is not clear. Contrary to the scholars like Hoffman, I would argue that political warfare, in the continuum of peace and war, could be seen as an early stage of conventional war to shape the conflict environment, or as an admixture integrating all means of national power which occupies a space between war and peace as Sun Tzu stated “...the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting at all” (Sun and Griffith, 1971).

b. The Origin and Evolution of Russian Political Warfare

Needless to say, Clausewitz’s work has enjoyed a diverse readership. Among them, early communist thinkers such as Engels, Lenin, and Stalin (even Mao) were also familiar with Prussian way of war, and no doubt that they were fascinated by Clausewitz who claims that war is a real political instrument and the servant of politics. In this respect, we could hold that their understanding of the links between politics and war was identical to Marxist theory (Dexter, 1950).

From my point of view, to understand the drivers of Russian political warfare, we should examine the longstanding “Russian imperial identity”, sketching from its expansion in the 16th century through 19th centuries and the records of the Soviet Union (Oliker, Crane, Schwartz and Yusupov, 2009). Particularly during the Cold War era -and now as well-, its imperial identity has a crucial role in framing Russian political warfare campaign in its periphery. Therefore, Russian analysts and accounts characterize this periphery as “buffer-zone”, namely countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union (Trenin, 2011). In conjunction with this mindset, Hill and Gaddy (2013) also note that Putin highlighted “*derzhavnost*”—the belief that Russia is destined always to be a great power exerting its influence abroad” as shown below.



(Figure 1: Russia’s Desired Spheres of Influence, source: RAND RR1826-2.1¹)

Additionally, analysis of the origin and the evolution of Russian political warfare reveal that Russia has been using political warfare not only to gain regional dominance in its buffer-zone, but also challenge the unipolarity of the West, and undermine the role of NATO and the EU (Dickey, 2015; Steward 2015). To illustrate this argument, I would also mention that Russia has sought to strengthen its status as a great power through its support for the UN;

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) association; the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; the Eurasian Union and other organizations that support the role of regional powers (Lukin, 2016). In this respect, we should revisit the frozen conflicts such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, East Ukraine, and Transnistria as evidence and toolkit that Russia redeveloped political warfare capacity and capabilities in order to gain influence in its near abroad neighbouring NATO and the EU borders. The rise of crude oil and naturel gas prices since the late 1990s and early 2000s have promoted the resurgence of the Russia and its military transformation as utmost important enablers of Russian political warfare and Russian supranationalism as well.



(Figure 2: Survey Results on the Scope of Russia's National Interests²)

The current Russian political warfare strategy, dating back to Bolsheviks and now using hybrid methods which was mainly shaped by Gerasimov (Chief of the Russian General Staff)'s doctrine, asks for a holistic, harmonized approach that comprises political, economic, humanitarian, informational, and other non-military instruments (Suzen, 2014). In conjunction with the Gerasimov doctrine, Russian Federation 2010 Military Doctrine, amended in 2014, conceptualized Russian political warfare. In that document, *"simultaneous use of military and non-military mean..."* was emphasized. In other words, "Russia is making full use of its diplomatic,

informational, military, and economic levers of power" (Dickey, 2015).

On this basis, Putin developed a strategy to use soft power elements in sync with military means (Reisinger & Golts, 2014). In his speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club's annual meeting in 2014, Putin argued that "the Western system of order threatened Russian interests", and he also urged that "if the existing system of international relations, international law and the checks and balances in place got in the way of these aims, this system was declared worthless, outdated and in need of immediate demolition."³ Based on his statements, we could hold that, from Russian view, -especially with their enlargement- the EU and NATO, and other institutions related to them are threatening Russian security and influence within its "buffer-zone" extends in the post-Soviet space.

To me, the Ukraine Crisis is a turning point of Russian political warfare which has been evolving since 1900s. In 2014, in the following months of violent turbulence in Ukraine, masked Russian Special Forces and Russian backed para-military groups, known as *"little green men"*, seized government buildings and key infrastructure in Crimea. In reality, this de facto invasion was not a surprise, but a deliberate and long-term political warfare strategy directed by Kremlin. A closer look at Russian political warfare reveals that hybrid methods using soft and hard power elements in a mutually complimentary and supportive manner are camouflaged by professional propaganda and strategic communication. (Suzen, 2016). This Soviet-style disruption uses "masked warfare" with the addition of computers, social and mass media, and deception operations paralyzed the Ukrainian government and the international community and they could take no action (Dickey, 2015). Furthermore, Russia conducted cyber-attacks against Ukraine (Kofman & Rojansky, 2015; Pyung-Kyun, 2015), organized Pro-Russian



Ukrainians to manipulate and terrorize the Eastern Ukraine. Putin⁴ manipulated the outcome of the referendum, which resulted in favour of annexation as well. (Reisinger & Golts, 2014). Putin did not even hesitate to play the “energy card” at every opportunity by exploiting Ukraine and Europe’s energy dependency on Russia (Popescu, 2014). Additionally, Russia has also exported instability to Ukraine through the use of economic warlords, mafia, and criminals whose origins are linked to the late-Soviet era black market (Dickey, 2015).

In the early period of his first term, Putin pursued closer relations with NATO and the EU⁵, as Trenin (2006) summarized⁶, Russia changed its view and left the Western solar system to create their own Moscow-centred strategy. At this point, I have to mention the most important driver of this shift, Eurasianism, discussed by some Russian intellectuals such as Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Panarin, who argued “a version of reintegration of the post-Soviet space into a Eurasian sphere of influence for Russia” (Dugin, 2012). In accordance with this change, there is no doubt that the Ukraine crisis was a dramatic shift away from the West. To this end, it must be noted that Russian way of warfare began initially by Bolsheviks, then kept by Soviets after World War II, evolved throughout the Cold War, and finally revisited by Kremlin, following the turn towards authoritarianism in the 1990s (Zimmerman, 2014). Additionally, from my understanding, Russian involvement in Syria in contrast with Western objectives, and Russia-Turkey rapprochement that enables Russia to use Turkey as a trojan horse within the Alliance, should be seen as a part of current Russian political warfare against the West as well.

3. Discussion

In this part, I will question actions and counteractions of three major actors (the EU, NATO, and Russia) in relation to full spectrum of political warfare, by applying a multi-disciplinary approach and

I will develop a set of measures to be used in the processes of applying or countering political warfare. I believe, this study would be of benefit for scholars in the field of international relations and security, peace studies or conflict resolution. The research would also have practical importance for decision-makers at the national and the supra-national level in Europe and NATO. The following seven hypotheses and hypothesized model are proposed to be tested in my further studies. In this paper, I aim to identify hypothesis, but since it requires a comprehensive long-term field study on the activities of NATO and the EU, albeit this paper also provides initial findings related to some hypothesis such as H₁₋₄, I plan to test them in my further studies. Next steps of this research will be primarily based on extensive investigation of databases, archival and academic materials; internet survey; follow-up interviews with key leaders; round-table discussions which could gather tacit knowledge on the root causes and drivers of the EU and NATO’s failure in countering political warfare.

a. Proposed Hypotheses

H₁: The Russian Grand Strategy since 2000, military transformation, and the Gerasimov doctrine have developed Russian political warfare capacity and capabilities.

H₂: Liberal democracies acting as “a strategic sponsor” in international organizations are more vulnerable to political warfare employed by one-man ruled countries that are also responsible for their own security.

H₃: In the framework of political warfare; NATO and the EU’s deterrence capacity and capabilities are less effective or sufficient than Russia.

H₄: In the framework of political warfare; the EU has less effective counter measures against Russian political warfare on the West.



H₅ : Current decision-making process and political military leadership in the EU and NATO have significant disadvantages when compared to the autocratic regimes which have uniform command and control structure, and political front.

H₆: Transformation and enhanced cooperation in defence planning and comprehensive crisis response process between the EU and NATO develops defence capacity and capabilities of these two organisations to conduct political warfare and undermine or counter political warfare.

H₇: If NATO and the EU reduce dependency of the US protection and power projection, the two organizations can develop defence capacity and capabilities against external threats and risks.




Figure 3: Hypothesized Model for Further Studies

b. Application of Theoretical Approaches to Political Warfare

In this paper, to provide a ground for next studies, I use Steward (2015)’s analytical tool, which extends Kennan (1948)’s overt-covert spectrum with direct-indirect approaches, to assess political warfare actions and counteractions of all parties as shown below.




Figure 4: Political Warfare Spectrum (Steward, 2015)

This analytical tool offers to evaluate political warfare actions, counteractions, and also contributes to develop a comprehensive approach in identifying effective practices for increased foreign affairs, security and defence establishments’ involvement in political warfare in the future. Table 1 shows us the toolkit and various techniques employed by Russia, which enable a political warfare actor to identify the general areas that can be manipulated in support of a political warfare objective. According to the Table, Russian political warfare actions can range from clandestine support of underground Russian-backed groups to all hard and soft instruments available to Russians such as black propaganda, agents of influence, sabotage, economic sanctions, cyber-attacks, and use of force as well; while NATO and the EU counteractions are based on primarily public diplomacy, strategic communication, and limited economic sanctions and assurance measures.

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Actions and Counteractions	Overt Direct	Overt Indirect	Covert Direct	Covert Indirect
Putin's Hybrid Tactics/Blurred War	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Energy blackmail - Economic manipulation - Strategic communication - White propaganda - Mil exercises for deterrence - Military buildup along the Ukrainian border - Annexation of Crimea - Invasion of Eastern Ukraine 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hybrid tactics in Eastern Europe - Russian military buildup in Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Syria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic deception - Psychological warfare/ information operations - Black Propaganda - Diplomatic support to oppositions - Cyber and troll attacks - Mobilized locals - Armed civilians - Para-military forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exporting corruption - Providing financial support to Russian-backed groups - Political destabilization - Russian trojan horses such as Turkey
NATO Counteractions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic Communication (The NATO-Russia Council meetings) - Assurance measures in Eastern Europe and Turkey <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Mil exercises for deterrence * Enhanced forward presence * NATO's VJTF⁷ - Suspension of all practical cooperation with Russia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alliance cohesion - Partnership with the countries in Russian buffer-zone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cyber defence 	- ?
The EU Counteractions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic Communication - Public diplomacy - Economic sanctions - Frozen policy dialogues and mechanisms of cooperation (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA⁸ - Lifting arms embargo on UKR - Common External Energy Policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diplomatic support to legal governments - Cyber defence 	- ?

Table 1: A Comparison Template of Political Warfare Spectrum

that can be manipulated in support of a political warfare objective. According to the Table, Russian political warfare actions can range from clandestine support of underground Russian-backed groups to all hard and soft instruments available to Russians such as black propaganda, agents of influence, sabotage, economic sanctions, cyber-attacks, and use of force as well; while NATO and the EU counteractions are based on primarily public diplomacy, strategic communication, and limited economic sanctions and assurance measures. From my perspective, I hardly doubt that the uniform command provides Russia a kind of situational superiority and an advantage in execution against both the EU and NATO, and an

opportunity for a systematic concentration of state authority. As group mobilization or collective action is very important to achieve political warfare objectives (Blackstock, 1964; Seabury and Codevilla, 1989), in my further studies, I will apply Social Movement Theory to political warfare actions and counteractions of all parties in order to understand the collective dynamics of the events. Additionally, I will discuss the true nature of governance types (liberal democracies vs. one-man ruled states) and its relations with political warfare. To achieve afore-mentioned goals, I will investigate applications of Democratic Peace Theory, Constructivism, and Liberalism to the EU and NATO, and Realism and Neo-realism to Russia. Furthermore,

I will focus on applications of Institutional Theory to all parties when questioning the role of political military leadership and decision-making process.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

This article, as the first of three articles in series, proposed a conceptual framework and some supporting models for policy makers, planners, and practitioners to better understand the new form of political warfare. Taking the new form of political warfare currently waged by Putin against the West into consideration, it could be argued that EU and NATO's response to Putin's protracted hybrid strategy has been ineffective. From my point of view, the EU and to some extent NATO's responses based on appeasement encourage Putin's aggression. In other words, NATO and EU lack strategy, policy, and the organizational framework for both implementing an effective political warfare strategy and countering thereof.

To me, Putin's political warfare affects the Western security and stability in three ways: a) it destabilizes the global security status quo, b) it threatens the EU's and NATO's solidarity and cohesion and undermine their roles in the international system, c) it sets an example for other possible adversaries how political warfare could be a valuable and effective way of war to target liberal democracies without triggering any armed conflict.

Although I will go in details in my further studies, based on the initial findings of this paper, I would like to highlight the following points which could bridge the gap between the conceptual framework presented in this paper and practice;

- The EU and NATO must keep dialog channels with Russia open. In this regard:

- The EU must improve its cooperation with Russia in common areas⁹ via/led by Permanent Partnership Council,

- NATO and the EU should approach Russia through a sense of joint responsibility and understanding with a special focus on countering radicalism, violent extremism, and terrorism; organized crime; non-proliferation; the Middle East peace process; and protection of human rights.

Rather than limiting NATO and EU enlargement demonstrating the rights of former Soviet republics to secure their own future, NATO and the EU must use a wide range of military and political tools to deter Russian aggression and preserve the liberal order,

To counter Russian efforts to divide and freeze the EU and the Alliance, the EU and NATO need for defence building or military transformation process in some particular areas such as decision-making, crisis response and operation management, and concept of operational art in order to launch and counter political warfare, in this context;

- European External Action Service involvement in political warfare will play a pivotal role in the Western political warfare strategy that encompasses all elements of soft and hard power and synchronizes the interagency community,

- For deterrence and enhanced responsiveness, the EU and NATO must adopt a proactive and integrated political warfare strategy to employ their sources to wage and counter political warfare, in particular to develop enhanced capacity building in eastern and southern flanks of Europe,

- The EU (and to some extent NATO) must reduce dependency of the US protection and power projection; in this respect, it is important to reverse the downward trend in European defence spending¹⁰, additionally the EU should develop Common Security and Defence Policy in order to allow to realize greater the EU-NATO cooperation.

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3. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860>
4. See Tom Balmforth, Russia mulls special day to recognize its polite people, 04 October 2014, <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-ukraine-cremia-little-green-men-polite-people/26620327.html>, Direct line with Vladimir Putin, 17 April 2014, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034>, and <http://www.vesti.ru/videos?vid=onair>, NATO would respond militarily to Crimea-style infiltration: general, 17.08.2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2041/08/17/us-ukraine-crisis-breedlove-idUSK-BN0GH0JF20140817>
5. See Vladimir Putin, “Speech in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany,” Berlin: President of Russia, September 25, 2001
6. “Until recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the centre but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely...”
7. Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
8. EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
9. Economy & the environment; freedom, security & justice (all negotiations and high-level dialogues are suspended, except technical level meetings); external security; research & education, including cultural aspects (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35939/european-union-and-russian-federation_en)
10. “Just three NATO allies (Greece, the UK, and the United States) exceeded the alliance’s goal of spending 2% of GDP on defence, for example in 2013, total defence spending by NATO European allies as a percentage of GDP was about 1.6%.” (Congressional Research Service, NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 1, 2014.)
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Why the EU and NATO Have Failed to Manage the Ukraine Crisis

The world observed a well-developed Russian strategy and military model have had destabilizing consequences and wide-ranging implications for international security, in particular for Europe, and global stability since the Ukraine crisis. Needless to say, most European countries and notably NATO conclude that Russian policy, military strategy, and military practice in the Ukraine crisis challenge the European security and carry significant implications for NATO, therefore the Ukraine crisis force the EU and NATO to concentrate on measures against Russian strategy.^[1]

In reality, Russia has already given the signals of its intentions via the Military Doctrine 2010 and Defence Strategy 2013 that list destabilization of the near abroad, in other words buffer zone, and NATO or the EU expansion, including deployment of military forces, as most relevant military threats. Both documents highlight that “Russia faced the very real threat of being side-lined in international affairs.”^[2] Furthermore MacKinnon suggests that in line with its new regime change strategy, the United States forced the former Soviet Union’s member states to establish their political institutions, provided funds for the opposition, and supported revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the revolutions added to the Kremlin’s perception that “Washington’s chief objective might have been to change the regime in Russia as well.”^[3] Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said “NATO’s expansion by pulling more Russia’s neighbouring countries into the alliance is unacceptable”.^[4] Therefore it could be concluded from Russian point of view that everything should be done to prevent NATO and the EU expansion which can be characterized as the greatest threat to Russian security, and that’s why Russia must restore its status as a great power inside its own sphere of influence.

It is the aim of this analytic paper to search why the EU and NATO have failed to manage the crisis emanating from Russian aggression and expansion in Ukraine, and to address the current strategic environment as well. I shall try to analyse the drivers and the reasons of NATO and the EU’s poor reaction against Russia, and finally I will emphasize why and how the roles of NATO and the European Security Strategy should be reconsidered in the light of energy security policy of the EU, and why NATO and the EU needs to improve their responsiveness rather than readiness.

The Drivers and the Reasons of NATO and the EU’s Poor Reaction Against Russia

The Rise of the Russia and the Russian Grand Strategy

As it is widely believed, the most important pillar of Russia’s recovery has been materialized via its economic boom in earnings from oil and gas exports. The rise of crude oil and naturel gas prices since the late 1990s and early 2000s have promoted the resurgence of the Russia, and allowed Russia to increasingly allocate funds towards its military forces and provided it with the leverage to exert pressure on its customers.^[5] Panel data from the World Bank-financed Russian Economic Barometer suggest that “by 2003–2005 capacity utilization rates had risen in most main sectors from lows of below 70% after the 1998 crisis to around 90%. Given the age and obsolescence of installed equipment (with an average age of nearly 20 years by mid-decade), the output gap had clearly closed.” From 2000 to 2008, its national security budget rose from 214 billion rubles to 1,017 billion. From 2008, Russia began to acquire new military hardware such as nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, and tanks.^[6] In addition to these developments, Russia has challenged the

current order by cultivating ties with rising powers such as BRICS countries to create a multipolar world order and also to counter NATO and the EU expansion.^[7]

Despite the fact that the world witnessed the collapse of Soviet Russia, in reality Russia remains a self-sufficient country and one of the richest nations in the world. According to a presentation given by Osipov at the Second Sociological Congress in Moscow, Russia has all the necessary pillars to achieve Great Power status.^[8] In other words, due to its geography, the socio-political system, natural resources, and nuclear weapons, Russia has remained a powerful country.^[9] In this frame, it could be concluded that after getting better the shortcoming of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's current foreign policy based on its economic boom is focused on bolstering Russia's prestige, supporting economic growth, and maintaining influence in its backyard. So, Putin has chosen to escalate the conflict in Ukraine, ignoring both the sanctions and the diplomatic pressures of the EU and NATO in response to Russia's aggression.

On the other hand, looking at the downward trend in European defence spending, and shortfalls in European defence capabilities, "just three NATO allies (Greece, the UK, and the United States) exceeded the alliance's goal of spending 2% of GDP on defence, for example in 2013, total defence spending by NATO European allies as a percentage of GDP was about 1.6%."^[10] On the contrary, Russian defence budget will rise over 4 per cent of GDP in the next ten years.^[11] Moreover, in addition to the ongoing global financial crisis, the cost of the military involvement in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Africa has made it difficult for both the EU and NATO members to act as the world's only economic and political authority.^[12]

The Transformation of Russian Armed Forces and the Russian Hybrid Model

Within this context; to carry out the new Russian foreign policy and security strategy, the armed forces of Russia have undergone a transformation that applies to structure, equipment, and leadership culture and thus replicates developments evident in Western armies.^[13] Thus, the Russian Armed Forces have evolved into a tool that can be used effectively in a national strategy of conflict management and conducting military operations, for example hybrid warfare.^[14]

In relation to the Russian Grand Strategy, in the speech held at the Russian Academy for Military Sciences in 2013, Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov lectured on the "the value of science in prediction". In this lecture, he first characterized modern wars and then derived challenges for Russian Armed Forces from his findings. He used the term "non-linear war". In this context, Russian Armed Forces' operation in Ukraine, in particular the annexation of Crimea, could be defined as "hybrid warfare" as frequently used. In other words, Gerasimov's theory describes a holistic, harmonized approach that comprises political, economic, humanitarian, informational, and other non-military instruments which are used simultaneously in order to achieve national interests. In short, the new Russian Military Doctrine mentions how military and non-military means are used in tandem in today's conflicts, but it also highlights the importance of new technology.

After beginning to implement its grand strategy and military transformation process, Russia has begun to test its new global force projection and sent a strategic deterrence message to the rest of the world. For example: show of force in Arctic region, creation of a new command and control system and construction of a new air defence system, long-range aircraft flypatrols in the Atlantic, boosting its fleet to reestablish its presence in the world's seas, in particular expanded Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean, new military exercises with China, and so on.^[15]

NATO and the EU Decision-Making Process versus Russian Uniform Command

Information from open sources says that with Construction of the new National Defence Centre in Moscow in 2014, during crisis, in case of war and also in disaster operations all relevant organs of the state such as Ministries of Economy, Finance, Internal Affairs and Disaster Control can operate under one uniform command, currently President Putin. On the other hand, when we look at the EU and NATO decision-making process, it is clear that the political complexities such as the Kosovo, Georgia and finally Ukraine cases inherent in North Atlantic Council and Military Committee debates mean that there is no simple fix to improve NATO or the EU decision-making. Moreover, some NATO officials believe that the growing necessity for rapid reaction indicates a clear need to develop a new process instead of the consensus and silence procedure to accelerate NATO decision-making process.^[16]

Similarly, turning to the EU side we see the same picture, for example European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called for forming an EU army capable of responding to security threats in member countries and states bordering the EU in March 2015, but there is no significant progress to form that kind of force consistent with the Common Security and Defence Policy.^[17] Furthermore, the gap or differences between European leaders' statements and the absence of hard and fast EU action highlights the "lethargy" in European decision-making.^[18] So, there is hardly any doubt that the uniform command provides Russia a kind of situational and implementation superiority against both the EU and NATO, and an opportunity for a systematic concentration of state authority.

Lack of Uniform Political Front Among Both NATO and the EU Against Russia

Before taking this analysis further, it is worth looking more closely at the significance of Russia's development and the impact of that development

on international perceptions of Russia and relations with Russia. With regard to this perspective, K.Govella and V.K. Aggarwal give significant examples:

Russia's imports are an important component of its best relationships with Western Europe – resulting, for example, in the German-led blocking of the Bush administration's attempt in 2008 to fast track NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Likewise, Russia's imports from the UK may help explain why the UK business lobby has been less effective in countering political tensions with Russia.^[19]

Moving to strategic decisive factors shaping the political front in the EU and NATO, I think we fully agree that the most significant by far must be the 2014 Ukrainian crisis which has aggravated numerous energy-related disputes and highlighted the overall politicization of energy issues between the EU and Russia. Regarding this significant factor, in particular the involvement of Western European energy groups in the new Russia-Europe gas pipeline projects called as "North Stream" and "South Stream", Guillet emphasizes that the EU leadership is certainly aware that member states had dissimilar interests, thus the EU is not prepared to fight with European energy champion, Gazprom.^[20] In line with this assumption, Paillard also highlights that "Europe's need for fuel and Russia's need for a stable export market would seem to make them natural trading partners for one another. 60% of Russian crude oil and 90% of Russian gas go to the European Union."^[21] Moreover, Russian energy security challenge is the most important driver of internal contradictions inside European energy security policy.^[22] Especially when we look at German, Italian and French cases that indicate a close friendship between the leaders of these states, we can see that they are showing specific function of networking in gas sphere involving European and Russian leaders.^[23]



That's why Blockmans claims that Putin may have – rightly – gambled that “the EU will not increase sanctions significantly, because the appetite for conflict with Russia is still limited in many European member states.”^[24] As an additional point, in general terms, we could hold from the view of the Baltic countries feeling themselves more vulnerable to Russia than Western European states during the Ukraine crisis were eager to take more deterrent measures against Russia. Overall assessment, we could clearly assume that the EU's weak hand in adopting further sanctions and the lack of uniform political front among both NATO and the EU against Russia due to the dependency on Russian energy (*for example: about 59% of the natural gas consumed in Poland, 80% in Hungary, 84% in Slovakia, and 57% in the Czech Republic*^[25]) and diverse economic perspectives paves the way for Russian aggression and expansion, at least encourage Russia to pursue its grand strategy.

To fight with this threat, Kazantsev highlights the realist perspective in international relations which based on “power”, and he holds that power can be understood in this context as “either making Europe less vulnerable for the threat of Russian gas supply disruption, or development of any types of instruments to pressurize Russia on energy security issues.”^[26]

On the contrary, apart from the realistic approach in the international relations, enhanced business ties could be used as an important element in producing a longer-term relationship. In relation to this idea, Kustova suggests that institutional developments in both the EU's and Russia's hydrocarbon sectors could cause a convergence of energy interests between the producers and consumers.^[27] In addition to that, with diversification of the external energy supply routes to Europe such as Nabucco and Transcaspian,^[28] Europe could speak with one voice in order to improve its position towards Russia by updating EU Common Foreign and Security Policy in the light of the energy security in future. At the same time, as mentioned in the

Swedish Defence Research Agency report in 2013, “Russia is well aware of the dangers of becoming isolated.” So, it could be expected that Russia is likely to tend to increase its efforts to cooperate with other countries and IOs as well, such as the Customs Union, Eurasian Union, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).^[29]

Lastly, although it could be hold that NATO sustains hardly its cohesion against Russia due to some specific reasons aforementioned, to demonstrate the “strength of the transatlantic bond, NATO has succeeded in implementing the Readiness Action Plan which ensures that the Alliance is ready to respond challenges from the east and the south, and particularly the Enhanced Forward Presence which is the largest reinforcement of NATO troops in the Eastern Europe for a generation.”^[30]

Conclusion

The commitment to universal norms and values, so typical in the EU and NATO, is de facto non-existent in Russia as we currently see in Ukraine crisis, in particular during annexation of Crimea, and finally in Syria. It can be concluded that the West's commitment to norms and values could be exploited as a weakness. In addition to that, due to the lack of coherence in policy, together with an obscure policymaking process, and the absence of an ambitiously conceived strategic vision among the EU and NATO members, the two organizations should adopt their military capabilities and decision-making process to the new strategic environment in particular shaped by hybrid threats as seen in Russian and ISIL's^[31] models. With respect to these realities, especially NATO should first enhance its responsiveness capacity and capabilities taking into account the members' budget constraints and the need to maintain a balance between security concerns and the EU's energy dependency on Russia. Secondly, fair burden and responsibility sharing between NATO's and the EU's members could ensure

sustainability of the taken measures against Russian aggression and guarantee a credible deterrence.

On the other hand, divergent interests, if well managed, can be part of an improving relationship. Therefore, it could be concluded that the fundamental geo-economic reality is that Europe is seriously and increasingly deficient in energy and Russia is likely to be the main energy supplier to Europe as Putin summarizes this situation very shortly: “we are in the same boat”. Therefore, in addition to practical assurance options for deterrence, taking into account the continuation of dependency of the EU and NATO members on Russian energy in foreseeable future, the EU and NATO might also work with Russia to address issues of instability in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the rise of China, counter global terrorism and extremism, and the proliferation of conventional weapons in Eurasia and the Middle East, instead of expanding NATO and the EU in Russian buffer zone. The discussions about energy security issues in NATO show that increased tension with Russia even create new additional problems for the Alliance since NATO could involve in new potential spirals of conflict due to Transatlantic solidarity.^[32]

Furthermore, Russia is the other principal nuclear power, and as in the past, it has still strategic deterrence. For this reason, if the EU and NATO wish to create a regime providing global stability and shaping bilateral relationship, finding a way to cooperate with Russia defining it as “a strategic partner” rather than compete with “the old enemy” might be a feasible solution to counter Russian aggression. For this purpose, the established Russia–NATO Council could be reactivated depends on Russian positive acts in Ukraine crisis. But there is a reality that we should keep in mind that the EU and NATO have causes to be sceptical of Russia’s declared intentions regarding Syria and Mediterranean to develop a security partnership. In other words, after

improving the EU and NATO responsiveness and deterrence capacity and capabilities, seeking ways for the integration of Russia with the international system rather than alienation of “the bear” could make substantial contribution to the global security and stability.

Finally, I strongly believe that the Ukrainian crisis shows the EU and NATO that firstly the European Security Strategy should be reviewed in the light of the EU–Russia economic and politic relations and the European energy security policy, secondly although NATO has enhanced its capacity and capabilities in terms of deterrence and defence posture, NATO should still tend to increase its “responsiveness” capacity and capabilities rather than its “readiness”.

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What Comes After ISIS: A Sociological Analysis of Radicalisation into Violent Extremism

1. Introduction

If we can determine what drives people to commit such heinous crimes, it is suggested, perhaps we can change their behaviour.^[1]

While it has been nearly two decades since the beginning of the global war on terrorism, the experiences gained in successive processes have revealed the fact that destroying terrorists in the battlefield is not a sufficient measure to neutralize the global threat of violent extremism. Even if a terrorist organization is deactivated in the battlefield—as is the case with Al-Qaida and ISIS examples—similar extremist ideas can proliferate in a different domain with a different organization. In this respect, along with the physical efforts exhibited in the combat zone, a successful war on violent extremism should also strategically focus on why individuals adopt and internalize the extremist visions and, in turn, engage in terrorist acts. To put it another way, as Borum emphasized, we should “seek to understand not only what people think, but how they come to think what they think, and, ultimately, how they progress—or not—from thinking to action.”^[2] This perspective provides an important hint regarding how to prevent the emergence of a new terrorist organization and to avert individuals’ acceptance of radical views after the ISIS falls. If we can clearly lay bare how individuals come to adopt radical views and participate in ISIS—in particular, and terrorist organizations—in general, we can take effective precautions to overcome this crucial issue. In line with this viewpoint, this policy report seeks an

answer to the question of how we can stem the tide of a re-emergence of violent extremist views after the fall of ISIS.

Extant academic research and policy reports have exerted a notable effort in explaining the triggers of participation in terrorist organizations. Some studies—especially studies from political science—have generally concentrated on the role of the ideology and the religion. Yet, the ideological transformation almost always takes place after joining a radical group and the ideology functions merely as a vehicle to be a violent extremist. The main question should be why these individuals feel a need to belong to a radical group and to which processes they are exposed until deciding to join radical groups. The “ideology” approach is therefore not sufficient to explain involvement in violent extremism. Explanations of religion as a trigger of violent extremism are also problematic. Recently, several academic studies demonstrated that the religion was seldom, if ever, the root cause of violent extremism.^{[3] [4] [5] [6]} Along with these researches, some other studies examined the issue from a sociological perspective and prioritized the illiteracy as the main cause of violent extremism. While this approach could be utilized for extremists who reside in Western countries, however, the unique case of ISIS clearly showed us that the average educational attainment of its members was higher than that of the public in source countries.

Aforementioned studies have generally failed to present a comprehensive model that explains the



social processes and accounts for the variability of individual and social-structural factors—facilitating the engagement in violent extremist actions—for different extremists residing in different countries. Thus, the current study intends to fill this gap through providing a comprehensive sociological model which would be suitable for explaining the process of radicalization both for individuals who reside in source countries (Middle East) and for those who reside in Western countries. To sum up, the purpose of this policy report is two-fold: (1) to elucidate the nature of the sociological process by which an individual adopts radical views, joins an extremist organization, and engage in violence; and (2) to extend policy recommendations towards the effective sociological measures that should be taken to undermine the process that might culminate in violent extremism.

2. The Process Of Radicalization Into Violent Extremism

The academic literature on radicalization and violent extremism has primarily concentrated on the question of why individuals adopt the beliefs that push them towards engaging in terrorist activities and violence. Although some early studies have considered the radicalization as a stable condition that is arising out of personal or mental abnormalities, much of the research has viewed it as a dynamic process. The nature of the process, however, has been poorly understood. Extant research has generally focused either on individual/psychological or ideological/religious aspects of the issue, and ignored the sociological process by which an individual adopts and

internalizes violent extremist views.




Figure 1: Pathway Model of Radicalization into Violent Extremism

Thus, the current study offers a comprehensive sociological pathway model that would account for both micro and macro-level explanations of and contextual variability in the process that would culminate in terrorist activity. Figure 1 represents our pathway model consisting of four interrelated phases, beginning with the experience of anomie and strain and resulting in either conforming or terrorist behaviour. Each phase is also impacted by a variety of factors. Within this pathway model, engagement with the terrorist activity is considered not as the outcome of a single decision but the consequence of a dialectical process that gradually propels an individual towards internalization of violence over time.

2.1 Phase 1: Experience of Anomie and Strain

“Theory can serve as an azimuth for exploring complex questions. There are many possible theoretical-analytic frameworks that might be



applied to the radicalization process.”^[7] Based on the propositions of Anomie and Strain Theories, our proposed pathway leading an individual to engage with violent extremism begins with the experience of anomie (at the macro-level) and strain (at the micro-level). Historical origins of Anomie and Strain Theories can be traced back to Durkheim’s seminal works, “Division of Labor in the Society” and “Suicide”.^{[8] [9]} According to Durkheim, there are two important factors connecting individuals to socially valued norms and preventing them from breaking these norms. These factors are social integration and social regulation. Social integration refers to individuals’ ties with the broader society, while social regulation is external constraints restraining individuals from deviating from social norms.

For Durkheim, when the levels of social integration and social regulation are too low or too high, societies face with important challenges. In his seminal book, “Suicide”, he explains this situation in detail. He states that there are four different types of suicide, a self-harming behaviour deviating from institutionalized norms. These are; (1) egoistic suicide, which occurs when individual’s integration with broader society is too low, (2) altruistic suicide, which occurs when individual’s integration with the society is too much; i.e. suicide bombers, (3) fatalistic suicide, which occurs when the level of social regulation is too high that causes individuals to lose their self-identity and meaning of life, and (4) anomic suicide, which occurs when the level of social regulation is too low. From this point of view, it could be understood that anomie refers to a consequence of low social regulation, or in other words lack of constraints keeping people from committing deviant conducts. Anomie, as a

French word, can be shortly translated into English as “normlessness”. According to Durkheim, when social norms lose their regulatory power over individuals’ actions, that society can be called as anomic and individuals can be expected to deviate from socially valued norms. He states that anomic situations can emerge at the times of rapid social, economic, and technological changes. At the time of economic depressions, for instance, individuals are expected to restrain their needs, limit their spending, and comply with the requirements of economic depression. Most individuals, however, cannot simultaneously adjust their situations to these new norms, thus they would be more likely to commit deviance or crime to reach their financial goals.

Durkheim’s approach could provide an important insight into understanding why an individual chooses to join a terrorist group and commits terrorist acts. A close examination of different cases of terrorism shows us that terrorist organizations have generally come to the existence immediately after rapid social changes and as a result of low social regulation, which is called anomie. Al Qaeda, for instance, was formed in 1988, during the last years of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lasted over nine years from December 1979 to February 1989, during which tens of thousands of people were killed, a lot more were jailed and fled the country. We can see the same process in the case of ISIS. The emergence of ISIS coincides with the bloody Syrian Civil War, which was an ongoing multi-sided armed conflict in Syria fought primarily between the government of President Bashar al-Assad, along with its allies, and various forces opposing the government. Both processes in

Afghanistan and Syria were accompanied by significant changes in social and economic conditions and by the disruption of social regulation. In other words, at the macro-level, one can conclude that the emergence of both terrorist groups was a consequence of anomie in source countries.

Durkheim's concept of anomie was firstly considered in the criminological area by the prominent criminologist Robert Merton. Merton stated that Durkheim's concept of anomie was a more macro-level concept, which was related to rapid changes taking place in the social structure at a specific period of time. He presented the concept of "strain" as an ongoing form of stress, as a useful tool to understand individual differences in deviance engagement.^[10] For Merton, for a long time, American ideology has exerted a substantial pressure to individuals and stimulated them to wealth accumulation, pecuniary success, and ambitiousness. However, social status and social stratification in the American system blocked the ways of achieving pecuniary success for some individuals. In other words, legitimate means to reach legitimate ends are not available for all people, especially for those in the lower-class status and having a different racial identity. This situation caused a strain (or commonly known as stress) on these individuals. According to Merton, individuals who are exposed to strain can develop five forms of modes of adaptation. These are; (1) conformity, by which an individual may choose to conform with both institutionalized goals and institutionalized means, (2) innovation, by which an individual may accept the legitimacy of institutionalized goals, but choose unconventional means (i.e. drug dealing) to

achieve these goals, (3) ritualism, by which an individual accepts the institutionalized means, but do not attempt to reach institutionalized goals; they remain poor, but proud, (4) retreatism, by which an individual may neither accept institutionalized goals nor means, they retreat from interaction with others (i.e. alcoholics); for Merton, these are "sociologically true aliens", and (5) rebellion, by which an individual may not accept the legitimacy of institutionalized goals and means, and attempt to change them (i.e. terrorists or marginal groups). Although Merton's theory provided an insight into understanding individual differences in deviant engagement, it has been criticized for being merely economically-oriented, and regarding the main cause of deviance as individuals' failure in reaching pecuniary goals.

For Agnew, strain as a consequence of one's failure in reaching pecuniary success can only partially account for his/her engagement in deviance.^[11] Thus, he stated that there are three main sources of strain including (1) goal blockage, (2) occurrence of negative or noxious stimuli, and (3) removal of positive stimuli. Goal blockage refers to one's failure in reaching economic, social, or cultural goals. The occurrence of negative stimuli refers to the emergence of the stressful event that is negatively affecting individuals' lives such as broken relationships with a romantic partner. Removal of positive stimuli refers to the loss of anything that affected individuals' lives positively such as the death of a parent. Removal of positive stimuli can sometimes be same with the occurrence of negative stimuli. In sum, Agnew states that these are three main sources of strain, which may lead individuals to engage in deviance. For Agnew,

however, the strain does not directly lead to deviance or crime. Rather, negative affective states or mental health problems such as depression, anxiety, anger, despair buffer the effects of strain on deviance. In other words, strain leads to negative affective states, and in turn they lead to deviant engagement. Agnew, on the other hand, states that there might be hundreds of types of strain, but not all of them lead to deviance. At this point, four dimensions of strain gain importance. These dimensions are; (1) duration, (2) magnitude, (3) recency, and (4) clustering. Strains that are ongoing or continuous, high in magnitude, more recent, and clustered in time are more likely to lead negative affective states and deviance.

Merton's and Agnew's propositions on the relationship between strain and deviance could provide an insight into explaining the causes of engagement with terrorism at the micro-level. Particularly Muslim individuals residing in European countries experience a significant amount of strain or stressful experiences. When we examine the European countries from where a lot of individuals joined the ISIS, for instance, we can clearly see that native people in these countries have a tendency to exhibit negative attitudes toward Muslim inhabitants and refugees. Since the cultural values in Europe are very different from those in Syria, refugees would have serious adaptation problems. This leads natives in European countries to adopt negative attitudes toward refugees. Religion is also an important component determining natives' attitudes. Because of the negative image of Islam among the vast majority of European natives due to inhuman activities of radical terrorists, refugees or Muslim inhabitants are generally

stigmatized as being poor, illiterate, and potential terrorists. According to Global Attitudes Survey conducted by Pew Research Centre in 2015, most people in European countries have negative attitudes toward refugees; the rates of people with negative attitudes are 29 percent in Germany, 46 percent in Spain, 52 percent in France, 69 percent for Italy, and 70 percent for Greece. These negative attitudes might turn into a physical violence and grassroots movements. As a destructive result of this stigmatization, refugees could gang up against natives or join an existing terrorist group. In 1975, for instance, Chilean refugees, who had fled to Argentina as a result of a military coup, took a number of hostages in Buenos Aires to protest the harassment they were exposed by native people.^[12]

Another source of strain Muslim people face in European countries is the problems resulted from dismal living conditions imposed upon refugees. Milton and colleagues noted that most refugee centres do not have sufficient amount of resources and health-care infrastructure.^[13] Given that refugees are the group of people whose physical and mental health suffers due to destructive war conditions, a new country that is incapable of improving their material well-being and health conditions would further exacerbate their negative emotionality. This might cause refugee population to turn to radicalism and engage in conflicts against host countries. In 1965, for example, Rwandan refugees who had fled Burundi due to the political turmoil assassinated the Burundi prime minister because of government's unsuccessful policies to take care of refugees. As could be recognized from this example, adverse or unsuccessful policies

implemented by governments could lead refugees to increased negative emotionality, radicalization, and ethnic conflicts.

In sum, in our model, the pathway to terrorist activity begins with an experience of anomie and strain. However, not all individuals who have been living in an anomic society or experienced a variety of sources of strain exhibit terrorist behaviour. Our model proposes that individuals who face anomie and strain might develop several coping strategies—either legitimate or illegitimate—depending on the availability of several factors. Thus, the second phase of the process of radicalization into violent extremism refers to the development of coping strategies against experienced anomie and strain or stressful experiences.

2.2 Phase 2: Coping Strategies

Thoits states “that “stress” or “stressor” refers to any environmental, social, or internal demand which requires the individual to readjust his/her usual behaviour patterns.^[14] As stressors accumulate, individuals’ abilities to cope or readjust can be overtaxed, depleting their physical or psychological resources, in turn increasing the probability that psychological disorder and deviant behaviours will follow.^{[15] [16]} The relationship between stress exposure and deviant behaviours, however, is not strong because individuals have extensive coping resources to help them handle stress.

Coping resources are social and personal characteristics upon which people may draw when dealing with stressors.^[17] Resources reflect a “latent dimension of coping because they define a potential for action, but not action

itself.”^[18] There are mainly three coping resources as; (1) social support, (2) sense of control or mastery over life, and (3) self-esteem. These coping resources are presumed to influence the choice and/or the efficacy of the coping strategies that people use in response to stressors. Coping strategies consist of behavioural and/or cognitive attempts to manage specific situational demands which are appraised as taxing or exceeding one’s ability to adapt. Coping efforts may be directed at the demands themselves (problem-focused strategies) or at the emotional reactions which often accompany those demands (emotion-focused strategies). Most investigators assume that people high in self-esteem or perceived control are more likely to use active, problem-focused coping responses; low esteem or perceived control should predict more passive or avoidant emotion-focused coping. A related concept is that of coping styles, which are habitual preferences for approaching problems; these are more general coping behaviours that the individual employs when facing stressors across a variety of situations (e.g. withdraw or approach, deny or confront, become active or remain passive).^[19] In general, problem-focused coping is more likely when situational demands are appraised as controllable; emotion-focused coping is more likely when demands seem uncontrollable. One could argue that people high in self-control or self-esteem should be more likely to appraise specific situations as controllable and thus to engage in problem-focused coping; those low in these personality resources should more often perceive problems as uncontrollable and thus engage in emotion-focused coping. In the cases of terrorist activities, it is generally supposed that individuals who engage in these activities are generally destitute

of coping resources and develop emotion-focused coping strategies.

Another factor that might influence the way a strained individual develop a coping strategy is social control. Social control theory proposes that “delinquent acts result when an individual’s bond to society is weak or broken.”^[20] There are four relevant dimensions of the social bond including; (1) attachment, (2) commitment, (3) involvement, and (4) belief. Attachment refers to emotional ties between an individual and other people and nonhuman objects in the society. Commitment refers to individual’s goals and expectations from the life. Involvement refers to individuals’ efforts to participate in noncriminal pursuits. And finally beliefs refer to individuals’ beliefs in cultural values in the society. Based on social control theory’s approach, we can conclude that individuals who lack attachment to conventional others, commitment to conventional goals of the society, involvement in conventional pursuits, and beliefs in values of the society are more likely to develop illegitimate coping strategies such as joining a radical group.

Although social control theory has been empirically supported by numerous researches, Hirschi believes that this theory is not capable of explaining stable individual differences in propensity to engage in crime and delinquency.^[21] Drawing on findings from relevant surveys, he states that there is a curvilinear relationship between crime and age. This suggests that, in any circumstances, criminal engagement reaches a peak level in adolescence and early adulthood, and then it sharply decreases. However, for some individuals, criminal engagement persists over the life course,

and does not decrease in adulthood. Thus, Hirschi concludes that this is due to the effects of low self-control. From this point of view, he also notes that self-control is acquired in childhood and individuals do not engage in criminal activity in next periods of their lives if they appropriately acquire self-control in their childhoods. He defines self-control as “the tendency to avoid acts whose long term costs exceed their momentary advantages.”^[22] Thus, self-control is another significant factor impacting the way an individual shape coping strategies against anomie and strain.

While an individual attempt to develop coping strategies against experienced anomie and strain, he or she may also be influenced by radical ideologies. They may find the opportunities of coping in the “collective ideology of one’s group that also identifies the grievance or loss of group significance in need of redressing.”^[23] If such ideology identifies violence and terrorism as the justifiable means to cope with anomie and strain, individuals may support and commit to terrorism and violence. Individuals may encounter these radical ideologies in a variety of ways. In some cases, they may encounter the terrorism-justifying ideology through some individuals in their informational ecology which may include mosques, family, friends, or co-workers. In a yet different instance, the individual may encounter the terrorism-justifying ideology through social media.

2.3 Phase 3: Legitimate Coping vs. Joining a Radical Group

As was stated in the previous section, individuals who face anomie and strain might develop several coping strategies—either legitimate or

illegitimate—depending on the availability of several factors such as availability of coping resources, self-control, social control, and encounter with radical ideologies. Studies indicate that most of the individuals develop legitimate coping strategies and choose to comply with conventional norms of the society. Some of them, however, develop illegitimate coping strategies including joining a radical group. In a radical group, individuals experience a socialization process by which they internalize the radical notions and get ready to accomplish tasks given by the group. This socialization is accompanied by a learning process, which is proposed by the Social Learning Theory.

Just as we learn reading and writing from our parents, friends or teachers, criminal behaviours are also learned by others in a similar process.^[24] Social Learning Theory, which is basically based on this idea, was firstly mentioned by Edwin H. Sutherland as Differential Association Theory.^[25] Sutherland, however, did not explain the learning process of criminal behaviour in detail. Subsequently, Akers expanded the theory by specifying the basic structure of learning process and renaming it as Social Learning Theory.^[26] According to Social Learning Theory, “the learning process consists primarily of instrumental learning that occurs either directly through rewards and punishments for behaviour, or vicariously by imitation or the observation of the behaviour, and the consequences that the behaviour has for others.” According to Akers and colleagues, there are mainly four phases through which criminal or deviant behaviours are learned.^[27] These are; (1) differential association, (2) imitation, (3) definition, and (4) differential reinforcement. Differential association refers to

the interactions with a group of criminal or noncriminal individuals, and it comes first in the ranking of social learning process. Considering the terrorism example, individuals firstly interact with a group of people who adopt radical views. Then they begin using verbalizations and justifications by imitating other people in the group. At this point, individuals define their behaviours by taking into account the rewards and punishments as potential consequences of their behaviours. If they believe that momentary rewards provided by the terrorist behaviour exceed its potential long-term disadvantages, after a while, their behaviours are differentially reinforced, and thus learned. Once the terrorist behaviour is learned and reinforced, it gets pretty difficult for an individual to return to conformity, although there is still a possibility to get de-radicalized.

2.4 Phase 4: Conformity vs. Terrorist Activity

The final stage of our proposed pathway of radicalization into violent extremism is conformity vs. terrorist activity. As was stated before, most of the individuals experiencing anomie and strain develop legitimate coping strategies and choose to comply with conventional norms of the society. Some of them, however, develop illegitimate coping strategies that may culminate in terrorist activity. The terrorist activity might include several acts varying from participating in passive duties to active participation in conflicts to even self-sacrifice. Once an individual engage in terrorist activity, it is nearly impossible for him or her to return to conformity.

3. Policy Recommendations

In the preceding section, we attempted to answer the question of why an individual comes to adopt

terrorism-justifying ideologies by offering a pathway or developmental model which reveals the sociological process. Now, we will turn to another critical question: “How can we prevent adoption and internalization of these ideologies?” In other words, we will offer effective policies to block the pathway through which an individual engages in terrorist activity. As was stated previously, once individuals joined a radical group, internalized radical viewpoints (phase 3), or engaged in terrorist activities (phase 4), it is pretty difficult to deradicalize them. Ideally, the goal of deradicalization is to push individuals towards changing their belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology and embracing a moderate worldview. This is difficult with extremists, because the requirements of the ideology are generally regarded as religious obligations. For this reason, we believe that a successful war on violent extremism should focus on the first and the second phases. From this point of view, we offer two general policies that should be implemented concurrently towards phase 1 and phase 2 of the pathway model.

3.1 Potential Policies towards Phase 1

Before explaining the potential policies that can be implemented to prevent anomie and strain, it is important to note the intercontextual variabilities in the engagement with terrorism-justifying behaviour. Terrorist organizations (i.e. ISIS) attract individuals to join the group from two sources; (1) countries wherein the terrorist organization come into the existence, which we call “source countries (i.e. Iraq and Syria)”, and (2) countries external to source countries, wherein the terrorist organization attempts to recruit new militants (i.e. European countries). While

individuals who join the terrorist organization in source countries generally experience “anomie”, the primary cause for those who join the terrorist organization from other countries is “strain”. Thus, we should focus on macro-level policies for those residing in source countries to suppress the anomic condition, and concentrate on micro-level policies for those residing in European countries to overcome the strain.

The concept of anomie encompasses social regulation and social integration. Thus, to prevent anomic conditions in source countries, we should focus on increasing social regulation and social integration. Social regulation is directly linked to the country’s political conditions. In order to promote the social regulation, it is essential for a nation to have a properly functioning state structure. The second aspect is social integration. Durkheim suggested that the problem of anomie could be overcome through social associations based on professions that would socialize with one another.^[28] He believed this would give people a sense of belonging, vital to preventing anomie. In his study, *Suicide*, Durkheim showed that Catholics committed suicide less often than Protestants because of the sense of community developed within Catholic churches. Thus he advocated the importance of communities within the larger society, through which people can share common values and standards of behaviour and success, and so avoid feelings of isolation and the development of anomie. To promote social integration in the society, M. Sharon Jeannotte’s model of social integration might also provide us with an important prospectus (see Figure 2).^[29]

As was explained earlier, strain is the major cause of joining a terrorist organization for individuals



living in European countries. There are three main sources of strain including (1) goal blockage, (2) occurrence of negative or noxious stimuli, and (3) removal of positive stimuli. There are two primary factors leading Muslim individuals to experience strain in European countries that block the ways they reach their goals, create negative stimuli, and suppress positive stimuli. The first factor is stigmatization. Because of the negative image of Islam among the vast majority of European natives due to inhuman activities of radical terrorists, refugees or Muslim inhabitants are generally stigmatized as being poor, illiterate, and potential terrorists. As relevant statistics indicated, native people in these countries have a tendency to exhibit negative attitudes toward Muslim inhabitants and refugees. As a destructive result of this stigmatization, refugees could gang up against natives or join an existing terrorist group. Thus, it is important to stop stigmatization activities towards Muslim inhabitants in order to prevent them from joining terrorist groups.

Another source of strain Muslim people face in European countries is the problems resulted from dismal living conditions imposed upon refugees. Given that refugees are the group of people whose physical and mental health suffers due to destructive war conditions, a new country that is incapable of improving their material wellbeing and health conditions would further exacerbate their negative emotionality. This might cause refugee population to turn to radicalism and engage in conflicts against host countries. This indicates that a successful effort towards preventing individuals from joining a terrorist group should focus on how to improve their material and health conditions.

Dimension	Level of Need	Formal Investment	Substantive Outcome
Human	Basic – primary education	Primary schools, incentives for female education	Increased literacy, higher female education rates
	Enhanced – secondary and postsecondary education	High schools, colleges and universities, advanced research institutes, scholarships for disadvantaged students	Increased number of high school and university graduates, increased innovation and productivity
Social	Basic – family connections	Family policies, adequate housing	Healthier children, fewer single mothers without support
	Enhanced – community connections, civic engagement, volunteering	Social capital investments (e.g. in clubs, professional organizations, sports teams, charities), community development initiatives	Higher volunteer rates, healthier civil society, more mobility across social groups
Cultural	Basic – recognition and respect for identity and culture, basic cultural infrastructure	Employment equity policies, anti-racism policies, language rights, libraries, community centres, broadcasting facilities	Diverse labourforce, linguistic diversity, access to information
	Enhanced – creativity, acceptance and celebration of cultural diversity	Multiculturalism and interculturalism policies, museums, galleries, theatres, recreation facilities, investment in artists and creative industries / districts	Diversity of cultural content supply, high level of intercultural exchange, high level of cultural participation (both active and passive), high number of “creatives” in population, vibrant community cultural life

Figure 2: Elements of Social Integration

Source: Jeannotte, 2008

3.2 Potential Policies towards Phase 2

An alternative policy we propose should focus on the second phase of the pathway model. In other words, we should implement policies that are promoting the legitimate coping strategies. To be able to accomplish this task, our efforts should be directed towards (1) promoting coping resources including self-esteem, mastery over the life, and social support, increasing self-control and social control, and (2) blocking the ways through which terrorist organizations attract individuals' interests. To promote coping resources, we should focus on social networks the individual has. To increase self-control, we should direct our attention to the education of children in a family environment. To increase social control, we should find ways of increasing individuals' attachment to conventional others, commitment to conventional goals of the society, involvement in conventional pursuits, and beliefs in values of the society. And finally, to block the ways through which terrorist organizations attract individuals' interests, we should concentrate on individuals' informational ecology (mosques, family, friends, co-workers) and social media. Recent studies show that social media is the primary ground

where individuals encounter the terrorism-justifying ideologies. For this reason, how individuals adopt radical ideologies through social media and the effective policy measures that could be taken against terrorist groups' use of social media is subsequently examined in a detailed section in the current policy report.

4. Social Media

Social media needs to be taken into account separately due to its force multiplier effect. That is neither a way of symmetric nor an asymmetric warfare, it is more like a way of hybrid warfare as it is a kind of game-changer. Thompson reveals the importance of the matter in a self-contained way by stating that "social media easily connects people very quickly with a wide audience, the synergy creates a movement en masse of like-minded persons. A leader is not needed. Ideas are exchanged and people choose to act on them—or not. Groupthink is a very powerful force."^[30] According to her, the formula is simple. She states that an egregious behaviour at the hands of a government authority against a presumably innocent person is captured as a video or photo, and the image is posted to a social media application and quickly spreads throughout the region via the Internet.

From social sciences or technological perspectives, there are several studies on this issue. This section does not focus on technological concerns; rather it looks for some social scientific solutions.

4.1 The Power of Social Media

First of all, it is necessary to comprehend the power of social media. As Thompson stated, the

purpose of social media is to connect with others and share information. The average person, who is not popular or a well-known individual to use social media, with a worthwhile message or cause can send it to a high-profile individual with a large social media following, and that individual may forward the message to his or her followers, immediately bringing the message or cause to the attention of millions of people throughout the world, who will, in turn, share the message/cause with their friends.

Social media distributes information to all users quickly and efficiently. "YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites now interact with one another; and posting a status update or message to one site automatically updates the other social networking sites. One person or group can instigate a domino effect of events, influencing the attitudes and behaviours of populations worldwide with one tweet or social media status update, which forwards the information to all the other major social media applications."

"Social media applications are a triple-edged sword that can create addictive information-seeking behaviours that break down social-norm behaviours of its users, encourage users to generate and report information that normally would have been kept private, and ultimately provide users with increased access to information that could be used to manipulate the user's perception of the world and the user's environment."^[31]

4.2 Why and How is Social Media Being Used by ISIS?

Terrorists use the Internet and social media as a tool for propaganda via websites, sharing information, psychological warfare, publicity, data mining, fundraising, communication, planning and recruitment.^[32]

“Isis is now increasingly fighting an online cyber war, with the use of slick videos, online messages of hate and even an app that all aim to radicalize and create a new generation of cyber jihadists. These modern day tools are helping Isis spread their propaganda and ideology to thousands of online sympathizers across the world. Indeed, the group has actively been using social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to recruit new would be members. This is being done through images and the streaming of violent online viral videos filmed and professionally edited that are targeting young and impressionable people.”

As Awan states, a number of videos depict ISIS as fighters with a ‘moral conscious’ and show them helping protect civilians. Some of these videos also show Isis members visiting injured fighters in hospitals and offering children sweets. Also, much of the Isis literature uses motivational powerful themes which aim to appeal to the youth and at the same time allow groups such as Isis to recruit and maintain its propaganda machine. Furthermore, Isis had released a free to download app which kept users updated with the latest news from the organization.^[33]

“According to Documenting the Virtual Caliphate, an October 2015 report by the Quilliam Foundation, the organization releases, on

average, 38 new items per day—20-minute videos, full-length documentaries, photo essays, audio clips, and pamphlets, in languages ranging from Russian to Bengali. The group’s closest peers are not just other terrorist organizations, then, but also the Western brands, marketing firms, and publishing outfits—from PepsiCo to BuzzFeed—who ply the Internet with memes and messages in the hopes of connecting with customers.”^[34]

As Awan stated, “the Internet, therefore, is becoming the virtual playground for extremist views to be reinforced and act as an echo chamber.” Thus, this sort of digital propaganda has motivated more than 30,000 people to turn their backs on everything they’ve ever known and journey thousands of miles into dangerous lands, where they’ve been told a paradise awaits.

On the other hand, as Koerner emphasized; more important, it decentralized its media operations, keeping its feeds flush with content made by autonomous production units from West Africa to the Caucasus—a geographical range that illustrates why it is no longer accurate to refer to the group merely as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), a moniker that undersells its current breadth. Each wilayat, or province, now runs its own media office, staffed by camera operators and editors who churn out localized content from Nigeria to Afghanistan.

4.3 Is it Possible to Prevent Social Media Efficiency of ISIS?

“If we’re serious about winning this media game, time is of the essence. To offset some losses in the Middle East, the Islamic State is now moving to strengthen its North African wilayats. The group is already on the verge of turning Libya into its

newest stronghold, which is why it's so important right now to dissuade young men and women around the globe from pledging their futures to the caliphate.”^[35]

What ways have been used to decrease the effect of social media efforts of ISIS? Regarding this crucial question, Talbot states: “Internet companies close accounts and delete gory videos; they share information with law enforcement. Government agencies tweet out counter-messages and fund general outreach efforts in Muslim communities. Various NGOs train religious and community leaders in how to rebut ISIS messaging, and they create websites with peaceful interpretations of the Quran.”^[36]

According to Koerner, most attempts to neutralize the Islamic State's media juggernaut have proven inept. He states; that is because the architects of our countermeasures fail to grasp what makes the organisation's content and distribution method so distinctive. We must admit, however grudgingly, that the Islamic State's propagandists are now as adept at social media as we are.

What's highly needed and also challenging is a huge effort to build peer-to-peer interaction online with the potential candidates for terrorist groups. Peer-to-peer work is pretty difficult, because you can't know whether the people you talk to online are the ones most at risk or are too far gone. This means, there is the risk of not obtaining the aim and a waste of effort.

So, a London think-tank called the Institute for Strategic Dialogue developed a peer-to-peer strategy against extremism. As an example for this strategy, the institute “recently piloted experiments in which it found people at risk of

radicalization on Facebook and tried to steer 160 of them away. It was a small test, but it shows what a comprehensive peer-to-peer strategy against extremism could look like.”^[37]

4.4 Policy Recommendations towards Social Media

“The Islamic State is an Internet phenomenon as much as a military one. Counteracting it will require better tactics on the battlefield of social media.”^[38]

As the legitimate forces of the world, you should not forget that you have a lot of possibilities and advantages that cannot be compared to its if the point is an illegal organization. In that case, you would not be convincing if you say that you are not able to cope. If the social media activity of Isis or another organization cannot be prevented, how to reduce its efficiency must be investigated. So, the governments and NGOs need to take initiative. In order to neutralize the media of a potential or an existing terrorist organization, there is a need for strong social media activity and it is necessary to maintain this activity with determination. On-line training always must go on. It is necessary to be proactive and the reactions never should be delayed. Whatever they are doing, they need to get a lot of response. For example, if they are campaigning, you should organize a counter-campaign which is stronger. You should make more effective counter-propaganda if they make propaganda. The information regarding what happened to the participants, how many young people had to flee, how many young lives have been lost, or how many young people have been disabled should be announced very well.

More specifically, one-on-one engagement is critical. Some efforts are at present, but those are quite inadequate in numbers. So, the attempts of peer-to-peer engagements are needed to be hugely increased in a more systematic and comprehensive manner. The category of each individual, who is discovered as a problematic person, must be determined. Afterwards, the efforts must focus entirely on the individuals who are potentially prone but have not fallen within the scope of phase 3 or phase 4 (explained previously) yet.

5. Conclusion

The preceding report examined the sociological process by which an individual adopts radical views, joins an extremist organization, and engages in violence. As it was explained before, to bring long-term solutions to the issue of violent extremism, one should take into account the developmental process pushing an individual toward terrorism. Although a notable effort, in this respect, was represented in extant research, the sociological aspect of the issue has generally been ignored, which indicates the importance of this policy report.

Utilizing the sociological literature, the current study presented a pathway model indicating how an individual comes to adopt radical beliefs and progresses from thinking to action. Our pathway model included four main phases: (1) Experience of Anomie and Strain, (2) Developing Coping

Strategies, (3) Choosing Legitimate or Illegitimate Coping, and (4) Engagement with Conformity or Terrorist Activity. Each phase is also impacted by a variety of factors. After presenting the pathway through which an individual engage in terrorism, we then offered effective policies to block the pathway.

Since the requirements of the radical ideology are generally regarded as religious obligations, it is very difficult to deradicalize people after they internalized the radical views. For this reason, our policy efforts have generally focused on the first and second phases of the pathway model. From this point of view, we offered two general policies that should be implemented concurrently towards phase 1 and phase 2 of the pathway model. More specifically, we demonstrated (1) how to prevent individuals' experiences of anomie and strain and (2) how to help them develop legitimate coping strategies against anomie and strain. Since the social media is the primary ground where individuals encounter the terrorism-justifying ideologies, we examined the issue in a separate part and offered particular policy recommendations toward prevention of harmful impacts of social media with regards to internalization of radical views.

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How can't ISIS re-emerge? Weak states and Post-ISIS challenges

1. Introduction

Considering the retreats of ISIS from Mosul and Rakka, the expectations for the collapse of ISIS is rising but the crucial questions remain that need to be addressed.

In this article, we focus on explaining how weak states offer convenient environments for terror groups, and presenting policy options on the measures the international community could take to hinder the remnants of ISIS to operate in these states and prevent ISIS from re-emerging.

This article aims to provide recommendations for policymakers to help them address the root causes for the original birth of ISIS in order to preclude its re-emergence after its collapse. Even if the US and the other members of the coalition forces have been able to force ISIS to withdraw from the territories that it had previously captured, its legitimacy and the cause have not necessarily been undermined. Having been defeated in their territories, terror groups may look for new locations to operate in better conditions conducive to the group's survival, especially when continuing to be present in the current location will lead to the organizational collapse. Considering the withdrawals of ISIS, it might look for new countries to relieve the pressure from the ongoing fighting, and might look for rebuilding its capacity to operate again. In this sense, we argue that weak states could be convenient places for ISIS for these purposes because the weak capacity of these states in maintaining law and order and managing border

security might appeal to terror groups to re-invigorate its fighting and mobilization capacity.

Focus on North Africa, Central Asia and Middle East

Specifically, we argue that weak states in North Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan countries, Middle Eastern countries, and weak Central Asian countries might be suitable place for ISIS to rebuild its capacity to re-emerge. North African countries are important to consider because these countries have played key role for ISIS recruitment, and unstable conditions in some countries after Arab Spring, such as in Tunisia and Libya, might offer convenient environment for the remnants of ISIS to recruit jihadists from these countries for its re-emergence. We also pay attention to the Central Asian countries which have not drawn sufficient attention from academicians and policymakers even though the perpetrators of some recent terror attacks in Europe, including the terror attacks in Stockholm and Sweden, originated from the Central Asian countries. Based on the fact that the corruption rate in some of these countries is high, such as in Kyrgyzstan, and also the presence of Caucasus Emirate that acts as a branch of ISIS in North Caucasus, ISIS might use these countries to recruit people and rebuild its material strength for its re-emergence. Finally, since most counterterrorism operations against ISIS mainly concentrate on Syria and Iraq, ISIS may move to other weak Middle Eastern countries, including Yemen, Bahrain and even Turkey, in which there is

considerably less military pressure on the terror group. Amongst those ones, Turkey is an interesting country which apparently fights ISIS on one hand, and on the other hand, the current Turkish government and president provided long-time sanctuary for ISIS agents and a useful corridor for the foreign fighters to transit to Syria and Iraq.

Organization of the Report

We have four additional chapters. In Chapter 1, we define the failed and weak states. We also explain the link between state failure and terrorism by drawing the insights from the scholarly literature. In Chapter 2, we revisit the existing suggestions provided by the previous studies to repair state failure, and give a discussion on the effectiveness of these suggestions. In Chapter 3, building on the existing literature, we provide our own recommendations for policymakers to keep the remnants of ISIS away from the weak states. We present four specific policy recommendations: providing foreign aid to weak states to strengthen their border control; developing and improving community policing; providing economic and political support to Islamic weak states for them to reform their religious education in a way that gain Muslims a flexible interpretation of Islam, which will eventually make Muslims much less prone to recruitment of radical terror groups. Finally, we also recommend the US and European policymakers to oversee where the aid money is being spent in weak states. More specifically, we suggest them to enforce the governments in weak states taking the aid money from the US and European states to spend it for counterterrorism purposes, and not for political causes. We provide

more detailed explanations for these four specific policy recommendations in the fourth chapter.

2. Failed States, Weak States and Terrorism

Weber (1919/1958) defines “state” as a human community that can claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within its sovereign border. This definition implies that states have varying degree of capacity in exercising their monopoly of the use of legitimate use of force. As the capacity of the state in projecting its authority erodes, declining state capacity might end up with a complete state failure over time. Figure 1 illustrates how declining degree of state capacity eventually leads to full state failure.

Based on this preliminary conceptualization of state and state capacity, in the next section, we will give an extensive discussion on different forms of states which varying degree of state capacity as well as on the reasons underlying the erosion of state capacity. We start with failed states.

Figure 1 The Process of Complete State Failure with Declining State Capacity



Failed States

In academic literature, many notions are used to name failed states. Rotberg (2003) describes failed states through shortcomings of the states. Nation states exist to deliver political goods – security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to

administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities – to their citizens. A failed state is no longer able or willing to perform the job of a nation state in the modern world. Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions. According to him, a failed state has following features: conflict, violence, civil unrest, communal discontent, dissent directed at the state, disharmony between communities, no control on borders, unable to establish security, growth of crime, flawed institutions, destroyed infrastructure, corruption, worsening GDP, economic chaos, lost legitimacy.

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In another article, Rotberg (2002) explains that failed states are unable to provide “political goods,” and describes a pattern of distinguishing features that failed states exhibit: government failure to maintain the essential wellbeing of their populations and/or governments that have begun to “prey upon their own citizens” through kleptocracy (a government or state in which those in power exploit national resources and steal; rule by a thief or thieves.); a sustained degradation of the infrastructure necessary for citizens to maintain a “normal” life, resulting in substantial humanitarian crises and/or migration; widespread lawlessness to the point that criminal groups act with impunity or rival the authority of

government actors; and a transference of some or many citizens’ loyalties to non-state actors in many parts of the country (Piazza, 2008).

On the other hand, Hehir (2007) defines failed state based on the principle of sovereignty. . . a government that has lost control of its territory or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force has earned the label [failed state].

The characteristics of failed states that are most commonly measured by scholars fall into four main categories. Those areas revolve around;

- a. a nation’s capacity or willingness to provide internal security for its population along with an effective form of border control,
- b. economic opportunity and prosperity,
- c. political stability found in a government free of corruption,
- d. a system of providing for the social welfare of its people by meeting basic human needs (Mechling, 2014).

Beyond this, there is an extreme version of failed state. Rotberg (2003) named this state in total failure as Collapsed State.

Relationship between States in Failure and Transnational Terrorism

After 9/11, international community began to see states in failure as places where terrorists were gathered, prepared and spread to the world. Officials, being aware of this fact, declared that international community could not continue to ignore the challenges posed by states in failure because their problems tended to spill across their borders, and a serious manifestation of this was increased transnational terrorist attacks (U.S.

National Security Council 2002). US national security documents explicitly describe states in failure as, "...safe havens for terrorists" (US National Security Council 2006).

In this respect, Rotberg (2002) hands over the responsibility to the wealthy big-power arbiters of world security. Making the world much safer by strengthening weak states against failure is dependent on the political will of those major countries. Otherwise it will continue to propel nation states toward failure and that failure will be costly in terms of humanitarian relief and post-conflict reconstruction. Ethnic cleansing episodes will recur, as will famines, and in the thin and hospitable soils of newly failed states, and thus terrorist groups will take root.

We have examined the political and intellectual approaches to the issues mentioned up to now. Are we sure that there is a real link between terrorism and states in failure?

Are we sure that there is a real link between terrorism and states in failure?

Some academics claim that the relationship is not clear. According to Hehir (2007), state failure by itself does not attract or breed terrorists and the attractiveness of a state as a locus for terrorists is contingent on a specific coincidence of variables. In his study, he compares the Failed State Index with not only the number of foreign terrorist organizations but also incidents and fatalities in the countries under the view of security of US nationals or the national security.

Piazza (2008) has researched the same topic and in contrast he has proved that there is a relationship between terrorism and states in

failure in his analysis. He argues that states plagued by chronic state failures are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks, to have their nationals commit transnational attacks, and are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists themselves.

Piazza bases this research on the tables he created with the data of the independent organizations. Firstly, he focuses on the incidents of transnational terrorism (MIPT database) by failed state index classification on a 1-year snapshot of data. It traces evidence of a significant relationship between state failure and transnational terrorism. Then he compiles the average aggregate state failure intensity indices [State Failure Task Force of the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland.] for 195 states for the period during 1991 to 2003 in order to review the situation over a longer period. He again finds out that the intensity of state failures is a significant, positive predictor of transnational terrorism. He also supports the hypotheses tested in his research with the results of the negative binomial models.

Piazza emphasizes that countries beset by significant state failures are more likely to be the source and target of transnational terrorism regardless of their regime type, size, age, level of economic development, degree of ethno-religious diversity, and whether or not they are experiencing an international war.

Today, it is certain that this relationship exists. Mechling (2014) specifies that states in failure lack the structural and institutional infrastructure to address issues within their own borders. In

addition to lacking the ability to look after the welfare of their own people, they do not possess the capability of providing internal security, which creates an environment conducive to harboring terrorist organizations. He gives the example of ISIS in this regard. ISIS has taken advantage of the security vacuum in Iraq created by US troop withdrawals, and political instability in Syria over the existence of Bashir al-Assad's regime, in order to advance their brutal objectives.

Convenience of Failed States for Terrorist Organizations

Some of the characteristics of these failed states, including providing the opportunity for further action and enabling impunity, are attracting terrorists. Piazza (2008) explains why these states are easier for terrorist movements to penetrate, recruit from, and operate within;

a. Those groups with ambitions to launch transnational attacks, in particular, need more extensive logistical and training and, therefore, need relatively more autonomous space with less costs of law enforcement.

b. These states offer terrorist groups a larger pool of potential recruits because they contain large numbers of insecure, disaffected, alienated, and disloyal citizens for whom political violence is an accepted avenue of behaviour.

c. They retain the "outward signs of sovereignty" (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, 100).

(1) The principle of state sovereignty places legal limits on intervention by other states,

(2) These states are sovereign and legally recognized states, and so their government

officials, who are often underpaid, poorly trained and monitored, and are therefore highly corruptible, they may help terrorists in exchange for money, political support or physical protection.

After this phase, it will be necessary to focus on which states offer the environment for the terrorists to operate easily. After Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was in search of a new country to settle in. Everybody expected that Al-Qaeda's most likely future destination would be Somalia, but that was not the case. According to Menkhaus (2003), the claim that Somalia hosted terrorist camps was repeated so often by government officials and media pundits that it became gospel, despite the absence of credible evidence that such a threat existed in Somalia. The environment assumed to be most attractive as a safe haven for al-Qaeda was, for some reason, not. Menkhaus presents the reasons, why areas of state collapse such as Somalia are not so attractive as safe havens, under four bullets:

a. In zones of complete state collapse, terrorist cells and bases are much more exposed to international counter-terrorist action.

b. Areas of state collapse tend to be inhospitable and dangerous, meaning few if any foreigners choose to reside there.

c. The lawlessness of areas of state collapse may reduce the risk of apprehension by a law enforcement agency, but it exponentially increases vulnerability to the most common crimes of chaos – kidnapping, extortion, blackmail, and assassination.

d. External actors(terrorists) find zones of endemic state collapse and armed conflict a notoriously difficult environment in which to maintain neutrality.

3. Weak States and Terrorism

As mentioned earlier, terrorist organizations cannot find the environment they need, in the states in total failure. For this reason, they prefer weak countries that can meet some basic needs, while providing protection against international counter-terrorism efforts at the same time. Stewart Patrick suggests a unique idea in that ***“truly failed states are less attractive to terrorists than merely weak ones.”*** He continues this point further by explaining that: while anarchical zones can provide certain niche benefits, they do not offer the full spectrum of services available in weak states. Instead, failed states tend to suffer from a number of security, logistical, geographic, and political drawbacks that make them inhospitable to transnational terrorists. (Mechling, 2014)

Truly failed states are less attractive to terrorists than merely weak ones

Hehir (2007) argues that modern international terrorist groups require access to functioning communication lines and thus states lacking infrastructural capacity are patently unattractive. Additionally, failed states, while generally characterized by a lack of effective central authority, are often host to heavily-armed warring factions and pose obvious risks even for international terrorists.

Menkhaus (2003) explains the reasons why weak state (quassi-state in his article) is repeatedly

preferred over the zone of complete state collapse as a base of operation, a lair for evading detection, and a setting for terrorist attacks:

a. Governments, however weak, enjoy and fiercely guard juridical sovereignty, forcing the US and key anti-terrorist coalition allies into awkward and not entirely satisfactory partnerships with those governments in pursuit of terrorists. Information-sharing in such a setting can quickly lead to leaks, failed missions, and the danger of compromising informants.

b. Weak states play host to a large foreign community – diplomats, aid workers, businesspeople, teachers, tourists, missionaries, and partners in mixed marriages, among others. That gives foreign terrorists a decisive advantage in their ability to move about and mix into the society without arousing immediate attention.

c. Weak states generally feature very corrupt security and law enforcement agencies, but not such high levels of criminality that a terrorist cell is especially vulnerable to lawless behaviour. Bribes to police, border guards, and airport officials allow terrorists to circumvent the law even while they enjoy a certain level of protection from it.

As understood from these studies, weak states are one of the main areas of preference for terrorists. This does not mean that terrorist activities in other countries are unlikely. Terrorists will always be active everywhere they find an opportunity.

4. Revisiting the Previous Suggestions for Repairing State Failure

Up to now there have been evaluations of states in failure and we tried to make inferences about how they could become a haven for transnational terrorism. In the direction of the data obtained, it was precisely determined that states in failure provided the conditions required for terrorist organizations. The international community will not feel safe and secure unless the factors that cause the relationship between states in failure and transnational terrorism are removed. For this reason, this chapter will focus on the actions that can be taken to neutralize this relationship.

As Mechling (2014) insisted in his study, by supporting nations-at-risk on the front end, we can avoid forcing ourselves into decade-long counter-insurgencies as a result of our failure to prevent transnational terrorist groups from establishing firm roots in their desired areas of operation from the start. That is the basic point. **International community should always be preemptive and must take the necessary measures.**

Nation-building comes to mind as the first way of getting rid of failed states. According to Crocker (2003), nation building evokes efforts at economic development, political “modernization,” and democratization. A wide range of organizations and governments already work to help failing states undertake such measures as power-sharing and wealth-sharing among units and regions, constitutional and electoral engineering to give voice to cultural and ethnic minorities, and community-based projects to foster inter-communal healing and religious reconciliation. Once target states are selected, the major powers

and institutions should focus their resources in four areas:

- a. defusing civil conflict,
- b. building state institutions,
- c. protecting the state from hostile external influences,
- d. managing regional spread.

In the meantime, some of the measures mentioned above are more effective. Basouchoudhary and Shughart (2007) find that it is economic freedom and secure property rights that reduce the number of terrorist attacks by source countries, rather than political rights (Azam and Thelen, 2008). They mostly focus on economic perspective but fighting with the ideology is missing in these studies.

From a local government point of view, they face another choice related to the method to deal with it; stick or carrot. Frey (2004) argues that the government is facing a tradeoff between using repressive counter-terrorism measures (“the stick”) and relying on more social spending for reducing the social support to the terrorists (“the carrot”). More militant groups might care less for social support, especially if they have external sponsors (Siqueira and Sandier 2006), thus pushing the government to choose more repressive methods.

Krasner and Pascual (2005) mention conflict prevention as the main issue in their article “Addressing State Failure”. However, there can be found some important clues for stabilization of failed/failing states inside. They insist on S/CRS (U.S. Department: the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) whose



mission is to anticipate, avert, and respond to conflict. They explain the tasks of the office as;

- a.** develop both the framework and the capability to plan for stabilization and reconstruction.
- b.** make sure that the government(s) is(are) ready to move rapidly to help countries in the aftermath of conflicts.
- c.** assess and fill gaps across government(international) agencies in contracts and more informal arrangements with organizations that specialize in various aspects of stabilization and reconstruction (need funding).
- d.** establish new management mechanisms that will foster interagency cooperation.
- e.** coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities between civilian agencies and the military.
- f.** cooperate more effectively with international partners.

This is the case for US. What about the international community? These efforts have to find grounds internationally. There are many organization in global arena that may have the responsibility or we can establish one.

The authors recommend four phases to manage post-conflict engagements effectively. They may also be implemented to failed/failing states:

- a.** Stabilization requires taking immediate action.
- b.** The conflict's root causes must be addressed.
- c.** Laws and institutions of a market democracy must be created in order to foster the "supply side" of governance.

- d.** Civil society must evolve, communities need to develop as constituencies that call for political attention for their needs.

States in failure have economic difficulties and they are in search for the aid of wealthy states. Azam and Thelen (2008) explains this situation with a story from the past. Many foreign rulers of the past have used various means for protecting their interests abroad by inducing local regimes to act on their behalf. The most illuminating example is probably given by the Republic of Venice, which built a trading empire in the Mediterranean world in the late Middle Ages, between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, while delegating to local rulers, and in particular the Byzantine Emperor, the task of protecting its traders by providing gifts and other incentives. The rich countries of the modern world have walked in their footsteps, on a much larger scale, coining the expression "foreign aid" as the name given to the underlying flow of gifts and presents.

At the end of their article, they suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education. In another article, Azam and Thelen (2012) added military intervention to foreign aid as the main counter-terrorism measure. Besides, according to the empirical results of Young and Findley (2011), foreign aid decreases terrorism especially when it is given to improve education, health, civil society and conflict prevention.

Systematic grouping of suggestions:

Efforts to ensure normalization of failed states should be coordinated by an international organization such as S/CRS, organized within the

framework of the nation-building, and acted upon immediately. As a result of the recommendations in the previous section, it is possible to classify efforts that should be applied to failed states as follows:

a. Political

- (1) political modernization, and democratization as an end state
- (2) power-sharing among regions
- (3) addressing to root causes
- (4) defusing civil conflict
- (5) protecting the state from hostile external influences
- (6) managing regional spread.

b. Economic

- (1) foreign aid
- (2) economic development assistance
- (3) economic freedom
- (4) secure property rights
- (5) wealth-sharing among units and regions

c. Social

- (1) supporting civil society
- (2) community-based projects implementation
- (3) social spending

d. Administrative

- (1) interagency cooperation institutions (such as S/CRS in international level)
- (2) building state institutions

e. Legal

- (1) constitutional and electoral engineering
- (2) creation of laws

f. Military

- (1) repressive counter-terrorism measures
- (2) military intervention

Debate on the Effectiveness of the Suggestions

At the beginning of the measures to be taken for the terrorists to settle in states in failure, it was emphasized that these efforts should be coordinated through an international organization. Crocker (2003) argues that the United States and other leading powers need to plan and coordinate their strategies for dealing with failed states more coherently, fund key programs more generously, and speak more openly and directly about how to strengthen states and why it matters to do so. He adds international institutions may take the responsibility to coordinate.

Despite the fact that there are many organizations to coordinate and cooperate around the world, the effectiveness of international organizations is limited due to the fact that not all of the member countries consent at the time of crisis. The role of UN at the beginning of Iraq and Syria crisis can be given as an example. Unfortunately, all countries have their own interests and it is not easy for them to be guided for a common purpose.

Despite the fact that there are many organizations to coordinate and cooperate around the world, the effectiveness of international organizations is limited due to the fact that not all of the member countries consent at the time of crisis.

Without an international interagency cooperation institution leading all such activities, it seems difficult for the efforts to progress and succeed in the desired direction. Who will plan and execute

the nation building efforts without such a structure? Do we really want to throw away our resources?


Until now, the nation building efforts applied to states in failure have not really achieved the desired result. There has been an improvement in their condition. But they have not turned into a real democracy. After a while, old harmful habits in these countries have relapsed and resistance to change has begun to be seen somehow. As long as the countries do not have a desire and effort from their own, it is only an illusion that states in failure reach the level of contemporary civilizations with an external intervention.

Just like this, major powers consider using military intervention to shape failed states. Following the interventions so far, we have witnessed how interventionists plan to rescue their troops from this swamp. In fact, a successful military intervention must rescue that state from its current state. But this has not been achieved until now. Azam and Thelen (2012) assert that military intervention in a country is only effective against the export of terrorist attacks when that country is located far enough from oil-exporting countries. When it is considered that the most problematic countries are close to oil-exporting countries or from another point of view, problems arise in the oil-producing regions; if this criterion is effective, we can reach the result that many military efforts will suffer in the field. And contrary to the expectations, a strong presence of foreign actors (like foreign troops) is counter-productive and they seem to be a strong attraction factor for terrorists.

One of the most important external intervention method is foreign aid. Azam and Thelen (2008)

found that aid can be pretty effective when it is used for education. The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed a major change in international relations, with the fight against terrorism becoming the dominant issue. At the same time, developed nations have massively stepped up their disbursement of foreign aid to poor countries, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Foreign Aid and Number of Terrorist Attacks, 1990-2007



Source: Azam, J. and Thelen V. (2012). *Where to Spend Foreign Aid to Counter Terrorism*, Toulouse School of Economics Working Paper Series 12-316.

Azam and Thelen used only secondary school enrollment rates as numerical data on education in their studies. In addition, a simple reading of the results, Bloom (2005), Reuter (2004) and Stern (2003) would suggest that such a wealth and education exert a positive influence on the decision to engage in terrorist attacks.

In contrary, aid to the Palestinian government increased in the last decade and there appears to have been a similar increase in terrorism related deaths against both Israelis and Palestinians, suggesting a reaction against the Western support (Stotsky 2008).

Young and Findley (2011) do not agree that foreign aid should only be used in the field of

education. According to their research, foreign aid can reduce terrorism if targeted towards the appropriate sectors like education (but not only this one), conflict prevention/resolution on terrorism, health, governance, and civil society. However, in the cases of budget assistance and agriculture aid, they couldn't find a significant relationship.

Although academics recommend to use it in different domains, it is not possible to check that the beneficiary states use foreign aid in the required areas due to problems in functioning of state institutions. Again, the use of the aid in a beneficial way is proportional to the efficient operation of the domestic system. If all the levels within the state are not operated as needed, it is inevitable that the aid will be wasted.

Until now, we have seen how the efforts for the failed states have been ineffective. Beyond that, we face a bigger problem. Academic reviews only deal with countries that have failed or are in a position close to being failed. Weak states with structural problems are out of sight. Crocker (2003) insists on this problem. A wide range of organizations and governments already work to help failing states, but weak states also need greater administrative and governing capabilities, if they are to behave as responsible, sovereign actors, including enhanced legal codes and court systems; upgraded local and regional administrative apparatuses; responsive and well-trained police forces; stronger bank oversight and public financial management; and closer ties between isolated financial, security, and intelligence personnel at home and abroad. We'll focus on useful policy recommendations in next chapter.

5. Developing Effective Strategies to Forestall the Re-emergence of ISIS in Failing States

Earlier chapters focused on international efforts in order to improve the situation in states in failure and protect them from being the target of transnational terrorism. In general, it can be seen that the efforts have a structure that can be effective in the long run, and that they cannot be implemented for a long-time due to rapid developments in the international conjuncture. In this chapter, we will focus on the possible courses of action for the terrorists and target countries by examining the EU and the US perspectives, the current practices will be reviewed and the measures that can be effective in the short term will be suggested.

Next Haven of ISIS?

It is still unclear whether or not ISIS militants will abandon Iraq and Syria after being defeated. It is also not known which countries they will go to if they decide to leave. However, some evaluations are made in this regard. In a recent one, Clarke (2017) reveals three possibilities:

- a.** The "hardcore fighters" will likely remain in Iraq and Syria and look to join whatever the next iteration of the devolving group may be.
- b.** A second group of fighters are the potential "free-agents or mercenaries," who will travel abroad to take part in the next jihadist theater, whether it be in Yemen, Libya, the Caucasus, West Africa, or Afghanistan.
- c.** Third group of foreign fighters may attempt to return to their countries of origin.

As seen above, two groups are expected to go to other countries. These terrorists will probably choose primarily their homeland or weak states in order to resume their activities from where they left off.

Many weak countries around EU can be evaluated in this context if we take into account the number of ISIS foreign fighters by country (Benmelech and Klor, 2016), the effectiveness and new tendencies of recruitment activities (Botobekov, 2016), and the risk levels of countries falling to failure. In light of the criteria given above, ISIS might find suitable environments in North Africa, especially Sub-Saharan countries, some countries in Central Asia, especially those having high corruption rates, such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and some weak states in Middle East, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and even Turkey which has an administration tolerating ISIS's activities and has a rapidly declining economy and military.

Policy Recommendation 1: Effective Border Management

According to the experiences obtained from Iraq and Syria, it is much more difficult to get rid of these terrorists once they have settled in a region. For this reason, **we should first focus on the measures to prevent terrorists from entering borders.** Border control measures need to be implemented effectively in countries where ISIS could come in sight. First of all, it is necessary for all countries to use their own security forces and resources appropriately in this direction.

Usually border control elements in the weak states do not fulfill their tasks effectively. Depending on whether these elements are civilian or military, effective control cannot be provided

due to lack of equipment and coordination, or human rights violations are caused by strict applications. The only way to solve this problem is to think about deploying gendarmerie elements on the border if they exist in the country. According to Lutterbeck (2013) gendarmerie-type forces, as opposed to civilian-style police, play a predominant role in border, due to their hybrid nature and the heavier equipment at their disposal. Moreover, the centralized and hierarchical structure of gendarmeries – a typical feature of military organization – may make them more suitable for operating over the vast and open spaces involved in border control. Of course, it is not enough to have only these forces. In order to use these and similar units in a harmonious way, standards of procedures, trained personnel and equipment are necessary. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is a good example of the institutions to promote, coordinate and develop border management.

Frontex was first established with the name “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” in 2004. While regular border control is the exclusive responsibility of the Member States, Frontex's role focuses on coordination of deployment of additional experts and technical equipment to those border areas which find themselves under significant pressure. Frontex also builds the capacity of the member states in various areas related to border control, including training and sharing of best practices.

During implementation, border guards and technical equipment are deployed to the operational area and carry out their duties

according to the operational plan. Guest officers have capacity to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border checks or border surveillance in accordance with Schengen Borders Code. Once completed, each operation is evaluated by Frontex, the participating countries and other stakeholders involved ensuring that the operational process is constantly refined (Frontex Official Site).

According to External Evaluation Report (2015), Frontex's operational activities were assessed to positively contribute to the improvement of integrated management of the external borders of the Member States (MS), by having a positive impact in reinforcing and streamlining cooperation between MS's border authorities and thereby improving the coordination and effectiveness of MSs border management activities. Report concludes that the Agency has been most effective in provision of assistance to Member States' training of national border guards. Activities of Frontex have contributed to improving the capacity of European border guards, to improving the access to relevant technical and human resources for operations at external borders, and to improving the knowledge and development of technical equipment for border surveillance and control. With these capabilities, it dictates that Frontex may train border guards from third countries properly.

Frontex also has the permission to cooperate with the third-party countries. Currently, it has 17 agreements with the third-party countries and two with the regional organizations whose membership is made up of third countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Canada, Cape Verde, Commonwealth of

Independent States, Georgia, Macedonia, MARRI, Moldova, Montenegro, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, USA. The agency is planning to sign working arrangements with eight other countries, according to the 'Single Programming Document 2016-19'. These countries are Brazil, Egypt, Kosovo, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia (Jones, 2017). Among these countries, some of them may be considered to be the places where ISIS militants can be settled in the future. However, these agreements are more superficial and might include limited issues. They do not have a holistic approach to border management. Unfortunately, without this kind of a holistic mission, the efforts may be wasted in weak states.

Figure 3: Overview of the current EU mission and operations



Source: Official Site of European External Action Service (EEAS)

At this point, we can have a look at the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Mission of EUBAM Libya which was initially launched in May 2013 as an integrated border management mission in Libya (EU-Libya Relations Factsheet, 2017). Frontex is contributing to the Mission with its expertise in border management. The Mission and Frontex jointly designed the law enforcement training curricula for Op Sophia's training of the

Libyan coastguard and navy. Frontex also provided a tailored monitoring (map) application for situation monitoring purposes. In addition, advising on the possibilities for cross-border cooperation (Libya-Niger) is being further explored in coordination with EUCAP SAHEL Niger, EUCAP SAHEL Mali and Frontex, where and when possible, including on exchange of information of migrant flows, smuggling networks and lessons learned (Strategic Review on EUBAM Libya, EUNAVFOR MED Op Sophia & EU Liaison and Planning Cell-15 May 2017). Even though Libya may be accepted as the second castle of ISIS, Frontex plays an active role here and its efforts are predicted to increase day by day. As such, it provides clues that it will properly carry out the activities for the improvement of border management in other countries.

CSDP missions/operations and Frontex can clearly be mutually reinforcing. But some of the researchers think that a CSDP mission is ideally part of a comprehensive approach in which also the 'root causes' of conflicts are addressed, while Frontex activities are geared towards managing the effects of conflicts. The involvement of Frontex in CSDP operations can endanger the EU's comprehensive approach in crisis management (Drent et al. 2013).

It is not possible to say their opinion is wrong. The use of Frontex outside the EU's external borders can cause problems in the existing system, but 'world is more flat' than it was in the past (Friedman, 2005). If we do not give importance to these weak states, if we do not help them, we will see the effect of the problems here on the mainland. With that in mind and in the direction of the topics discussed under border management

up to now, in order to augment and to add value to border control activities of the Weak States:

- a. Weak states shall deploy hybrid elements such as gendarmerie on the border if they exist in the country.
- b. Frontex experts should be deployed to the countries where ISIS is likely to be settled,
- c. These experts should review the existing system and advise agencies on border management, especially on such topics as intra and inter-agency cooperation, risk management methods, optimal use of existing equipment, restructuring of agencies to increase effectiveness and best practices.
- d. Border guards and other relevant staff shall be trained on the spot and some of them shall be sent to Europe to reach common training standards of EU.
- e. The experts should assist technical and operational cooperation with other countries.
- f. During all these activities, the necessary precautions should be taken in order not to cause problems in the EU borders, as Frontex experts are deployed abroad.

Policy Recommendation 2: Community Policing

Initially, it would be the primary goal to prevent transnational terrorists from crossing border and entering a country. If this cannot be achieved, what measures should be taken to prevent terrorists from becoming effective?

It should be based on a system that can be effective in the short run and can be implemented with existing tools. At this point, community-based counter-measures should be foreground. The results from Australia show that, in the

context of community-based approaches to counterterrorism, there are actions and approaches that police can adopt to improve relations with the concerned community and increase their cooperation in efforts to tackle terrorism (Cherney and Murphy 2016). According to Lambert and Parsons (2016), individuals in communities and neighborhoods where terrorist movements seek recruits and supporters are often more likely to help police identify and disrupt terrorist conspiracies if they are treated fairly. The particular advantages of this kind of community policing are that it provides local communities with a degree of collective influence over how they are policed and that, in acting to address locally defined problems, neighborhood officers are well placed to generate trust and collect community intelligence (Innes 2006). It would not be wrong to claim that community policing is effective against terrorism when mutual trust is established.

Several scholars have observed that community policing strategies developed in the ordinary crime control context can be transferred into the terrorism context. Although the scope and ambitions of ordinary community policing are hotly contested, one strand of that strategy focuses on police measures to encourage members of a pertinent community (defined in geographic terms) to share information with the police, and to participate in collaborative problem-solving exercises (Huq 2016). Community policing forms partnerships between law enforcement and communities and emphasizes proactive joint problem-solving so as to build trust and cooperation and address the conditions that mitigate public safety. Research studies of community policing in other situations

have shown that it usually improves citizens' satisfaction with and trust in the police (Weine et al. 2017).

Lambert and Parsons (2016) argue that the practitioners of community based counterterrorism policing are not just police officers but also civil servants operating at both national and local levels, teachers, and nongovernmental organizations. But Huq (2016) opposes that they are two different concepts. He also accepts that non-state actors embedded in geographically and religiously defined communities have a distinctive role to play in responding to growing terrorist recruitment efforts in Europe and North America but he is naming this type of efforts as community-led counterterrorism. The central way in which it differs from community policing against terrorism is the primacy of non-state actors over state actors. But he adds that the community-led variant presents delicate normative challenges and risks large potential costs.

It would be more appropriate to use the existing police elements in order to be able to quickly start implementing. As a result of their study of how the implementation should be done, Weine et al. (2017) identified **five community policing practices**:

a. Engage : Community outreach officers meet and establish one-on-one relationships with community leaders to open communication channels. They also build partnerships with community-based organizations, including faith-based and interfaith organizations.

b. Build Trust : Community outreach officers work to establish honest and open dialogue on sensitive

issues with community leaders and members, such as concerning terrorism, hate crimes, and discrimination. They acknowledge and promote mutual understanding of communities' historical traumas and their present needs and strengths. The officers aim to be as transparent as possible regarding crime fighting and police conduct.

c. Educate : Community outreach officers teach communities about crime (including hate crimes), police work, and community resources to combat criminal activity. This includes building knowledge and awareness in communities about violent extremism and how to prevent it.

d. Problem Solve : Community outreach officers help communities and individuals respond to their current problems. This includes helping communities respond appropriately to Islamophobia, discrimination, and hate speech and crimes. They also help community members access available resources to address social, legal, and mental and physical health concerns. They provide communities with knowledge and skills to assess the threat level of individuals and educate them on how to respond.

e. Mobilize : Community outreach officers promote the civic engagement of community members, including promoting women and youth advocacy on civic and public safety issues. They assist immigrants and refugees in promoting their integration and addressing their security concerns. They also provide community-based organizations with consultation, materials, information, and support regarding how their organization can contribute to building resilience to violent extremism.

Weine et al. (2017) insist that adopting a community policing model is a necessary approach to better protect and serve communities at risk for violent radicalization. As Ian Blair expresses his learning from extensive experience in regard to counterterrorism policing and Muslim communities: "I just think we have to be incredibly careful, we shouldn't be doing this to the community, we should be doing this with the community." (Lambert and Parsons, 2016).

If we want to prevent the terrorists from becoming active in the weak states, we should educate the police in these countries to use community policing methods. In this regard, it will be possible to establish and maintain true partnerships between police and communities, and the established trust environment will prevent the settlement of terrorists.

Policy Recommendation 3: De-radicalizing Religious Education in Muslim Weak States

One of the most important recommendation for the policymakers to prevent the re-emergence of ISIS in the future **is to invest in improving religious education in Islamic countries, especially those from which ISIS find recruits, such as Tunisia.**

One of the most important recommendation for the policymakers to prevent the re-emergence of ISIS in the future is to invest in improving religious education in Islamic countries, especially those from which ISIS find recruits, such as Tunisia.

Even though there is nothing inherent in any religion or culture that either encourages terrorism or prevents it from motivating violence (Ginsburg and Megahed 2003), the fact that ISIS or ISIS-type transnational terrorist groups can find

recruits from different Islamic countries indicates an unfortunate reality that there is a serious problem with the internalization of Islamic principles by Muslims. Furthermore, considering the fact that suicide terrorism is one of the major tactics used by terror groups advocating radical interpretations of Islam, like ISIS, but committing suicide is strictly forbidden in Islam, Muslims supporting or participating in such terrorist groups also have lack of basic knowledge about the rules in Islam. Not all Muslims can read Arabic scripture of Quran, and the majority of them do not know the meaning of the sentences in Quran. Therefore, they usually rely on the guidance of religious scholars ((Fair, Goldstein, and Hamza 2016; Wiktorowicz 2005). ISIS, Al-Qaeda or other radical groups exploit this knowledge and the internalization gap by appealing to small minority of Muslims and establishing moral authority over religious matters (Ciftci, O'Donnel and Tanner 2017). This small minority of Muslims favours the literal interpretation of religious texts, and they may find these radical terrorist group' literalist interpretation of Islam and their justification for using violence to implement sharia law persuasive (Ciftci, O'Donnel and Tanner 2017). The empirical results of Ciftci et al.'s (2017) study show that people favouring literalist interpretation of Islam are more supportive for militancy than those having flexible approach.

Our first recommendation regarding improving religious education, in this sense, is to help weak Islamic states to provide religious education to Muslims that integrate their reflective thinking skills and intercultural understanding. More specifically, these Islamic countries should offer a religious education to Muslims that can enable

them to have a contextual understanding of Islam and its contextual expressions.

Islamic countries should offer a religious education to Muslims that can enable them to have a contextual understanding of Islam and its contextual expressions.

Being informed by the contextual expressions of Islam will allow Muslims to develop flexible interpretation of religious texts, and undermine the literalist interpretation of Islam among Muslims. As Muslims in these countries have flexible approach in interpreting their religion, the chance of radical terrorist groups to find recruits from those Muslim societies will dramatically reduce since As Ciftci et al. (2017) suggest, these radical groups rely on literalist interpretations of religious texts. Such an approach in improving religious education in these countries might even be used to rehabilitate the fighters of ISIS when they returned to these weak Islamic countries after ISIS has been defeated. By taking such a religious education, Muslims living in these weak Islamic states might be better informed about Islam, and challenge the radical interpretations of their religion.^[4] In this way, the propaganda activities by the remnants of ISIS in these weak Islamic countries will fail because the justification for using violence against innocents will not find support among Muslims who expose such a religious education.

Our second recommendation for policymakers is that in helping weak Islamic countries to improve their religious education system, Western countries might want to allocate more resources to Muslims educators to teach proper understanding of some critical concepts in Islam.

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While the general lack of knowledge about Islam constitutes a serious problem that needs to be solved, we also argue that radical terrorist groups like ISIS might be more likely to exploit the misunderstanding about some particular concepts in Islam among Muslims, such as martyrdom, jihad and the use of violence. According to Al-Badayneh's (2011) study on 190 students from Mutah University in Jordan, martyrdom, violence, hatred and jihad are ideas that radical beliefs are mostly concentrated. Providing proper understanding of these concepts to Muslims in these weak states, in this sense, bears a crucial importance to hinder radical terrorist groups to capitalize on the confusion of some Muslims in order to recruit them. The financial resources might be concentrated to religious teachers/Muslim educators teaching these concepts to Muslims. Given that even these terms are debated among religious scholars, the training of religious teachers/Muslim educators might also be useful to teach the proper meanings of these important concepts. When Muslims distinguish martyrdom from committing suicide and learn that the killing of the innocent people and even animals are forbidden in doing jihad, they will be much less prone to the propaganda of radical terrorist groups, and these Muslims will be more likely to reject participating in these extremist groups.

Our final recommendation to improve religious education in the weak Islamic countries is to support reforming madrassah schools. Madrassah schools have a significant

place in religious education in some Islamic countries, and these schools have been discussed recently since they might be the centre of extremist interpretation of Islam, and facilitate terror groups to recruit people from these schools.

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The US pressured Pakistan to reform these schools but there was a resistance from madaris elites against reforming madaris institutions. We recommend the policymakers in Europe and the US to provide financial support to the weak Islamic countries to reform madrassah-type schools in order for these religious schools not to promote extremist thoughts but provide a religious education that holds a flexible approach in interpreting Islam. In addition, the policymakers should also give political support to the politicians who want to reform these schools in these weak states because the establishment in these schools may prevent such reform movements as we see in the Pakistani examples. Providing political support to these politicians may help them undermine these religious elites to clear the path to reform madrassah schools.

Policy Recommendation 4: Discouraging Recipient States from Using Foreign Aid for Different Purposes

As the studies investigating the nexus between foreign aid and terrorism have suggested, providing foreign aid to the states from which transnational terrorism originates might lead to favourable outcomes in counterterrorism under

some conditions, especially allocation of foreign aid to some specific sectors, such as education, civil society (Young and Findley 2011; Azam and Thelen 2012). In addition to this condition for the success of providing foreign aid in countering terrorism, another factor that might also affect the success of this strategy is to consider the recipient state's domestic and foreign policy priorities, and prevent the recipient states from using aid for the purposes other than counterterrorism. Boutton's (2014, 2016) quite recent studies suggest that the recipient country might use the aid for the purposes of fighting against its rival or regime consolidation, and therefore, these countries might not intentionally eliminate terrorists since doing so might endanger the future aid provisions. Some examples also confirm this argument. After 9/11, the United States has provided Pakistan over 10 billion dollars to combat Taliban and other terror groups in Pakistan (Boutton 2014) but since Pakistan's primary concern after its independence has been to achieve parity with its rival, India (Paul 2014), some observers argue that Pakistan has used the considerable portion of the US foreign military aid for its military buildup in case of a future conflict with India, rather than defeating terror groups (Rashid 2008; Haqqani 2005). As we see in the Pakistani example, it is possible to see a different form of aid diversion during President Nouri Al-Maliki's administration in Iraq. In the aftermath of the US withdrawal in 2011, Maliki administration used US counterterrorism funds to purge the dissidents, namely Sunnis, which eventually contributed to Sunni insurgency (Dodge 2012). Furthermore, such an aid diversion has led to the discrimination of Sunnis and contributed to the emergence of ISIS (Boutton 2016). This example from Iraq shows that providing foreign aid

without considering the dynamics of domestic politics has generated unexpected outcomes, which is an emergence of a new deadly terrorist group.

In this sense, while we propose that foreign aid from the US and the European countries should be provided to weak states in which the remnants of ISIS might operate in the post-ISIS environment, specifically to improve religious education to discourage radicalism, we also provide an important caveat, suggesting that donor countries must consider domestic and foreign policy priorities of the recipient states.

More specifically, donor countries should specify the conditions placed on aid packages, and show a clear signal that they will withdraw the aid and even sanction the recipients when the aid is used for the different purposes (Boutton 2014, 2016). In this sense, the US and European countries should consider the rivalry relations and the concerns for regime consolidation in African countries in which the remnants of ISIS might operate. Considering territorial disputes and ethnic conflicts in some African countries, the donor countries should be highly aware of these problems, and quickly punish the aid diversion behaviours. The limitation of making such a proposition is that the donor countries are not fully capable in monitoring the recipient states' efforts or aid diversion behaviours (Boutton 2016). In order to strengthen their monitoring capacity, they should improve relations with the recipient countries as many fields as possible. As their relations become closer, they will have more opportunities to monitor the extent to which the recipient country uses the aid money for counterterrorism purposes. Security cooperation, trade relations or



joint educational initiatives might be some ways of improving relations with the recipient countries.

Conclusion

We have not yet witnessed that a state has declared support to terrorism. Normally, it is clear that no country will want to establish partnerships with such brutal killers. But there is a reality that terrorists do not have difficulty finding territories for themselves.

States should adequately deliver political goods to their citizens. If they cannot do so, their existence does not seem possible to be continued. They become a weak state and then inevitably fail or collapse. During the period of weakness, they offer the most appropriate conditions for transnational terrorism even if they are not very willing. Majority of the states around Europe may be counted in this category.

The international community has made great efforts to transform these countries into nation states. But it's not as simple as it looks. Efforts cannot be claimed to be very effective: The establishment of an international interagency cooperation institution, nation building, military interventions, unmanageable foreign aids, etc. All of these tools were used to solve the problem, but it was not possible to fully recover the weak states through long-running applications. There is nothing else in the world that changes as fast as change. Today, it is impossible to catch up with the pace of events. Factors that lead to the

decisions taken in the context of the situational assessment can become much more different just even one day after.

Under these circumstances, it is necessary to reach solutions that can achieve fast results. We should strengthen the borders of these countries so that transnational terrorists do not get in. Frontex experts are thought to be able to make useful contributions to border management of these countries. We should educate the police in these countries to use community policing methods. Establishing true partnerships between police and communities will prevent the settlement of terrorists. We should also invest in improving religious education in Islamic countries to teach the community proper understanding of contextual expressions and critical concepts in Islam and to reform madrassah schools. Finally, foreign aid should be allocated to be used in certain areas. We have to set up systems that may detect if governments use them for different purposes.

We, as international community, can cooperate against transnational terrorism, by focusing on proactive solutions that will yield results in the short term. In this way, we may make the world a more peaceful place.

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- [1] The original idea for such an approach to improve religious education belongs to Abdullah Sahin, who is a reader in Islamic Education at University of Warwick, and he practiced this approach young British Muslims. See his article on the Guardian for more details. <https://www.theguardian.com/profile/abdullah-sahin>

Post-Daesh Challenges for Europe

Daesh is about to lose the whole territory it holds in Syria and Iraq once as big as the UK. The Salafi jihadist organization, ruling over 6 million population with an army of 30.000 in 2015, had benefited from regional sectarian and ethnic tensions and imposed its ideology to recruit and attract more than 40.000 foreign terrorist fighters from across the globe. The question that keeps busy most European capitals currently is "What awaits Europe after the implosion of Daesh?". The answer to this question will help show the next steps to neutralize its negative effects. Within the scope of this study, the trends shaping the flow of events have been studied to prescribe four future scenarios. Accordingly, the first scenario foresees that Daesh will revert gradually to terrorism from its proto-statehood. Second foresee that as long as it holds a social base, Daesh will survive and pose a real threat for Europe in the foreseeable future though in decreasing intensity. The third finds its transformation to a "Virtual Caliphate" a low probability. The fourth and last scenario finds the possibility of its replication in one of its eight provinces a small chance. At the end of each scenario policy recommendations have been made to reverse those trends.

1. Introduction

Daesh is about to lose its total territorial gains in Syria and Iraq. On December 9, 2017, Iraqi PM Abadi declared victory over Daesh after three years of struggle whereby Iraq had lost one-third of its terrain, to include strategical cities like Mosul and Tikrit.¹ In Syria on the other hand, Daesh is currently giving a vital struggle along eastern and western flanks of Euphrates river with its some remaining 3.000 fighters against coalitions headed by USA and Russia.²

Based on this advance, both international community and the countries affected by Daesh have been preparing to celebrate the disappearance of black dots symbolizing it from maps. Those on the field are well aware that this means just a transformation rather than extinction. Daesh or its decedents -whatever name or form they shall take- will continue to be operational both physically and as a potential to create further security challenges for Europe. As pertains to the primary audience of this study, the most crucial question of this study is: what exactly awaits Europe in the post-Daesh world?

This question is essential in that countering and defeating a threat requires first understanding its true nature and anticipating its next moves based on this insight. This study aims at serving to fulfill these two tasks: understanding and anticipating. The latter is in simplest terms the art of connecting the dots. In this regard, it is essential first to identify the trends that have been definitive in shaping the chain of past events to make projections about the future ones. As those trends do shape flow of events, they will equally create new dots along the line if not reversed or redirected.

Within the context of the study, I used NATO's multiple futures methodology. I envisaged four different futures to include most likely and most dangerous ones based on the trends so far. At the end of each future, I made policy recommendations, an attempt to change futures through stopping or reversing those trends. The methodology is didactic in that it establishes the causal link between the phenomena witnessed and offers opportunities to break that link or preempt repetition of past failures.



2. Understanding Daesh

Daesh is a Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization of which history goes back to “Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad” in 1999. It became AQI (Al-Qaeda in Iraq) in 2004 under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, where it joined insurgency against American-led forces during the invasion. At the beginning of 2006, the organization merged with other Sunni groups under the name Mujahideen Shura Council. Towards the end of the same year, it merged with six out of 31 Sunni tribes under the name Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). During the announcement of this self-proclaimed state, a masked fighter would say: “We swear by God to do our utmost to free our prisoners and to rid Sunnis from the oppression of the rejectionists (Shi’ite Muslims) and the crusader occupiers...”³ As would be understood from this declaration, the debaathification process which severely erased the Sunnite population from political landscape of Iraq and Maliki government’s discriminating and harsh treatments towards the polity caused popular support for ISI especially in Al-Anbar, Nineveh, Kirkuk, Salah-ad Din, and partly in Babil, Diyala, and Baghdad.⁴ In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, taking into account the void of credible powers in the theater and the deadlock over interference by major powers, overtly stated that ISI would extend its operations to Syria. He changed the name of the organization as ISIS or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham. Then on June 2014, Baghdadi declared his so-called “caliphate.” So Daesh and its predecessor first made a claim on statehood in 2006 and on caliphate or religious and political rule on all Muslims in 2014.

The latter claim has several inherent connotations. First with the declaration of caliphate Baghdadi positioned himself above all Muslims to include other Salafi-jihadist organizations like Al Qaeda. This assertion heralded coming fights among such groups for

supremacy. As there can be one only one caliph and as those not pledging allegiance would be accepted as apostates a series of mutual excommunications and fights for superiority ensued. Second, this proclamation positioned the so-called “caliphate” or “Islamic State” as the only place on earth where the “purest” Islam -as Daesh perceives- would be exercised. The Salafi ideology targets to create conditions and live the Islam in the form it existed during Prophet Muhammad’s time. Daesh skillfully used this image to lure more fighters to its ranks. Third, with this proclamation, Daesh unilaterally put itself in a position where it could speak in the name of Islam, define what Islam is and offer necessary interpretations.^{5,6}

Especially this last part has many problems. Lacking own cadre of scholars, Daesh in reality taps into Salafi-jihadist ideology and selectively borrows religious texts with no contextuality in ends justify means fashion. Basing its ideology or interpretations on narrow, selective reading of Quran and Prophet’s words, Daesh scholars dismiss the practice based on interpretation of Muslim scholars in the past 14 centuries. In their messianic understanding of state and religion, an Islamic state should be created to prepare the grounds for the expected “Mahdi” to bring order.⁷ To form that state and attain superiority over other Salafi-jihadist terror organizations, Daesh uses extreme violence both towards internal and external opposers and sanction systematic criminal acts if it will result in more recruitment and cohesion. One good example is the systematic abduction, sale and raping of Yazidi girls and women well documented by media.⁸ Yet this should not create an impression that it is only non-Muslims that got its share from Daesh violence. As Obama states, the vast majority of Daesh victims are the Muslims themselves.⁹

Daesh and the others of its ilk are worlds apart when it comes to their indigenous worldviews and

methods to attain political aims. Its claim on statehood and then caliphate, its securitization against other Salafi-jihadist organizations and struggle for supremacy indicate that Daesh prioritizes "near threat" over "far threat." Embedded well in Salafi-jihadist terminology, the far threat refers to the West in general and the US more specifically. According to their ideology, the West supports and keeps in power corrupt, authoritarian and repressive regimes in the Muslim world, which constitute the "near threat." This collaboration aims at preventing a borderless "dar-al Islam," a country in line with their ideal state model. For them to prevent such meddling, the West's will to interfere in Muslim World and dar-al Islam should be hurt by inflicting damages to their interests or where it hurts most. In the post 9/11 era, those networks became a staple in daily media coverage in West based on the violence they perpetrated with no visible discrimination of targets.¹⁰

This superfluous coverage of the jihadist terror had opposite effects in Western and Eastern Worlds. In the West, those were conflated -this continues till today to an extent- to the real reactions of Islamic World, an overestimation of such groups to the detriment of the latter. In reality, such networks are very marginal and do not represent Islam in neither numbers nor concept. Yet their deeds caused fear and perception of threat in the West towards Islam and Muslims. It further resulted in "polarisation" of the Muslims in Europe or a perception towards them as "the other". The result has been an identity crisis for many Muslims in Europe.

In the Muslim World too, the acts of Salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations proved to be counterproductive. As can be followed from its precedents in the examples of GIA in Algeria, their

operations diminished their support base and showed the voidness of their political objectives together with their teachings. Due to lack of political, social and territorial base, such organizations' nebulous agenda had no eminence or creativity to attract multitudes except for places like Iraq where the effects of post-invasion havoc dovetailed with sectarian persecution. Still, thanks to wide media coverage for their atrocities they were able to attain a level of recognition far beyond their reach.¹¹

Based on those lessons learned, Daesh followed a different strategy, giving priority to the near threat and healing all those deficiencies mentioned above. In its statehood initiative, Baghdadi's first move was to present himself as the defender of the Sunnite population oppressed by Shiite government in Iraq. This assertion provided a social base, territorial depth, political power and steady supply of fighters not sharing the same extremist ideology.⁴ This proto-state proved instrumental in building up the romantic image of an Islamic state answering for the needs of jihadi candidates from all walks of life from the region and the world. In the post-caliphate era, Daesh constantly posed itself as land for pious Muslims willing to live according to their beliefs in serenity, away from polarisation, oppression and tyranny of the infidels (!). In line with its slogan "Baqiyah wa-Tatamaddad" (settle and expand), Daesh claimed to be victorious all the time and that this war required all Muslims to be a part of such success story by moving to Daesh soil and make jihad. The land of Daesh was resplendent, and there were pure women for jihadis as wives who would readily help constitute the main tenets of this so-called Islamic state by supporting their men and raising their kids as new jihadis.¹² In the run-up to 2016, remarkable victories above all in

⁴ Most of those tribes would later turn against Baghdadi because of the extreme violence committed.

Mosul created great allure for Muslims and converts in Europe and across the globe. Its propaganda and what it offers was amplified through media effect showing new atrocities committed every coming day. Online propaganda was not solely enough to radicalize or find recruits. Especially the women joining Daesh from foreign lands engaged those back home to seduce them to make the trip, "hijrah" to Daeshland.

At its height in September 2014, Daesh was able to control a land of the same size as the UK with about 210.000 square kms.¹³ This corresponded to one-third of Syria and Iraq combined. Daesh also started to spread beyond borders to states in MENA region where the state was either repressive or was it weak. Those states included Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nigeria.¹⁴ The terrorist network was able to recruit more than 42 000 from more than 120 countries between 2011 and 2016. About 5.000 of those came from Europe.¹⁵ France alone had about 1910 FTFs corresponding about 40% of the total from EU and ranked 5th among those states who had most FTFs reaching Syria and Iraq. Departures peaked in 2015 and stemmed in 2016 constantly decreasing in the period in-between. According to estimates, so far 30 % of the FTFs returned to their homes in Europe mostly comprised of women and children. The remaining have either been killed in the conflict, hide in somewhere trying to decide where to go or escaped to third countries.¹⁶

3. Multiple Futures

a. Will Daesh Perish?

Daesh is the latest mutant in the evolutionary line of Salafi-jihadism. The reasons that gave rise to its existence were put concisely by the former US President Obama saying: "ISIL is a direct outgrowth of Al-Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our invasion, which is an example of unintended

consequences."¹⁷ In the wake of invasion in 2003, the destruction of whole statecraft and disbanding of the security forces left Iraq bereft of the experienced / skilled human capital to build a nation of unity. The inability of US to justify the invasion and its effects in the restructuring of the new state privileging Shiites as final arbiters in the fate of the state provided ammunition to the jihadi narratives. Also, the unchecked oppression of the Sunnite population during al-Maliki's ten-year rule between 2006-2016 and his close cooperation with the Iranian government created an estrangement of the Sunnites in the country. Under these unique conditions, Daesh made collaboration with former Baathist officers and Sunnite tribes in its fight against the West and its collaborators(!), the Shiite dominated central government. Daesh used those unique conditions to create its proto-state in Iraq. When conditions ripened in the civil war in Syria, Daesh took its chances for expansion into Syria.

As of today, Daesh's self-proclaimed caliphate is on the brink of extinction. Daesh has never had a social base in Syria. So, this loss of land means losing almost total footprint in Syria. For Iraq on the other hand, Daesh's extreme violence can be said to have estranged the once supporter tribes in Iraq. However, it is not possible to mention a total loss of social base. Because the disillusionment in the institution of politics, the politicians and Abadi rule is not gone. Sectarian hostility, corruption and lack of transparency are diminishing the security for Iraqi people and endangering national unity. In the haste to defeat Daesh, Iraqi government welcomed unorthodox methods to include employment of Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) which was formed from predominantly Shia components. PMFs are not under total control of the Iraqi state. Still, the state will be held accountable for the atrocities PMFs committed against Sunnites during the

insurgency. There are many reports documenting killing, torturing, kidnapping and extorting civilians by PMF.¹⁸

What's more, on September 25, 2017, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) made a referendum with 72 % turnout. By 92% the voters opted for secession. To complicate the issue, by holding the referendum in contested territories like Kirkuk, Barzani attempted to legitimise Kurdish hold on such multi-ethnic entities. To attain demographic dominance, Peshmerga forces had forcefully displaced natives and destroyed their homes in those contested territories after their reclaim from Daesh.¹⁹ This also eroded the trust of the Sunnites towards the state.

Based on all those reasons above, Daesh is expected to continue to exist as a terrorist organization in Iraq after losing its proto-state. However, it will aspire to transform into an insurgent group by holding territory, and imposing order.²⁰ To attain this goal, it will benefit from ethnic and sectarian competition in the weak presence of state. It will try to play the role of the state by first providing security then services. This will result in gradual gains regarding popular support. Within the same context, Daesh will try to carve itself a role especially in the probable conflicts where various sectarian groups will try to attain control over disputed and liberated areas. It will be instrumental in the reconstruction of war-torn cities to win hearts. This is most likely in future. In addition, the brutality of Daesh has alienated its potential supporters, the Sunnite tribes. Daesh may try to change name and appearance to appeal to the same audience, putting difference between its current and former self to regain the trust of the local Sunnite tribes.

Policy Recommendations (a)

Joel Migdal defines the ideal state as "an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way."²¹ It is clear that Central Iraqi government is far from this definition. It does not have total control over the use of force. To win the war against Daesh, it has cracked the door open to the contrary implementations like PMFs. Also by accepting Iranian help, it has become more prone to its effects which especially hurts its image.

It is regrettable that despite having made some progress over the reconstruction of security forces, Haider al-Abadi has not been able to make much progress in Iraq. He has found himself in many cases within the intra-Shiite rivalry. Polls about the parliamentary elections to be held on April 2018 shows that Haider al-Abadi will be elected for a second term. Mr.al-Abadi should be supported by EU and Member states against the negative influence of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and pro-Iranian former PM Nouri al-Maliki by clear support in definition and implementation of the reforms required to reinforce and develop the institutional structure of the statecraft. To create a mechanism for such, a special relation should be created between Iraq and EU.

It should be noted that no insurgent or separatist organization can exist in an area for a long time if it has no social base. They do feed on ethnic, religious and sectarian competition or weak state institutions to survive. Mr. Abadi should focus on attaining a new social contract among the different ethnicities in the country to promote peace. In this regard, inclusive policies should be

put in place, and the Sunnites should have more say in the governance. He should pay particular attention to fight against corruption and attain national cohesion and confidence. He should heed more the institutionalisation of the state and its full functioning.

EU has great experience and mechanisms to help Iraq make headway in this direction. The lately formed "The European Union Advisory Mission", which came about 2,5 years after Defence Capacity Building (DCB) package to Iraq by NATO, is a late step in the right direction. The work of this newly formed mission should be tailored to Iraqi needs and the remedies it recommends should be holistic and tied to carrots. Piecemeal solutions or small attempts do not yield result. The functional systems/structures within the state should be rehabilitated based on EU or Member State experience. Success in reformation should be rewarded.

The problems Iraq face do not emanate solely from within its borders. Iraq should be supported in its reformative actions by also bringing other regional actors to the table, especially Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. All those countries have been important actors in the struggle against Daesh and has potential to affect or contribute to the security conditions in Iraq. Clear carrots and sticks should be defined for positive or negative actions.

The same countries mentioned above and Iraqi Security Forces have gathered great intelligence on Daesh and the actors on the ground. Daesh keeps neat record in areas under its control. EU intelligence and Situation Centre (IntCen) should seek ways to share intelligence of mutual interest with Iraq and try to gain as much as possible to help prevent terrorism within its own borders.

b. Will Daesh remain as a security challenge for Europe in the next decade?

European leaders have been apprehensive about the returnee foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) especially since 2015. It is a known fact that Daesh has been sending FTFs with European origins to their homelands to conduct suicide bombings or to set up cells to recruit new adherent. As such, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Belgian Daesh ringleader was sent to his home country Belgium to organize and carry out the deadliest suicide attack in France to result in the death of about 300 innocent civilians.²² At least six of the perpetrators of Paris attacks were FTFs that had entered Europe in late summer of 2015. In the case of Brussels bombings which included the bombing of Brussels airport and a metro station on 22 March 2016, three of the perpetrators were FTFs in the same manner. As Daesh started to get military setbacks on the field starting from the beginning of 2017, this apprehension took a different turn in two ways. First, a new wave of Daesh attacks were feared to take place in Europe. Because, as it was the case formerly, Daesh media campaign was based upon attacks in Europe in case of military setbacks to distract attention. Second, it was feared that after those losses, escapee or disillusioned jihadis would return Europe after it became clear that the caliphate's days were numbered. For both reasons FTFs posed a risk and thus caused great unrest.

According to Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), so far about 30 percent of the FTFs have returned to Europe. RAN experts claim that there will not be so many fighters coming directly from the so-called caliphate. Instead of a "mass exodus" women and children will return to their old neighborhoods.²³

Among many, some of the reasons for this low return rate can be cited as:

- a. Deaths of FTFs on the battlefield
- b. Will to fight until the last moment
- c. Being stuck in Syria, Iraq and Turkey and/or indecision where to go in the meantime.
- d. Self-transportation to other Daesh provinces (wilayats) or third countries.

Peter Neumann, a well-known expert on radicalization and director for International Centre for the Study for Radicalization, says: "I've been saying for a long time that there won't be a 'flood' of returnees, rather a steady trickle, and that's what we are seeing. Many of them are stuck in the Turkish border areas, where they are contemplating their next move."²⁴ Amidst this mood of optimism, a news by BBC showed that about 3.500 Daesh fighters to include their families were allowed to safely evacuate Raqqa after a deal was struck with Kurdish forces. Initially unwilling to speak about the issue, the coalition spokesperson admitted the deal. According to this substantiated news, Daesh militants were given a pass to freedom from Raqqa to pass to first Idlib and then spill over to different lands through different routes.²⁵

So the question is, what should one make out of the low return rate of FTFs? Is it good or bad news? Can Europe be content if a battle-hardened European citizen who has fought within the ranks of Daesh passes from Syria or Iraq to Egypt? Or should Europe still accept the same person as a threat based on his potential to transport himself to Europe and further commit terrorist acts? The general tendency among European policymakers has so far been observed as the former. They underestimate the potential of threats that did not revert to Europe directly.

FTF is only one side of the multifaceted problem. A former British intelligence officer and an important counter-terrorism expert, Richard

Barrett on the other hand tries to draw the attention of the audience to another point. In the latest report he wrote: "At least initially, those who have traveled to Syria are less likely to see themselves as domestic terrorists than those IS sympathizers who have stayed at home. They generally appear to have had a stronger desire to join something new rather than destroy something old. As a result, returnees have, so far, proved a more manageable problem than initially anticipated."²⁶ It is arguable that those already radicalized but never made the journey to the "caliphate" pose a more significant threat to Europe.

Another important dimension to be taken into account is the causes pushing them to radicalize and become an FTF in the first place. A deep insight into this may open up windows to sound recommendations. To be motivated by such ideology and make the journey to war-torn countries there should be some strong push and pull factors. In a recent publication by RAN, they have been listed as such:

There are many reasons why recruits are attracted to this destructive ideology and motivated to join. For some it offers excitement and status, looting opportunities, wages, housing, and the option to keep women as slaves; for others, it is an opportunity to offer humanitarian support. For some, it offers an escape from their ordinary, depressing and problem-filled lives. Others seek belonging, a sense of purpose and a higher calling. It can offer excitement and action, or strict rules on how to live within a clear moral framework. Some are recruited from within their families and friendship circles. Using grooming techniques, Daesh recruiters identify individual psychological weaknesses and skillfully exploit these through online and offline techniques.²⁷

Fawaz Gerges asserts that Daesh "appeals to

disaffected and disadvantaged Sunni youths around the world, who are often dealing with issues concerning their identities.”²⁸ Afua Hirsch, a freelance journalist, writing in the Guardian, finds the root cause of extremism as "alienation." She further continues saying:

*They (young Muslims in Britain) are British; they were born here, and don't know life anywhere else. But they are sharply aware that mainstream society has not quite grasped this. If you are not white in the UK, people constantly ask you where you are from. With a father who was born here and a mother who moved here when she was 11, I have tried a variety of answers to this question: "south London" rarely suffices. People want an explanation; perhaps an arrival date, a stamp in the passport.*²⁹

Then she quotes one interviewee, Kash Choudhary who says: "Minority British people have developed their own labelling, "Black British" or "British Muslim", for instance, or in some cases, simply opting for the non-white country in their heritage to explain their identity – I've frequently ended up describing myself as "Ghanaian", despite having visited the country for the first time when I was 15."³⁰

Here comes the main question. Among so many feeling themselves deprived and unfairly treated why some remain on the ground whereas some others join the ranks of terrorist organizations. Using an analogy of climbing a narrowing staircase, Moghaddam opines:

"These individuals believe they have no effective voice in society, are encouraged by leaders to displace aggression onto out-groups, and become socialized to see terrorist organizations as legitimate and out-group members as evil. The current policy of focusing on individuals already at the top of the staircase brings only short-term

gains. The best long-term policy against terrorism is prevention, which is made possible by nourishing contextualized democracy on the ground floor.

All in all, it is arguable that Daesh has successfully mobilized those alienated, disadvantaged and polarised youth with a promise of a land that they would rebuild identity or enjoy what they lacked. The validity of the promise had a deadline until the military successes stalled and Daesh started to lose territory. Then the numbers of the FTFs to join its ranks stalled in a parallel way. The statistics of FTFs by dates they joined Daesh reflects a peak in 2015, after Mosul, and a low point 2016.³¹

Despite its claim of "caliphate" for a period, Daesh is a transnational terrorist organization with Salafi-jihadist ideology. The developments following its total loss of terrain will be definitive in shaping its future policies and strategies. Based on its modus operandi so far it can be fathomed that to sustain the link between itself and its adherents, Daesh will try to compensate its losses on the ground by attacks in Europe and interpretative narratives justifying those losses. To accomplish that it will have to depend on its sleeping cells in those countries, returnee jihadis or will it have to order some of its remaining militants to pass to Europe by illegal ways. Daesh will evaluate all those elements to keep the momentum of recruitment alive. This recruitment does not mean a travel to Iraq or Syria. But to gain adherents ready to execute its orders. For that reason, it will continue to radicalize the European Muslims and converts through its members in Europe and online propaganda to be able to use them for such attacks and spread its ideology. Some of those aforementioned possibilities should be looked carefully into.

Policy Recommendations (b)

The geography populated by Muslim countries has been witness to interference by global and regional power competition for hegemony and access to natural resources. In the era between two world wars England and France, in post-WWII era, US and USSR have been active in shaping the political, social and economical landscape. In the post-Cold War era the problems have not ceased to exist. The last US invasion of Iraq and the selective response of the West in the face of Arab Spring have produced great distaste and sentiment of injustice among Muslims. However, this does not mean that Muslim World agrees and finds the use of terror by transnational jihadi networks legitimate. On the contrary, they do feel angry because those terrorists are simply conflated with "Muslims" or "Sunnite Muslims" more precisely. They do also feel the frustration of not being able to explain this to the average man walking on the streets of Western capitals and them being polarised / behaved as alien or the other in the society they live in.

Europe and the member states should heal this identity and polarization problem of their Muslim citizens. There is need to differentiate between a terrorist organization and a religion. This distinction should be made at all levels from politicians to the general public and this should be meant rather than said. For that more effort should be invested to understand Islam and the frustrations lived by Muslims within Europe.

There has not been a sole profile for those joining Daesh. However, low educational and socio-economical conditions of Muslims has been two important factors in joining Daesh. Both common sense and studies tell us better education result in better jobs and better sociological status. Europe should pay special attention to "education" to integrate their Muslim citizens and heal prejudice towards them. Better educated EU citizens will

add more value and rightly guide posterities on the threat of radicalization.

A considerable number of Muslims living within EU borders have internalized the values represented by EU like democracy, freedom of thought and speech and tolerance while retaining their religious and cultural codes. Those are examples showing that it is possible to integrate into a Western society without losing identity. Those should be empowered against radicals. Moderate voices have an important role to play in this struggle.

Daesh has been able to destroy the lives of many EU citizens enticing them with false promises. It has not only destroyed the unity in Syria and Iraq, it has also harmed the social tissue of the Muslims by opening door to radical interpretations or implementations of Islam. As Obama says, it is the Muslims that are the most affected from this problem. Therefore, it is moderate Muslims' best interest or duty to stand against this ideology. There must be a Muslim opposition or unrest against Daesh. Much repeated "developing counter-narratives" is not a correct way forward. It denotes a passivism. Muslims should move proactively to defeat Daesh and the others of its ilk by better educating their children against its detriments. They should also educate the societies they live within by explaining what Islam is with their words and behaviours. One recent much publicized youtube video reflects the need for such. In the video, a person reads a verse from a bible with cover indicating the book is Quran. The listener thinks it is Quran that orders violence and the interviewer makes comments on Quran. Once he/she learns that those verses are in fact from Bible, the embarrassment is visual.³² Reverting to Moghaddam's analogy, being a Muslim or Christian alone does not push a person to the last level in the ladder. This should be well understood.

On the institutional side, European Intelligence services should cooperate to share information gathered on the ground on the fighters. As the targeted networks operate in a transnational manner, no state can tackle the problem based on solely national resources. The solution requires better governance in cooperative security approach. One such initiative was presented by Gen. Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of US in June. Accordingly, a military programme called Operation Gallant Phoenix started to transfer data acquired on the field in Syria and Iraq to law enforcement units in Europe. In the same vein, UNSCR 2396 of 21.12.2017 was unanimously adopted to “to strengthen their efforts to stem the threat through measures on border control, criminal justice, information-sharing and counter-extremism.”³³ Such information sharing and cooperation should be institutionalized which will both stem flow of returnees and discourage further recruitments.

c. Daesh will not evolve into “Virtual Caliphate”

The sophisticated and skilled use of cyberspace by Daesh is a fact. From its launch of cyber jihad in 2014 till the beginning of 2017, Daesh has shared instant textual, audio, visual and audiovisual propaganda over Website 2.0 environment with unprecedented quality. This becomes even clearer when compared with others of its kind. However, since the beginning of 2017, alongside its territorial losses and decline in manpower, Daesh cyber activities has shown a constant decline in quantity, quality, and a dramatic shift in themes.³⁴ The findings of a report recently published by Policy Exchange indicates Daesh online content production is decentralized and dissemination is made through an interconnected network with the name ‘Swarmcast,’ a resilient and agile system that enables presence at all times despite efforts to reduce it.³⁵

Parallel to its decline in battlefield its clout on cyber space is shrinking too. Charlie Winter, a researcher at International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation made a longitudinal comparison between two universes of Daesh broadcast in mid-2015 and January 2017. Although the rate of change between consequential months may be meaningless statistically, his study revealed a 50 % decline between the two studied periods. Winter also found a significant decline in the number of the highest quality products, quality video clips. To be more precise, the total number of products Daesh produced fell from 892 to 463 whereas the number of quality video clips fell from 54 to 9. While consistent with the general composition of the media items, Daesh replaced the most effective of its media tool, high-quality videos with crude, short video clips. One last element of the study is the narrative. Accordingly, the initial emphasis put on utopia has been shifted towards warfare after military setbacks.³⁶

One illustrative example of such rhetorics change can be seen in the speech made by Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, notorious chief spokesman of Daesh killed by Coalition, on 21 May 2016. In the statement, Adnani tries to mask failures on the ground by developing a narrative accommodating such loss. Below is an excerpt from his speech:

Or do you think, O America, that victory is by killing one leader or another? Indeed, it would then be a falsified victory. Were you victorious when you killed Abu Mus’ab, Abu Hamzah, Abu ‘Umar, or Usamah? [...] Or do you, O America, consider defeat to be the loss of a city or the loss of land? Were we defeated when we lost the cities in Iraq and were in the desert without any city or land? And would we be defeated and you be victorious if you were to take Mosul or Sirte or Raqqa or even take all the cities and we were to return to our initial condition? Certainly not! True

*defeat is the loss of willpower and desire to fight. America will be victorious and the mujahidin will be defeated in only one situation. We would be defeated and you victorious only if you were able to remove the Quran from the Muslims' hearts.*³⁷

There is now a widely shared idea, an idea of a "Virtual Caliphate" circulating among media, academia and security professional circles. Based on its initial strength of using cyber platforms and due to its loss of territory and thus the caliphate, the holders of this idea believe in a phoenix which will rise from its ashes on battlefield. This new "Daesh 2.0 Virtual" will spread harm from cyber space after its total loss of territory. From this platform it will command its already radicalized citizens irrespective of borders, radicalize and recruit new militants and continue to order/coordinate attacks against the West at its own home.³⁸ One especially important figure advocating the same idea/prophecy is the commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Joseph Votel. With the article he co-authored he prescriptively claims:

Following even a decisive defeat in Iraq and Syria, ISIL will likely retreat to a virtual safe haven – a "virtual caliphate" – from which it will continue to coordinate and inspire external attacks as well as build a support base until the group has the capability to reclaim physical territory. [...] ISIL's virtual caliphate offers them citizenship free from terrestrial constraints, which can be accessed from anywhere in the world. Disaffected Muslims seeking community and purpose can find these in ISIL's caliphate. ISIL's alluring and dynamic caliphate narrative is steeped in religion and history and promises the restoration of dignity and might. Members need not commit violent acts or immigrate to a distant land to join the caliphate; they need only to favour the idea of an Islamic state governed by sharia and click "like" to express their support and membership in the virtual

caliphate. Moreover, the ubiquity of technology in daily life and the insatiable need to be online at all times make it easy, even natural, for virtual caliphate members to operate and exist comfortably in the cyber domain.

His words have great importance because he is the commander on the field who directs the operations against Daesh. In this regard his every word requires extra scrutiny, and that is what I will do.

Daesh has proved its skill in bypassing the strict regulations and account bannings of mainstream social media platforms and has been able to communicate with its members using encrypted tools. It also can change rhetorics to compensate for a loss or color its brutal acts with religious motives. Based on those two strengths General Votel's premise may seem justified.

However, several important points diminish the value of his claims. First, the leaders of Daesh and its operatives on the ground struggle for their lives. Many of its media operatives have been killed, and related assets have been destroyed. It is not conceivable that they will decide to change platform to regain old vigor with so many losses.

Second is a dilemma related to relationship between a product and its source. ISIL used the propaganda based on a success story on the ground with ample opportunities to film/document its artifacts. As it spread its message promising abundant opportunities to those disenchanted, seeking identity or adventure, there was a promise of land to live or a life promised. The failure of Daesh on the ground created such a great hole in its narratives that it has the potential to alienate those adhering to the organization because of its promise.

A third reason is an overestimation of Daesh's online activities. Prof.Scott Atran, co-founder of

the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict at Oxford University has interviewed captured fighters of Daesh, Nusra, and Al-Qaeda. On 23 April 2015, he addressed the UN Security Council to relate insight on Daesh saying:

*About 3 out of every 4 people who join Al Qaeda or ISIS do so through friends, most of the rest through family or fellow travelers in search of a meaningful path in life. It is rare, though, that parents are ever aware that their children desire to join the movement: in diaspora homes. Muslim parents are reluctant to talk about the failings of foreign policy and ISIS, whereas their children often want desperately to understand.*³⁹

In the same vein, Prof. Rik Coolsaet also confirms the necessity for a social context for radicalization. He says: "One does not simply become a terrorist by watching social media messages or heroic videos. However important they may be as a means of feeling oneself part of a (virtual) community of like-minded people, in most cases cyberspace bonds need a physical extension in order for an individual to match their actions to their words."⁴⁰

Last, there is a wide variety of literature aiming at capturing true nature of radicalization. The generally accepted four elements to produce radicalism are grievances, ideologies, networks and support structures. In radicalization, each of those factors has relative weights based on the person or context. So, demonstration of online radicalization as the mother of all evils is a problematic approach.

It is challenging to fathom how the events will evolve from this point at time. To speak about a future "virtual caliphate" would be a big prophecy if it happens. Because this will also depend on factors that there is very limited knowledge about. Those include above all the will of the

Daesh leaders. There is no open source information clearly showing this is their intended next move. Second, it will depend on the resilience of the remaining Daesh militants about adhering to its ideals despite so many setbacks

and their capacity in numbers and skills. All those information is unknown to us.

Based on all those reasons, it is arguable that Daesh will still be relevant in the next decade. In these days, its operatives responsible for cyber activities and its avid followers will try to give a favourable interpretation of the losses on the ground. They will bless the struggle as a sacrifice and will try to keep the adherents bound to the organization. To keep this narrative alive and to pretend greatness, Daesh will inspire and stage attacks in the West. Yet, the more Daesh turn into a terrorist organization and become local, the more it will lose its allure as what it can promise will decline. Equally, its shadow in the cyber world will also die down gradually. If not for exterior support, building a virtual caliphate seems "not feasible" for Daesh with its current resources.

Policy Recommendations (c)

A simple communication effort requires the sender put his message across to the receiver through a channel and get feedback. So the elements required for communication are the sender, receiver, message, channel, and feedback. It has been emphasized that Daesh utilizes the cyber space [channel] aptly to transmit its message and adapts following the feedback back-transmitted from the same channel. In the struggle against Daesh all the elements of communication should be targeted. Following are recommendations that have not been voiced so far.

Daesh's ideology and its assertions about what Islam says and what an Islamic answer would be

to current problems find audience and are accepted as true among a marginal group. This ideology should be countered and its deviance from mainstream Islam -advocated by scholars for 14 centuries- should be shown. From the very beginning, there are Muslim scholars that have voiced their objection to the deeds of Daesh and their such interpretations of Islam.⁴¹ In fact, about 70,000 Muslim clerics from across the world came together in November 2015 for the annual meeting of South Asian Sunni Muslims to pass a fatwa against global terrorist organizations to include Daesh and other Salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations. The message they wanted to convey was that they did not consider groups like the Islamic State to be true Islamic organizations and their members as Muslims.⁴² However, it is not possible to mention a coordinated action to turn into a social movent. EU and Member states should help those to organize and make their voices heard especially by those within its borders.

It is widely accepted that prevention is the cheapest and simplest solution to any problem, terrorism included. If it is feared that Daesh will seduce those on the brink of radicalisation through online programmes, why cannot EU or member states cannot fund projects that offer more enticing, technologically more advance and morally more epic programmes, games and applications.

Especially religion/moral lessons in the secondary schools offer a good occasion to teach Muslim kids the true nature of their religion. A module that will teach Muslims students their religion and a small module to all students on all religions has the potential to build resilience among Muslim kids and partly prevent prejudice among those from other confessions. The content of the class can be relayed to the students through an iPad / tablet application which will heed all

requirements of today's youth. This has several strong points. First, those machines are all the rage. Second, they do appeal to all types of learners: visual, auditory, and kinesthetic.

Last recommendation is about the channel. Daesh uses cyberspace for all sorts of reasons, from propaganda and indoctrination to logistics and coordination. A sizable success has been attained in prevention of Daesh message propagation in social media platforms like twitter, facebook or youtube, However Telegram⁴³, SureSpot⁴⁴ and some other end-to-end encrypted telecommunication applications still provide safe and easy-to-access platforms for Daesh members. The CEO of Telegram Pavel Durov refused to take serious precautions to put the application off-limits to Daesh use on the grounds that it is a refuge for privacy. This argument is right in its own value. Yet a balance should be found between the privacy and protection of lives. This balance should be articulated to the tech companies to take required measures not to provide safe haven for jihadi content and its propagation.

d. Will Daesh replicate itself in one of its Provinces ?

In November 2014, Daesh announced to have added new five provinces to its so-called caliphate. The targeted impression to be given was that Daeash was succesfully extending beyond its and that its claim for control over Muslim world was well progressing. However, those claims have not been justified so far.

While Daesh is expected to lose currently its territory in Levant, fears are articulated regarding its relocation into one of its eight provinces. Until 2017, Daesh was able to transfer financial assets and its militants to its affiliates around the globe. But it has been extremely difficult to transfer finances any more. The organization rather

economizes on its savings and tries to pay its fighters. Its financial resources have dried up. It raises funds by increasing taxes. The question is will Daesh transfer its core which is currently busy surviving? To make sound surmises, a deep insight is necessary into the sui generis peculiarities of those provinces, all under pressure now. They are namely: Sinai, Yemen, Libya, Hejaz, Algeria, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Nigeria and the Caucasus region.⁴⁵

Daesh is a long rival of Saudi Arabia in its claim of ownership of wahhabism. It perceives the governing Saud family as corrupt and apostate and wants to replace them by its own adherents. As such it wants to have presence in peninsula. Despite such ambition, so far ISIL has remained after Al-Qaeda in Arabic Peninsula (AQAP) in the threat it posed. Aside from several attacks against Shiite population in Saudi Arabia, Daesh has existed more in the eastern province of Mahrah in Yemen. It has so far been able to relocate its militants in the core to this province relatively easily due to proximity and has the ability to make attacks throughout the peninsula at its will.⁴⁶

In Egypt, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis had sworn loyalty to Daesh at the end of 2014. A terrorist organisation executing operations in whole Egypt, it raised its profile through this while Daesh took credit from its operations. The group has not been able to control territory. But it has so far targeted security forces and targeted Coptic community to stir up a sectarian divide.⁴⁷

Yet the greatest prize among all provinces, Libya was seen as a candidate to replicate the abilities of the core. Daesh establishment in Libya was destroyed first in Darnah towards end of 2015 and then in Sirte in December 2016. As a result of the latter loss, its militants were dispersed throughout the country trying to form dormant cells in especially southern and western parts of

the country, as well as in the coastal cities of Benghazi, Sirte, Zawiyah and Sabratah. Libya is important in that it connects several other countries: Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria. Especially Tunisia is heavily affected by Daesh setbacks in Libya. Despite a core in Tunisia, many militants from Libya have commuted between the two countries especially in Kasserine and Ben Gardane regions.⁴⁸ The diminishing revenue from the core and the obvious absence of myth of success put the loyalty of the provinces in jeopardy. This is especially true for Khorasan/ Afghanistan and Boko Haram. Algeria province, on the other hand, remains a myth, no trace on the ground except for several attacks on Algerian army.⁴⁹

So, different provinces have come together under Daesh rule with different motivations. For Daesh keeping the myth of “settle and expand” and to compensate for the losses in the Levant, it is vital to keep those provinces at hand. But, this will not be easy. As the revenues from core came nearly to nothing, some provinces need extra motivations to stay under its flag. Especially those provinces that rebranded themselves have great potential to revert to their old names, usually local focus and original modus operandi when they deem there is nothing to get more from the core. Provinces like Libya on the other hand, which was created under the direct influence of the core will rest loyal to the Daesh.⁵⁰

Policy Recommendations (d)

To exhaust Daesh, it is important to counter the network in all of its provinces. Especially the situation in Libya is of critical importance. Libya has the potential to offer a second launch point after the Levant. This should not be allowed and constant pressure should be applied to Daesh elements in Libya. If Daesh is allowed to take hold, it will pose great threat to Europe and it will try to spread to whole North Africa, replicating its

actions in Iraq and Syria. As such this future is the most dangerous among the others.

A second important dynamic is the vacuum of power. There is a reverse correlation between strong state and Daesh presence. The greater power vacuum the greater chance for terrorist organizations to grip hold on the field. In this regard, security establishments of those countries hosting Daesh provinces should be supported in capacity and training.

The main problem on the field is that too many European States under NATO hat offer various military courses and outmoded equipment. This creates more problems than solutions because they create mismatch and confusion. Instead, those states should focus more on lasting solutions through educating officers in meaningful numbers and helping in the structuring of the security establishment in a holistic approach.

4. Conclusion

How will the post-Daesh landscape look is a question hard to be answered based on the multiple unknowns in the equation. The ability to give credible answers to this question as an outsider requires a deep understanding of Daesh and a vigilant following of the events with this wisdom. By merging those two, credible but not certain answers can be offered which is what this study aims to do.

The fight against ISIL and the precautions to be taken against its negative effects are generally precautions taken against the symptoms rather than root causes. The root cause for the rise of Daesh is the havoc in the wake of US invasion of Iraq, demolition of its state, disbanding its armed forces and inability to re-establish the state. Daesh and its predecessors in Iraq have used sectarian and ethnic competition to rise and find adherents. The more it has replaced the state in providing security and services the more it has

found a wider social base. So the number of the killed militants and number or the reclaimed territories does not mean much. Drain the swamp and there will be no more mosquitoes. The state of Iraq should be helped to accelerate in the process of state building by owning the monopoly on the use of violence, by renewing the social contract with its citizens and attaining a social harmony. Any terrorist organization with no social base cannot maintain its life for long.

Daesh has shown superiority in using cyberspace and manipulating religious tenets to promise a false heaven and recruit new members. EU and Member States should invest more to do better than what Daesh makes to eclipse its harmful effect. The solutions found should be adapted/localized according to the contexts and inclinations of the targeted groups like the use of tablet applications and social media.

So far Daesh has shown unprecedented success in recruiting militants among disaffected Muslims in Europe. It has benefitted from their grievances and identity problems. Europe has no other option than healing this problem through breaking vicious cycle of low education – low income – low socioeconomical status. It should invest on education and empowerment of the Muslim population. It should convince Muslims that they are equal members of their societies and have equal access to education and jobs.

The worst among all other scenarios would be Daesh's take hold in Libya. In many EU policy documents security in EU has been reflected as dependent on security neighbouring and surrounding regions. This is true. Europe should support Libya to keep it stable to preempt Daesh replicate itself .

Onur SULTAN*

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